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***THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE***  
***OCTOBER 20, 1991***

***A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT***

***PREPARED BY THE OAKLAND FIRE DEPARTMENT***

The information in this document was researched and prepared for the **Oakland Fire Department** by Robin Silberman, Technical Writer.

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## **The Report Abstract**

The Oakland Tunnel Fire will go down in history as one of the worst urban conflagrations since the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906. What separates this fire from the one of the past is environment. Whereas the San Francisco fire of 1906 was truly an urban fire, the Oakland Tunnel Fire of October 20, 1991 was not. Nestled in the Oakland hills amongst a forested habitat, thousands of residents were caught in a natural disaster exacerbated by climatic conditions of hot dry winds, dead and dried vegetation, and the incident of fire.

What we are calling The Oakland Tunnel Fire represents a magnitude and scope of fire which goes far beyond the experience of any living Firefighter. The Oakland Tunnel Fire called into question all of the resources known to a firefighting organization, and we acknowledge that help and assistance from throughout the State of California to evacuate thousands of residents on a Sunday afternoon, and limit the risk of fatality. We acknowledge the importance of human resources to control an element which begs indifference to human intervention. We acknowledge the courage and conviction of the thousands of people— professional Firefighter as well as civilian — who helped quell the onslaught.

In addition to acknowledging those who put their lives in the balance to control and contain the fire, we need to put into perspective the information coming out of this fire. The issues of time, location, and personnel lend an organizing effect to how to reasonably account for and understand the complexities of the fire.

We need to learn about those elements which created the situation of The Oakland Tunnel Fire. We need to understand why time is so important in putting the factual information together into a coherent and cohesive report.

There were many factors to consider when putting this report together: What do people already know about the fire, and what do people need to know about the fire?

We have focused our attention on the fire personnel, and those who fought the fire with them: Where did they go? And what did they do.

Tracking an engine company through the turmoil of the fire, was difficult, especially without reliable communication. Trying to ascertain peoples' whereabouts, what they were doing, and whom they were with becomes even more tenuous when the situation is no longer with us.

The goal of this report is to put factual information into a perspective from which we can learn.

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### 1. Overview of the Report

Documenting a major tragedy that imparts changes in thousands of lives becomes an overwhelming task. The questions "what will be forgotten" or "what hasn't been mentioned" are recurring dilemmas. The ongoing concern in writing a report about an event in which 1,800 fire personnel were involved is that all of the information concerning the Oakland Tunnel Fire will never be learned.

Controversy becomes a major part of documenting a tragedy of this magnitude. Was everything done which could have been done to alleviate the situation, and is this discussed in the report?

This report documents an unprecedented situation. We need to gain some knowledge for understanding how that situation affected our lives, and how we can protect ourselves for the future.



**Defining the Sections of this Report**

Because of the complexity of the Oakland Tunnel Fire, segments of information need to be categorized. The following descriptions of each section of this report will help familiarize readers with the kind of information which is documented in this report, and where certain information will be found.

**1. Overview of the Report**

This is the section which will describe all of the sections in this report. You are reading it now.

**2. Overview of the Fire**

This section delineates all of the major important factual information about the fire. This section includes information about the following:

- *The Origin of the Fire*
- *The Terrain*
- *The Nature of the Fire*
- *The Weather*
- *The Fire Spread*
- *Fire Precautions*
- *Calling for Mutual Aid*
- *Communications*
- *Tunnel Command*
- *Fire Statistics*
- *Engine Companies Responding to the Fire*

### **3. *Chronology of Time***

This section of the report documents the events and actions which took place during the Oakland Tunnel Fire, and those fire personnel and engine companies who were responsible for those actions. Information in this section comes from a broad range of data: The Oakland Fire Department Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) tapes and transcripts, interviews with fire personnel on-duty during the fire, Oakland Fire Department engine company reports, the California Department of Forestry (CDF) Report of the Oakland Tunnel Fire, and additionally from the East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP) report, reports from the surrounding areas including the San Francisco Fire Department, and other sources of information which excludes media reports.

This information is organized by "hour", and references all the information which occurred during that particular period of time. This is the information in a situation which becomes questioned; this is the section which can help alleviate those questions.

### **4. *Chronology of Place***

This section of the report organizes information according to where fire personnel actions took place. Because of the vast land area involved in the Oakland Tunnel Fire, locations for planning and managing the fire had to be labelled. In managing the fire, fire personnel divided the area into "Divisions" and "Branches". This report includes descriptions of those Divisions and Branches, but also delineates the areas by the neighborhoods effected by the fire – those areas which are known to the citizens of the Oakland Hills. Those areas include:

- *The original burn area, and area encompassing Buckingham Blvd., Marlborough Terrace, and Grizzly Peak*
- *Grizzly Peak and Grizzly Peak Terrace, and Bay Forest*
- *Parkwood Apartments*
- *Hiller Highlands*
- *Claremont Canyon – Amito, Alvarado, Besito, and Gravatt*
- *Claremont Hotel and the surrounding areas*
- *Vicente, Bridge, Alvarado, Grand View, and Tunnel Road*
- *Roble Road /Chabot Road*
- *Rockridge, Golden Gate, Contra Costa Road, Buena Vista Avenue, Acacia, Beechwood, Margarido, Country Club*

- *Lower Broadway Terrace – Agnes, Proctor, Hermosa, Florence, and Alta*
- *Upper Broadway Terrace – Swainland/Forest Park, Glenwood Glade, Pineneedle, Capricorn, Farallon, Mountain Blvd.*

**5. Chronology of Engine Companies**

This section of the report documents the Oakland Tunnel Fire through the eyes of the fire personnel who fought the fire. Some of the information in these individual engine company reports hasn't as yet been revealed to the public. Due to the major communication overload during the fire, many engine companies could not report either where they were or what they were doing until after the actions had already taken place. Reading these reports can fill in those gaps that have confused those who have researched this fire. Some of these reports also offer an insight into what could have been alleviated in terms of problems and hindrances fire personnel experienced in-the-field. These observations reflect the feelings and thoughts of those individual fire personnel, and might not reflect the philosophy of the Oakland Fire Department.

Read this section of the report to gain a better understanding of the fire from the point-of-view of those who fought the fire.

**6. Reports from the Fire Officers**

This section of the report sheds light on a more complex perspective of the Oakland Tunnel Fire than seen before. These reports chronicle the management of the fire, the escalation of the fire, and the interaction of all fire personnel who fought the fire. Battalion Chiefs as well as those who commanded strategic areas of the fire, have a more complete understanding of why certain actions were taken to defend certain parts of the fire zone; why strike teams and other personnel made stands at particular locations, and what the overall strategy was for stopping a fire of this magnitude.

Read this section of the report to gain a better understanding of fire-management through the Incident Command's actions.

**7. Problems, Hazards, and Hindrances**

In this section of the report, many of the problems, hazards, and hindrances encountered in fighting the Oakland Tunnel Fire are made.

There has been much talk about what went wrong in this emergency situation. Overall complaints about the fire's inaccessible environment were described in detail by most all of the fire personnel who fought the fire in the Oakland Hills.



### **8. Report Recommendations**

This section of the report is probably the most important section to read. It is with this section that Oakland moves forward to learn, not only from mistakes of the past, but generates a movement of production and change.

### **Appendices**

This section includes important information coming directly out of the fire incident.

- *Office of Emergency Services (OES) Strike Team Report*
- *Alameda County Mutual Aid Requests*
- *Directory of Narrow and Dead-ended Streets in the Oakland Hills Area*
- *Agencies and County Jurisdictions which were Involved in the Fire*
- *Additional Strike Teams Under the California Department of Forestry (CDF)*
- *Map of the Oakland Fire Department Stations*

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## **2. Overview of the Oakland Tunnel Fire**

This section of the document summarizes the actions which occurred during the Oakland Tunnel Fire of October 20, 1991. It presents an overview of where and how the fire started, the directions of the fire spread, those who initially responded to the six alarms, those who fought the fire in the different areas or divisions of the fire, and the graduated responses for the Incident Command. This overview is not presented as a time or location chronology, but it does pinpoint those events which are crucial in both the chronology of time, and the chronology of place sections of this document. Refer to those sections of this document for a more complete accounting of the Oakland Tunnel Fire.



### **The Origin of the Fire**

The fire began in the area of Buckingham Blvd. and Tunnel Road, between Marlborough Terrace and Buckingham in the wildland area below the Gwinn Tank.

The origin of the fire was on a steep hillside in a wooded area, with heavy underbrush, narrow roads, and a very steep terrain.

### **The Terrain**

The terrain where the fire started was a canyon with steep drainage. This area has been described as a "box" canyon. A "box" canyon has the effect of a fire in a stove. Strong upslope winds are drawn in from the bottom and confined to the course of the canyon by the walls. Narrow canyons or gulches at the head of high mountain valleys cause a fire to react in the same way that fire reacts in a chimney. A "box" canyon is basically a basin – only one open end providing ingress or egress. [Note: This was taken from "Wildfires Prevention and Control, by Harry Gaylor.]

The fire created a natural "flue" driven by the winds coming straight down the canyon, as well as being driven on the up-slopes from upper Tunnel Road, the Bay Forest area, and Hiller Highlands.

### **The Nature of the Fire**

The Oakland Tunnel Fire has been labelled by fire experts across the country. Was it a fire-storm, was it a conflagration, or was it a fire-front? Technical terms for all of these fire conditions exist.

- **A Fire storm** creates its own weather and wind conditions within 15 minutes to one hour, and pulls air into the fire area, in essence, a fire feeding itself.
- **A Conflagration** needs the right weather and climatic conditions to feed the fire. A conflagration is also a fire which exceeds the boundaries of a city block of origin.
- **A Fire-Front** moves away from the wind direction – a north-east wind would produce a south-west movement of fire – the wind pushes the fire in a forward movement.

The Oakland Tunnel Fire exhibited all three of these conditions. The ideal weather conditions of hot dry and high velocity winds, coupled with dry and overgrown terrain, and hot temperatures triggered a conflagration which quickly turned into a firestorm with several fire-fronts. Not acknowledging each essence of the fire, simplifies the conditions in which fire personnel had to tackle the fire. This fire was complex, both in the nature of fighting it, and suppressing the conditions in which it grew. Nothing could change the conditions which made the fire expand: weather and the environment were fixed criteria in the situation.

### **The Weather**

[Note: Weather report sent by CDF.]

Saturday, October 19, 1991

Red flag warning . . . Issued at the 0930PDT Issued to CDF Santa Clara ranger unit at Morgan Hill for further distribution. Red flag watch issued at the same time for all other areas for advent of strong northerly winds and lowering humidities later Saturday. Strong high pressure in Oregon and in Gt. Basin kicking in stronger winds and sharply lowering humidities. Pattern was expected to hold into Monday morning then switch around to southwest with higher moisture as a new trough came closer to the coast. Mt. Diablo at 0900PDT reported northeast winds at 22 gusty to 37 mph . . . Mission Ridge north-northeast at 25 gusty to 31 mph. During the day, winds increased at Diablo to gusty 38 mph with temperatures at Mission Ridge at 85 degrees. By 9:00AM, Diablo winds had increased to 58 mph in gusts from the north northeast and east-northeast. Mission Ridge reported in with gusts to 48 mph out of the north-northeast. No doubt there were higher wind speeds in and about the fire site during the night of the 19th and the day of the 20th October.

Sunday, October 20, 1991

Red flag warning continued thru sunset Sunday night. Record high temperatures were measured by 1500 PDT Sunday around the Bay Area. Examples were Oakland Airport at 91 degrees F . . . Oakland museum at 88 . . . Moffett NAS at 90 degrees. These exceeded the previous record maximums for the date by 2 to 6 degrees, at 2:00 PM Oakland Airport recorded sustained winds to near 30mph . . . Hayward gusts to 35mph, Mt. Diablo gusts to 34 mph from the northeast while earlier Sunday gusts atop Mt. Diablo reached 58mph. At Mission Peak winds were gusting from the north at 48 mph at 0900PDT. These weather conditions of strong north to northeast winds were to dominate the weather thru the night of Sunday the 20th of October. Strong high pressure off the central California coast continued to combine in effect to produce this strong offshore pointing winds (east to west) over the entire Bay Area including the East Bay Hills and Northern Bay Counties. Red Flag warning continued thru the night.

The wind played a most crucial part in the scenerio which manifested itself once the fire was established. The wind blew into the Oakland hills from the east, over and down ridge tops forcing flames to swirl in many different directions causing the fire to burn down hill as quick as it was burning uphill. This prevented Firefighters from falling back to defensible space because there was no place to hide. The fire crews were trapped and forced to protect themselves under water umbrellas as the flames roared over and around them, at speeds of up to 100 yards in 15 seconds. The wind whipped the fire into the Hiller Highlands and consumed all combustibles (homes, vegetation, and vehicles) in a matter of 16 minutes. The wind caused the fire to pre-heat everything in its path, which then caused structures and contents to explode from the radiated heat almost instantly.



**The Fire Spread**

Beginning at 1058 when the first alarm was transmitted, the fire quickly exploded down Buckingham towards Tunnel Road and expanded in three major directions:

- Up towards Grizzly Peak
- Across towards Westmoreland and Marlborough Terrace
- Advanced straight down the hill towards Highway 24

The fire then moved simultaneously down to Tunnel Road and the Parkwood Apartments. It spread across the hill and jumped Highway 24 to the Swainland Hill area. The fire crossed Tunnel Road into the upper Chabot Road area and engulfed it. Within 40 minutes, the fire had jumped Highway 24 into the hill near Lake Temescal. Within this first hour of the fire, there were three different major fire areas in a one square-mile area. The high winds, and flying firebrands and embers took this fire in those three different areas. These fires were seen as urban conflagrations, and not specifically wildland/urban fires.

**From 1058 – 1130:**

- Grizzly Peak, Marlborough Terrace, and Buckingham Blvd.
- Parkwood Apartments
- Bay Forest
- Grand View Drive and Hiller Highlands
- Spotting in back of the Caldecott Tunnel

The fire's movement during the first hour advanced rapidly, moving into the Buena Vista, and Golden Gate area near Broadway. The fire had already crested over the hill behind Lake Temescal, along Contra Costa Blvd. and over Contra Costa onto Buena Vista. By about 1200, it was starting to come across in a southwesterly direction towards Broadway Terrace. At the same time, the fire had already crossed Tunnel Road, burning in the upper Chabot Road and Roble Road – this whole area was already completely burned out – the fire had communicated across Tunnel Road into the eucalyptus area, and down the hill. The fire advanced into the Chabot Road area at about 1200 and the area became fully involved, with 8 -10 houses all burning at the end of the road. Hiller Highlands was burning during this same time.

**From 1130 – 1200:**

- Buena Vista Avenue
- Contra Costa Road
- Golden Gate Avenue
- Chabot Road
- Roble Road

**From 1300:**

- Alvarado, Amato, and Besito

**From 1100 through 1400:**

- The fire was burning from Grizzly Peak to as far south as Margarido and Ocean View.



**From 1200 to 1300:**

- The fire was burning from Claremont Avenue to Alvarado, with Alvarado continuing to burn through 1700/1900.

**At 1330:**

- The ridges of Swainland were beginning to burn

**At 1400:**

- Margarido and Manchester were burning, with the fire travelling east to Broadway Terrace

**1430:**

- Mountain and Ruthland

**1530:**

- Sheridan, east of Broadway Terrace and close to Proctor

**1600 – 1700:**

- Proctor to Florence

**1830:**

- Homes at the end of Proctor

**1900 – 2000:**

- Broadway Terrace near Skyline

**1930:**

- The Mountain View Cemetery – the farthest southeast direction

**Fire Precautions**

The Assistant Chief on duty had taken extra precautions to prepare for "the most critical fire conditions in 5 years". Fire personnel left hose at the scene Saturday to assure readiness in case of fire eruptions. On Sunday, this Assistant Chief also assigned extra fire personnel to patrol the area – with Patrol 28 (an extra assignment of 2 fire personnel) to be on-duty through 1800. Early Sunday morning at 0853, Oakland Engines 19 and 24 went to the scene to observe the area of the previous day's fire and to retrieve equipment left by both the Oakland Fire Department and by the East Bay Regional Parks Fire Department, and to inspect the area. One half-hour after these engines were on the scene, the Assistant Chief ordered both Battalion 3 and Battalion 4 to each send an engine company to patrol the areas of Skyline. Engine 4 and Engine 27 were these patrols – an addition to patrol 28 which was already patrolling the area. When Engine 24 arrived on the scene to retrieve hose, the officer communicated the wind conditions to be "... 25 mph and whipping up hot-spots". Testing plans at the Training Academy 2 were quickly cancelled for the day when fire condition hazards were relayed.

**Calling for Mutual Aid**

Requests for mutual aid in the form of air support and fire suppression units were made during the initial stages of the fire, and additional requests were made throughout the day. Mutual aid was requested right after the first alarm assignment, with the Lieutenant from Engine 19 asking FDC to "start CDF". Air support was requested before the fourth alarm.

Shortly after 1130, the Incident Command relayed the information that the fire was on several fronts, with 100 acres of trees, brush, and homes in flame, and needed 5 Strike Teams and mutual aid to respond to staging at Hiller and Tunnel Road.

Mutual aid requests are processed through the State Office of Emergency Services (OES). Requests were channeled through Alameda County OES which is divided into north and south zones, and then from the county level to the state.

By late afternoon, 370 engine companies from as far away as the Oregon-California state line in the north, to Bakersfield in the south and Nevada to the east were arriving or destined to arrive in Oakland.

Aircraft in the form of helicopters and large air tankers which had come from hundreds of miles away made hundreds of water drops on the fire throughout the day.

This was the largest mutual aid effort ever undertaken in the State of California.

**Communications**

The Oakland Fire Department uses two operational radio frequencies to communicate between the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC), and the thirty five companies in the city. Communication with other jurisdictions is usually accomplished on the state-wide mutual aid frequency which is referred to as the "White Fire" channel. The effectiveness of these frequencies was soon reduced because of the overwhelming load placed upon them by fire units requesting assistance, by commanders trying to place resources, and the FDC's attempts to send fire companies into the burn area. These problems were compounded by additional fire units from surrounding cities which began to arrive to assist with the fire. The steep hilly terrain in the Oakland hills also interfered with radio signals, in some cases creating "dead spots, which drastically reduced radio effectiveness.

### **Tunnel Command**

The Oakland Fire Department uses the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage all emergency incidents, as was the case with the Tunnel Fire. The system consists of an incident commander who directly supervises four functional groups: Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance. The operation and planning functions were conducted at the scene from the department's mobile command post, while logistics and finance functions were conducted from the Fire Dispatch Center.

This was the basic structure of the initial management of the Tunnel Fire. This structure remained in tact until late into the evening when the California Department of Forestry provided an overhead management team to assist with the enormous task of managing such a large fire.

The Assistant Chief became Tunnel Command, with the other Assistant Chief becoming Operations. Shortly after the fourth alarm, Battalion 4-A became Division A on Buckingham Blvd. The Command Van was enroute to the fire scene during the third alarm, and was situated at the same location as the previous day's fire. The Command Van located to east-bound Highway 24 at Tunnel, and then for a third time to Highway 4 off Broadway.

Several Divisions had been established soon after the fire started, but as the fire escalated, those Divisions changed. By early afternoon, the following Divisions had been established.

- Division A was at Rockridge
- Division B was at Chabot
- Division C was at the Claremont Hotel
- Division D was at Highway 13 and upper Broadway Terrace

In order to better organize the operations of the fire, Branches were established. Those Branches remained fixed throughout the fire.

- Branch 1 – everything north of Highway 24
- Branch 2 – everything south of Highway 24 and east of Highway 13
- Branch 3 – everything south of Highway 24 and west of Highway 13



**Fire Statistics**

|   |                 |
|---|-----------------|
| • Fatalities                              | 25              |
| • Injuries                                | 150             |
| • Single Family Dwellings Destroyed       | 2, 843          |
| • Single Family Dwellings Damaged         | 193             |
| • Apartment Units Destroyed               | 433             |
| • Total Living Units Damaged or Destroyed | 3, 469          |
| • Total Acreage Burned by the Fire        | 1, 520          |
| • Fire Perimeter                          | 5.25 miles      |
| • Fire Loss Dollars                       | \$1,537,000,000 |

**Engine Companies Responding to the Fire****Sunday Morning Retrieval and Follow-up Inspection**

- Engine 19
- Engine 24
- East Bay Regional Parks

**Patrols**

- Engine 4
- Engine 27
- Patrol 28

**First Alarm**

- Engine 10
- Engine 16
- Engine 6
- Training 2

**Second Alarm**

- Truck 15
- Truck 1
- Engine 25

**Third Alarm**

- Engine 5
- Engine 4

**Fourth Alarm**

- Engine 15
- Truck 8
- Engine 27
- Engine 1
- Engine 8

**Sixth Alarm**

- Engine 2
- Engine 13
- Engine 17
- Engine 23
- Truck 3
- Engine 26
- Engine 21

**Later Response**

- Engine 3
- Engine 18
- Truck 18
- Engine 20
- Engine 29
- Engine 36
- Engine 38
- Engine 39
- Engine 41
- Engine 48

**Recall**

- Engine 20
- Engine 21
- Engine 29 B
- Engine 26 B
- Engine 18/Unit 7
- Team 8
- Crew 10
- Engine 8/ Vallejo Task Force 1
- Engine 8
- Engine 15
- Engine 40

- Engine 16 C
- Engine 16/Engine 3
- Narrative
- Truck 15 C
- Truck 15
- Truck 15
- VAL.REL.
- Fire Inspector/working for FDC Operations



### 3. Overview of the Chronology of Time

The most important aspect of understanding this fire, is to understand when various events took place. Because the fire encompassed a vast land area, trying to pinpoint each event becomes confusing and haphazard at best.

There are one hundred and twenty-five on-duty Oakland fire personnel on each shift. With the recall of **all** off-duty personnel, that number is tripled. Vacationing and dispatch personnel also add to the labor pool. Research of all fire personnel at the fire scene through Monday evening expands the fire personnel count to almost 1,800. Accounting for 1,800 personnel in a fire of this magnitude would entail a far more sophisticated system than what is in place today. This chronology of time does not account for all personnel at all times. This is only an accounting of Oakland fire personnel, and those neighboring fire departments and Strike Teams which have been referred to in Oakland's accounting of time. What it does account for are those situations either mentioned on dispatch-tape relating specifically to fire personnel actions, or those situations which demand action.

Because not all personnel had access to communication networks – either radios, or cleared dispatch channels – these personnel had to make due with either one-on-one in-the-field communiques, or take the initiative to place themselves on the scene where they deemed necessary or proper.

In interviews with these personnel, their accounting for when they arrived on the scene might be the only reference to when a situation occurred, and in knowing that fire personnel were not looking at their watches, but fighting fire, their accounts of when situations occurred can be questionable. What can be reliable though, is the understanding that several engine companies worked together, and that their presence in working with each other makes their stories not only credible, but provable. In researching this chronology, accounts from the fire personnel themselves become an overwhelming source of information. Piecing these bits of information together becomes a jig-saw puzzle, and that puzzle as yet, has not been completed.

When reading this chronology of time, dispense with trying to figure out a location-flow. There are no story-lines to follow in this section. This accounting deals specifically with time.

For a better understanding of what happened in a given area or location of the fire, refer to *Section 4: Chronology of Place*, and find those areas which can be of particular importance.

**Note:** Notations listed before the action denotes from where this particular information came. Notations with (CDF- ) represent listings on the California Department of Forestry (CDF) Chronology report. Those actions which are not "claimed" are assumed to be from the engine company describing the events. The main communications listed here in the chronology are attributable to the Oakland Fire Department, the California Department of Forestry (CDF), and East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP). The Fire Incident Report listings are not "claimed". They are standard fragments representing Oakland Fire Department actions as logged with the OFD computer dispatch system. Those times with \*\*\*\*\* after them represent quotes or information taken directly from FDC tape transcripts, or from the FDC tapes themselves. All OFD descriptions in this report are listed by personnel rank – not by name.

**Saturday October 19, 1991**

**1200 – 1300**

**1212**

**FIRST ALARM.**

Engine 19 responded to the first alarm. Other engines and personnel responding include Engine 24, Engine 6, Battalion 2 and Battalion 4.

**1213**

Battalion 2 'on-air'.

**1215**

Engine 19, Engine 24, Engine 6 dispatched.

**1216**

Battalion 4 'on-air'.

**Battalion 3-B.** I drove in the direction of the fire to assist. I got on the radio to give my location and to acknowledge the response to the fire, so that the Assistant Chief on duty would know.

**1218**

Large column of smoke showing from the freeway. Battalion 4 responds up Tunnel Road from Hiller Drive.

**1219**

**SECOND ALARM.**

Engine 10, Engine 25, Engine 15, Truck 8, and Battalion 3 respond.

**1221**

**THIRD ALARM.**

Engine 5, and Engine 16 respond.

**1224**

**FOURTH ALARM.**

Engine 1, Engine 17, and Truck 15 respond.

**1225**

Tunnel Command.

**1223/1230**

**Battalion Chief 3-B.** I was the first Oakland fire unit on the scene at Buckingham. There was a good column of smoke and flames midway behind the house on 7100 block of Buckingham and proceeded up the hill. There was fairly moderate fuel burning uphill at a moderate rate. The fire was commanded by the Assistant Chief Battalion 2-C who arrived and immediately established Division A and Division B. Division A would be myself, located on Buckingham, and Division B would be Battalion 3-C located off of Marlborough Terrace off of the top. The area was anchored on the lower flanks on the upslope. One and 1/2" lines were extended to the southern and eastern flanks, and westerly to the northern flanks from below.

Once we got those lines into position, I sent Brush 19 to the end of Westmoreland to see if the fire was exposing any of the houses at that end. I then sent them Truck 15, and Berkeley Engine 3 to that location. They put an extended line from that location to the location of the fire.

The helicopter from ARRIS and a Helitac unit from the California Department of Forestry (CDF) were called in. Those helicopters worked the north and west flanks of the fire throughout the afternoon. Division B who was at the top of the hill, had extended lines from the top. Although I didn't see his lines, we would continually talk trying to secure the perimeter of the fire. Later on in the afternoon, the Assistant Chief released the fire both to me and Division B, and then finally just to myself.

**1237**

East Bay Regional Parks notified need full alarm wildland response.  
Eagle 5 will circle the area.

**1240**

California Department of Forestry.

**1241**

East Bay Region Parks got the report of the fire.

**1241**

**CDF Battalion Chief.** I was dispatched from Sonol in Alameda County through mutual aid to a fire in the city of Oakland. The original dispatch was for 2 engines, a dozer, a Battalion Chief and a helicopter. While in transit to the fire, and seeing the column of smoke from Highway 24, I asked that our dispatch bump up to a first alarm wildland fire dispatch which would bring the total number of [CDF] engines from 2 to 6. This was done.

My first site of the fire was when I was travelling on Highway 24. The column of smoke went straight up 300 – 400 feet above the ridge line. It seemed it was hitting a slight inversion layer, and the smoke was coming out of the inversion layer and going south-west, and indicating that there was a north-east flow of air. The weather condition was a concern; it was in the high 80's low 90's, dry with a north-east flow of wind.



**1245**

Responding ARRIS helicopter with a 20 minute ETA.

**1246**

Medicals have been suspended.

**1251****FIFTH ALARM.**

Engine 13, and Engine 8 respond.

**1253**

CDF notified of fire being in the threat zone.

**1254**

Notified Alameda, Berkeley of yellow alert. Will update to red when we get a location.

**1256**

San Leandro also notified of yellow alert.

**1258**

Berkeley Parks Department reports has 500 gallon tank with tow behind pump. Requesting Berkeley to send 1 engine company to cover-in at Station 8 if needed.

[Note: This entry is not a chronology. Mutual aid from Berkeley, CDF responded with a Helitac crew of 11 members, and 6 engine companies. East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP) responded with 2 water tankers, and 2 type-3, and 4 patrols. ARRIS was called in as a private aviation company supplying air support. Piedmont covered in for Station 24, Alameda covered in for Engine 4, San Leandro covered in for Stations 20, 27, and Berkeley 8.]

**1300 – 1400****1309**

Red Cross is notified to respond with refreshments.

**1311**

Requesting San Leandro to send 1 cover-in to Station 20.

**1312**

Requesting Alameda to send 1 cover-in to Station 4.

**1314**

Red Cross to respond to the Command Post above Caldecott Tunnel.

**1317**

**CDF Battalion Chief** When I arrived on the scene, our helicopter-C106 was already there making water drops. I proceeded to the top of the ridge of Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace. Met with Battalion 3-C. It appeared that the rate of spread of the fire had stopped, and there was shaky containment. Given the very warm and very dry environment, both Battalion 3-C and myself were very concerned, and we talked about those concerns. We walked over to see what progress had been made on the fire. Oakland had already started a large response with East Bay Regional Parks on the scene as well. The fire apparatus on the roads made transit very difficult. Because of the congestion on the roads, I had all CDF equipment stage at Fish Ranch Road and Grizzly Peak Blvd. We staged 6 engines, the helicopter C106, and the bulldozer 1642. Battalion 3-C walked to the top of the fire area and was coordinating with Battalion 3-B who was at the bottom. There was also an Assistant Chief at the Command Post.

Battalion 3-C looked at the fire. The spread had been contained. There were 2 helicopters – one the CDF Helitac crew (a crew of 8 and a Captain) went down the east flank, and started putting in some handlines. There was also a private helicopter.

Spoke with 2 fire personnel from East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP). There was apparatus from EBRP and the Oakland Fire Department, and between all of this apparatus and hoseline, the fire personnel appeared to have the fire completely surrounded with a lot of water flowing. The entire fire crew was going through mop-up and overhaul. All the hydrants were flowing. I offered Battalion 3-C any and all of the CDF engines which were at staging, but after surveying all of the equipment being used, we couldn't figure out where they would be put. It seemed like there were enough personnel working on the fire.

**1319**

Tunnel Command reports 5 acres involved, house threatened. Contacted the standby mechanic to respond to Tunnel Road to repair Engine 10.

**1321**

CDF helicopter C106.

**1322**

6 CDF engines enroute.

**1339**

Incident under control.

**CDF Battalion Chief.** Battalion 3-B asked me to release my engine companies from the incident. I did release them. I stayed at the fire talking with both Battalion 3-C and the EBRP officer for about 30 minutes. About 30-45 minutes after arrival, the Battalion Chief released our helicopter C106. I coordinated getting the 8-person crew back up to the Landing Zone (LZ) on Fish Ranch Road. The helicopter C106 dispatched to another fire in Saratoga, and I went back to Sonol.

**1345**

Information at 7151 Buckingham. Oakland Police Department notified.

**1348**

Piedmont Fire Department engine covering at Station 24.

**1400 – 1500****1402**

Engine 27 responds to Division B.

**1418**

Battalion 4 went in command.

Division A Battalion 4 Incident Command.

**1434**

**CDF Battalion Chief.** Left the fire area. The helicopter left the fire area at this time.

**1450**

ARRIS helicopter to be released per Division A Incident Command.

**1500 – 1600****1559**

Engine 12 now responding (??) to top of Marlborough/ Division B.

**1600 – 1700**

**Battalion 3-B.** Prior to leaving late that afternoon, there was concern on my part because this was a wildland fire. I physically went up the hill and walked the entire perimeter of the fire – all 4.5 – 5 acres of the area. Starting from Buckingham, I walked the southern flank back to Gwinn Tank, across west and back down to the north and west flanks, and then back down to the bottom. I ordered the crews to leave their lines in position, in case there were going to be hot spots. Prior to leaving the fire itself, I walked back up again to the top of the hill directly behind the home [where the fire started] looking for hot spots. This is a common practice of operations. There were no hot spots, so I left the fire scene. There were still some companies in service picking up some remainder of hose, and I put them in command. I think it was Engine 19 who was still on the scene at the time.



**1700 – 1800****1730**

Command terminated.

**1739**

**Battalion 3-B.** I left the fire scene. I drove down Buckingham to Norfolk. There was a woman whose car had stalled. I drove to the end of Westmoreland, and stopped to observe the flank. When I stopped, there was a homeowner, a woman who flagged me down, and we were discussing vegetation and brush. I drove back down Norfolk and back to Marlborough Terrace, stopped at Marlborough Terrace at the hydrant where we had hose laid, and walked through the brush and back to the hydrant. I drove to the top of Grizzly Peak, and stopped to make an observation. It was very quiet, and very still. The weather was very dry, and there was no fog, and no wind.

**1800 – 1900****1839**

**Battalion 3-B.** I finished my drive around the fire area.

**1900/1930**

**Battalion 3-B.** I called Engine 19 when I returned to quarters, and asked the officer to go back to the scene of the fire to make observations and to be sure that there were no hot spots. I talked to the Lieutenant and told him to take a ride after dinner.

**Sunday October 20, 1991**

**0800 – 0900**

**Battalion 3-B** was relieved by Battalion 4-A. Discussed the preceding shift's activities including the fire on Buckingham Boulevard the preceding day. I related the details of the fire control operations, and was told of the hose-lines which were left in place at the fire scene, in the event of any flare-up at the fire site.

**0830**

**Battalion 3-B** phoned both Battalion 3 and Battalion 2 from home. Reported to Battalion 2-C, and Battalion 3-A that there were high winds in the Oakland Hills. Related the details of the previous day's fire on Buckingham Boulevard to the Assistant Chief.

**0830**

**Engine 24** is to rendezvous with Engine 19 in front of 7185 Marlborough Terrace to recover 700' of hose left from Saturday's fire.

**0851**

Response area.

**0852**

**Engine 24** is dispatched.

**0853**

**Engine 19 and Engine 24** 'on-air'.

**0853 – 0900**

**Engine 6.** Engine 24 and Engine 19 were in the area of the previous fire. There was a little incident, and the Assistant Chief responded. The situation was controlled. The Assistant Chief came by Station 6. He ordered both Battalion 3 and Battalion 4 to designate 1 flat-land engine company for hill patrol. At roll call at 0800, I heard that there was going to be Brush 28 patrol, a special patrol from Station 6 to the Berkeley line. This has been done before. While monitoring the radio during the morning, the Assistant Chief had stated that "these are the worst fire conditions in 50 years" – with low humidity and with winds out of the east. The Assistant Chief's intent was to have patrols all along Skyline and Grizzly Peak Boulevard from one end of the city to the other.

**0853**

Engine 19 was dispatched to the burn area at 7150 Marlborough Terrace to initially pick up hose left from the previous evening. They parked the rigs on Marlborough Terrace in front of the hydrant, and proceeded to turn the hydrant off to break up the line. Shortly after beginning this procedure, the Engine 19 Engineer noticed some smoke coming from the burn area of the previous day, although there was a question as to whether it was smoke or ash blowing from

the previous day's burn. Engine 19 donned brush jackets and helmets, charged the lines again, and started overhauling hot spots on both the right and left flank of the previous burn for about an hour. There was a 1 1/2"900' line going from the Gwinn Tank down to the right side of the fire to the bottom of the hill. They took the lead from Lieutenant Engine 24 and broke the 900' line into two, to help overhaul the flare-up at the top. They hooked up a divider to these two hoses to put out the hot spots at the top of the hill. The two Firefighters from Engine 19 took the top hot spots, and Engine 24 took the left side at the bottom of the hill. The Engine 19 Lieutenant told the Engineer to take the brush rig down Marlborough and pick up the 2 Engine 19 Firefighters who had been putting out hot spots at the bottom of the hill. After a 15-20 minute wait for them to finish their hot spots and retrieve hose, he was told to come back up Marlborough. The East Bay Regional Parks crew was going to bring these other 2 firefighters back up.

**0854**

**The Assistant Chief (who was the on-duty Battalion 2)** responded to the Gwinn Tank to observe progress of the overhaul operations after Engine 19 and Engine 24 reported a small hot spot in the burn area from Saturday.

**0854**

This incident 130625, is linked to Saturday's 5-alarm fire – incident 130528.

**Engine 24** is on the scene.

**Engine 24** Notice hot spots in burn area first on north flank in duff under pine trees, second in duff near Gwinn Tank (east flank). Wind is from the east, light and variable.



**0900 – 1000****0900**

**Engine 27.** We were ordered to patrol the hill area in Battalion 3.

**0905/0908 \*\*\*\*\***

**Battalion 2-A** requests FDC to send a printer message "Due to extreme fire hazard conditions in the hills, we will be operating patrol 28 today north from Engine 6 until 1800."

**0908/0911 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 24 reports.** "We got about . . . just for your information, we have about minimum, 25 mph winds already blowing up here."

**0908/0911 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 19.** "Notify Battalion 2 that we're working on several hot spots. We have them on both sides of the canyon, and it's going to take a long time."

**0911 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 24.** "Have you been able to make contact with East Bay Regional Park?"

**Oakland 2.** "Affirmative, Engine 24. They don't have anyone at this time."

**0916 \*\*\*\*\***

**Battalion 2.** We have extreme fire conditions . . . starting up at this time."

**0919**

**Engine 16** has changed quarters for Engine 24.

**Engine 16** is 'on-air'.

**0919**

The scene location has changed from 7150 Buckingham Boulevard.

**0920**

**Engine 24** requested with EBRPFD to assist in retrieving 1200' of their hose from south flank. Winds light to moderate.

**0920**

**Engine 27.** As we left quarters I noted winds at approximately 30 to 35 mph, at 102 and E. 14th at 40 mph, at Grass Valley and Skyline at 45 mph.

**0921**

**Engine 16** is enroute.

**0922****Battalion 2** is 'on-air'.**0923****Battalion 2** is in command.**0925****East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP)** is notified to retrieve hose (from the day before) or lose them to the fire. EBRP will be sending someone to retrieve the hose.**0926****Battalion 2** declares an extreme fire hazard in the hill area.**0929****(EBRP)** Public Safety Dispatch Center tones out a service request for a fire unit to respond to the area of Saturday's fire to pick up fire hose left in place overnight "before it burns" because of a rekindle of the original fire.**0929**

The Tunnel Incident Command (IC) is reestablished with Engine 19, Engine 24, Engine 16, and Battalion 2. EBRP crews were called to the scene to pick up hose.

**0930****(EBRP)** Unit 5675 advises that he will handle the service request and directs Dispatch to assign an additional unit because of the report from Oakland Fire about a rekindle. 5675 advises that he is about three minutes from the scene.**0931****(EBRP)** Dispatch tones out firefighters to respond the additional unit requested by 5675.**0932****(EBRP)** Unit 5675 advises that he is on the scene with Oakland. He directs that the additional unit respond Code 2 (no emergency lights or siren). **[Winds are gusting and out of the northeast at this time.]****0933****(EBRP)** Dispatch repeats the tone-out and advises the second unit to respond Code 2.**0935****(EBRP)** Tone-out is repeated (in accordance with normal policy to ensure two-county coverage and timely response.)**0935****Engine 16** is on the scene.

**0935**

**Engine 27.** At Skyline and Keller, the winds were at 55 plus mph.

**0939**

**(EBRP)** 5675 advises responding firefighters to stage on Marlborough "below the tanks".

**0945**

**(EBRP)** District Fire Chief calls Dispatch and directs them to increase staffing levels at the fire stations because of heightened fire danger due to unusual weather conditions. (Note: This time is approximate. This is a telephone call. The Chief is not aware of the rekindle on Buckingham at this time.)

**0947**

**(EBRP)** 5675 advises unit 5632, engine responding from Station 1, to meet him at Marlborough and Grizzly Peak for staging incoming firefighters.

**0947 \*\*\*\*\***

"Rekindles are under control for the time being."

**0948**

**Engine 24** is in command. Battalion 2 leaves the scene.

**0950**

**Battalion 2-A** requests that Battalion 3 and Battalion 4 each send a flat-land engine to patrol the hill area for hazards. (These will be Engines 4 and 27.)

**0951/0955**

**Truck 8** out of service. Medical emergency.

**0953**

**(EBRP)** Unit 5632 advises that he is on the scene

**0955**

**Engine 18** out of service to the Training Division.

**0955/0959 \*\*\*\*\***

**Battalion 2-A.** "Ask 18 if he can make a deal with the proctors and get them out of 18? We need companies in service. We don't need this stuff going on today." . . . "Be advised we have the most critical fire conditions in 5 years right now, so it's on you."

**0955**

**Engine 23** out of service. Medical emergency.



**1000 – 1100****1000**

**Battalion 2-A** left the scene with no more visible hot spots. Engine 19 becomes Tunnel Command.

**1000**

**Engine 4** and spare Engine 111 with a crew of 4 – a Lieutenant, an Engineer and 2 Firefighters were dispatched by phone by Battalion 4-A to be a hill patrol. Instructed to patrol the area between Colton Boulevard and Joaquin Miller Road.

**1003/1005**

**Engine 29** out of service. Odor of smoke.

**1004**

**(EBRP)** Unit 5676 advises that he is on the scene. Two other Firefighters also arrive at that time.

**1004**

**EBRP** arrived at Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace. There were 5 fire personnel representing East Bay Regional Parks: 5675, 5676, Truck 5632, and 5669 with both a firefighter and myself. We met adjacent to the water tank. 5675 said to pick up the hose, so we drove down Marlborough to Buckingham, and turned on Buckingham and set up below 7151 Buckingham. We moved a lot of stuff, debris, and lumber in order for the truck to get in close to the hill (for traffic), and then we backed the engine around so that the engine was facing west. The wind was blowing hard; chunks of building insulation were blowing towards the direction of the truck. I realized it was bad weather and thought of calling in to Command to get extra people into the stations. Command had already thought of that.

**1006**

**Engine 4** hill-patrol on Skyline between Colton and Joaquin Miller.

**Engine 27** hill-patrol on Skyline between Redwood Road and Grass Valley.

**1005/1010**

**Engine 15** out of service. Medical emergency.

**1008/1010**

**Engine 5** out of service. Medical emergency. Cancelled.

**1013**

**(EBRP)** Unit 5632 arrives on scene and stages on the service road leading to the water tank above the burned area.

**1015**

**Oakland Fire Department Patrol 28** is in service.

**1021**

**(EBRP)** Dispatch advises 5675 of the fire chief's direction to increase station staffing due to weather conditions. 5675 asks Dispatch to tone-out additional firefighters.

**1015/1020**

**(EBRP)** Dispatch advises 5675 that they have Oakland Fire on the phone again, and that they're reporting a hot spot (smoking embers) on the east flank of the fire and that OFD is unable to get to it. 5675 acknowledges by directing a fire unit to the hot spot. However, 5632 has already located it and is working on what appears to be the hot spot in question.

**1020/1030**

**EBRP** We started going up the hill. There were a group of 5-6 people standing in a driveway. 5632 went up the hill to see what was going on. He told me to bring up a backpack-pump and some hand-tools. Behind 7151, there was a hole in the fence. I brought up the backpacks and noticed white smoke and open fame coming from underneath the pine trees on the western side of the gully. I walked the gully, which was hard to walk. At the same time, an OFD person went to this same spot, so we approached the "smokers" together. Two other OFD plus another EBRP met us at the "smokers" with the backpack and hand-tools, extinguishing the hot spots. While this was going on, Truck 5632 was repositioned in order to run hose to the hot spot. This was from the south-west side of the 7151 Buckingham house, and our Firefighter laid a 1 1/2" line up the western side of the gully to extinguish the fire under the pine trees.

**1024**

**(EBRP)** 5675 directs a Firefighter to a hot spot and says that he'll "follow up with 5632 (an engine)."

**1026**

**(EBRP)** Dispatch asks 5675 if he has the capability to come up on Fire White (a radio frequency) for Oakland. He responds "Affirmative, give me a couple of minutes."

**1028**

**(EBRP)** Dispatch tones-out additional Firefighters due to the weather conditions. (These are to increase staffing at Park District fire stations.)

**1028**

**EBRP 5675** working hot spots.

**1029**

**Battalion 2-A.** "Contact patrol 28. Tell them every time they make their patrol out of Grizzly, take a good look at the fire area from a vantage point at Grizzly and Marlborough. Report any hot spots."

**1033**

**Engine 24** reports 1 1/2" hose left at the hydrant at the foot of the fire on Marlborough Terrace.

**1030/1033 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 16 to Engine 24.** "I'm looking at fire. . . Are you in contact with Regional Park?. . . We've got fire burning down at the bottom of the burn. All they need to do is to stretch that 1 1/2" right down to it. I'm looking at it from across the canyon. . . Is that on the east flank? On the west flank all the way down at the bottom. At the bottom of the burn not at the bottom of the hill. . . Looks like you got a Regional Park's guy within 20 feet of that right now."

**1035**

**(EBRP)** 5675 advises 5632 that Oakland Fire is reporting an "open flame down in that area." He tells 5632 to move his engine into position to lay hose up to the fire. 5632 has already positioned his unit in the driveway of 7151 Buckingham to lay hose in order to attack the flare-up (open flame) on the left flank.

**1037**

**(EBRP)** 5675 asks 5632 "How's it look? Can you guys handle that? Do you need some Oakland people down there?" 5632 replies, "I don't see anybody with us. It's just McCormick and I. We're going to lay a hose up this thing." 5675 asks, "Can you handle it, or do you want Oakland with you?" 5675 asks another unit working on the hot spot if they have it under control. The unit advises, "10-4" (radio code for affirmative).

**1037 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 19.** ". . . are working with Regional Parks on that hot spot. When you get down there, see if you can give them a hand."

**1037/1038 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 28.** "We just got a call from 7092 Marlborough Terrace on a hot spot."

**1041**

**Engine 4** was southbound on Skyline Boulevard when an alarm for 13685 Campus Drive was transmitted. Engine 4 requested to be assigned to this incident, and was assigned. This incident was cancelled.

**1041**

**Engine 27.** I noted the first alarm on the Tunnel Incident. Then the second alarm was struck. I instructed our Engineer to proceed closer to our north limit of Redwood Road and Skyline. On the fourth alarm I instructed our Engineer to cross Redwood Road and start toward the fire. I heard Battalion 2 order the sixth alarm. At this point I ordered our response to the fire via Skyline Drive I called Oakland 2 and had us assigned to the incident but no reply from FDC. As we went around a curve at about Ascot Drive I saw the largest column of smoke that I have ever seen. This smoke column was traveling very fast in both east and west directions. East being up into the hills and west toward the bay. As we arrived at the intersection of Skyline and



Grizzly Peak, I made the decision to take Skyline Drive after hearing the radio traffic and observing the smoke travel.

**1043**

**Engine 24** is leaving the scene for fuel.

**1044**

**Engine 19** is in command.

**1043/1045**

A grass fire at 13685 Campus Drive. Units due: Engine 21, Engine 25, Battalion 4, Engine 27.

**1043/1045**

**Engine 16** at Skyline and Snake.

**1043/1045**

**Engine 16** covers in at Station 25.

**1045**

**Engine 4** was at Joaquin Miller Road when the first alarm (1058) for the Oakland Tunnel Fire was transmitted. Engine 4 requested to be assigned to this incident, and was assigned.

**1045**

**EBRP at Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace.** We extinguished most of the flames and hot spots, but there was more smoke and more flames directly across east of the gully and in more oak and pine trees. Then there was another hot spot. All of these hot spots were in the burn area of the previous day. The wind was blowing the dead pine-needles into the area from the day before. The Firefighter and I ran back across the gully to extinguish the smoke.

**1048**

**Engine 25** going back in service.

**1049/1053**

**Engine 19 to Battalion 2-A.** "I've charged the line to the inch and a half to the fire area. We've got pretty good smoke showing. We've got smoke showing. East Bay Regional Parks is with me only." "Do you want some help back up here? . . . Send 24 back up. Engine copy. We'll turn around and head back. . . "This is in an unburned area, is it?" "Affirmative. It's starting to go into the brush area from the home address."

**1050**

**(EBRP) 5675** directs Dispatch to have another engine respond Code 3 (red lights and siren) to Marlborough. He says, "We're getting a lot of rekindles up here. We're gonna need assistance."

**1052/1055 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 19 to EBRP 5632.** "We have open flame on the left flank and hot spots on the right flank. We're sending another engine from our station. One to help us out with this. As far as update, I don't see if we have open flames, just a lot of real hot spots that are blowing over into the unburned."

**1052**

**(EBRP) 5669** says, "Talk to Oakland and get a helicopter up here, and get this area wet. We're having all kinds of rekindles."

**1052**

**(EBRP)** Dispatch advises Station 1 to respond another engine to the "Oakland Hills Fire, Marlborough and Grizzly Peak."

**1053**

**(EBRP) 5669** asks 5675 to call Dispatch and ask them about "getting some air up here" 5675 responds, "OK. Oakland's responding a bunch of engines right now, Bill, and I've got Station 1 coming to give us a hand."

**1053**

**Engine 24** is 'on-air'.

**1055**

**Engine 19** notified Engine 24 via radio to return to scene. Flare-up on north flank.

**1055/1057 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 19.** Notify him (Battalion 2-A) that Bay Regional Parks has dispatched another company to work the hot spots, and that we have it under control at this time."

**1056/1057 \*\*\*\*\***

**EBRP 5632 to Engine 19.** "We keep getting little hot spots flaming up and we're running back and forth on this hill. Until we get another engine here and get both flanks secure." "We have Engine 24 responding to the Tank. My crew is split and I'm not in contact with him as of right now." . . . "Copy.. We just need to have people around in case it goes up."

**1057**

**Engine 27** is ready to go back on patrol.

1058 \*\*\*\*\*

**FIRST ALARM**

**Engine 19** transmits a box. "We have flames, visual flames showing on the lower east flank."

1058

**EBRP** dispatches a second unit.

1058

Engine 19 saw fire running across the brush at the lower right flank of the original burn area. Engine 19 Lieutenant called for "a box" – the first alarm. Engine 19 and Engine 24 tried to put the fire out which had spread to the deck of the house near 7150 Buckingham Boulevard. At this time, the East Bay Regional Park crew was working on the right side of the fire with Engine 19 Firefighters. In a short period of time, the fire had jumped Buckingham, and within a 5-10 minute time span overran the entire crew working the fire area. In addition to the Engine 19 Engineer, Engine 24 Firefighter and Lieutenant, 2 media people from Channel 2, Battalion 4 Chief, and the Lieutenant from Training 2, Engine 19 looked like it was going to be trapped, so Engine 19 retreated from this original position.

1058

**Engine 19 to Oakland 2.** "Start CDF."

**Oakland 2 to Engine 19.** "We'll get CDF."

1058

**EBRP at Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace.** Called for the duty officer 5675 to get air support. I knew it was a bad situation. Called again a minute later. Worked on these hot spots with the OFD. The 2 other EBRP crew were working the hose that had been laid up to the west-side of the gully. This was 100 – 150 feet from where we were. We were turned into the hill, facing Grizzly Peak. The 2 other crew members felt something to the side and below. There were large open flames below us. It was a fully involved fire in an unburned area of fresh fuel. I radioed to 5632, the Engineer for the hose laid over on the west-side of the gully. "We got something going up here, I'm going to bring 200 – 300 feet of hose adjacent to the position, to make another hose line up to catch the flame." We got the 200 feet of hose, ran down the hill to the fence – it was a really hard area to run in – to get to the truck. The engineer was trying to reposition the truck, because he had seen the open flames and he didn't want to do the hose around the structure and across the gully. He uncoupled the hose line that was running through the western part of the gully, because that fire was out. He backed out of the driveway and repositioned in his original position on Buckingham. At the same time Engine 24 (??) came down Buckingham, found a hydrant and then hooked a hydrant into Engine 5632, so that 5632 could have water. The OFD Battalion 4-A and another Lieutenant came by and started helping with the hoses. Ran an 1 1/2" hose-lay up in the side of the house (7200 Buckingham??). By this time, the fire is burning down toward Buckingham, but it is also burning west into the trees and the backyard of 7151 Buckingham. We went through the gate, where there is a huge green shed on pilings. The shed caught on fire at the same time, and the first person on the hose went down because of the heat intensity. After a blast of



water, he was fine. Was forced out of the gate when the fire was coming into the house. The engineer of 5632 gave over his engine to another EBRP Lieutenant. The engineer and an OFD officer went under a masonry retaining wall to the roof to keep the fire off the back of the house. There was a camera crew from Channel 2 at this position, other civilians had taken off. Three of the EBRP are on one 1 1/2" line and straight-streaming the fire. The other EBRP and OFD were on the roof. The word came down to get out, that the fire couldn't be held. The fire crew on the roof were fixated on the fire and wouldn't come off the roof. The house is then fully involved. We needed to leave south and then west.

**1100 – 1200****1100**

**Battalion 2** responded from Station 1 on-call for the first and second alarms by Engine 19 for a flare-up in the unburned area above Buckingham Boulevard. Called for a Mutual Aid response from the California Department of Forestry (CDF) on the way up Highway 24 and also the third alarm assignment due to size-ups being given by Tunnel Incident Command (IC) Engine 19. Changed response route to Grizzly Peak Boulevard via the Hiller Highlands due to a back-up of traffic at the Tunnel and requested from Engine 19 a spot progress of fire from the top. There was very little smoke visible while responding to the fire.

**1100**

**Engine 24** returned via Grizzly Peak Boulevard. Stopped south of Gwinn Tank to check condition, noticed flare-up on south flank below antenna. Winds strong. Blowing parallel to Buckingham.

**1100**

**Engine 6.** I was monitoring the situation because I knew that Engine 24 and Engine 19 were in the location. There was a fire beginning again on both flanks and that he was requesting a full assignment, and subsequently requested to make it a second alarm. At that point Engine 6 responded via Skyline to Grizzly Peak. We met up with Command just about 1000 feet above Marlborough Terrace and Grizzly Peak. Our Brush Wagon 6 assisted Engine 19 on Buckingham. Other members of the crew and the pumper remained on Grizzly Peak Boulevard. and set up a defensive position along Grizzly Peak back in the area of Grizzly Peak Terrace. The fire was moving uphill and outward on both flanks.

**1102**

Nature of the fire has changed. Priority has changed to 1. The incident has been changed from Code 3 to Code 1.

**Battalion 4** is 'on-air'.

**Engine 10** dispatched.

**1102**

**Engine 10** responded on the first alarm. Under direction of Command, we took a position on Marlborough Terrace at the 7100 block. We took a lead from the hydrant at approx 7150 Marlborough, supplying a 3" line for Engine 19 and placing three preconnected hand lines in position to protect homes on the lower side of the street. Engines 25, 4 and 15 supported our position from behind us, up Marlborough towards Grizzly Peak. We were able to defend our position but the velocity of the fire driven by the strong winds (50 mph+) pushed the fire storm over our position and through houses on our right flank. Houses beyond the reach of our streams were rapidly and totally engulfed in flames.

**1103**

**Oakland Police Department (OPD)** is on the scene.

**1104****SECOND ALARM**

Respond to Marlborough. 7140 Marlborough.

Units due: Engine 6, Engine 10 (responded at 1102), Truck 1, Truck 15, and Battalion 4.

This assignment has Channel 2 priority.

**1104**

OPD is requested for traffic control.

**1104 \*\*\*\*\***

**Command to Engine 6.** "Can you respond on the east-side of the Gwinn Tank on Tunnel Road?" "We're responding. Pumper 6 facing Skyline towards Tunnel Road. I got a hydrant right here."

**1104 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 19.** "I'm heading up toward the Gwinn Tank in the burned area. It's moving up the canyon towards Grizzly Peak."

**1104**

**Truck 15** responded on the second alarm to Grizzly Peak Boulevard and Grizzly Terrace. Battalion 2-A assigned Engine 6 and Engine 21 with Truck 15 under my command for this sector. We immediately attacked the fire threatening homes in this area on the north-side of Grizzly Peak Boulevard dragging lines from Engine 6. Engine 21 came in on the eastern side with a line. After knocking down the perimeter of this area we set up lines on Grizzly Peak.

When the fire came up the hill we knocked it down and kept it from jumping the road. There was a very strong, hot wind from the Orinda side. Because the pressure was very low, we alternately moved Pumpers 6 and 21 down the road from hydrant-to-hydrant, leaving a line connected to the hydrant as we left. I asked Battalion 2 for air drops in this area to prevent a new front from moving east below Grizzly Peak Boulevard.

**1105**

Flames are on the lower-east flank.

**Training 2** is enroute to the scene.

**1105 \*\*\*\*\***

**Battalion 2-A.** "Call CDF and see if they have anybody available. We're requesting mutual aid for another fire in the threat zone."

**1105 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 19 to Engine 10.** "I want you on Marlborough Terrace."



1105

**Truck 1** responded on the second alarm. With the Captain, and 2 Firefighters I responded to the hill fire at Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace via Highway 24. While enroute up Hiller Drive Battalion 2-A ordered Truck 1 to report to the Command Post at Highway 24 and Tunnel Road off ramp directly across from the Parkwood Apartments. The wind came up from nowhere and the fire spread to the northeast-side of Highway 24 to the Parkwood Apartments then down that side of Highway 24, also at the same time the fire jumped to the east-side of Highway 24.

The Captain ordered me to act as officer of Truck 1 and for one of the Firefighters to assist Command. Shortly thereafter Truck 1 was ordered to Golden Gate and Broadway. We spotted the truck on Broadway and I ordered the crew to don their brush gear. We assisted the Lieutenant of Engine 18 at Buena Vista Place and below the curve on Buena Vista Ave. During this time one of the Firefighters was working with Engine 13. We lost water a couple of times.

1105

**Engine 1.** I ordered Engine 1 via radio to evacuate all civilians from the Parkwood Apartment complex. I also ordered our Firefighter to Acting Lieutenant and take command of Truck 1. I continued to assist at the Command Post. It then became necessary to relocate the Command Post stopping at several locations and eventually to Highway 24 and Broadway. I continued to assist the Command Post and the staging area at Country Club and Broadway Terrace with logistics and updates for Division M.

1105

**Truck 15** responded on the second alarm to Grizzly Peak Boulevard and Grizzly Terrace. Battalion 2-A assigned Engine 6 and Engine 21 with Truck 15 under my command for this sector. We immediately attacked the fire threatening homes in this area on the north-side of Grizzly Peak Boulevard dragging lines from Engine 6. Engine 21 came in on the eastern side with a line. After knocking down the perimeter of this area we set up lines on Grizzly Peak. (Note: There are no other times presented for Truck 15 A. The Grizzly Peak, and Grizzly Peak Terrace stand was fought throughout the day. Refer to Section 4: Chronology of Location, and Section 5: Chronology of Engine Companies for a more complete accounting of the Grizzly Peak stand and of Truck 15 A.)

1105

**Engine 4** arrived at Grizzly Peak Boulevard and Marlborough Terrace, behind Engine 25. Engine 15 was also at this location. Two civilians – one in a car, and one on a motorcycle – were blocking the intersection. Engine 15 crew directed these people away from the scene. Engine 25 went down Marlborough Terrace with Tank Wagon 25 ahead of Engine 4. Engine 10 had preceded both Engine 4 and Engine 25. Engine 25 was parked in front of 7160 Marlborough Terrace. Engine 4 was parked next to the green-top hydrant about 150 feet up the hill from Engine 25. Engine 10 was parked in front of 7145, with another hydrant.

1105

**Battalion 3-A** responded to the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) on the second alarm from a previous fire on Campus Drive, and after meeting Engine 4 at Joaquin Miller Road and Skyline.

**1105**

**Engine 24** responded down Marlborough Terrace, Norfolk to Buckingham. Spotted at hydrant in front of 7180 Buckingham. Used Stang gun (1 1/2" tip) on head of fire-winds turned stream 90 degrees from fire. Used 2 1/2" pre-connect on East bank of Buckingham-1 1/2" pre-connect on East side of 7185 Buckingham-saved four story (7185) - shingle-sided dwelling and one story (7180) dwelling worked with OKL Engine 8 and EBRPFD #5675-winds strong-lost house next to 7180 Buckingham. Used chain saws to fall trees near to 7180 Buckingham. Fire came down North of our position and parallel to Buckingham - crossed below our position cutting us off our egress - hydrant continued to flow until approximately 1500 hours - used tank wagon to drag 3" hose up Buckingham to use as supply for engine.

**1106**

**Patrol 28** responds.

**Engine 28** requests another Pumper at the foot of Gwinn Tank. Command suggests either Engine 4 or Engine 6 to respond to the Tank. Engine 25 responds to the Tank.

**1107**

**THIRD ALARM.**

**Location is Grizzly Peak.**

**Engine 25** 'on-air'.

Medical calls are cancelled.

**Truck 15** responds via Claremont.

**Engine 25** to Marlborough and Norfolk. Report of a fire just starting

**1107**

**Engine 25** responded on the second alarm to the intersection of Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace. Engine 25 used the hydrant at 7160 Marlborough and worked on 7 dwellings. Saved 7156, 7160, 7126, 7130, 7145 and 7165. Lost one). We worked with Engine 4, Engine 10, Engine 15, Engine 19, a crew from Contra Costa Co. Fire and their Captain. Used 600' 3", 800' 1 1/2", 200' 2 1/2" and 1 Stang gun.

**1109**

(EBRP) 5632 asks 5675 to update the situation for Oakland. 5675 advises that he is in radio contact with Oakland Fire and also that "I've got that hot spot knocked down . . . I still see two more way inside the burn. The flank is out." 5632 asks, "Do we need help from them (Oakland)?" 5676 responds "I don't know Jeff. The way things keep popping up. I think we might as well just keep them coming."

**1110**

**THIRD ALARM** report to Marlborough.



1112

(EBRP) Dispatch card time stamp indicates that CDF has been notified and is 10-49 (radio code for enroute).

1110/1115

Engine 8 ready to go on service, but can't get through on Channel 1.

1110/1115

Engine 6. Proceeded down Marlborough Terrace across Norfolk onto Buckingham. Stopped at 7101 Buckingham, Brush 24 was blocking the narrow road, they had a line out and were working that vicinity. Lieutenant from Training 2 pointed out that the lady from 7101 Buckingham was wetting things down. There was a pool at that site. They took up a defensive position at this structure. The fire was 100 yards away, burning behind 7151 Buckingham, burning up and left of Gwinn Tank, up towards Marlborough Terrace and Grizzly Peak. Battalion 4's car was blocking the driveway access, so we moved the Chiefs car for access to the driveway. There was a big driveway and a turnaround area, so told the other officer to bring the Tank Wagon up, and turn it around facing downhill.

1113/1115 \*\*\*\*\*

Engine 19 to Battalion 2-A. "We're holding our own. I need someone to take over rig 19 at the hydrant. There's a hot spot in the trees by the Pumper."

Battalion 2-A to Engine 19. "Engine 10 is almost on the scene right now."

1113/1115

Battalion 2-A and Engine 19. "Where is the spot we want most of the companies?" Down on Marlborough. I've got a hot spot that I've got Brush 19 on. He's working both sides of lower road. I think it's onto Norfolk. And I've got this hot spot under the pine trees. The main bulk of the fire is where that hot spot that I was working earlier this morning. It started and moved down the hill from there."

1113

(EBRP) (At this time a major breakout occurs on the lower right flank in an area outside the Saturday burn area.)

1115

FOURTH ALARM.

Engine 10 'on-air'.

1115

Battalion 3-C placed Battalion 44 (spare chief's car at station 17) in service. Reports were being received of fires in the hill area east of Redwood Road. Went 'on-air' to determine the movement and direction of the fire, and which areas were threatened.



1115

**Battalion 2-A (Command)** arrived at Grizzly Peak and Marlborough, and saw the extent of the fire from the top of the hill and ordered a fourth alarm. Took command as IC, and directed Battalion 4-A to take charge of the Buckingham area as Division A and ordered an additional chief officer to respond, intending to make him Division B on Marlborough Terrace. Directed incoming companies to Marlborough and Buckingham in response to requests from Engine 19 and Engine 24. The other Assistant Chief was the additional chief responding and asking about the Command Van vehicle, he was directed to stay with it down below. Reaffirmed the need for CDF air support along with new size-ups of the fire. [Note: the Command Chief became Operations; the other Assistant Chief became Command].

1115

**Engine 15** responded to the fire on the 4th alarm. Engine 15 with the Command Post responded to Grizzly Peak and Claremont, I left one of our Firefighters and the Command Post there and proceeded to Grizzly and Marlborough Terrace. There we took a 300' lead of 5" hose and put the Stang gun in operation aimed downhill to protect the Microwave tower. The wind made our stream ineffective so we changed to a smaller tip for better results. The fire was blown across the road uphill toward the Tower; we were able to extinguish it as the wind subsided briefly.

1115

**Director of Training** received a phone call from the head of FDC. There was a four-alarm fire at the same location as the day before. Needed to come in to help with Operations.

1115 /1125

**Director of Training** responded to the fire from Moraga, taking 10 minutes from the Caldecott Tunnel. Saw a huge column of smoke coming from the north-Oakland hill area. Called the FDC and relayed the information seen in the hills. Was told to respond to the incident, and not to Operations. Travelled Highway 24 and Fish Ranch Road. Got off at a side street and proceeded to Grizzly Peak with heavy traffic.

1115 \*\*\*\*\*

**Division A to Command.** "I'm up on Grizzly Peak where would you like me?"

**Command to Division A.** "Work your way down there to Buckingham. They're reporting a structure fire down there. You'll be Division A on Buckingham."

1115 \*\*\*\*\*

**Tunnel Command.** "Command Post is on Grizzly Peak."

1115

**Engine 24** On Buckingham, saying that they have cut the fire off on the west-side of the structure.

1115

**Engine 8** was attempting to go in service after their previous assignment. Because our location was so close to the fire (Highway 13 and Broadway Terrace), I elected to respond directly to the fire. I attempted to notify FDC of my actions on both radio channel 1 and channel 2, but was unsuccessful. Consequently, Engine 8 does not show on the dispatch records as ever having reported to the fire.

1115

**Engine 8** is to respond to 7140 Buckingham. Command assigned us via radio to 7140 Buckingham. We were unable to reach that address due to other apparatus and civilian vehicles blocking the street. At this time we observed a fast-moving brush fire threatening 7235 Buckingham – a large, three story house. Our initial action was to take a 200' supply lead from the hydrant at Tunnel Road and Buckingham. We then "pumped at the scene" in front of the driveway of 7200 Buckingham. Here we joined Engine 24 who was operating from another hydrant just around the corner from us. Engine 24 was providing water to the crews at 7151 Buckingham and also supplying a 300' 1" line to the upper corner of 7235 Buckingham. Their 1" line was being staffed by a civilian volunteer, who had shown up with full firefighting gear and was quickly put to work.

1115

**Battalion Chief 3-A (Dispatch IC)** arrived at FDC. The head of FDC and another Captain had requested air operations from CDF and also from a private company.

1117/1119

**Engine 19 to Command.** "It's really spreading up to the . . . on the north-side of the canyon again where we were this morning behind the houses on Buckingham."

1117/1119?? \*\*\*\*\*

**Command.** "Any engine companies not committed yet call in."

1117/1119?? \*\*\*\*\*

**Engine 4 ??, Engine 19 ??, and Command.** "From my location below Parkwoods it looks like the fire is actually running up the canyon and going east away from what burned yesterday. "Yeah, it's going to run clear up to Grizzly it looks like." We have a fire on 2 fronts."

1119??

**Engine 2 and Command.** Beneath the Tank down here you have a fire beneath the Tank. Down here you have a fire running . . . the direction of the original fire. . . heading towards the gully that wasn't burned out yesterday, going west."  
"It looks like the houses on Bay Forest may be in danger."

1119??

**Truck 1** to meet the Command Van on the Tunnel off-ramp from Highway 24. The Command Van is supposed to be responding there.

1119??

**Division A.** "This fire is spreading fast towards Marlborough Terrace." Engine 25 responds to Marlborough Terrace. Division A moves to Marlborough from Buckingham.

1119??

**Command to Truck 15 ??.** "Follow Engine 6, they're going to have to protect homes here on this new subdivision, Grizzly Terrace."

1119??

**Engine 19.** "I'm up at the Tank now I'm looking down on my flank, on the west flank and it doesn't seem to be spreading up the hill. It's spreading laterally towards Norfolk."

1119

**Training 2** on the scene.

1119

**(EBRP) 5675** asks Dispatch to contact CDF again and "tell them we're gonna need helicopters out here. I don't know if Oakland's contacted them yet or not. We don't have contact with them, but this is getting bad out here."

1120 ?? \*\*\*\*\*

**Training 2** has a structure fire on the roof at 714? Buckingham.

1120 ?? \*\*\*\*\*

**Division A.** "We've got a structure fire, fire going back down the hill, it's going to jump Buckingham any minute."

1122 \*\*\*\*\*

**Command and Oakland 1.** "The Command Post is supposed to be on the way. I want you to get in touch with them. Put them on Channel 3 and have them report to the off-ramp just before upper Broadway, just before entry to the Tunnel and get me a Truck company." "What is the Command Post location . . ." "The final off-ramp before the freeway, or before the Tunnel, upper Broadway. And have the Command Post here and have them come on Broadway parallel to the freeway or they're not going to get here. And have the Truck company come up to assist." ". . . where is staging for CDF and other units." "I'm going to have 2 staging areas. The initial one will be at Hiller and Tunnel Road and send a truck company to that location to set up a base."

1123

**Dispatch IC.** Returned to FDC and coordinated activities for the rest of the city. I delegated the following activities and functions to manage the various demands of the fire and the rest of The City.

- **Fire Dispatch Center**
  - Requested Mutual Aid and other support



- Ordered OES Staff Command Team
- Requested Strike Teams
  - First call approximately 1130
    - 10 Strike Teams from Lawrence Livermore Lab
- Requested Air Support
  - Approximately 1105 from a private company
  - Approximately 1116 from California Department of Forestry (CDF)

(Refer to Battalion Chief 3-A report in *Section 6: Reports from the Fire Officers* for a more complete listing of duties. Those duties listed here are important for a chronology of time sequence.)

### 1125

**EBRP at Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace.** The engine went first, and their pick-up went afterwards. Going up the road. Red and black, fire across the road. Battalion Chief's car was on the road and fully on fire. There was other car in flame. A garage, and driveway was burning. We were trying to make the turn in the road. There was a power-line bouncing up and down on the road, and there was flame across the road. We couldn't get out. We had waited too long. Backed up into driveways which were already on fire. 5632 went down first. There was solid flame. The 2 OFD were on the road. They jumped into the truck. The truck was rocking back and forth because of the wind. Powerlines were going down, and things were exploding. Came down Buckingham in an east direction, came around the corner, and there were 2 Oakland engines between 2 houses. One was Engine 8, and the other was Engine 24. There were hoses all over the street. There were hydrants. There were 12 people on those engines, and another 5 from our crew. There was a civilian ride-along cutting down pine trees with a chainsaw. There were 5-6 civilians that were under the porch of [the big] house, who were middle-aged and calm. Everything was on fire, but the intensity wasn't the same. The fire started to move down and up. While the fire was being fought, we tried cutting a fire break. There were rekindles in this area, and the crew decided to back-fire it. The back-fire worked. The firestorm had moved on, but there were still fires in the area.

### 1126

#### SIXTH ALARM.

### 1126

**Command** skipped the fifth alarm and ordered a sixth alarm as the fire blew up over Grizzly Peak Boulevard and expanded rapidly on both flanks and downhill. Placed companies to protect Grizzly Peak Estates homes and put the Captain of Engine 15 in charge of that sector. Ordered the Hill Area Disaster Plan to be activated and told the other Assistant Chief to assume Tunnel Command as my position had become untenable. Headed for the Command Post location via Grizzly Peak Boulevard, Skyline, and Broadway Terrace, using the car's Public Announcement (PA) system to warn fire on-lookers to prepare to evacuate. Noticed a tremendous increase in the size and speed of the smoke column (downhill and west, making it impossible to see the fire perimeter or front.

1126

**Operations.** "I'm requesting mutual aid 5 engine companies to Grizzly Peak and Fish Ranch. . We have another threat area now which is Bay Forest Drive off Tunnel. I want the six alarm assignment to respond there."

1127/1129

**Division A.** "This thing's up . . . Buckingham coming back down the hill. We got one structure involved. We need some more help up here."

1127 \*\*\*\*\*

**Dispatch IC** is heading back to quarters.

1127

**Truck 3** had changed quarters for Truck 1.  
Truck 3 was 'on-air'.

**Truck 3** and Engine 1 went to the Parkwood Apartments to assist in the rescue and the evacuation of the complex. When rescue and evacuation were complete, all of the structures at the Parkwood Apartments were fully involved in fire.

1127 \*\*\*\*\*

**Command.** "I'll tell you what I want now . . . type-1 StrikeTeams from Alameda county . . . get all of Contra Costa tell them that . . . and you can notify Livermore of this because I don't have the time to go through that procedure. Tell, call Orinda, tell them if they can initiate a Strike Team from Orinda we'll need them up on top."

1128 \*\*\*\*\*

**Oakland 2.** "Set up the Command Post on the freeway off-ramp to Caldecott Tunnel, approach it by Broadway."

1128 \*\*\*\*\*

**CDF** is ordered for aerial strikes on the fire.

1128 \*\*\*\*\*

**Engine 27** is assigned to the fire.

1128

Twenty-thirty minute ETA for aerial strikes.

1128 \*\*\*\*\*

**Command Van.** "We need OPD up here at Fish Ranch and Skyline [amended to Grizzly Peak] to block off the road here."

1130 \*\*\*\*\*

**Battalion ??** ". . . the fire is now crossing Grizzly Peak." Traffic control is being given for Fish Ranch Road and Claremont.

1130

**Battalion 3-B (assumes the position as Dispatch Operations)** saw a large plume of smoke in the Oakland Hills, and responded to Station 1. Reported to Dispatch IC and remained working at FDC.

1130

**(EBRP)** Dispatch tones out for ten additional Firefighters. Eagle 5 (Park District police helicopter) arrives on the scene.

1130 – 1140

**Engine 6.** Winds began to increase, and we decided to advance our 1 1/2" lines in the backyard area to the pool area to develop a defensive posture, so that if the fire advanced we would be able to wet the area down in front of the fire. The situation changed drastically, when waiting for the water and getting the line in place, the pinetrees in the vicinity erupted in flames. Pineneedles which were on the roof began to burn. The fire and wind picked up and swirled. We were trying to get the line charged – the other officer had placed a ladder near the roof from the garage to use to have access to the roof. With the wind, the fire, and the heat – everything turned, and was coming our way moving 50 – 100 yards in less than 15 – 30 seconds. The pine trees were going, coming from the east. The woman was going downstairs and the other officer was going upstairs. The fire was approaching, and the other officer told her to get into the pool. "Where's the water?" The front of the house was on fire. The hose was uncharged and had already burned off the rig. He pushed her in the pool, and the other officer went in after her. I was in the house. An interior window blew out. And the flames came in the house about 6 feet just like a blow torch. I went back outside to the pool and got into the pool with them.

1131

Alameda County (ALCO) is sending a Strike Team.

1131 \*\*\*\*\*

**Personnel 2.** "Chief, we've got the flames all the way up to Grizzly Peak now. It's coming up, it's coming to the road, it's getting ready to cross over."

1131 \*\*\*\*\*

**Command to Oakland 2.** "We need air support real bad. Have they got anybody coming?"

1131 \*\*\*\*\*

**Training 2 to Command.** "Can you get PG&E to shut the power down up here? We got lines that are starting to drop all over the place Chief."



**1132**

**Berkeley.** Acting BFD investigates the situation.

**1133 \*\*\*\*\***

**Division A to Command.** "You're probably not to be stable to stay there, it's coming over . . ."

**1133 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 19??** "We're abandoning the tank."

**1133 \*\*\*\*\***

**Operations.** "The fire is totally out of control on several fronts." 100 acres burning, trees, brush, houses. Give me 5 Strike Teams under mutual aid. Staging will be at Hiller and Tunnel."

**Operations.** "Contra Costa County, we're going to need their assistance also. It's gone over the top of Grizzly Peak."

**1134**

**OPD** starts evacuation from Parkwood Apartments.

**1134**

The Command Van is moved to Tunnel Road off-ramp, eastbound Highway 24.

**1134**

**Orinda FD E-43.** The fire made one incredible run up a small ravine and despite 5 engines hitting it with 1 1/2" or larger hand lines, it went right over the top of us. Amigo - we established a marginally effective supply line from the hydrant and spent the next 45 minutes protecting the house. Finally, our hose line burned through and we were left with no water. When I returned to the front of the house, I was also informed that the hydrant had gone dry.

**1134**

**Orinda FD B/C 45.** The wind was blowing from the east and the temperature was warming. I was met by an Oakland Battalion Chief who asked me to follow him to the command vehicle positioned across the freeway near the east-bound Fish Ranch Road exit. Almost immediately, the Oakland Chief decided to move the Command Post back to the Oakland side, conditions were critical. Smoke was very heavy, brands and burning branches were blowing across the freeway. The decision was made to move the Command Post (near the PG&E power plant). My first assignment from the Oakland Chief was to contact CDF to request air drops and get an ETA for the air support. I contacted a Firefighter and he made contact with CDF between 1140 and 1150. CDF advised that they would be unable to get any air support to the scene for at least 2 hours. This information was given to the Chief in charge of the Oakland Command Vehicle.

**1135**

**Command.** Major evacuation in the area of 7100 Marlborough. Need OPD for that. The fire is crossing Marlborough. "I don't think we're going to stop this thing."

**1135 \*\*\*\*\***

**Division A.** "We evacuated Buckingham. The fire went over both sides of us. We're losing rigs up here now at the Tank."

**1135**

**Orinda FD PW-45.** On Grizzly Peak, CDF was on the scene and we all attempted to check the fire when it reached us, but it simply jumped over us and joined the fire burning above us. We were directed to Claremont and turn left onto Alvarado. We made great progress at stopping the fire until our 2 1/2" supply line went dry, the units started running out of water. The fire encircled us – it was futile to continue and we were being overrun by the fire and heat.

**1135**

**Orinda FD OES 237.** On Fish Ranch Road and Grizzly Peak. After retreating from the original location, proceeded to Grizzly Peak and Claremont. The only available water supply was a hydrant next to an EBMUD water tank. There was very little water available from it, but by using it to supplement our tank water we were able to keep operating. Heavy smoke conditions and threat of falling power lines made operating conditions difficult.

We retreated down Alvarado to the first non-burning house. The hydrant across the street went dry shortly after our arrival.

**1135**

**Orinda FD E-44.** B/C45, E-45, and E-43 dispatched. B/C45 stated he could not get through to dispatch and wanted me to phone them stating they needed an air strike, "houses are going up like crazy."

**1135 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 16.** "Notify any companies that are coming from Downtown, Highway 24 is completely blocked. Do not take it."

**1136 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 25.** "We've got the fire stopped at 7160 Marlborough. It's headed up Grizzly Peak I guess. The two houses here are protected."

**1136/1137**

**Engine 5** is requested to go to Marlborough from Grizzly Peak and Claremont.

**1137 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 6.** "We're at Grizzly Peak Terrace. The fire has gone south on Grizzly Peak from us and it's proceeding south."

**1137 \*\*\*\*\*****Command.** "I want 4 engine companies immediately to the Command Van location."**1138 \*\*\*\*\*****Engine 16** is requested to go to the Parkwood Apartments.**1138/1139****Engine 1 and Truck 3** are at the Parkwood Apartments.**Command.** "Set up some lines on the north-side of the building there to keep it from, to keep . . . from sweeping it."**1139 \*\*\*\*\*****Engine 27.** "We're at Bay Forest, behind Bay Forest. Winds are swirling. Give me 2 more engine companies up here on Bay Forest."**1139**

**Engine 27.** We turned off Tunnel Road onto Bay Forest Drive. At Bay Forest Court, we took our 1st hydrant and lead 150' up the street. At this time, the fire just started on the end house on Bay Forest Ct. Our Firefighter extinguished that house with the use of the Stang Gun and the 500 gallons in the rig's tank. Then I noted 5 more houses burst into flames. I yelled back to the Firefighter to turn the water on at the hydrant. He responded, "I did. The hydrant is dry". I was overwhelmed with this occurrence. I reported over the radio at 1141 that "we lost our water from the hydrant". No reply from FDC. We left that 150' of 3" hose in the street and retreated back down Bay Forest to the next hydrant at Bay Forest Place.

Note: The winds were at 60 plus mph and swirling with fire embers, dust and smoke. Spot fires were erupting around us. A firefighter and I checked this 2nd hydrant and it had water. But we didn't turn this hydrant all the way on. After taking another lead, backwards, up Bay Forest Drive, we again tried to operate the Stang gun, but now, we didn't have any water in this hydrant. I ordered this 2nd lead to be left in the street because about 20 structures were on fire and we didn't have anyway to protect ourselves without water except to retreat from this subdivision. Yet, we did knock on a few doors, blew the siren and yelled in attempt to evacuate the sub-division. We saw no movement except an OPD officer attempting the same. I requested alot more help to this location but, again, got no response. I realized FDC and Command were doing their best.

At this time I heard a urgent request for help from the Captain of Engine 8 at Buckingham and Tunnel. Even though the rest of my crew thought it too dangerous to go down Tunnel Road I ordered it in an attempt to assist Engine 8 and possibly attack the Bay Forest fire from a lower flank position. I did not feel that we couldn't get out of this area if needed. After two turns down Tunnel from Bay Forest Drive we were forced to stop because of major fire spread across Tunnel Road and power lines down and burning in the roadway. I radioed this information in and again no response. We took our 3rd hydrant, here, next to a 5th wheel trailer, in another attempt to save something in the Bay Forest area. The Firefighter and I checked this 3rd hydrant



and had okey water but when we tried to charge the suction, we lost the water, again. The fire was advancing very fast and we were in a heavy fire load area. I now felt threatened and ordered this 3rd lead also be left in the road and we retreated back-up Tunnel Road to Skyline Drive. Note: Now, I'm thinking, where can we find water, when are we going to get help.

**1140**

Red Cross enroute with 15-20 minute ETA.

**1140**

**Director of Training** at Fish Ranch and Grizzly, met the Command Van and Truck 8 with other Oakland units. They were being redeployed from orders from Battalion 2-A. A Firefighter driving the Command Van was directed to go back down the hill to Broadway near the North Oakland soccer field. This is a predesignated location for operations. I followed the vehicle to the east side of the tunnel. All traffic east bound had been halted, west bound was continuing through the tunnel but backed up. Encountered either state police or regional parks police and told him that all traffic on Highway 24 needed to be halted, and to escort us to the east bound lanes to take the van to the other side of the Caldecott. Going against the normal flow of traffic. Went through the center of the tunnel, and got off at tunnel exit, and begin to set up the Command Post. Encountered Operations setting up as well. Begin Command Post operations.

**1141 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 4 to Pumper 25 ???.** "We've lost our water." Truck 3 checks if there is water in the complex. (1145. Pressure restored.)

**1140 /1145**

**Director of Training** Operations was concerned about the Parkwood Apartments, and asked if I would assist at that location. The hillside around Parkwood was fully involved, but couldn't see Parkwood themselves. There was a lot of fire blowing across the freeway. Crossed over the freeway to the other side of the freeway on Caldecott Lane to Parkwoods, but the heat was so intense it was impossible to do this. Tried the maneuver twice, and both times failed. Turned back. Came back across the freeway. The Command Van had been relocated opposite the PG&E substation at Highway 13 and Highway 24.

**1145**

**Engine 19 to Command, and Engine 15.** "We're trapped behind the tank. We've abandoned our rig. We need help to get out." "15 is right above you." Engine 15 ". . . if you keep the big line going off that hydrant you'll protect yourself."

**1145**

**Battalion 2-A** arrived at the mobile Command Post on upper Broadway at the PG&E Substation. Designated Operations and briefed the Oakland Fire Department Chief and Command. Advised moving the Command Post to East Broadway and Highway 24 over Golden Gate Avenue. Remained in the ICS mode.

1145 \*\*\*\*\*

**Command.** "I need 4 engine companies out of the commitment to come on Skyline going north on Grizzly from Skyline to assist Grizzly Terrace."

1145

**Battalion 3-C** approaching Thornhill Boulevard on Highway 13, vehicles were travelling south in the north-bound lanes evacuating the fire area. Approaching Lake Temescal, the fire was seen spreading west to the Contra Costa Road area between Broadway and Broadway Terrace. Instructed an East Bay Regional Parks police officer to continue directing traffic south on north-bound Highway 13.

1145

**Captain of Training** reported to the Command Van after taking a circuitous route through the Oakland hills because the Caldecott Tunnel had been closed by the California Highway Patrol. The Command Van at this time was located on upper Broadway above Highway 13. [Note: The Command Van was relocated twice during the course of this day. The first time to upper Broadway near the PG&E sub-station below Highway 13, and finally to the east-bound lanes of Highway 24 at the Broway on-ramp.]

1145/1200 – 1330

**Engine 6.** We were in the pool for approximately an hour and a half- two hours. We used the bubble-cover of the pool to protect ourselves, splashing water on the cover so that it wouldn't burn. Everything was on fire – the buildings on both sides, the fence, the brush, all the vegetation. The house was fully engulfed. The wind was blowing at about 50 mph, and the flames blew across the pool going in the wrong direction. The wind was blowing the heat and flame towards the deep-end of the pool, where we were. We needed to get to the shallow end of the pool where there was less heat and flame. We told the woman what we needed to do. The other officer got out of the pool, walked around to the shallow end and got in. I took the woman, and we went around the pool together towards the other end. We were afraid of the super-heated gasses and flames burning our lungs. We needed the pool-cover so that we could breathe the remaining air, because the fire was feeding on air. The embers were raining like a hail storm, while we continued splashing water on the cover. We had no idea of the magnitude of the fire because we had no portable radio. The portable radio had been given to Brush 28 for patrol. The Brush Wagon radio was in the rig.

1147 \*\*\*\*\*

**Battalion 2 to Command.** "They're calling for help at Parkwoods." ". . . I got an engine company in there now and I'm waiting for 4 more." (Note: a question about who was in staging came before this answer. The answer might refer to staging or to the Parkwoods.)

**Command to Battalion 2.** "I ordered the Strike Teams to report. I imagine they're not on the scene yet."

**Battalion 2 to Command.??** "I ordered 5 Strike Teams in Alameda County from Contra Costa County. Should have a Contra Costa County 1. . . Orinda. . ."

**1148**

A2 is 'on-air'.

**1150 \*\*\*\*\***

??? "This fire is spreading in several directions. It's taken everything east of the fire – north of the fire yesterday and now it's going in the other direction threatening houses on Grizzly Peak and I don't know how far it's going to go to the south."

**1150 \*\*\*\*\***

**Oakland 2.??** "Be advised we have 7 Strike Teams enroute to the Command Van."

**1150 \*\*\*\*\***

**Command to Battalion 2 ??** "Air support has been ordered. . . We need a lot of volmers. . [bombers ??] . Air tankers have been ordered and are enroute."

**1151 \*\*\*\*\***

**Pumper 20** informs command that the fire just crossed Marlborough Terrace at 7115, with two houses fully involved.

**1151 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 15** needs a water tanker attack.

**1152 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 1 ??** reports that the fire has just crossed between both ends of Grizzly Terrace.

**1154 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 16** reports that they're trying to keep the bottom end of the[Parkwood] apartments from going. "We've been charging the snorkle. We're on the dead-end main here."

**1155 \*\*\*\*\***

Fire is showing on the roofs in the south-end of the Parkwood Apartments.

**Truck 3** is asking for more help at the Parkwood Apartments.



**1200 – 1300****1200**

**EBRP at Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace.** The civilians were moved to another location during this period. The major concern was getting the civilians out of the area. In walking about 200 feet, there were power lines down everywhere, and we knew we couldn't get out. It was about this time that the water ran out [Note: 1215 by other accounts]. The hydrant went dry. Three of the EBRP crew walked back up Buckingham to see what the situation was in getting out of the area. In walking this route, we saw 2 OFD with a woman walking down the hill. [Note: These are the 2 members of Engine 6 who had been trapped in a swimming pool up on Buckingham.] [Note: The 2 members of Engine 6 had presumed they had gotten out of the pool at around 1330, and spent another 15 minutes doing oxygen therapy. EBRP timing was assumed to be 1230 at the latest when the water ran dry. The question remains as to how long a period of time between the water running dry, and the 2 members of Engine 6 escorting the civilian woman down the hill. The time difference remains at an hour to an hour and a half.]

This woman joined the other civilians under the protection of Engine 8, Engine 24, and EBRP. The captain of Engine 8 suggested that since we had a wench on the truck, that we should go down Tunnel Road. We went with the ride-along civilian down Tunnel. At the intersection of Tunnel and Charing Cross, there was a body. We left the body and went further down, clearing the road of debris. We continued down Tunnel and found another body, and left this body as well. Since Tunnel seemed clear, we went back up and got the rest of the civilians. The ride-along lead these other civilians back down Tunnel Road to Highway 24. EBRP stayed on Buckingham continuing to put out hot spots in the area. With the Captain from Engine 8, they went back down to pick up the bodies from Charing Cross and Tunnel. Went down to Highway 24, and realized for the first time how massive the fire was. We took the bodies down to Oakland Tech. (Oakland Technical High School). There were flames above Temescal at this time. We had our eyes flushed out. We left Oakland Tech and came back up to the Command Post. Engine 8 Captain checked in. At the same time we picked up a few volunteers and went back up to the scene. The other EBRP people had left at that point. They had gone back up Buckingham to Fish Ranch. There was an EBRP IC at Fish Ranch.

**1200**

**Engine 27 C Captain (became Engine 39)** Was recalled from home. Reported to Engine 20 and was told to go to Engine 16 and put their spare brush wagon in service (with 2 firefighters) as Engine 39. We were met at Engine 20 by an engine from Piedmont with 4 men.

**1200**

**Engine 1** reports that units at the Parkwood Apartments are fully involved.

**1200**

**Engine 3** was dispatched, and told to report to the parking lot at Lake Temescal. Arrived at the intersection of Broadway and Golden Gate, and Engine 13 relayed information that the road was not passable due to the fire conditions. The Lieutenant from Engine 13 asked if it was possible to pump into the 5" lead that they had taken from the red-top hydrant at Brook-

side and Broadway. Engine 3 did this. A few minutes later, a couple of San Francisco Engines arrived. The Director of Training ordered Engine 3 Lieutenant to take an Engine 3 Fire-fighter and go with the San Francisco units up Brookside Avenue and try to make a fire-stand.

**1200**

**Director of Training.** The Chief was at the Command Post. Captain of Training, and other members of Truck 1. Stayed for a few minutes, and relaying information and observations and suggestions. At that time Command asked me to try and discover what the extent of the fire was on the other side of the freeway. If it had jumped Highway 13 and Highway 24 into the Chabot Canyon area. The fire was coming down Chabot Canyon and had already burned half-a-dozen homes in upper Chabot Canyon and Roble Road, and all the way to the end of Chabot Road. Needed to get resources at that location. I encountered the Lieutenant from Engine 3 at Golden Gate and Broadway, Contra Costa and College Prep. Tried to establish contact with Battalion 44 to see if we could link up and if he had any resources. Tremendous problems with communications on the radio. Was trying to report conditions to command, but never got through – FDC was always busy. The cellular phone was always busy. Gave up portable radio to the Truck 15 Captain who didn't have a radio (this was in the College Preparatory School area).

**1200**

**Orinda FD E-45.** Responded to the Parkwood Apartments.

**1201**

**Engine 8** "We're running out of water up there. Is there any up there? Is there anybody that can relay from the hydrant down at the bottom of Buckingham. We got a four-way there. Anybody can relay us water? We need it bad."

**1202 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 8** "Don't send anybody down Buckingham. There's parked cars here, the streets are completely blocked. Buckingham is blocked at the 700 block. We need somebody to come in at the bottom of Buckingham, pump into our four-way. We can't get to it. There's power-lines down."

**1203/1204 \*\*\*\*\***

Temescal appears to be on fire.

**1205 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 2 and Command ??** "This is [Engine] 2 adjacent to Temescal. If you want us to go back down and set up Command, we have a large spreading fire with structures eminent with no forces on the scene."

"What's the location?" "... up on Highway 24 adjacent to the Temescal parking lot. No structures yet, but probably within a couple of minutes." "Go to work there and call for help."



1205

**Battalion 44** met Engine 2 Captain on Highway 13. This Captain stated the fire had jumped Highway 24 and was burning the upper Rockridge area, near the Lake Temescal parking lot, in the 6500 block of Broadway. Returned to Broadway Terrace with Engine 2 following, and notified Oakland 2 to assign Battalion 44 to the incident. Began to look for the best location to set up a defensive action along Buena Vista Avenue. First set up at Buena Vista and Contra Costa Road where evacuation procedures had been started by the California State Police and Acme Western Ambulance #223. The smoke made it difficult to determine the extent of the fire but it appeared that a majority of the homes along Contra Costa Road were already involved. With conditions deteriorating, and with limited fire resources, the fire position became untenable. We relocated to Golden Gate and Acacia, at Ocean View. Intended to use Golden Gate from Broadway to Broadway Terrace as a defensive line.

1204

**Engine 12** is 'on-air'.

1207

**Berkeley.** Call from 32 Vicente Road said the fire "... was coming over the hill."

1208 \*\*\*\*\*

**Engine 13** is on Tunnel Road near the Tunnel. They need a location to respond to the fire. The priority is for the Parkwood Apartments on the end of Caldecott Lane.

1208 \*\*\*\*\*

"Did PG&E ever get dispatched up there? We need a lot of power cut." (The location of Engine 8 at Buckingham Boulevard).

1209 \*\*\*\*\*

"This is **Command panel wagon from 42 Moraga**. We're here at Marlborough and Grizzly Peak. We have a tanker with us. Do you wish us to come to the top of Marlborough." They are directed to Grizzly Peak Terrace, where two companies are trying to protect structures."

1210 \*\*\*\*\*

**Command to Oakland 2.** "How are we doing on air support? The only way we're going to get ahead on this is with massive air support." "Tell Command that tankers and helicopters have been ordered and for air support."

1213

**Berkeley. BFD Engine 3** arrived at the top of Tunnel Road and Domingo Way.

1214 \*\*\*\*\*

"Command, we have Engine 13, Engine 18, and Engine 29 enroute to your location, the four engines that you ordered."



1214 \*\*\*\*\*

**Battalion 44.** "We have houses on fire on Contra Costa." "I got a Command Post set up at Contra Costa and Buena Vista. As soon as you can get some company, start moving that way, please."

1215 \*\*\*\*\*

**Engine 2.** "We're on Buena Vista. We're going to commit ourselves to this fire."

1215 \*\*\*\*\*

**Engine 8** reports that there are two rigs on Buckingham with no water. Would like to have a zone valve opened, or something.

1215

**Engine 8. Buckingham Boulevard.** After making the repair, we turned on the hydrant again – the hydrant was dry. The only water we had left was 500 gallons on Engine 8, 500 gallons on the EBRP pumper, and 300 gallons on a brush wagon. Running out of water presented a new challenge. There was still plenty of fuel surrounding our position – mainly unburned trees around one house and heavy brush next to the shingle house where we had stopped the fire earlier. The wind had calmed and the fire around us had subsided considerably at this point. Houses had been reduced to burning piles of debris and the brush was slowly burning itself down. Unfortunately, I was worried about the wind-storm returning. During the height of the storm, I estimate that between Engine 8 and Engine 24, we were flowing 1600 to 1800 gallons of water per minute. If the still smoldering brush reignited or if either of the remaining houses caught fire, the 1300 gallons aboard our apparatus would not be enough water.

1215

**(CDF-JE)** E1661 and 1674 arrive on scene we try to access fire spread on north side of fire and determine if it spread into SRA. At that time, fire was moving south and west into Oakland and Berkeley with 10-30 mph winds.

1215 \*\*\*\*\*

"Engine 2, Captain . . . can you come over to Buena Vista here off of Broadway Terrace?"

1215

**Berkeley. BFD** calls their first alarm assignment. BDF Engine companies 2 and 5, as well as BFD Truck 5, Paramedic Ambulance 113, and the Assistant Chief respond.

1216

**Berkeley. BPD** Close Tunnel Road to all traffic and began to evacuate the upper Tunnel Road area. Lieutenant continues up Grandview and Westview and saw rapidly moving fire sweeping down the far ridge.

**1217 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 3 to Command.** "We're with Engine 13. We're cut off from getting up to your position. Engine 13 asked us to pump into a lead. They're going to try to protect some houses here at Broadway and Golden Gate."

**1217 \*\*\*\*\***

**Truck 3.** "We have a water shortage up here and we need some more manpower."

**1217/1218 \*\*\*\*\***

**Operations to Command.** "I hope we got a lot of help coming, because this thing is now going towards Broadway Terrace. I guess you heard they got an outbreak. They got going on Contra Costa. We got multiple new fronts."

**1218**

**Battalion 44 to Operations** "I'm at Contra Costa and Buena Vista. I got about 15 houses involved. Helicopter 106 is working on our flank. I ordered 10 additional engine companies. If we could move an engine company from the top of the hill that's not committed down here, we need them desperately."

**Operations to Battalion 44.** "Up the hill they're totally committed and overwhelmed."

**1218 \*\*\*\*\***

**Oakland 2 to Command.** "How about 10 engines from San Francisco. Somebody ordered 10 engines from San Francisco, and let's get them going to Contra Costa."

**1219 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 3 (in Eagle 5).** "You're about to lose some houses on Golden Gate and the fire has jumped Highway 24."

**1219 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 26.** "We're at Golden Gate and Broadway Terrace. Can we help you from here?"

**1219**

**Truck 15** is at Golden Gate.

**1220 \*\*\*\*\***

**2026 Wagon.** "We've got a house fire on Country Club Drive, structure fire."

**1220 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 26 ??** "Country Club Drive. . . We're at Romany and Golden Gate now."

**1220 \*\*\*\*\***

"Engine 26, report to Battalion 44 at Contra Costa and Buena Vista."

**1220**

**(CDF-JE)** E1616, E1661 and E1674 proceed to Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace. Meet with Oakland F.D. Captain with two crews from truck and engines attempting to save structures. Fire had burned that area earlier. Had E1661 try to extinguish power pole burning half way which was threatening to break and endanger equipment nearby.

**1223 \*\*\*\*\***

**Command.** "Advising that we have 6 air tankers and 6 Helitac units enroute to your location. No ETA at this time."

**1223 \*\*\*\*\***

**Command.** "I want 10 engine companies from San Francisco, . . . and have them to report to Tunnel and Hiller."

**1224 \*\*\*\*\***

East Bay MUD is going to open the zone valves.

**1224**

**Berkeley. BFD** The Chief of the BFD contacted their Communications Center and ordered an immediate recall to duty of all chief officers as well as firefighting personnel.

**1225**

**Berkeley. BFD** Engine 3 was fighting the spot fires along Vicente. Berkeley Command is assumed.

**1225**

**Engine 8.** "We're trapped between the lines of fire here. We got no water. Is it possible to drag a lead across the burned out section coming down from Westmoreland. I'm looking at a big transmission pole. If we come down the canyon, we'll drag a lead through the burned out section to supply us with water. We got 3 rigs and two houses we might be able to save."

**1225 \*\*\*\*\***

One unit from Emeryville responding through Tunnel and Hiller.

**1226 \*\*\*\*\***

**Oakland 2.** "We have a report of a person unable to get out. He's some type of patient. He's stuck behind a fence at 1516 Northhill Court. "

**1226- 1227**

**Berkeley. BFD** Engine 5 began firefighting operations in the Roble Road area (in Berkeley).

**1230**

**Berkeley. BFD** Lieutenant establishes Roble Command and remains on duty for the next 16 hours. Calls for a second alarm, and BFD engine companies 1 and 6, and BFD Truck 2 respond.



**1230**

**Orinda FD E-45.** Due to the advanced stage of fire in all buildings of the complex, and the lack of consistent water supply, a defensive strategy was adopted.

**1230**

**(CDF-JE)** Met with F.C. Drager and Helitack crew. We access that we could only try to slow spreads to north into Claremont Avenue (we did not know how far fire was down hill into Berkeley at that time). We felt that we could only take independent action as a group on that side of fire, we could not make radio contact with Oakland command. F.L. from Oakland attempted to try contact with his commander, but it did not appear successful.

**1200 /1300**

**Director of Training** tried to connect with Battalion 44 and involved briefly at Buena Vista between Acacia and Hill in the area around Chaumont Path.

Engine 2 was attempting to make a stand, and fire-control operations in back of Buena Vista were working the rear yards from Contra Costa. The fire was already burning houses on Contra Costa Road. Engine 2 was on Buena Vista. They were disengaging from this location. I attempted to hold them there, to stop them so that other resources could help them make a stand to keep the fire from spreading on Buena Vista. Engine 2 had a good hydrant supply, and a 5" lead, but the fire was beginning to burn on either side of Buena Vista. I told them to hold, that a stand could be made, went around the block and encountered Engine 29. Got 29 to bring in a lead from Hill Road out Buena Vista, and City of Alameda Engine company. Got them in place on Buena Vista. Wanted them to hook up with Engine 2, but Engine 2 was too far away. The fire was starting to cut off Engine 2's escape route, so told them to disengage. Drop their lines and drive out Buena Vista to Acacia. I went out ahead of them and at Golden Gate and Acacia, found Battalion 44 along with an Engine 2 officer and Engine 26. Attempting to establish a [Divisional] Command Post location and a good place to hold the fire at the intersections of Ocean View, Golden Gate, and Acacia. Conferred with Battalion 44, he was in charge of Division A and then back to the Command Post. Engine 2 worked with Engine 26 until the poor water supply drove them out. I went back to the Command Post, told Command they needed resources to get over Chabot Road, but there were no resources. A Strike Team from San Francisco had just come in, a 5-engine Strike Team. Command said he could have 2 of those engines and the other 3 should go over to assist Golden Gate and Broadway. Directed those 3 engines from that Strike Team to College Prep school and encountered the Truck 15 Captain, and directed him to take command of this area. and direct the activities of the San Francisco engines. I took the other 2 engines to the other side of the freeway to Chabot Road to establish other operations on Chabot Road to prevent the fire from spreading past Chabot Road.

1230

**Battalion 4-B.** From Station 1, was assigned as an Aerial Observer and coordinator for the police helicopter Argus. Communicated with the Oakland Police Department about evacuation and street closures, and coordinated with firefighting activities with California Department of Forestry (CDF) from the air.

1230

**Eagle 5.** "We're with you on the south-side of the fire. On the south-side you now have a quarter of a mile south of Highway 24 burning back up into the trees . . . on Redwood Road, stopping at the road and then the fire is contained. You have CDF helicopters on scene at the present time."

1230

**Engine 4** reported that the water-main on Marlborough Terrace went dry. The engineer operating the pumps from Engine 19, Engine 4, and Engine 25 shut them down. The Lieutenant from Engine 4 radioed Command. After answering questions about location, Engine 4 Lieutenant became Division F. Spoke with Operations, and reported the water-main going dry. Operations asked if there was a suction hydrant. The answer was no. Command directed an engine stationed on Grizzly Peak to try pumping into a suction hydrant they were near. The attempt failed. Called about an ETA on water supply; the answer was that there was none. There was fire on all sides in this location, and no water to fight the fire. This position was abandoned by order of Command.

All the available officers in this area met to prepare to abandon the position. A second concern was that there was a house up-slope and to the east, built on stilts, fully involved with flames. If it burned through, it would fall on to Marlborough Terrace and block the only means of egress. Boulders had already fallen onto the road. Engine 15 and the Contra Costa County crews moved up Marlborough Terrace to prepare hand-lines off their rigs – about 1500 gallons of water still remained in the tanker [tender]. Engines 4, 19, 10, and 25 proceeded to pick up as much hose as possible and to back out of Marlborough Terrace. A car was blocking the egress and was moved by the fire personnel to Marlborough Terrace and Grizzly Peak.

When the companies had arrived on Grizzly Peak, Engine 4 Lieutenant took this car down Marlborough Terrace and ordered two civilians near 7126 to abandon the area, relating that there was no water and that the fire personnel were leaving. Asked that they inform their neighbor at 7145 to leave. Engine 4 Lieutenant the crew and radioed command for reassignment.

1230 \*\*\*\*\*

**Truck 3 to Command.** "We're losing the Parkwood Apartments. Can you get some more units up here please."

**Command.** "We're sending you another engine company with the Battalion Chief for Orinda right now."



**1230 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 28.** "Notify Battalion 2 we've got fire going up the hill on the north side of Marlborough Terrace."

**1230**

**Engine 20B** Contacted Engine 20. Advised that there was a general recall, and was unable to make contact with other OFD numbers from 1200.

**1231 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 24 and Oakland 2.** "We are on . . . Buckingham in the 7000 block. We are out of water on . . . our mains are completely dry." ". . . be advised that we have ordered East Bay MUD. Will contact them again." ". . . this is all hydrants."

**1232 \*\*\*\*\***

**Training 2** "Be advised that the fire is coming down Drury and into Amato at the intersection there. We have no resources to stop it."

**1233 ??\*\*\*\*\***

**??** "Engine 26, relocate down to Golden Gate. We're going to set up a perimeter on Golden Gate."

**1233 ??\*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 26 and Battalion 44.** ". . . it's jumped Buena Vista. It's now down below, and you got . . . it's crowning here actually. If we can get an air drop somewhere in here, we'd get in pretty . . . we may be able to hold it here, but you've got major fire now crossing Buena Vista." "Take your company . . . I want you to go to Acacia and Golden Gate and set up there." "We're going to have to get at least 3 or 4 blocks below this." "That's where we're going. We're going to set up a perimeter line on Golden Gate."

**1233 ?? \*\*\*\*\***

**Oakland 1 or Oakland 2 and Battalion 44.** "Be advised Battalion 44 is relocating to Broadway and Golden Gate. I want all resources to meet me at Broadway and Golden Gate." ". . . "Battalion 44 is going to attempt to hold the fire at Golden Gate."

**1234 ?? \*\*\*\*\***

**Truck 1** will be at Broadway and Golden Gate.

**1234 \*\*\*\*\***

**Oakland 2 to Battalion 44 (??)** "We report a fire going up the hill on Norfolk. We also have 10 units from San Francisco coming to Tunnel and Hiller, and one to you from Emeryville."

**1234**

**Berkeley. BFD** establishes a first-aid station at Claremont Boulevard and Ashby. Additional resources are called for including a paramedic supervisor from the Regional Ambulance Company.



**1235****Oakland 2.** "You have four additional helicopter units responding."**1235 \*\*\*\*\*****Engine 28.** "Notify Battalion 2 the fire's crossed Grizzly Peak and it's headed up Norfolk, the north-side of the hill toward Pacific Bell Tower."**1237 \*\*\*\*\*****Engine 19 to Command.** "I have CDF at Grizzly Peak and Marlborough. I have 2 engine companies and probably 30 guys and one of their Chiefs."**Command.** ". . . I need an air strike unit to hold the fire from moving south (past Tunnel and Hiller)."**1238 \*\*\*\*\*****Battalion 44.** "I've got a number of structures on Golden Gate and below on fire."**1239****Berkeley. BFD** called for their third alarm with the last remaining BFD units responding – Engine 4 and 7.**1240 \*\*\*\*\*****Truck 1 and Oakland 2.** ". . . we have several structures. A report on Contra Costa, Broadway from Buena Vista. " "We'll attempt to get to the ones on Broadway."**1241\*\*\*\*\*****Engine 3 and Oakland 2 ??.** "We're at the College Preparatory School at Brookside and Broadway. The fire is in the eucalyptus trees right behind the school heading this way." . . . "Come up the road and meet Battalion 44 at Brookside and Golden Gate." "We're at a hydrant pumping into a lead. We're fully committed to the pumping operation with Engine 13 and Engine 18."**1245 \*\*\*\*\*****Engine 20** responds to Station 5.**1245 \*\*\*\*\*****Battalion 44 and Oakland 1.** "Do you have any idea where my San Francisco engines are?" . . . "No ETA at this time, Battalion 44. They are enroute. They're going to respond to Tunnel and Hiller per [Command]." ". . . I've got 50 houses along Golden Gate, above Golden Gate. I've asked for 10 engine companies. I'm asking for 10 more and as soon as he can assign some companies for me, I need them, please." (Golden Gate and Acacia with Engine 26.)

1245

**Orinda FD E-44.** I notified dispatch of water supply problem and to relay to EBMUD. It took 15 to 20 minutes to refill water tank and while doing so, dispatch came back that EBMUD was aware of the problem and they were having electrical problems with their pumps. Assigned to structure fire protection area off Claremont Avenue. Each engine company chose a house to protect. There was little or no water supply available, so we utilized 1 1/2" hand lines supplied from the apparatus water tanks. The houses on either side of us became involved and there was very heavy smoke everywhere. Due to the heavy smoke we repositioned ourselves down the street with Engine 16. There was little or no water pressure and because of the heavy smoke and lack of water we were unable to stop the progress of the fire and had to abandon our position.

1245

**(EBRP)** Dispatch puts out an "all call" fire tone-out.

1247 \*\*\*\*\*

**Oakland 2 to Command.** "Battalion 44 is on Golden Gate and Acacia. You have 50 houses threatened. He needs 10 more San Francisco units in addition to the ten we already have responding to Tunnel and Hiller. He needs some help on that ASAP." "Tell him to go ahead and call San Francisco. Ask them to give us 10 more."

1247

**Captain Engine 1 to Command.** "...those 5 units must have went by Fish Ranch Road by themselves. I've been through the Tunnel both sides. There's nobody around here. I have been in contact with BART. ... they have all power to stations between Orinda and Rockridge shut down if we need to cross any of their area." "I need for you to get down to Tunnel and Hiller and meet the Strike Team from San Francisco."

1247

**Berkeley. BFD** Fire conditions became untenable and the BFD Command Post was moved to Tunnel and Bridge.

1250 \*\*\*\*\*

**Battalion 44 to Command.** "I'm trying to set up a perimeter on Golden Gate. I have ... got approximately 50 houses here. I guess about 30 of them are involved, and I need one of those Strike Teams along Golden Gate. Anyway you can relocate one of them?"

1250 \*\*\*\*\*

**Command to Oakland 2.** To divert one San Francisco Strike Team to Battalion 44 on Golden Gate.

1250 \*\*\*\*\*

**Disaster Coordinator 1 (DC1).** Locating to the Command Van. "All fire units on Golden Gate, Oakland fire units on Golden Gate, be advised we're going to try to get a helicopter water drop along Golden Gate."

**1250 \*\*\*\*\***

**Truck 15.** "Is there any way we can get a drop down the canyon on the south side of this perimeter. It's on the edge of a whole group of eucalyptus and it's not burning badly. If it jumps across in the eucalyptus, we're going to have another front."

**1250 \*\*\*\*\***

**Training 1.** Mentions an update for the progress of the fire: upper Broadway Terrace area.

**1250 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 3 and Oakland 1.** "I have a rig at Brookside and Broadway from Emeryville with 4 men. They want to know where to go." "To Golden Gate and . . . Acacia."

Engine 3 also has a Tanker [tender] with 500 gallons of water. Battalion 44 wants them at staging at Golden Gate and Acacia. Battalion 44 also requests a minimum of 2 Strike Teams on Golden Gate because they're losing houses.

**1255 \*\*\*\*\***

**Argus** is trying to land to pick an observer up at the Training Station but can't land because of the winds. Another location in the field west of Channel 2 is suggested.

**1255 \*\*\*\*\***

The fire is coming up the hill at 4848 Grizzly Peak.

**1255 \*\*\*\*\***

**Captain Engine 1 to Command.** "I've been around the area of Tunnel and Hiller. There's no Strike Teams waiting around here. The smoke is pretty heavy. They're probably staged somewhere else."

**1255**

**Berkeley. Albany** Engine A25 assists BFD Engine 1 and 3 in intense firefighting operations on Vicente.

**Pumper 3.** "I have 5 rigs and a Battalion Chief from San Francisco at Broadway and Brookside. They can't go to any other place."

**1257**

A house is starting to ignite on Broadway and Golden Gate.

**1258 \*\*\*\*\***

**Command to Engine 3.** "Tell that Strike Team from San Francisco to work its way over to Golden Gate Avenue. Will you give them directions?"

**Engine 3 to Command** "Right now, San Francisco is at the corner of Broadway and Golden Gate. They've got a bunch of hoses in the street heading up Golden Gate in that direction. Do you want to go over the hoses. Do you want to send manpower?"



**Command to Engine 3.** "Go over the hose. Have them drive over the hose and come right up to Golden Gate and Acacia."

**1258??**

**Berkeley. BFD** An evacuation zone is established in the active fire areas along Tunnel Road, Roble Road, El Camino, The Uplands, Vicente, Alvarado and Bridge Road.

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**1300 – 1400****1300**

**D.C.1 (Disaster Coordinator 1).** "We're at the PG&E substation, end of Broadway next to Lake Temescal."

**1300**

**Engine 4** was assigned to Broadway Terrace and Skyline Blvd. Engines 23 and 27 were already at this location. Lines were already out and houses were being defended on the west-side of the intersection.

Engine 4 proceeded south on Broadway Terrace from Skyline. All the houses on the west-side of Broadway Terrace were fully involved. All the houses on the east-side were intact and unburned.

Engine 4 noticed high voltage towers and wires which straddled Broadway Terrace from east to west. Radioed Command to find out if these wires were energized. Operations mentioned that they were not energized. Houses were burning below the towers and wires.

Engine 4 took a 3" 400' lead (supply line) from the hydrant at Balsom and Broadway Terrace. Used 200' 2 1/2" line to defend the structures on the east-side of Broadway Terrace; also used a 3" line to 2 1 1/2" line, and a 200' of 1 1/2" line from a discharge. Two civilians as well as 2 Firefighters from Truck 8 operated lines. These civilians stayed and assisted for many hours. One of the civilians was a PG&E employee experienced with burned telephone poles and wires.

Disconnected from the hydrant at Balsam and Broadway Terrace and removed all nozzles from the hose lines and dragged all lines attached to the Pumper down to the next hydrant at Broadway Terrace and Pineneedle. Hooked up there with the soft-suction to the steamer connection and continued to put out spot fires on the east-side of the street, and wet down those structures. while putting water on burning buildings and trees on the west-side.

Two houses on the southeast corner of Broadway Terrace and Pineneedle were on fire. One with an attic fire, and the other fully involved. Engine 23 stretched 1 1/2" lines to the house with the attic fire.

**1300 \*\*\*\*\***

**Battalion 44 (relaying a message to Command from the Air-co.).** "Have immediate need for 2 Strike Teams on Gypsy [Lane] toward the top of the fire."

"Have them contact air attack on White Fire."



**1300**

**Engine 39** was sent to the parking lot of the Claremont Hotel. We supplied 18 trucks ladder-pipe with 2 leads from Piedmont's engine, and advanced several hose lines from the parking lot to protect the homes on Alvarado Road above the parking lot.

**1300**

**(Truck 3 at the Parkwood Apartments)** Engine 16, an engine from Orinda, Engine 1, and a command vehicle were on the scene. Set up master streams and attempted to save the front-wing of the front building.

**1300**

**(CDF-JE)** F.C. Drager with Helitack and E-1674, E1661 and Dozer 1642 drive to Claremont Avenue and into Claremont Canyon. We proceed up Alvarado Road noting that fire was backing into Claremont Canyon, but not knowing how far west it had gone into Berkeley. (Dozer 1641 remains on Claremont Canyon Road). We proceed to Alvarado and Amato and see two structures starting to burn.

**1300**

**Director of Training.** All of upper Chabot Road was involved. The fire had burned down to the area of the Rock La Fleche development center, and the Chabot Road Tennis Club. Took the 2 engines to Chabot and Reata, and established a defensive line at Chabot and Reata Court. My attempt was to save the houses at Reata Court and to keep the fire from burning down Chabot Road; there was a good open area behind Chabot School and the tennis courts that abutted onto the freeway. Another goal was to keep the fire from going into Roanoke and Hill Crest, and The Uplands area. We had an engine company bring water from Roanoke to Reata, and work up Reata Court, the other engine company went to Chabot Road and Rock La Fleche center. Another engine company from Colma pumped a lead up Reata Court, and those 3 engines worked for an hour to an hour and a half. I went back up Roanoke to Hill Crest and The Uplands – in Berkeley – to see if the fire had gotten into this area. Encountered Berkeley companies that were operating at the end of Hill Crest Road. The fire had burned up behind Reata Court, the hillside behind Rock La Fleche center, and was coming up into the homes in back of Hill Crest, and Hill Crest Court. Hill Crest dead-ends in a court and overlooks Chabot Canyon. One Berkeley company was working at the end of Hill Crest, but they were overwhelmed by the amount of fire they had facing them. There were also many civilians working who were trying to help them. One of the engines was parked at The Uplands; they tried to move it but they were under-staffed at doing their work in this location. When working this Chabot area, I had become Division B Commander.

**1300**

**Aerial Observer** Made a first-perimeter check of the fire. The north-side of the fire-check was behind the Claremont Hotel, up Claremont Canyon to Grizzly Peak. There were homes on Alvarado, Gypsy Lane, and Dartmouth which were burning, but the direction of the fire was burning south-west, and the burn down the canyon walls was slow, with a heavy cover of smoke, and heat thermals didn't allow penetration to see what was going on.

Continued up Claremont to Grizzly Peak toward Highway 24. The fire was burning up Marlborough to Grizzly Peak, with the home on the end of Marlborough fully involved, where the water tank is, but there were units fighting the fire along Grizzly Peak. We proceeded along Grizzly Peak in a southwesterly direction towards Highway 24.

**1300**

**Engine 4** radioed for air strikes at this location [**Broadway Terrace ??**]. Air strikes began at 1500 just south of this location, and on Farallon Way. In total, there may have been 5 or 6 air strikes in this location by S2 bombers.

Proceeded around the corner to Farallon Way to check the exposure next to the fully-engulfed house. The fire had not reached this house. Stretched a 3" line from Engine 4 to the side yard of 6575 Farallon Way and both Engine 4 Firefighters defended this house – the first house on the ridge east of Broadway Terrace.

An East Bay Regional Parks member with a Tank Wagon was using a 1" line in the backyard of Farallon Way. The line was in the rear yard of 6575 and worked down Farallon Way in the rear yards.

**1300**

**Captain of Training** designated as Division C commander by OFD by Battalion 2 Chief "C" at approximately 1300. Orders were to protect the Claremont Hotel utilizing mutual aid Strike Teams. Requested 2 – type 1 strike teams and a ladder truck company through OFD Dispatch Center (FDC). Established Division C command in the upper parking lot of the Claremont Hotel off of Tunnel Road. The first arriving units were OFD Truck 18 commanded by the Lieutenant and a Piedmont Fire Department Engine commanded by the Lieutenant. Shortly after the arrival and deployment of these units, a type-1 Strike Team from San Francisco – commanded by their Chief – committed this resource to Division C. The Piedmont engine developed mechanical problems and was taken out of service.

Three San Francisco engines were stationed along the rear (the west-side) of the hotel, with each Pumper utilizing a private hydrant. The company officers were instructed to set up master streams (Stang guns) and wet down the trees and brush next to the hotel. Another San Francisco Pumper replacing the disabled Piedmont engine, supplied water to OFD Truck 18's ladder pipe. The fifth San Francisco engine was positioned in the lower parking lot next to Tunnel Road, conducting wet-down operations in the brush and trees. The San Francisco Chief directed operations, extending a 3" hose line through a breach fence to protect homes on Alvarado Road. Additional San Francisco units arrived and were deployed under the command of the San Francisco Assistant Chief.

**1300**

**Engine 25.** We continued our fire attack for approximately 2-3 hours until the fire main on Marlborough went dry – 1215. After a 20 to 30 minute attempt to recharge, the main failed. We reloaded our equipment and hose and abandoned our position.



**1300/1400**

**Division B.** San Bruno company was working on Roanoke, using a lot of volunteer help to move and extend hose lines, to keep the fire from burning Roanoke and Reata Court. They attacked Hill Crest towards Roanoke to prevent further damage on Roanoke and on Hill Crest. One of the San Francisco Engine companies disengaged from what they had been doing, and brought in a water supply from Chabot Road and Roanoke (they were working in the rear houses on Roanoke from below the area that was supplied with fire).

**1300**

**CCCFPD.** Alvarado and Gypsy Lane. After using all of our tank water, we tried unsuccessfully to resupply our water from the hydrant on Gypsy Lane, but there was no water. The winds out of the north were keeping the fire and radiant heat away from the houses on the lee side of Silver Place.

**1301**

**PG&E** is dispatched.

**1305 \*\*\*\*\***

"Be advised we have 2 aircraft approaching 17th and Castro." This area is too small. The planes land in the schoolyard on 18th street.

**1305 \*\*\*\*\***

**Treasure Island Fire Department** calls in to verify information about apparatus needed.

**1305 \*\*\*\*\***

**Oakland 2 ?? to Command ??.** "I can't get through to Eagle 5. I need an air drop immediately . . . at the housing projects. Get ahold of Eagle 5. Direct the next helicopter drop . . . now."

**1307 \*\*\*\*\***

**Oakland 2 and Command.** "Do you have the location of the Command Van ." "The location of the Command Van is fluid. It's at the PG&E substation right now on Upper Broadway."

**1308 \*\*\*\*\***

"22, you contact Eagle 5 and tell them to redirect the air strikes to the fire that's coming over the crown north of Highway 13. . . . get ahold of East Bay MUD . . . East Bay Regional Parks. . . Tell them I want the air strikes diverted on Golden Gate to take care of that fire that's started coming over the crown north of Highway 13."

**1310 \*\*\*\*\***

The Command Van is being moved to the middle of the freeway.



**1310**

**Truck 8** reports that they're at Grizzly and Marlborough, and have finished what they can do there. They are instructed to head south on Grizzly and meet the Strike Team that's on Grizzly south of their position.

**1310**

**San Francisco.** San Francisco Strike Team 2 arrives at the OFD Command Post at Highway 24 and Broadway.

**1311 \*\*\*\*\***

**Command ??** "For 42 there, I want to order at least 10 more Strike Teams from anywhere you can get them."

**1311**

**Battalion 44.** "Ask Command to get a hold of PG&E and shut off all the power in this area between Broadway Terrace and Broadway."

**1312 \*\*\*\*\***

**Command to Battalion 44.** "San Francisco Strike Team here at Golden Gate and Broadway. Do you want them or did you already get your Strike Team? . . . "Request that Strike Team at Golden Gate and Acacia. That's the eucalyptus trees." Battalion 44 needs 2 Strike Teams.

**1313 \*\*\*\*\***

**??** "We have approximately 7 houses fully involved southwest, I believe of Marlborough Terrace just before the horseshoe turn. We need an air strike in here if there is anything like that."

**1315**

The Command Van is going to relocate at Broadway and Brookside.

**1315**

**Engine 3** gives an update on the Parkwood Apartments – fully involved. Command calls for Engine 1, or Truck 3 to respond about Parkridge [Parkwood ??]. Engine 1 reports that all four buildings are fully involved. Orinda is supplying water. Oakland has a 5" line coming from a different direction and attempting to rehook-up their lines. Their lines are busted.

**1315**

**Battalion 44.** At Acacia and Golden Gate, companies were placed at hydrants to set up a water curtain using Stang guns and handlines. The fire conditions were becoming more severe, driven by the high winds; as the large burning trees exposed structures, this added fuel to the fire. Engine 26 Captain and Engine 2 Captain were assisted by volunteers and were directing a valiant effort to save multiple structures at Golden Gate and Acacia. Emeryville Engine 4 commanded by the acting Lieutenant worked on structure protection in the 5300 block of Golden Gate in zero visibility, and in the firestorm attempting to stop the fire spread. Requested resources to form a defensive line, but none arrived. The Captain acting as Battalion 44's aide,

obtained information on downwind fire spread, and gave accurate assessments on personnel, water supply, and fire conditions. This aide was reassigned to Broadway Terrace at Highway 13 to secure any available equipment and to organize and direct mutual aid fire companies working in that area. The Firefighter from Truck Wagon 26 worked the Ocean View area with civilians, attempting to limit the fire spread; they were driven out of the area by the firestorm.

**1315/1316 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 26 to Battalion 44** reports that the wind "is pushing it [the fire] that way. We've got it pretty well right now from moving anywhere south." . . . It's on the intersection of Acacia and Buena Vista. We have one, two, three, four houses totally involved." . . . "Are we going to be able to keep that fire from coming across Golden Gate?"

**1320 \*\*\*\*\***

?? "I'm at the Command Post out on Broadway at Golden Gate. I think they're about to move it."

**1320**

**(CDF-JE)** E1674 and E1661 attempt to protect remaining structures on Alvarado, E.B.R.P. engine also assists with F.C. Drager and Helitack crew. At about this time, JE calls on cellular telephone to M. H. Headquarters and describe situation.

**1321 \*\*\*\*\***

**Argus** leaves from 18th and Market to give OFD an update on the fire.

**1322 \*\*\*\*\***

The evacuation perimeter of the fire up to this time: Claremont and Alvarado, Montclair probably east of Broadway Terrace probably down to 51st street.

**1325**

Shop 2 notified to respond. Shop 1 informed enroute with tankers [tenders].

**1327/1330 \*\*\*\*\***

**Aerial Observer reports from Argus** that Grizzly and Skyline really needs units, because the fire is starting to come up the hill "real good". Again from Argus "I'm up here at Grizzly and Claremont right now. We got fire burning on the downhill side towards Contra Costa. It's no problem at this time, but you better get some units up to Grizzly and Skyline as soon as possible." Battalion 44 wants a report from Argus about the south-side of the fire (his location is Acacia and Ocean View).



**1330**

**Engine 6.** When we came out of the pool, we were concerned about the rig's fuel tank rupturing, so we got back into the pool. Concerns about electrical power and other hazards, such as fallen trees falling into the pool. Helmets and shields did protect us, but not the woman. She had no protective clothing. After getting out of the pool, it was like walking in an open bar-beque – the residual heat, the embers and the ash. We had to get back into the pool a couple of times because it was so hot. We had the beginnings of hypothermia the last 15 minutes in the pool. We again got out of the pool, with everything burned. There were fires on the tires of the brush wagon, which we put out with a bird-bath, and the fire had burned all of the wood off the handles of the fire equipment – axes and shovels. There were two air masks (MSA's – Mias Safety Appliances) the hoses were destroyed and burned. We took 15 minutes of oxygen therapy, there was oxygen in the tank, spent time revitalizing ourselves. Afterwards we spotted apparatus at the corner of Tunnel Road and Buckingham (the large 4-story house still standing). We took Engine 24's Tank Wagon which had been abandoned on Buckingham, and commanded it. We left the woman at the Buckingham house where there were other civilians and Engine 8 crew. At this time, we assisted Engine 24 and Engine 8, and the East Bay Regional Parks Pumper. They had a float pump, and because they had lost their water, they needed water. They were to put their float pump into the pool that Engine 6 had just left. They wanted this water for their rigs, so they drug the hose up the street towards 7101, with assistance of the crew, and got the pump into the pool, and proceeded to fill all the tanks. [Note: An estimate of 20,000 – 30,000 gallons of water in an environment where all the hydrants were dry. Engine 8 had called in dry hydrants at 1215.]

Took the 24 Brush Wagon, and took bolt-cutters to Tunnel Road and Skyline, and cut wire from the poles along Skyline. (This took several hours to do.) We went around Grizzly Peak and Grizzly Peak Terrace, and found the rest of our crew on Grizzly Peak. Up on Grizzly Peak, Truck 15's Captain was in charge of the rest of Engine 6's crew. But I told him that Engine 6's crew was exhausted. We were mopping up until 0400 the following day.

After the fires were put out, and discovered that the radios were working, (for time reference) we found out the fire had advanced to Golden Gate and Acacia (and that they were giving up their position), and they were going to set up again on Golden Gate and Contra Costa Road (or Country Club) with 3 homes on Sheridan and Cochrane were beginning to burn. [Note: The time in which the streets Golden Gate and Acacia were burning can be verified in the chronology. Engine 6's approximations are just that – approximations.]

**1330**

**Engine 25.** Under the direction of Operations, we were directed with Engine 10, Engine 15, Engine 19, and Engine 5 to Claremont and Alvarado Road. At this location, we filled our tanks with a live hydrant and looked for our Division Leader. After a discussion with our Division Leader and learning of no specific plan or need at this location, and combined with a desperate need for help at other locations, we called for another assignment.

We contacted Division C Command who was in need of help to protect the threatened Claremont Hotel. At this time, Engine 25, Engine 10, Engine 15 and Engine 19 were set up at a fire



stop between #10 to #50 Alvarado Road. Engine 19 supplied Engine 25 from the hydrant on the corner of Tunnel Road and Alvarado Road.

**1330**

**(CDF-JE)** B.C. JE tries to access fire spread behind homes on Alvarado and went down unknown street off Alvarado to find fire burning across road and igniting structures into path - numerous fire brands are starting roof fires and vegetation fires (spot fires) in front of main fire, many residences are fleeing area and some are on roofs with hoses or have left sprinklers on roofs.

**1330**

**Engine 25.** At Claremont and Alvarado Road - Met with Division Leader - no desperate need for help at this location.

**1330**

**Aerial Observer.** The fire had not crowned on the Swainland ridge where the PG&E power-lines are set up. The fire line had not exceeded to the south-west beyond the crest of the Swainland hill.

While flying in the area of Grizzly Peak, saw that Contra Costa County had range fires burning, with helicopters providing bucket drops. Called command, with no response, so called Operations telling them we had no aerial coverage at that time. There was another aerial flight by a Firefighter in the Eagle helicopter flying near Claremont. Another perimeter was being mapped, concentrating on the east-side of the fire, and the south-west perimeter to help evacuation directives. They were flying over upper Broadway Terrace and down Swainland, Fairlane giving residents the directions for evacuations being announced from the helicopter. Residents were disbelieving of the warnings they were hearing.

**1330 \*\*\*\*\***

A priority at 7120 Pinehaven, an invalid whose house is going up. Need any units in the area to respond.

**1330**

**CCCFDP.** Alvarado/Claremont. Several attempts were made to contact CDF B/C 1612, without success. These homes were all on very steep terrain and canopied with heavy brush and trees. We repositioned up the street to clear a path for PG&E to come through and cut the downed power wires and fallen telephone poles.

**1333/1335\*\*\*\*\***

**Conversation in transcripts:** Battalion 44 becomes Division A, Director of Training becomes Division B, Captain of Training becomes Division C. Their respective areas: A= Acacia and Golden Gate, B= Chabot Road, C= Claremont.

1335 \*\*\*\*\*

**Division B** acknowledges 2 San Francisco engine companies located at Reata and Chabot Road, and that everything from the tennis courts on Chabot Road up to the Tunnel is involved. Trying to establish a line at Chabot and Reata. Going to need more resources – at least 1 more 5-engine Strike Team to try to keep it from going any further.

1335 \*\*\*\*\*

**Captain from FDC to Command** has ordered an entire overhead team to Raimondi Park, the same location as the earthquake. "Also 13 additional strike teams – 6 type-3 and 7 type-1. We've got 6 more air tankers and 6 more helicopters. **Command responds** "I want the next available Strike Team after you. I want you to move 2 Strike Teams to the Claremont Hotel under the control of [Division C] then I want the next available Strike Team to go to the end of Chabot Road and contact Division B. . . Division B is going to need an additional Strike Team immediately."

1335 \*\*\*\*\*

**Command and Aerial Observer (Argus).** "We can't get in too close on that ridge. So far in back of Montclair it's all covered with heavy smoke and flames. Looks like several buildings involved. We need air strike along Skyline Blvd. so don't walk up these hills. It's moving fast up along Broadway Terrace now." Argus is put in charge of air strikes, with direct contact with CDF through Argus.

1336 \*\*\*\*\*

**Engine 21** "Fire is going to jump Skyline and go over the hills into Contra Costa at this point." Contra Costa has been notified of the fire on Skyline and Grizzly Peak. "We're going to need some help up here. We've only got one engine company with lots of homes and lots of people up here."

1336/1337 \*\*\*\*\*

**Aerial Observer (Argus) to Command.** "Starting at Mountain Blvd. and going up Fairlane, we've got a heavy fire line there and no units on that side. It's a downhill burn, but I think we're going to be in trouble down there." "Give me all the air strikes you can right in that area."

1338 \*\*\*\*\*

Establishing command at Ashby and Tunnel Road.

1338 \*\*\*\*\*

Directing Eagle 1 to 18th and Market so he can land via the helicopter landing zone.

1339/1340 \*\*\*\*\*

**Engine 16** reports from Parkwood Apartments that there is a main transmission line burning overhead. Concerned where it's going to come down.

1340

**Division B** reports that 2 engines are working Chabot Road and Reata. All units are committed, and need 1 more Strike Team – 5 engines and other support personnel, and a portable radio. A Strike Team is directed to Division B.

1343 \*\*\*\*\*

?? "I'm on Acacia and Country Club . . . I've got fire, it's overrun Golden Gate. We're trying to hold on Golden Gate. We're not able to do that. I'm on Acacia at Golden Gate at Country Club. . . I've got 2 houses, 2 roofs on fire, 2 on Margarido. I need those Strike Teams to come in here on Country Club from the back of the fire and we got to start working these streets."

1343 \*\*\*\*\*

**Engine 4** reports that their main went dead on Marlborough while covering 6 houses.

1344 \*\*\*\*\*

**Truck 8** missed the Strike Team. Command wants them on Country Club and Bowling Drive, with Strike Teams coming up Broadway Terrace and . . . Country Club.

1344 \*\*\*\*\*

Broadway between Broadway Terrace and Country Club needs evacuation.

1345 – 1415

**Engine 27.** Our Firefighter and I went back up Broadway Terrace to our fire stand. The fire is almost there. Engine 23 Lieutenant has taken the Broadway Terrace side and I took the Skyline side with our crews and four volunteers divided in between. We started flowing lots of water. The pressure was minimal. The fire and winds were intense. The smoke was thick on us.

Near the end of this stand, our Firefighter, one of our volunteers, and I took Brush 23 up the same private road which parallels Skyline to work on the fire still advancing on homes. With the help of another Firefighter and volunteer we used many garden hoses and the 1-1/2" from Brush 23 to stop even more structures from being lost.

1345 \*\*\*\*\*

"Marlborough Terrace we have 4 rigs trapped here by some down power lines that would be available for service if the power lines were moved."

1345 \*\*\*\*\*

**Division D.** "I'm on Broadway Terrace and Sheridan. I've got 2 houses on the west side of the street starting to go. If you got anybody we can free up we need them right here." ". . . there will be a 250 gallon . . . Pumper showing up for you on the freeway at Broadway Terrace and Highway 13. Flag them down."



1345

(CDF-JE) B.C. JE goes back to staging at Fish Ranch and notify DR of situation on Alvarado - JE considers Claremont Canyon critical. He has some engines on scene (Strike Team JE thinks) JE moves them down to Alvarado Avenue for structure protection.

1346 \*\*\*\*\*

**Division A** reports the police are there to evacuate and wants to move his Command Post to Country Club and Beechwood.

1347 \*\*\*\*\*

**Strike Team 2** at Parkwood Apartments has a patient and needs a Code-3. Has been waiting for 20 minutes.

1347

**Engine 37** is 'on-air'.

1348 \*\*\*\*\*

**Argus** reports there is a second column of smoke from the Shephard Canyon area. Also reports the fire spread to Redwood and Carson. Argus is directed to get air strikes in that area. An Air Tanker is enroute now and standby.

1349 \*\*\*\*\*

**Division C** reports that there is more fire coming over (the intersection of Ashby and Claremont). Berkeley has a Battalion Chief and has set up command at Roble and at Highway 13.

1350 \*\*\*\*\*

Marlborough Terrace becomes Division F. Engine 4 Lieutenant becomes Division F Command.

1350

Radioed for more engine companies.

1350 \*\*\*\*\*

**Argus to Command.** "Advise . . . that this fire is totally out of control at the Skyline - all the way to the east end and get units onto Fairlane off of the Mountain if at all possible until our air strike gets here." As far east "right up to Grizzly Peak now. It's extending fast." As far south "it's starting to go up the hill on the other side."

1352 \*\*\*\*\*

**Command to FDC.** ". . . Eagle 5 is going to control the air strike. I want to know immediately when the tankers and helicopters are here and I will tell you where they're going to drop."

**1353 \*\*\*\*\***

**Division F** reports from Marlborough that the main on Marlborough has been shut down, and can East Bay MUD get them water. They have about 6 houses they're protecting."

**1354/1355**

**Engine 24 and Command.** "We're on Buckingham in the 7,000 block. I have Engine 8, Engine 19's crew along with 2 companies from EBRP. . . . We are been trying to find access out of here. We are trapped in this area. "Are you in danger?" ". . . negative. We have about 500 gallons of water. . . ." "you. . . come down Buckingham to Tunnel and get out of there." ". . . trying to find a location out. We have power polls down, down all the way down the road."

**1356 \*\*\*\*\***

**Engine 3.** "We have 6 tactical units at Brookside and Eustice and we're getting overwhelmed at that position." . . . "We need an engine at Claremont Pass and Brookside. The fire is starting to go there. We need it to stop right there."

**1358 \*\*\*\*\***

**Division B.** "We still have the 2 San Francisco engines working in the area of Chabot Road and Roanoke. We need another Strike Team. Also need OPD assistance at least 1 or 2 patrol units to block traffic and do some evacuations."

**1400 – 1500****1400**

(CDF-JE) Battalion Chief establishes another Battalion Chief W. -B.C. JE and old red net at communication with Fish Ranch staging. B.C. JE checks on F.C. D. and at that time they were just holding their own protecting structures. F.C. D. told B.C. JE that HC-106 was less effective because of wind condition.

**1400 – 1600**

**Engine 25** set up its Stang gun and two 3" lines between dwelling on Alvarado. Used 1100' 3", 200' 2 1/2". We stayed in this defensive position until directed to shut down and pick up our lines.

**1400**

**Engine 36** spots fire at Rockridge Boulevard and Prospect Steps. Connects to red-top hydrant at Rockridge Place and Rockridge Boulevard South. Stretch 400' 11/2" attack line for structure working at Prospect Steps. Volunteers stretch 600' 21/2" attack line to F/O 6178 Rock Ridge. Line stays dry, insufficient water. Engine 36 calls for assistance via land line. Wind strong from northeast. Multiple structures working at Prospect Steps and Margarido.

**1400**

**Engine 4** disconnected from the hydrant at Pineneedle and Broadway Terrace and repositioned on Farallon Way at a hydrant half way down the street. Engine 21 had gone down Pine-needle from Broadway Terrace to Farallon Way earlier in this situation. Engine 4 pumped into Engine 21. Engine 21 and Engine 4 operated big lines from a flat roof on Farallon Way toward Broadway Terrace to the west. Engine 27 was also fighting fire from this roof.

**After 1400**

**Division B** There was a real concern about the fire along the freeway. The fire was being pushed along the freeway, and was threatening the homes along Chabot School on Patton. There were no companies at Patton. Went back to the Command Van. There was another Strike Team at the Command Van on Broadway and Highway 24 – this team was from Marin. Type 3 Strike Team went under the freeway at Patton. First engine company from this Strike Team was used to extinguish the fire along the freeway and to protect the homes on Patton and to protect homes on Chabot and Patton to the end of the burn area. This assignment was covered over through to the next hour. This Strike Team was left in command of this assignment

**1400****(Truck 3 at the Parkwood Apartments)**

San Leandro Fire Department and Hayward Fire Department were on the scene. Set up more master streams.



**1400**

**Battalion 44** Relocated Engines 17 and 18 with their respective Lieutenants from Broadway and Golden Gate to a more mobile defensive posture along the right flank of the fire. Engine 3 Lieutenant was working at the College Preparatory School at 6100 Broadway, and Engine 13 Lieutenant was protecting structures near Buena Vista and Golden Gate. There were reports of multiple roof fires behind this position on Brookside and Ocean View, indicating that the fire was surrounding this fire stand. These companies were ordered to relocate to positions which were downwind of the fire to set up a defensive line to limit the fire spread.

**1410**

**ALA-0012** Fire victims found at Charring Cross Road.

**1411**

**Berkeley. BFD** Establishes a base camp at Berkeley High School.

**1415**

**(CDF-JE)** B.C. JE calls M. H. on cellular telephone and Chief R. asks if SRA involved or threatened, B.C. JE said some SRA, but fire was moving away from SRA into Oakland-Berkeley with numerous structure loss and situation not getting better. He wants B.C. JE to go to C.P. Hiller and Tunnel Road and sent B.C. 1612 from Franklin Canyon to help. He also sends 1611 and 5 engines to fire. I told him to have them go to Fish Ranch staging.

**1430**

**Battalion 44** Drove down Ocean View (with zero visibility) to Alpine Terrace where roofs were already on fire. Drove along Margarido Drive to Country Club, and observed several well-involved structure-fires. Set up a Divisional Command Post at Beechwood and Country Club, but this location was not practical. Relocated to Broadway Terrace and Country Club to set up a staging area and Divisional Command Post. These natural boundaries could be used – the Claremont Country Club golf course along Margarido toward Broadway (the Rockridge area) on the west, and the golf course and cemetery along Broadway Terrace and Clarewood to Moraga (the Piedmont line) on the east. The fire could burn into the eucalyptus forest without loss, while fire personnel could concentrate on structure protection. As additional resources arrived, their assignments would be the threatened but still uninvolved structures along the margins of the fire.

**1430**

**(CDF-JE)** B.C. JE travels Claremont Canyon to access situation. At Claremont Hotel, a lot of equipment staged or protecting hotel. At about this time, B.C. JE notices air tankers on fire.

**1430**

**(CDF-9170C)** Started initial attack structure protection Branch 3.

**1430 ??** [Note: This time is unclear in Berkeley notes.]

**Berkeley. BFD** An update of Berkeley's Division B, which includes the Claremont Hotel Area. There are 5 engine companies here including San Francisco Strike Team 2, several Oakland engine companies which include Engine 10, 15, 19, 25 and Brush rig 276, as well as Piedmont Engine 1. The San Francisco Fire Department also had about 80 additional Firefighters who had been transported to the Claremont by a Municiple Railway motor coach.

**Berkeley. BFD** Roble Road area. The Roble Road contingent included Berkeley Engines 5 and 6, Trucks 2 and 5, Emeryville Engine 3, and NAS Alameda Engine 1.

**Berkeley. BFD** El Camino Real area protected by Berkeley Engines 7 and 11, and about 15 to 20 citizen volunteers.

**Berkeley. BFD** Alvarado-Bridge Road area. Two Strike Teams and 1 Task Force were deployed in this area. They included South Alameda County Strike Team 1, Task Force 12, and Strike Team 2143C from Marin County.

**Berkeley. BFD** Upper Alvarado Road-Gravatt area. There was at least one significant operation in this area that involved a relay pumping operation of about 3,500 feet that began at the bottom of Eucalyptus Path and terminated near Robinson Drive off Alvarado. Fire companies involved in this relay operation included Fremont Engine 1053, Union City Engine 1, Hayward Engine 2, Pleasanton Engine 61, and Berkeley Reserve Engine 14. This relay operation was responsible for saving several homes, including 2 on Robinson Drive. There was some overlap of units working in this area as several units that were assigned to the Claremont Hotel found their way up into the area.

**Berkeley. BFD** Upper Alvarado Road -Siler area.

**Berkeley. BFD** Claremont Road-Upper Alvarado area. There were 2 Strike Teams and a water tender assigned to this area to pick up spot fires. When they were extinguished, the Strike Teams were returned to staging.

**1430**

**Berkeley. BFD** South Alameda County Task Force 12 responded to the 100 block of Alvarado Road, and began defensive operations in the area.

**1430/1500**

**Aerial Observer.** Water tankers were on the south-west and east quadrant of the fire. At this point, the fire had jumped Highway 13 to Proctor at about 1430. Continued with evacuations, closing Highway 13, forcing people to use the main arteries.

**1445**

**(CDF-W.M)** Advised ECC that tunnel is closed will go over Grizzley Peak. Advised that was to report to staging at Grizzley Peak.

1449

**Berkeley. BFD** Oakland Command had dispatched a San Francisco Strike Team for the protection of the Claremont Hotel area. There was a concern about the hotel becoming a conflagration breeder. If the hotel were involved in fire, there was the possibility that flying embers would spread the fire deep into Berkeley. This Strike Team was assigned to Division C Command.



**1500 – 1600****1500**

**Aerial Observer.** Contacted operations. The fire had crested Swainland hill, burning down the hill slowly, due to the lack of vegetation in this area.

**1500/1530**

**Aerial Observer.** Told Operations to get a Task Force to Swainland. Trying to keep a head of the fire. The next fire stand would be on Broadway Terrace.

**1500**

**Engine 39** led a Strike Team of 5 engines and a Battalion Chief from Redwood City to Broadway Terrace and Capricorn. The fire was all around us so we relocated to Broadway Terrace and Cross Street to protect homes not yet involved but threatened by fire.

**1500**

**Engine 24.** Tank by float pump in swimming pool under the direction of the Engineer.

**1500**

**(CDF-JE)** Could not find C.P., but came across B.C. B. from Union City who has burn victim with him, regional ambulance arrives and takes him to Alta Bates Burn Center. He informs me that as his Strike Team came through burn area he saw ten burn casualties, one of them an Oakland Police Department. He could not do anything about them.

**1500**

**(CDF-JE)** Arrive at E.C.P. at Highway 24 to College Avenue.

**1500**

**(NOV-J.M.)** A Division Chief JM and a Captain DD reported to the base of the fire located at Margarido Drive and Quail Lane. We encountered heavy winds, and observed five to seven structures fully involved in fire. The wind was blowing from the northwest approximately 30 mph. The fire was spotting ahead to several structures. A single 1 1/2" hose line operating from a fire hydrant was being used by a retired Oakland F.D. Battalion Chief and his son-in-law an active Oakland Fire Department Engineer. I joined their efforts on the roof of 5917 Margarido. I observed for the next several hours many (15-20) structures catch fire by flying brands or exposure by windows. I remained on the roof top protecting exposures for approximately four hours. The fire behavior was erratic and spread was dictated by the wind. When the wind died, so did the rapid fire spread. I left the neighborhood at approximately 1900.

1500

**Oakland Engine 36.** Oakland Engine 41 (Albany Engine 1 with Albany crew and five Oakland fire personnel – eight Firefighters total) drops supply line to Engine 36. Returns to Broadway and Rock Ridge to pump lead. Engine 36 charges 2 1/2" line. Engine 41 splits crew. Half work large line on Rock Ridge, half assist Engine 36 at 6156 Rockridge. Wind strong from northeast. Six working structures between 5926 Margarido and 6001 Margarido Drive.

1500

**Engine 4** The water-main on Broadway Terrace went dry. At this time, one big line was operating directly on the hydrant pressure from Broadway Terrace. The Engine 4 crew defending 6575 Farallon Way had no water. Engine 4 crew joined Engine 21 crew.

Put one of Engine 4 Firefighters in charge. Engine 4 Lieutenant returned to Broadway Terrace to see if any help had arrived. Radioed that the water-main on Broadway Terrace was dry. Was informed that Engine 4's location was on a list for needing help.

The house at the entrance to Pineneedle on Broadway Terrace had an attic fire. There was a charged 1 1/2" line charged at the door. Spent 45 minutes going from room to room punching holes in the ceiling and putting out the attic. After this, returned to Engine 4. The situation on the west slope quieted down.

1500

**Division B** Went back to Roanoke, and Hill Crest area, making sure that this area was secured and under control. At this time I was reassigned by Command as Branch 3 Director. The operational area of Branch 3 was unclear – what had been Division A. Wanted to meet up with Battalion 44 who had been the director of Division A.

1500

**Division B** Major problems with Rockridge Road and Rockridge Place South. There was major fire involvement. There was just 1 Oakland OES engine company – a recall Firefighter. Albany Engine was pumping from Rockridge and Broadway. San Francisco Engine Company (1 engine along with civilians) to lay a supply line from the Albany Engine to the OES Engine pump with 2-3 leads. The Albany engine couldn't supply enough water. There was not enough water to do this because of the water supply in the area. Assigned Engine 5 as a pumping engine company doing relay operations – supplying water to the Albany Company. The San Francisco Engine Company on Rockridge Blvd., picked up an El Cerrito Engine Company and a Richmond Engine Company which had been assigned by Headquarters command, (as single resources) and directed these companies to Rockridge Blvd.

1515

**(CDF-W.M)** At Grizzly Peak briefed by District Chief MC to take one division.

**1515**

**(CDF-9160)** Arrive staging (Fish Ranch and Grizzly) and talked to B-1612 - will meet at staging, wait at staging 30-45 minutes - call 1612. He is tied up at ICP west of tunnel on Highway 24.

**1530**

**Engine 24.** Used engine tank to protect structure at 7180 Buckingham. Smoke clearing.

**1530**

**Division B** There was an El Cerrito Battalion Chief who was working with the Richmond Company and was put in charge of the overall operation at Rockridge Blvd.

Division A Command Post location was Broadway Terrace and Country Club working with Battalion 44 in Branch 3 Division A. Battalion 44 was at the Command Post doing resource-identification mapping – what was the greatest need.

**1530**

**(Truck 3 at the Parkwood Apartments)** San Leandro Fire Department and Hayward Fire Department were released to the Command Center.

**1545**

**(CDF-JE)** 1612 arrives at I.C.P. starts to organize I.C.S. structure. B.C. JE contacts Chief R. and finds out incident management team has been ordered.



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**1600 – 1700****1600**

**Director of Training.** There were not enough resources. A huge fire area and not enough resources. Upper Rockridge, Buena Vista, Golden Gate, Cross Road, both sides of Broadway and Clarewood were in need of resources.

The goal was to keep the fire from jumping across Broadway Terrace. Needed to cut the fire off from Broadway Terrace - not letting the fire get past Moraga. Confine it to Clarewood and Harbord. Not below Broadway Terrace or below Ostrander and Roman Road.

The Helitac units ceased operations. There was no well-defined perimeter of the fire – it was burning in several different locations not one general fire-front. The area around Broadway Terrace, Proctor and Agnes, and Alta was a problem. The area of Hermosa was a problem. There were no common perimeters. We were trying to determine where the fire was. Couldn't link companies in a well-defined line because of the change in the fire's direction.

**1600**

**Engine 20B** went to Station 1. Reported to the Fire Marshal. Advised CDF overhead team enroute. Started 201. Assisted the Lieutenant with log duties. Assisted with check-in supplies. Went to Raimondi Park to set up check-in and a staging area using a cellular phone.

**1600**

**EBRP at Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace.** There had been a report that a Firefighter was down on Norfolk, so the EBRP's first assignment after returning to IC was to dispatch to the location of the Firefighter. The other 2 crew from EBRP took this assignment. It turned out that the person reported down was really the on-duty Battalion 4 Chief. At this same time, the Engine 8 Captain left for reassignment. I was left with the volunteers at the scene.

**1600**

**(CDF-JE)** B.C. JE met with Oakland Assistant Chief and he addressed air attack priorities which B.C. JE radios to air attack over fire.:

- West of Highway 13 - South of Highway 24
- East of Highway 13 - South of Highway 24
- North of Highway 24, air attack has poor visibility to the south due to smoke conditions.

**1600**

**(CDF-9160C)** Reconnaissance Claremont Drive down to hotel. Fire backing down to road and creek. Could bump road in a few areas. Deploy engines along Claremont Avenue down to Claremont Hotel/Resort. Dozers 1641 and 1642 at staging (Fish Ranch and Grizzly) three Delta crews in staging.

**1600**

**Oakland Engine 36** and Engine 41 holding positions. Lose 6156 and 5959 Rockridge. San Francisco Engine Company arrives stretches 1 1/2" lines to F/O 5929 Margarido for exposure protection. Units arrive from Colma, Richmond. Individuals from Palo Alto Fire and Mare Island Fire. Cyclonic wind conditions high heat, heavy smoke and embers.

**1600**

**(Truck 3 at the Parkwood Apartments)** The water supply runs dry. Truck 3, and Orinda's engine, Engine 16 and Engine 1 make a sweep of the garages.

**1600/1630**

**Aerial Observer.** The fire fully engulfed the Pinewood/Swainland area, with wind blowing in a southerly direction. Fire brands were flying into the Mountain View Cemetery and starting spot-fires. Florence and Harbor Drive had big problems. Aerial tankers and helicopters did an excellent job of knocking down the fire-line with water taken from Lake Merritt.

**1610**

**Engine 4** arrived and took a position 300' down Broadway Terrace. Engine 21 arrived about 1630 and took a lead down Farallon Way. Engines 23, 27, 4, 21 and few more volunteers made many more fire stops in this area until about 2010.

**1615-1700**

**(CDF-9160C)** Engines patrol Claremont Avenue. Regional Parks calls - need hand crew Regional Parks deploy two Delta crews from Fish Ranch Road on Hillside to Claremont Avenue. Inventory equipment hotel to staging.

**1630 - 1730**

**Engine 25.** We contacted Division A Command. We were directed to St. Theresa's Church at the dead-end of Mandalay Road. At this location, we met Truck 8 and 2 water tankers [tenders] with the plan to establish a fire stop at the church. After checking the surrounding hydrants for water supply, and finding that they were on dead-end mains, we abandoned our plan and checked back with Division A Command.

**1630**

**(CDF-JE)** B.C. JE is asked to recon the fire with retired OFD Assistant Chief. We recon Broadway Terrace - south of Highway 24 and east of [Highway] 13 and determine it is a feasible point to make a stand, but no fire equipment is available. 1611 offers two engines - E. 1661 and 1674.

**1630**

**(CDF-WM)** Tour of division - local government engines backed into houses along Alvarado and Rieser (?) area 1/2 - 3/4 of houses involved, found Captain D. and C-106 crew. They were cutting down trees and helping to create a break (seems to help). Water is a problem, none of the hydrants work - sent one Strike Team engine down the hill to fill-up and return to area and standby. Had concerns of fire crossing Claremont Road [Avenue ??]. Kept 4 Oakland engines available for this.



**1630**

(CDF-9110C) Arrived at staging area near Cypress Avenue.

**1654**

BART to stop service due to fire around tunnel.

**1700-1800****Between 1700 and 2000**

**Division B.** There was an uncertainty of where to go and who to send out. At dark the Strike Teams arrived, and we were able to send them out.

**Engine 20B** met CDF personnel and directed them to correct contact people. Contacted OPD at OES for lighting and security at Ramondi. Was assigned finance duties by Services personnel. Met OES personnel. Went to ICP Highway 24 and Broadway. Assisted in coordinating fuel tankers and supplies.

**1700**

**Battalion 44** Oakland personnel arrived via AC Transit to reinforce the personnel on the scene. Numerous requests for additional resources were not filled. The first request for Strike Teams got lost in the confusion of the situation. Later requests for resources were duplicated for other divisions and the companies were never assigned. Battalion 44 remained in this area until midnight as Division A when Branch 3 Command was established.

**1700**

(CDF-JE) We continue reconnaissance of what is now called Branch 2 from bottom to top along many narrow roads. Broadway Terrace is blocked in several locations due to power-lines and fire, but it still seems to be a viable point to stop the fire spread.

**1700**

**Engine 36** Perimeter below Margarido established. Eight structures on west side of Margarido fully involved but remaining exposures out of immediate danger. Engine 36 large line extended with two 1 1/2" lines for exposure protection on Margarido. Four structures fully involved (5950, 5940, 5934, 5926). 5960 saved. Two additional fully involved (5964, 5972).

**1715**

PG&E shut-off at Shephard Canyon.

**1730**

(CDF-JE) We make our way to top of Branch 2 at Skyline and Broadway Terrace and find some Oakland F.D. and EBRP engines. The fire is not as active at this point and an anchor point has been established.

**1730****(CDF-9160C)** 1665 advises on a spot fire around houses. Rispen Drive.**1730****(CDF-9110C)**

Dispatch to staging on Highway 24 and Broadway.

**1740****(CDF-9160C)** Check on spot fires - engines committed - doing well.**1750**

**(CDF-9110C)** On line Florence, Proctor, Harbord Area off Clarewood. 200 + structures - 2 story and larger all heavily involved on arrival. Held one side of Proctor with a couple of losses and many roof fires in the Modoc/Harbord area. Very chaotic - no control - no communications. Tied into other Strike Team's and made our own plan. Major wind change around 1 p.m. [A.M. ??]. - southwest at 1-5 [15 MPH ??]. No further major problems. Started to go into areas of heavy loss and save isolated structures. My Strike Team saved two 3-story structures with major roof fires by interior attacks. Longest ladder on Strike Team was 16'. Very impressive work by all personnel. Negative - several Strike Teams pulled off the line due to fatigue, lack of leadership, lack of water, no plan - basically displayed a major lack of initiative - no independent action ability. All staging areas lacked communication with command and operations. No one thought Type 3 engines could operate in this environment. Very major misconception - Type 1's are not as mobile and lack unbedded 1 1/2" hose and tank capabilities. Type 3's are very useful in this kind of fast moving incident.

**1800 – 1900****1800 (Dusk)**

**Aerial Observer.** The wind was dying and shifting. Tankers were making their last drops before leaving the scene. The helicopter flew until 2100. The last pass was reassuring that the ground forces were making a stand on Broadway Terrace in the north. The fire was blowing red and yellow flame in a cyclone appearance. One-half mile down wind, fire brands started fires on vegetation, wood shingles, and wood roofs. (Note: the type of construction which went first was vegetation nearest to homes, shake roofs, and roofs which were not tiles. Stucco walls were better than wood-siding.) Above Highway 13, felt the operations were good. The Eagle took the north-side with a fire department representative. They were landing and carrying their information to the Command Van. Argus was flying south from Grizzly Peak and Fish Ranch Road to Highway 13 and Broadway Terrace.

**1800**

**(Truck 3 at the Parkwood Apartments)** Truck 3, Engine 1, Engine 16, and Orinda's engine return to the Command Center for reassignment. Engine 1's rig was 6/6 (inoperable) at the Parkwood Apartments.

**1800**

**(CDF-JE)** We start down Branch 2 via Skyline to Thornhill and pass a strike team of Type 1 engines. We make radio contact with Strike Team 2301. We go back to the top and assign Strike Team 2301 top of Broadway Terrace and part of Skyline.

**1800**

**(CDF-9160C)** Talk to San Francisco Engines 13, 17 and 6 - structure protection at Claremont Hotel.

**1800 – 0300**

**Engine 25.** We joined with Division C Task Force at Broadway Terrace and Country Club Drive. We assisted on Beechwood Drive and Glenbrook Drive with on-going dwelling fires. We relayed water from tankers [tenders] to engines. Assisted Engine 18 with drafting from a swimming pool. We used 600' 3", 200' 2 1/2", 500' 1 1/2" and 12' ladder.

**1814**

**Engine 1** break-down at 200 Caldecott.

**1815**

**(CDF-9160C)** Talk to E-1661 and E-1674 and C-106 crew on Alvarado Drive and two Regional Park engines.



**1830**

**Truck 3** was newly designated as part of Strike Team 45 (with Engine 1, Engine 16, and engines from Orinda and Alameda). Strike Team 45 was dispatched to Broadway Terrace and Pinewood. Spread the pumpers out and operated handlines and master streams from this location.

**1830**

**(CDF-JE)** We start back down to ICP to try and get resources.

**1830**

**(CDF-WM)** At Command Post, briefed IC and OSC asked to stay at C.P. and organize the planning operation.

**1830**

**(CDF-9160C)** Give E1661 and E1674 and two Regional Park engines to B-1616 on Branch 3. B-1612 calls. JL is now Branch 1.

**1847**

Red Cross responding with 100 meals and soda to Broadway.

**1900 – 2000****1900**

**(CDF-9170C)** Two Firefighters taken to hospital with debris in eyes (both were wearing goggles).

**1900**

**(CDF-9170C)** Oakland Engine 1784 air filter fire burned up turbo. Rest of engine O.K.

**1900**

**(CDF-9170C)** Fire moving down toward Claremont from Alvarado. Use dozers 41 and 42 to construct line west from Rispen Drive. Engines lay hose and assign one Delta crew to strengthen the dozer line. Dozer 41 puts line in from end of Rispen down to Claremont.

**1900**

**(CDF-JE)** Retired OFD Assistant Chief and B.C. JE discuss situation - with plans - 1612 and various OFD Chiefs and get 2 Strike Teams or type 1 engines which we assign to bottom of Broadway Terrace and Highway 13. Staging area is established at Highway 13 on Thornhill and we get a Staging Manager.

**1900**

**Engine 1.** I was teamed up with Branch 3. I continued to assist Branch 3 and Division M.

**1900**

**Engine 36.** Roof fire at 6000 Margarido. Handled by an SFFD engine. At this point in time, the Margarido section of the fire was contained with no further structures involved. The balance of the night and following morning was spent cooling hot spots and waiting for relief.

**1930**

**(CDF-9160C )** Travel Alvarado Drive. Locate: Marin County Strike Team (Leader B-1513), East Bay/Moraga Strike Team #42, 1-Oakland Strike Team. Cannot travel very far west on Alvarado - San Francisco blocking road with engines and hose.

**1930**

**(CDF-JE )** We get two more Strike Teams of type 1 engines and assign to Broadway Terrace and Leo Mountain. E1661 and 1674 also in the area, wind has died down and chances for containment near or at Broadway Terrace improve.

**1900**

**Engine 3** ordered back to staging.

**Engine 3** was made part of a Strike Team which was sent to protect homes in the Broadway Terrace and Pinewood areas and worked this neighborhood until 0200.

**1900**

**Engine 4** returned to Pineneedle and Broadway Terrace below Merriwood and Crown streets. The PG&E civilian and Engine 4 Lieutenant escorted a Strike Team down beyond Merriwood. This civilian was helpful with assessing the conditions of the power-poles and downed wires. Wires were draped across Broadway Terrace, and civilian and Strike Team Firefighters cleared the road of wires.

Below Merriwood, houses on the west-side of Broadway Terrace were burning. Some Strike Teams spread out along the length of Broadway Terrace to defend the houses on the east-side of the street.

Arriving on Virgo and Uranus streets, there were 2 engines accompanying Engine 4. There were 4 or 5 houses on the east side of the street fully involved. A 3" line hooked to the hydrant and divided into 2 1 1/2" lines was already in place. Two civilian crews were using these lines. One Strike Team engine positioned by the hydrant at Uranus, the other was positioned behind near Virgo. Neither engine had 3" to 2 1/2" reducers. Put the 2 1 1/2" lines in the tank filler to supply this pumper. Remained at this location for about an hour assisting with lines and operating nozzles.

After helping with this operation, walked up Broadway Terrace to Merriwood, meeting the Services Officer. Took a ride up to Pineneedle where Engine 4 was sitting, out of water and almost out of fuel. The water-main on Broadway was dry.

Engine 23 arrived at this location and used their Tank Wagon on an involved house whose attic had been worked on previously. There was not enough water for this fight. Engine 23 ran out of fuel and left for Engine 6 to refuel.

**1924**

Need ambulance Code 2 for eye injury for a Firefighter at Broadway Terrace and Country Club.

**1940**

Engine 42 has changed quarters for Engine 17.  
Engine 48 has changed quarters for Engine 20.  
Engine 42 is 'on-air'.

**1941**

Engine 39 has changed quarters for Engine 23.



**2000 – 2100****2000**

**Truck 3** and the Strike Teams spread out on to Caldwell, Monzal and Mountain Blvd, using 1 1/2" lines with hydrant pressure, and in some cases garden hose to save homes which were beyond the reach of the pumper hand-lines.

**2000**

**Truck 1.** I reported to Tunnel Command. I was ordered to report to the staging area at sector [Division] A. Upon arrival at sector A staging, we were ordered to rest and standby.

**2000**

**Engine 39** took the Brush Wagon and hit spot fires in the Broadway Terrace and Cross Street area. During the night we worked with several crews and made an interior attack and saved a home at 149 Beechwood.

**2000**

**(CDF-9160C)** To Berkeley staging - Tunnel and Ashby Battalion Chief very busy - won't communicate?!

**2010**

**Engine 27.** We were requested to the Taurus/Capricorn area. We went down Colton to Mountain, right on Mountain to Florence Terrace, Right on Florence Terrace. At the corner of Capricorn and Florence Terrace we were prevented from going up Florence Terrace because of so many out-of-city fire rigs. I handed out our last four 3" to 2-1/2" reducers to these rigs. We turned left on Capricorn and traveled about 800' before we were blocked again by another rig. We turned around, and took a 5" lead 300' back Capricorn. We operated our Stang gun on the structures not burning on the lower side of Taurus. I walked up the hillside to Taurus to assist a Palo Alto Strike Team. There were many houses burning on the upper side of Taurus. While I was assisting one Firefighter with a big line, he asked me how the fire fight was going in other areas? I stated fine but that it had been a real tough day for us.

**After 2000**

**Branch 3.** Things got better. There was a better idea of where to put companies, because there were more resources.

**Branch 3.** The first priority was putting Strike Teams along Broadway Terrace along Hermosa and Cross Road. San Mateo Strike Team arrived between 1900/1930. Santa Clara Strike Team at the St. Teresa School or Hill Crest School working along Florence. A lot of single resources were working here – Engine 19 Tank Wagon and recall Firefighters, miscellaneous units, reserve engines and standby engine companies. There was one Firefighter working alone from a street flusher tank on Hermosa working in a burning garage. A Marin Company Strike Team from Chabot Road self-dispatched due to lack of communication.

**2000/2030**

**Branch 3.** Ran out of gas near Holy Names High School. Called Division D, got picked up, and then we worked together to dispatch units. Branch 3 became better organized. Was worried about Branch 2. There wasn't a lot going on in Branch 2 – the Montclair area above the Warren Freeway, between Highway 24 and Broadway Terrace. Branch 3 was going to be sharing resources staging with Branch 2 at the intersection of Moraga Road and Highway 13. It was the decision of Incident Command to link Branch 2 and Branch 3 staging. Incident Command didn't have a good idea about what was going on in the area.

**2001**

Need Code 3 ambulance for a broken leg/heart problem.

**2050**

Per Division A, have PG&E turn off all gas in the area of Broadway Terrace, Broadway, and Highway 13. No ETA available yet.

**2100 – 2200****2100**

(CDF-9160C) Recheck with all units in Branch 1. All well and holding their own. Note - right now, JL considers Branch 1 to be from Grizzly down Claremont to Tunnel and Ashby - Berkeley handling Tunnel/Ashby south.

**2100**

(NAP-E3382) Structure protection at Glenbrook and Westminster.

**2100**

**Division C Command** was passed to the San Francisco Chief (at my request).

(Note: There was some confusion regarding the use of the San Francisco Strike Team. Shortly after all the San Francisco companies were committed, I was approached by Deputy Chief from the Berkeley Fire Department. He was upset because the San Francisco Strike Team did not report to him. He informed me that the SFFD Strike Team had been assigned to the Berkeley Fire Department. I explained the circumstances, that the engines were committed and that my mission was to stop the fire at the hotel. He was not happy but agreed that the units should remain in place as committed.)

**2100**

**Division B Command.** At Moraga Road and Highway 13 - staging Strike Teams for both Branch 2 and 3.

**2100/2130**

A Strike Team from Tri-Valley abandoned their operation when relief personnel could not be found for their units. The Strike Team was led by an Assistant Chief from the Lawrence Livermore Fire Department.

**2109**

PG&E notified to shut off gas.

**2115**

**Training Captain** returned to the Command Van and assisted with command operations.

**2130**

**Branch 3.** Strike Teams were available for Broadway Terrace and Country Club. Assigned along Clarewood and Maxwellton. One house was involved at Clarewood and Hilltop Court. A Stanislaus Strike Team was working at Maxwellton, and were linked with units along Moraga Road in Piedmont. There was a San Leandro Strike Team at Harbord and Moraga with their Assistant Chief.

**2149**

Need another Code 2 for injuries at Broadway Terrace and Country Club. Ambulance was waiting at Broadway Terrace and Highway 13.



**2157**

Engine 4 needs fuel at Broadway Terrace and Skyline. Engine 23 needs transmission fuel at the same location.

**2200 – 2300****2200**

(CDF-W.M.) Management team begins arriving and team briefing.

**2200**

(CDF-9160C) Go to ICP on Highway 24 west of tunnel. Give inventory to Plans. Plans introduces me to Berkeley Chief who says he will telephone Assistant Chief at staging and make sure he knows that he is working for Branch 1 and will get together with me.

**2200**

**Branch 3.** Called back to Command for Branch director's meeting. The Branch perimeters and responsibilities were clearly defined. This was a planning meeting, giving briefings for the Plans Chief and Operations Chief, so they could develop plans for the next operational period. Perimeters for the branches were defined for tactical purposes. Redefined the Divisions for Branch 3 – Divisions M, N, O, and P. The perimeters were Broadway, the Warren Freeway, Moraga Road, Pleasant Valley.

**2216**

DOA discovered by PG&E crew. CMD notified. Location at Windward Hill and Hiller.

**2217**

Perimeter of the fire: North – Grizzly Peak, Fish Ranch Road, and Claremont. South – Moraga, Thornhill into Piedmont. East – Skyline. West Estates and Proctor.

**2224**

**Division A.** Code 2 ambulance for smoke inhalation at Broadway Terrace and Country Club.

**2230**

**Engine 27.** I walked back down to Engine 27; the rig needed fuel, we needed food, I couldn't get through on the radio and we were not assigned to any other unit and there wasn't anymore that we could do here. I ordered us back to staging at Highway 24 and Golden Gate. There I requested that we be given permission to return to quarters for much needed sleep. That request was denied. We filled the rig with fuel and reported to the staging Captain as ordered. We slept the night in his fire department car. The next morning I was given permission to go back up in the hills to get the hose we left in various locations. The Aerial Observer – Battalion 4-B – ordered us to NAS Alameda for release from the incident and for us to return to quarters.

**2230**

(CDF-9160C) Go to Berkeley staging - Tunnel/Ashby meet with Assistant Chief BW. Go over maps and resources.

**2243**

Engine 29 leaving scene.

**0100 – 0200****0100**

(CDF-JE) We continue to assign and monitor Branch 2. Progress is being made and by 0200 hours it appears that the perimeter has been established and is holding.

**0100**

An EBRP and CDF Strike Team was formed to protect Broadway Terrace structures. This lasted though 1000.

**0100**

**Battalion 44.** Division B Command and Division C Command worked at Broadway Terrace and Country Club the remainder of the evening, regrouping resources and resting personnel, sending out Task Forces and Strike Teams to various assignments. Services 3 personnel worked during the night to keep mutual aid companies supplied with 3" fittings. An off-duty Firefighter in the Supply Van worked to maintain supplies and deliver personnel to the fire area. This Firefighter stayed on the job until relief at 0900. With assistance from civilians, these personnel completed every task assignment.

San Francisco Public works assisted by setting up their Field Command Post, providing lighting and support services. Red Cross and the Salvation Army provided food, drink, and bedding for the personnel.

Water Tenders from Oakland, Caltrans, and private contractors were utilized to support a weakened water supply. Two type 3 Strike Teams from CDF were utilized to maintain patrol along Clarewood to the Piedmont line. These companies prevented fire from backing across Clarewood and destroying homes and apartments in that area.

As support companies arrived, they were placed with the Oakland units to control structure fires.

Battalion 44 was relieved. Went to the Command Post and was debriefed by the Assistant Chief. Conducted damage assessment in the East Bay Regional Helicopter, with the California Department of Forestry (CDF) Chief 1602.

**0100**

**Training Captain** reported to Station 19, delivered Public Information Offices (PIO) equipment and furnishings and reported to the Communication's Officer. Was going to be needed for television interview at 0600.

**0100**

**Truck 3** relieved at the scene by a Strike Team from Santa Cruz. Returned to Engine 24. Called the Command Center from Engine 24.



**0130**

**Engine 4** reports that food arrived at Engine 6.

**0130**

**(CDF-9170C)** Engine 1784 repaired, but not in service. Waiting for new air filter.

**Captain of Training.** Returned to the Command Post and briefly relieved Operations. I assisted with operations around the Command Post.

**0200 – 0300****0200**

**Operations** was relieved.

**0200**

**Engine 39** went back to staging and remained there.

**0200**

**(CDF-JE)** Planning meeting - Branch 2 is divided into 3 divisions (H, I, J). The retired OFD Assistant Chief leaves to go home.

**0200/0300**

Progress reports, and situation updates and reassigning units to prevent fire from expending.

**0230**

To relieve the Engine 4 crew, a crew with a Firefighter and Acting Lieutenant arrived in Foam 2. The relief crew worked with Engine 4 to restore hose and do inventory.

**0230**

**(CDF-JE)** Division H is assigned to a Strike Team Leader from Strike Team 2301 from Skyline and Broadway Terrace down to Uranus Drive.

**0230**

**Engine 15** and **Engine 20** assigned to fire-watch at Proctor and Julia.

**0300 – 0400****0300**

Planning meeting for day operations for October 21st are presented by the Plans Chief (CDF) for the Branch directors.

**0300**

(CDF-JE) Division I is assigned to the middle portion of Broadway Terrace to Strike Team Leader 2304.

**0300**

**Engine 4** reported in to Branch 3 Chief and was told to report to the lower Broadway Terrace Command Center. Engine 4 ate and slept.

**0300**

**Engine 25.** We returned to Division A Command center for rest and rehab.

**0400 – 0500****0400**

**Training Captain** reported to the staging area at Moraga Avenue and Thornhill Drive to give the staging officer a replacement battery for the portable radio.

**0400**

**Engine 6.** Went back to the firehouse. Talked to Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) about being back, and about rigs from Strike Teams being there.

Engine 6 was off-duty the following day (the 21st). Went back into service on Tuesday and Wednesday (the 22nd and the 23rd) and retrieved equipment from Grizzly Peak. We did no firefighting on these days.

**0400 – 0600**

(CDF-JE) Branch 2 starts to quiet down - all personnel are tired, but successful.

**0500 – 0600****0530**

Truck 3 reported to the Command Center.

**0530**

Returned to staging.

**0600****INCIDENT OBJECTIVES FOR DAY SHIFT**

- A. West Skyline Drive - Grizzly Peak
- B. South Claremont Drive to Grizzly Peak
- C. East of Tunnel in Branch 1
- D. East of Broadway, Pleasant Valley
- E. North Sheppard Canyon in Branch 2

**0600**

Engine 4 was told to report back to Station 4 where 2 units from Treasure Island were stationed. Engine 4 crew remained at Station 4.

**0600**

Engine 20B day shift briefing.

**0600 – 0700****0630**

(CDF-9170C) Firefighter returned to Strike Team.

(CDF-JE) Attend briefing and I.C.P.

**0700 – 0800****0730**

Truck 3 sent to our own quarters.



**0800 – 0900****0800**

**Truck 1.** We were relieved by a Lieutenant and four Firefighters. I was ordered to assemble a crew, pick up Engine 2 and go in service at Station 2.

**0800**

**Engine 10.** We were directed to report to staging at N.A.S. After a discussion with FDC Dispatch Operations, some personnel were sent home and ordered to return to duty at 0700. Engine 10, Engine 25, Engine 26, Engine 5, Truck 15 and a spare engine were directed to return to their own quarters at approximately 1200. An Engineer was sent to the hospital from N.A.S., he later was put off-duty with smoke inhalation and a bruised breast bone.

**0800**

**Engine 39** was sent to base.

**0800**

**(CDF-JE)** Brief Branch 2 and two Strike Team leaders on situation.

**0800**

**Engine 15** sent to N.A.S. Alameda for R&R.

**0800 to 1200**

**Engine 25.** We were sent to Alameda Naval Air Base for R&R until told to return to quarters.

**0830 – 1000**

**(CDF-JE)** Drive the day-Branch 2 leader around the Branch to familiarize him with problem areas.

**0830 – 1100**

**Branch 3.** Relieved as Branch director. Went back to command and debriefed with OFD Command with a situation update. Picked up car at Harbord and returned stranded Firefighters to quarters.

**0838**

Captain from FDC requests Argus on Oakland 2.

**1000 – 1100****1000**

**Engine 39** was sent back to Engine 16.

**1000**

**Engine 4** was informed by Battalion 44 that they were no longer needed on active duty.

**1044**

**Engine 10** reports that a Firefighter is transporting himself to Merritt Hospital with respiratory problems.

**1100 – 1200****1100**

**Engine 1.** I was relieved and went off-duty.

**1100**

**Engine 15** returned to quarters.

**1146**

Oakland Police Department reports structure fire at 830 Mountain Blvd. Given to Operations.

**1200 – 1300****1227**

Command Van operations are moved to the Alameda Naval Air Station per Battalion 4-B.

**1300 – 1400****1300**

**Engine 10** returned to quarters and in service.

**1400 – 1500****1400**

Command Post at Naval Air Station in Alameda reassigned as Branch director for night operations.

**1400**

**Truck 1.** I was relieved and I returned home.

**1500 – 1600****1600**

**EBRP** Redeployed out to Grizzly Terrace, on the north-side of Grizzly Peak Blvd., right above where the fire started. We spent the night putting out hot spots until 0200 (Wednesday).

**1600 – 1700****1700 – 1800****1800 – 1900****1900 – 2000****1930**

**Engine 10.** We were assigned to P.I.O. at Station 19 and remained there until relieved on the 22nd.

**2000 – 2100****2000**

**Branch 3.** Night operations. Nothing significant occurred. Patrolling and extinguishing hot spots throughout the evening. There were enough resources for this operation.

**2200 – 2300****2300**

**FDC Dispatch Operations** remained working at FDC Station 1 until the 22nd.




#### **4. Overview of the Chronology of Place**

The Oakland Tunnel Fire encompassed a vast area of land. In order to accurately describe the events which took place on October 20, 1991, neighborhood delininations need to be clear. As part of the Incident Command operations during the Oakland Tunnel Fire, the Oakland Fire Department first designated "Divisions" of fire area soon after the fire started. Some of the areas designated as Divisions changed their locations as the fire spread. These Divisions increased in number and in size as the fire escalated, and as the fire escalated, the Divisions became Branches. The deliniation of Branches occurred as follows:

- Branch 1 – Division A and B
  - Extending from Tunnel Road north of Highway 24 to Grizzly Peak and Skyline
- Branch 2 – Divisions F, G, H, I, and J
  - Extending from Skyline and Broadway Terrace to Highway 13
- Branch 3 – Divisions M, N, O, P
  - Extending from Highway 13 to Highway 24 and Tunnel Road


A map deliniating the Branch areas is illustrated on the following page.

THE MAP OF THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE DIVIDED INTO BRANCHES





# THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE








Clarifying these areas within the Divisions and Branches is also of major importance. In order to follow a chronology of a particular place, the burn area has been divided into 11 specific areas. These areas include:

- The origin of the burn area, and area encompassing Buckingham Blvd., Marlborough Terrace and Grizzly Peak
- Grizzly Peak and Grizzly Peak Terrace, and Bay Forest
- Parkwood Apartments
- Hiller Highlands
- Claremont Canyon – Amito, Alvarado, Besito, Gravatt
- Claremont Hotel and surrounding areas
- Vicente, Bridge, Alvarado, Grand View, and Tunnel Road
- Roble Road/Chabot Road
- Rockridge, Golden Gate, Contra Costa Road, Buena Vista Avenue, Acacia, Beechwood, Margarido, Country Club
- Lower Broadway Terrace – Agnes, Proctor, Hermosa, Florence
- Upper Broadway Terrace – Swainland/Forest Park, Glenwood Glade, Farallon, Pineneedle, Capricorn, Aquarius, Mountain Blvd.

This chronology of place describes events in these given locales, and presents a brief summary as to what was happening in the area. It presents a picture of the area – the fire personnel fighting the fire, and when they arrived on the scene. "Time-stamping" events in this chronology becomes difficult. For a more accurate recollection of time, refer to *Section 5: Chronology of Engine Companies*, and/or to *Section 6: Reports of the Fire Officers* for more comprehensive information about individual engine/truck companies or fire strategy. Because of the importance of the initial events of the fire, we have duplicated some of the engine company reports which are documented in *Section 5: Chronology of Engine Companies*. Review these reports together as a unit regarding the actions in the burn area. Added maps and diagrams throughout this section clarify the geography of the locations presented, as well as actions taken by the fire personnel themselves. Some of the diagrams were drawn by the fire personnel in a given fire-stand being described. These diagrams are labelled accordingly. The major sources of information for this section were the fire officers, and the engine company leaders in charge of specific fire-stands in the noted locations.

1. The origin of the burn area, and the area encompassing Buckingham Blvd., Marlborough Terrace, and Grizzly Peak Blvd.





**Engine companies which responded to the origin of the burn:**

|              |                 |  |
|--------------|-----------------|--|
| • Engine 19  | 0853            | <b>Summary of this location</b>  |
| • Engine 24  | 0853            | At approximately 0853 on Sunday morning, Engine 19 and Engine 24 responded to the Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace area to observe the area of Saturday's fire, and to retrieve equipment. They noticed hot spots on several flanks, and proceeded to work on these. Engine 19 called a first alarm assignment at 1058, which was then followed by a second, third, fourth, and sixth alarm. Several engine companies responded. Major fire stands include Grizzly Peak Blvd., Marlborough Terrace, and Buckingham Blvd. |
| • Engine 10  | 1102            |  |
| • Engine 6   | 1100            |  |
| • Training 2 | 1104            |  |
| • Engine 25  | 1107            |  |
| • Engine 5   |                 |  |
| • Engine 4   | 1105            |  |
| • Engine 15  | 1115            | <b>Grizzly Peak Blvd.:</b> Engine 19, Engine 24, and Training 2.   |
| • Engine 8   | 4th – 6th alarm | <b>Marlborough Terrace:</b> Engine 10, Engine 25, Engine 4, Engine 15, Engine 5, and Engine 6. Contra Costa County FD Engine 4, and Water Tender.  |
| • Truck 8    |                 | <b>Buckingham Blvd.:</b> Engine 24, Engine 8, and EBRP.  |
| • EBRP       | 0940            |  |

**The original burn area.****Engine 19/Engineer**

Engine 19 was dispatched to the burn area at 7150 Marlborough Terrace to initially observe the fire area from the previous day and retrieve equipment left from the previous evening. We parked the rigs on Marlborough Terrace in front of the hydrant, and proceeded to turn the hydrant off to break up the line. Shortly after beginning this procedure, the Engine 19 Engineer noticed some smoke coming from the burn area of the previous day. Engine 19 donned brush jackets and helmets, charged the lines again, and started overhauling hot spots on both the right and left flank of the previous burn area for about an hour. There was a 1 1/2" 900' line going from the Gwinn Tank down to the right side of the fire to the bottom of the hill. We took the lead from the Lieutenant of Engine 24 and broke the 900' line into two, to help overhaul the flare-up at the top. We hooked up a divider to these two hoses to put out the hot spots at the top of the hill. The two Firefighters from Engine 19 took the top hot spots, and Engine 24 took the left side at the bottom of the hill. After awhile, the Engine 19's Lieutenant told the Engineer to take the brush rig down Marlborough and pick up the 2 Firefighters from Engine 19 who had been putting out hot spots at the bottom of the hill. After a 15-20 minute wait for them to finish their hot spots and retrieve hose, he was told to come back up Marlborough; the East Bay Regional Park's (EBRP) crew was going to bring these other 2 firefighters back up.





**Engine 19/Lieutenant**

We arrived. Engine 19 and our Tank Wagon and Engine 24 and their Tank Wagon met at the hydrant with the lead at Marlborough Terrace. Went to the area of Saturday's fire. Walked up to where the lead went across into the very steep terrain. You couldn't see the burn area from the street. There were 8 people walking in the burn area. Engine 24's Firefighters and myself went down the burn area finding hot spots in the north-east flank – well within the burn area. The Lieutenant from Engine 24 and Engine 19's crew went up the hill towards the top of the Tank and found hot spots in that area. At this time, I put both engines out of service. Battalion 2 was on the scene above the area. [Note: Battalion 2 was on the scene at 0854.]

**0900**

Winds from the north were gusting at about 15 mph, and building. We were extinguishing hot spots. Engine 24's Lieutenant notified East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP) to pick up their hose. EBRP responded that they had no one available to do that. Battalion 2 notified them that they needed to respond.

There were 3 areas of hot spots.

- Below the Gwinn Tank
- The north-east flank near Westmoreland (part of a very steep canyon. Westmoreland parallels Marlborough Terrace.)
- The south-east flank where EBRP hose originated, and ended at Buckingham.

Engine 24 took the area near the top of the Tank. Engine 19 took the area of the north-east flank. The south-east flank was where the EBRP hose was extended from the Tank to Buckingham Blvd. Their hose extended for about 1300' of 1 1/2" hose.

These hot spots were all part of the original burn area. The south-east flank was the origin of Saturday's fire, near the television aerial. The hot spots were emanating from the roots of the oak tree in the south-east flank.

Within this time, we had extinguished hot spots and picked up some hose. Battalion 2 had asked Engine 16 to come and help pick up hose. We used the hose from the Tank to extinguish the hot spots. This was EBRP hose. The hose on the north-east was left attached to the hydrant and flaked at the top of the burn area. I helped pull down Engine 1's hose at the bottom of the burn area. There was lead line and baby line which Engine 16 and myself pulled out. On Engine 16, we proceeded back to the hydrant on Marlborough. Engine 16 said they would deliver the hose to Engine 1. They left. Engine 19, and Engine 24 were still left with their Tank Wagons. Engine 19's Firefighters were on the south-east flank of the fire helping bringing EBRP hose to them down the hill from the Tank to Buckingham. At this point, Engine 24 said they needed fuel for their Tank Wagon. They were going to go to Engine 6 to refuel and return to quarters, leaving Engine 19 in charge.

EBRP was on the scene at this time. One of their supervisors was at the hydrant on Marlbo-



rough with Engine 24 and Engine 19. He knew of the hose that had been flaked at the north-east flank. He had crews working the hot spot underneath the oak tree, and he had crews picking up hose. I dispatched my Engineer down to Buckingham to pick up the Firefighters. He took the Tank Wagon. I was left with the EBRP supervisor at the hydrant area. The EBRP supervisor was going to check on his crews in the burn area, walking along the hose out-of-sight. We had tried regular communications with our portable radios. He was able to transmit and receive on our channel – White Fire. I was able to receive on White Fire. I was not able to broadcast. He walked into the burn area. I contacted my Engineer and asked if he had been able to locate our Firefighters. The Engineer was down on Buckingham at the point of origin of the original fire. At this time I heard someone mouth-whistle and yelling for me to charge the lead. I went to the hydrant to turn the hydrant on. I could see a small amount of smoke at the north-east flank of the area. The lead was charged. I started to go towards the burn area through the unburned area. As I was in the brush, I asked for Engine 24 to return to the scene.



The origin of the fire.

**1058**

I asked the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) to transmit a box – the first alarm. The wind was blowing from the north, the north-east. The wind had progressively increased throughout the morning. Getting into the burn area, looking down towards Buckingham, the smoke had started to "column". I still didn't see any flames. FDC asked if I had wanted the same assignment that Engine 24 had asked for – the first alarm assignment.

**1102**

I asked for a second alarm. I also requested FDC to start California Department of Forestry (CDF). EBRP had also asked for CDF. I still saw no flames. At this time I was the Incident Command, and my task was to disburse the companies in the best way possible. I knew I needed to get to higher ground to see the fire. I turned my back to the smoke and climbed towards the top of the hill where the [Gwinn] Tank is located. It was very steep terrain. I went no more than a 150 feet and it took a minute to climb. When I got to the top and turned around, I saw open flames on **both flanks**. I deployed the companies through the third alarm in positions where I thought we could contain the fire in the boundries of Grizzly Peak Blvd., Buckingham Blvd., and Marlborough Terrace.

At this point, the fire was coming up the hill at an unbelievable speed. At the [Gwinn] Tank, there were some resources. There were EBRP lines made up already. There was an EBRP Firefighter with a Brush rig. There was an Inspector from Patrol 28, and a citizen. I had placed the third alarm assignments. I had heard Battalion 2 take over as Command. And I went to do some firefighting near the Gwinn Tank. I had the EBRP Firefighter and the Inspector make up another hose-line, and in the process fighting fire around the Tank. My situation deteriorated; I was no longer doing offensive firefighting – I was getting into a defensive stance against the fire. I was looking for a way out. The EBRP's Firefighter disappeared, and our situation deteriorated. I tried to gain entry into the pumping station – a concrete block with a steel-clad door, but we couldn't do this. There's an access road to the Gwinn Tank off of Grizzly Peak, but this was impassible. I put the citizen in front of an open hydrant underneath the water. The Inspector and I made a water curtain, putting the hose in a 'fog pattern', and we sat down in the fog pattern. The fire crowned in the pine trees around the Tank. We were sitting in the water curtain, and the citizen was in the water stream. I had my doubts about making it out of the area. I radioed to the Incident Command, and told him what our situation was – that we were trapped.

**1300 – 1330**

We stayed here for what seemed like six days – it felt like six days. We were in a firestorm. The wind was coming from several directions at the same time. The fire brands were blowing, the trees were glowing. We sat for a period of time. There was an access road, the house directly behind the Tank was totally involved. There was the EBRP and the Oakland crew trying to extinguish the flame from the outside. They couldn't get inside because the roof had already collapsed. The underpinnings on the house were burned. The inspector left in his Tank Wagon to see if he could be of assistance somewhere else. [Note: In terms of a time frame, the Lieutenant from Engine 19 was "digging out" of his entrapment at the same time Battalion 44 was asking for



his second order of 10 Strike Teams for the Contra Costa, Golden Gate, Acacia area. This was a little after 1200.]

**(1 – 1 1/2 hours)**

EBRP and Engine 5 were trying to extinguish the fire. We were given the assignment of trying to reverse pump to a zone hydrant. This was to augment the water supply on Marlborough. We worked at this, but it didn't work. We couldn't pump from one to the other. We couldn't augment the water.

**1500 – 1530**

Engine 15, Engine 10, Engine 25, and a Firefighter driving Engine 19, pulled out of Marlborough and came to Grizzly Peak and Marlborough. Under the direction of the Captain from Engine 25, we freelanced.

**ENGINE 24/Lieutenant****Prior to 0800 roll-call**

The C-shift officer of Engine 24 told me that there had been a fire the previous day in back of 7151 Buckingham. As a precaution, they had left 700' of hose at the hydrant at Marlborough in case of a rekindle on the north flank of the fire area. I called the officer on duty at Engine 19, and coordinated with this Lieutenant to get those hoses out of there. We both agreed to move the hose out of there as soon as possible. [Note: The weather conditions were similiar to the 1970 fire.]

**0830 [Note: This time has been logged as 0851 and 0853.]**

Rendezvous with Engine 19 in front of 7185 Marlborough Terrace below Grizzly Peak to recover 700' of hose left from the previous day's fire. I noticed hot spots in the burn area – first on the north flank (Marlborough side) in the duff under the pine trees, and second in the duff near the Gwinn Tank (Grizzly Peak side - east flank). Access to these areas was through Grizzly Peak. We each had crews of 2 Firefighters each. We took our crews and walked into 100 yards of heavy brush. We followed the 3" hose from the hydrant to the unburned area. We went to work, with 3 people in each crew working up towards the Gwinn Tank. EBRP had hose from the hydrant at the Gwinn Tank. The wind was blowing from the east – light and variable.

**0920**

Requested East Bay Regional Park Fire Department (EBRPFD) to assist in retrieving 1200' of their hose from the south flank. We went down the south flank, and with 2 of my Firefighters, we broke the EBRP hose at 600' to drag the hose to Buckingham since it was easier to drag part of the hose down the terrain, with the other 2 Firefighters dragging the other 600' hose up to the Gwinn Tank. It was extremely heavy brush and steep terrain. We put a nozzle on the hose, and we were able to use it to overhaul the area directly below the Gwinn Tank. We saw hot spots underneath the pine trees. Engine 19 was working on the north flank. There were hot spots on the north side. We saw that in the burn area, about 30-50' from the south flank,



under a live oak tree, smoke was coming up. We notified EBRP to come in from Buckingham, because we couldn't get to it from our side with our lines. Winds were light to moderate.

**0930 – 0940**

EBRPFD arrived on the scene— 2 Firefighters at the Gwinn Tank in a pick-up truck. Engine 24 notified EBRPFD (coming in with hand crews) to work the hot spot near the south flank near the live oak tree. The EBRPFD crew went down the hill to move their hose to Buckingham (overhauling the area). They noticed hot spots below where Engine 19's crew was working on the north flank of Marlborough Terrace. I worked in the area underneath the Gwinn Tank and the upper part of the north flank. The winds were still light to moderate from the east.

We worked for 2 to 2 1/2 hours. During this period of time, Assistant Chief Battalion 2 had upgraded the situation to a first alarm status – extreme fire conditions, which meant that we would be getting another engine company to help us with the situation – Engine 16. In declaring a first alarm status, the Assistant Chief also prepared 3 roving patrols to patrol the area of Skyline. Engines 4, 27, and Patrol 28. Battalion 3 and Battalion 4 had each dispatched 1 Flat Truck for patrol. Engine 28 came out of Engine 6 quarters; it was a brush rig. The Battalion 3 area extended from the San Leandro border to Redwood Road along Skyline. The Battalion 4 area extended from Redwood Road to Snake Road/Colton to the Berkeley line.

**1045**

We couldn't see any smoke; the area looked like it had been knocked out. Battalion 2 had left me in command of the area when he left. I conferred with Engine 19. Engine 24 and Brush 24 left the area to refuel at Engine 6 (Skyline and Snake - the closest point for refueling diesel). All the lines were charged, none of the hose had been picked up. EBRP was working down below with Engine 19. I Left Engine 19 in command. I left Marlborough Terrace to Grizzly. At about Skyline, Engine 19 called.

**1045 – 1055**

Engine 19 notified me via radio to return to the scene. There was a flare-up on the north flank. The winds had picked-up tremendously.

**1058 – 1104**

Returned via Grizzly Peak Blvd. Stopped south of the Gwinn Tank to check the condition. Noticed the flare-up on the south flank below the antenna. I was 1/4 mile below Marlborough Terrace. I asked for a first-alarm assignment at the same time that Engine 19 had put in for a first alarm assignment (putting a "box" in place). [Note: A box represents 3 engine companies and a chief officer.] The winds were strong, blowing parallel to Buckingham Blvd. out of the east. Responded down Marlborough Terrace to Norfolk, and then to Buckingham Blvd. [Note: Continue with Engine 24's accounting under Buckingham Blvd. In this section.]

**Training 2**

Battalion Chief 4-A responded from quarters on the alarm and on information being given over the radio network. Battalion 4 was assigned to the scene and in position to assist Battalion 2. Training 2 was preparing a Pumper apparatus for drafting at the Training Division when the second alarm was sounded. An Engineer assigned to Engine 16, and myself responded to the fire scene at the corner of Buckingham and Tunnel Road, and assisted with fire operation size-up, giving information to Battalion 4, and requesting through Oakland 2 to have PG&E respond and to turn off the power for the entire area. Fire conditions deteriorated at a rapid pace, putting fire crews in jeopardy. At one point in time, the entire street was filled with flying brands, whipped into a frenzy by high winds which sometimes appeared to create a whirling environment. This was an impossible situation to control with hand-lines; the streams were destroyed, broken up, or deflected so badly that they could furnish little or no protection to firefighters, or penetration to the immediate fire for extinguishment. Under command of Battalion 4, Brush Wagon 19, the Engineer, Firefighter, and this Lieutenant did what had to be done to terminate suppression activities and move to a safer position.


The apparatus was moved along Buckingham to the intersection of Norfolk. At this point, Battalion 4 – now Division A – left the apparatus having the balance of the crew proceed with evacuation of the endangered homes, working along Norfolk, up Strathmoor, Drury Road to Amito. Here a position was taken to insure that vehicles and civilians were headed out of the fire area. While at this intersection, flames could be observed closing from Drury Road and Dawn Street, to the south of Amito, across the canyon toward Perth. Flames could be observed on a long front. Once it was decided that nothing more could be done in the way of evacuation, the apparatus was moved down Amito to Alvarado Road. At this intersection, Oakland Police Officers were stationed for traffic control, the Brushwagon was filled with water. The route then proceeded up Alvarado Road to Claremont Avenue, on Claremont to Grizzly Peak Blvd. On Grizzly Peak Blvd. above Claremont Canyon Regional Preserve, the fire was observed as it consumed trees and brush, burning up to the roadway and jumping across.



**Marlborough Terrace****ENGINE 10****1102**

Engine 10 responded on the first alarm. Under direction of Battalion 2, we took a position on Marlborough Terrace at the 7100 block. We took a lead from the hydrant at approximately 7150 Marlborough, supplying a 3" line for Engine 19 and placing three preconnected hand lines in position to protect homes on the lower side of the street. Engines 25, 4 and 15 supported our position from behind us, up Marlborough towards Grizzly Peak. We were able to defend our position but the velocity of the fire driven by the strong winds (50 mph+) pushed the fire storm over our position and through houses on our right flank. Houses beyond the reach of our streams were rapidly and totally engulfed in flames.

Unable to extend lines, we were forced to take a defensive stand, allowing homes to burn while attempting to protect homes that were not yet involved. After some period of time we were forced to abandon our position on Marlborough because the hydrant stopped flowing. When our tanks were depleted we moved, searching for a water source. The Captain was group leader at this time. Radio communication was extremely heavy and difficult during this period.

**Marlborough Terrace**



**Engine 25****1107**

Engine 25 responded on the second alarm to the intersection of Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace. Engine 25 used the hydrant at 7160 Marlborough and worked on 7 dwellings. Saved 7156, 7160, 7126, 7130, 7145 and 7165. We worked with Engine 4, Engine 10, Engine 15, Engine 19, a crew from Contra Costa County Fire and their Captain. Used 600' 3", 800' 1 1/2", 200' 2 1/2" and 1 Stang gun.

**1300**

Engine 25. We continued our fire attack for approximately 2-3 hours until the fire main on Marlborough went dry – 1215. After a 20 to 30 minute attempt to re-charge, the main failed. We reloaded our equipment and hose and abandoned our position.

**Engine 4****1105**

We arrived at Grizzly Peak Blvd. and Marlborough Terrace, behind Engine 25. Engine 15 was also at this location. Two civilians – one in a car, and one on a motorcycle – were blocking the intersection. Engine 15 crew directed these people away from the scene.

Engine 25 went down Marlborough Terrace with Tank Wagon 25 ahead of Engine 4. Engine 10 had preceded both Engine 4 and Engine 25. Engine 25 was parked in front of 7160 Marlborough Terrace. Engine 4 was parked next to the green-top hydrant about 150 feet up the hill from Engine 25. Engine 10 was parked in front of 7145, with another hydrant.

Engine 4 conferred with the Captain of Engine 25, and stretched a 1 1/2" line to the rear of 7156. The fire was blowing up the hill to the east behind the houses on the east-side of the street. The fire was also advancing up the west-side of the hill behind the houses on the west-side of the street. The houses at the south-end of the street were fully involved with flame. All the houses below 7126 were totally involved as was 7155, which had burned from the rear.

Engine 4 operated the 1 1/2" line behind 7156 and 7160 against the advancing fire from the south. Engine 4 extended this 200' line with 300' of 1 1/2" line from the hose bed, and then extended it again with 100' of 1 1/2" from the high-rise pack. Engine 4 Lieutenant and Engine 4 Firefighter operated this line against the fire that had jumped the Marlborough Terrace road to the north of 7160. Engine 4 continued to use this line on the north, south, and on the east sides of 7156 and 7160. The Engine 4 crew operating this line received word that there was a large flare-up on the north side of 7160, closer to the street. Engine 4 took this line from the rear of 7160 to the north-side. A large volume of fire was seen racing up the west-side of Marlborough Terrace threatening Engine 4 Pumper and crew. Engine 4 had 100' of 3" line hooked into a hydrant supplying Engine 4, Engine 25, and Engine 19. Engine 4 Engineer made up a 3" big line with a nozzle to defend the apparatus and crew from the advancing fire up the west slope, and helped Engine 4 Firefighter in this same defense. The other Engine 4 Firefighter-

was defending the apparatus and crew with a line directed from the east side of the street to the fire advancing up the west slope, keeping both crew and Pumper wet. This fire was eventually knocked down. Engine 4 Lieutenant and Firefighter continued to operate on the south and west-sides of the the structures 7160 and 7156 Marlborough Terrace.

The Captain from Contra Costa County – Engine 4 and [Water] Tender 15 arrived. OFD Engine 4 requested relief from the lines in this area. OFD Engine 4 was relieved, and met with other Contra Costa officers and directed them to areas down to 7155 Marlborough Terrace. The fire needed to be stopped at this location in order to prevent it from jumping the road.

When making up these lines, a civilian woman's screams were heard coming from the west and down-slope of this fire position at 7155. An Engine 4 Firefighter responded by proceeding through the rear yard at 7156 Norfolk Road. Every house on the west-side of Norfolk Road was fully engulfed in flame, including the house where it was believed the woman's screams had been heard. It was too hot to approach any of these houses. **[Note: After the fire, a disabled elderly woman was discovered on Norfolk Road.]**

The house at 7156 Norfolk Drive had not started to burn. OFD Engine 4 instructed Contra Costa and Engine 25 to stretch a 3" line through the rear yard of 7155 and 7156 Norfolk Drive to protect 7156. One line was stretched through the kitchen area and through the 2-story deck of the house. Contra Costa put a line on the north-side of the house. Everything on the west-side of the street was fully involved, as was property to the north – on the west-side. The fire around this area got larger and hotter. Water turned instantly to steam. When it became too hot to maintain, both the Contra Costa Captain and the Lieutenant from OFD Engine 4 agreed to retreat up the slope. **[Note: After the fire, 7156 remained the only house on Norfolk Drive fully intact.]**

Returning to Marlborough Terrace, Engine 4 Lieutenant discovered that Engine 4 Engineer had helped Engine 10 drag a big line up to the homes on the west-side of the street and had helped Engine 25 Firefighter put a 24' ladder on to the roof of a house on the east-side of the street. The crews from Engine 19, Engine 10, Engine 25, Engine 15, and Engine 4 continued to defend 7126, 7144, 7145, 7156, and 7160 Marlborough Terrace. **[Note: After the fire, all of these houses remain intact and undamaged.]**

### 1230

The water-main on Marlborough Terrace went dry. The Engineer operating the pumps from Engine 19, Engine 4, and Engine 25 shut them down. The Lieutenant from Engine 4 radioed Command. After answering questions about location, Engine 4 Lieutenant became Division F. Spoke with Operations, and reported the water-main going dry. Operations asked if there was a suction hydrant. The answer was no. Operations directed an engine stationed on Grizzly Peak to try pumping into a suction hydrant they were near. The attempt failed. Called about an ETA on water supply; the answer was that there was none. There was fire on all sides in this location, and no water to fight the fire. This position was abandoned by order of Operations.



All the available officers in this area met to prepare to abandon the position. A second concern was that there was a house up-slope and to the east, built on stilts, fully involved with flames. If it burned through, it would fall on to Marlborough Terrace and block the only means of egress. Boulders had already fallen onto the road. Engine 15 and the Contra Costa County crews moved up Marlborough Terrace to prepare hand lines off their rigs – about 1500 gallons of water still remained in the tender. Engines 4, 19, 10, and 25 proceeded to pick up as much hose as possible and to back out of Marlborough Terrace. A car was blocking the egress and was moved by the fire personnel to Marlborough Terrace and Grizzly Peak.

When the companies had arrived on Grizzly Peak, Engine 4 Lieutenant took this same car down Marlborough Terrace and ordered two civilians near 7126 to abandon the area, relating that there was no water and that the fire personnel were leaving. Engine 4 asked that they inform their neighbor at 7145 to leave. The Engine 4 Lieutenant radioed command for reassignment for the crew.

### **Engine 15**

Engine 15 relocated per Command to Marlborough Terrace to assist Engine 4. We took a lead off Engine 4 and set up two 1 1/2" lines to protect Engine 4's flank. Our crew moved down the road to assist Engine 10, and Engine 25 lay 1 1/2" lines to protect structures. We remained there until our water supply was depleted. We relocated and reported to Division C at the Claremont.



**Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace**



**Buckingham Blvd.****Engine 24****1058 – 1104**

Returned via Grizzly Peak Blvd. Stopped south of the Gwinn Tank to check the condition. Noticed the flare-up on the south flank below the antenna. I was 1/4 mile below Marlborough Terrace. I asked for a first-alarm assignment at the same time that Engine 19 had put in for a first alarm assignment (putting a "box" in place). [Note: A box represents 3 engine companies and a chief officer.] The winds were strong, blowing parallel to Buckingham Blvd. out of the east. Responded down Marlborough Terrace to Norfolk, and then to Buckingham Blvd. I bypassed a hydrant (7151) and spotted at the hydrant in front of 7180 Buckingham Blvd. This hydrant was used to thwart the fire which was moving down the canyon. The second alarm had already been called.

**1105 – 1120/1130**

There were 4 of us from Engine 24. Two other Firefighters had become stranded from Engine 19, so we now had 5 Firefighters. But my Tank Wagon driver had gone up the hill, so I had 4 Firefighters – a 5-person crew. I used the Stang gun with a 1 1/2" tip on the head of the fire. The winds turned the stream 90 degrees from the fire. Used a 2 1/2" pre-connect on the east bank of Buckingham, and a 1/2" pre-connect on the east-side of 7185 Buckingham. The winds were strong. Hose was aimed at the 3 houses on Buckingham Blvd. Saved a 4-story shingle-sided dwelling and a 1-story dwelling. Some time during this fight, Engine 8 responded to the fourth alarm, and arrived on the scene at about the sixth alarm.

Engine 8 took the hydrant in front of the 4-story house. I worked with Engine 8 and EBRPFD 5675. Engine 8 used the Stang gun to try and cut the fire off. Evacuating civilians had been put into the 4-story house for protection. They were being protected in the basement, with both Engine 24, and Engine 8 keeping the fire away from the house.

At this time, we were surrounded by fire, 360 degrees. Engine 24 had 5 people; Engine 8 had 4 people; EBRP had approximately 4 people. There were also approximately 8 - 10 civilians in this house; the owner of the house from across the street, and a volunteer civilian firefighter. We were trapped in this area. We couldn't go down Tunnel Road or Buckingham, because the fire was moving across and down, with power poles/lines burning. Cars were burning and houses were burning, with debris falling down the streets. There was no egress from this area. The fire was moving down the canyon. The people who had come down Buckingham had been coming on foot. Cars had stalled in the roads. We had to save the houses because of the civilians we were protecting.

**1100 – 1700**

We were in this area from the on-set of the fire. The hydrant in front of 7180 stayed good for about 2 hours. We lost water at about 1300-1330. [Note: The transcripts indicate that this time was 1215 - 1230.] The main bulk of the fire had burned around us and down the hill, burning

houses, and smouldering brush, with hot spots and smoke.

**1500 – 1600**

After the initial firestorm, the Captain from Engine 8 started walking east on Tunnel Road. There was no exit. He took the Brush rig (or 4-wheel vehicle) and with bolt cutters, proceeded to clear away cars, power lines, and fire debris. After he cleared the road he came back. There were hot spots burning, and the house across the way was burning (7200 Buckingham). We needed firefighting water. We still had homes burning, we still had hot spots. Our Engineer dragged 3" hose up the hill and put a EBRP float-pump into the swimming pool at 7151 Buckingham. He got us water for Engine 24. Used chain-saws to fall trees next to 7180 Buckingham.

**1630 – 1700**

Worked in a mop-up procedure. Tried to make contact with Oakland 2, but there was no response. We left the area via Tunnel Road West to Hiller to Caldecott Road. Proceeded to the Parkwood Apartments and contacted Engine 1 Captain for information on where Command was set up. Tried to contact Broadway Terrace Command, but there was no response. Proceeded to Engine 24 quarters to get cleaned up and to get something to eat. On arriving, I contacted FDC via the department phone, and was instructed to go to Broadway Terrace and Pineneedle.

**Engine 8****4th alarm**

Engine 8 was attempting to go in service after the previous assignment. Because our location was so close to the fire (Highway 13 and Broadway Terrace), I elected to respond directly to the fire. I attempted to notify FDC of my actions on both radio channel 1 and channel 2, but was unsuccessful. Consequently, Engine 8 does not show on the dispatch records as ever having been assigned to the fire.

Command assigned us via radio to 7140 Buckingham. We were unable to reach that address due to other apparatus and civilian vehicles blocking the street. At this time we observed a fast moving brush fire threatening 7235 Buckingham – a large, three story house. Our initial action was to take a 200' supply lead from the hydrant at Tunnel Road and Buckingham. We then "pumped at the scene" in front of the driveway of 7200 Buckingham. Here we joined Engine 24 who was operating from another hydrant just around the corner from us. Engine 24 was providing water to the crews at 7151 Buckingham and also supplying a 300' 1" inch line to the upper corner of 7235 Buckingham. Their 1" inch line was being staffed by a civilian volunteer, who had shown up with full firefighting gear and was quickly put to work.

Engine 8's first water on the fire came from our Stang deck gun equipped with a 1-1/8 inch "big line" tip. One of Engine 8's Firefighters operated the Stang gun and directed it toward the brush fire that was threatening the three-story shingle house. Engine 8's second line was a 1-1/2 inch preconnect staffed by our Chabot College "ride-along" student. This line supplemented the



Stang gun's flow. The three lines – the Stang, the 1-1/2 inch preconnect, and Engine 24's pre-connect were stopping the downward advance of the fire on what was then the right flank. Other areas of the fire were not yet visible from our location.

I broke into and searched the three-story shingle house. It was newly constructed and not yet occupied. I then coordinated with Engine 24's Lieutenant. Things were getting hectic at 7151 Buckingham. The bottom of the fire had apparently jumped the road and was threatening the crews and their apparatus. Soon, the crew members from Engine 19, along with Engine 16's separated Engineer, retreated from their positions to join pumper 24. About this time we were also joined by two East Bay Regional Parks apparatus, which skidded sideways around the corner – due to their exit from the firestorm. Two to three civilian vehicles also drove through the fire and careened to a stop in this traffic jam.

In the background I could hear a public address horn announcing to residents, "Evacuate the area. This fire is out of control...Evacuate the area". This was apparently the Oakland Police Officer who saved hundreds of lives before losing his own.

At this time I discussed our situation with Engine 24's Lieutenant and the EBRP's officers. We all concurred that it was best for us to abandon our position and "get the hell out of here". The road above was obviously impassable. Upon checking the roads below, though, we realized that it was too late to leave. The roads below were also impassable. Houses that only 15 minutes earlier had been untouched and occupied by neighbors were now completely involved in fire. PG&E high-voltage transmission lines had fallen and were jumping around in the street. Power transformers were exploding and throwing huge balls of fire into the treetops.

Engine 8's Engineer informed me that he was having water supply problems. He was having difficulty keeping up his fire flow. Thinking that the friction loss in 200 feet of 3-foot supply-line might be the cause, we began dragging a second 200 foot lead to the hydrant. Upon reaching the hydrant, we realized our water problem – heat from a burning dwelling had melted a hole in the supply lead. Water was leaking away at about 100 gallons per minute. Replacing the damaged hose was impossible due to the heat from the fire and because a high voltage PG&E-line had fallen across the 4-way hydrant valve. Surrounding the hydrant was an entanglement of fallen wires and broken power poles. Firefighters – possibly EBRP were attempting to cool the supply line with a 1" inch preconnect from Engine 8.

By this time the fire had completely surrounded us. We were attempting to save three houses and ourselves. Two of the houses were on the west-side of Buckingham and had heavy landscaping and trees around them. The other house was on the east-side of the street. Since it was a newer house, the landscaping was not yet in place but heavy brush still remained on the upper left side where we had earlier stopped the right flank of the fire. There was also about an acre of unburned brush to the right and below this shingle house. Our apparatus, the civilian vehicles and the EBRP's rigs were in the street between. Eventually one of these three houses caught fire. We didn't have the labor-force or water to save it. We allowed a controlled burn while attempting to keep it from spreading to the last two houses. At this point, if either of



the last two houses caught fire, it would mean the automatic exposure of the apparatus and the loss of our water supply. It was imperative that we save both buildings.

I placed the civilians inside the shingle house as a safe refuge. My ultimate plan was to use the basement garage of this building as the safe refuge area for these people and the Firefighters in the event that either house caught fire. I hoped that the concrete walled basement garage would provide us with protection from the fire while the house above burned – the idea being that we would leave the basement after enough of the outside fuel had been consumed.

Over the radio, I could hear communications about evacuating the burning Parkwood Apartments which were located in the canyon below. I had also heard reference to the fire jumping Highway 24. About this time the already high winds became ferocious. I could feel a barometric pressure change in my ears. The wind began swirling around us like a tornado. I realized that the “eye of the firestorm” was passing over us. About this time also, the unburned acre of brush below the shingle house caught fire and a 20-foot wall of fire began a run toward our position. A 2-inch preconnect line was hastily put into place. The fire had reached an extremely critical peak. There was debris and burning embers flying everywhere. Firestreams were evaporating before they even hit the fire. It became difficult to breathe – as though the oxygen was being sucked from the air. Trees were exploding in fire above us while homes and brush burned around us.

The firestorm took 5 to 8 minutes to pass. Much of the fuel below us had been consumed. We used this period to replace the damaged hydrant hose.

#### **1215**

After making the repair, we turned on the hydrant again – the hydrant was dry. The only water we had left was 500 gallons on Engine 8, 500 gallons on the EBRP pumper, and 300 gallons on a brush wagon. Running out of water presented a new challenge. There was still plenty of fuel surrounding our position – mainly unburned trees around one house and heavy brush next to the shingle house where we had stopped the fire earlier. The wind had calmed and the fire around us had subsided considerably at this point. Houses had been reduced to burning piles of debris and the brush was slowly burning itself down. Unfortunately, I was worried about the wind storm returning. During the height of the storm, I estimate that between Engine 8 and Engine 24, we were flowing 1600 to 1800 gallons of water per minute. If the still smoldering brush reignited or if either of the remaining houses caught fire, the 1300 gallons aboard our apparatus would not be enough water.

I made a risky decision. I took advantage of the calm winds and enlisted the skills of the EBRP crew. They were more experienced with backfires than Oakland firefighters. I had them remove some of the remaining fuel by burning the brush next to the shingle house. I next enlisted the skills of our civilian volunteer. He used Engine 24's chain saw to fell a number of trees between our other house and the neighboring burned-out buildings.

I moved the civilians from the shingle house to an outside location down the street at the inter-

section of Tunnel Road and Buckingham. This area had been absolutely untenable ten minutes earlier but now was relatively safe. All the homes, brush and fuel in this area had pretty much been consumed. We also moved the civilian cars and one EBRP's 4-wheel drive truck to this location. The purpose of this was to provide comfortable seating for the civilians and also to divide resources in case the two houses caught fire.

I left Engine 24 Lieutenant in charge while I attempted to locate an escape route from the burned-out canyon. During that period, the Lieutenant was joined by another Lieutenant and Firefighter and a female civilian. They had "rode out" the fire by staying in a swimming pool when the left flank of the fire had gotten out of control. The Lieutenant left his civilian with Engine 24's Lieutenant, borrowed 24's brush wagon and eventually worked his way up to the rest of his crew on Skyline Blvd. The Lieutenant took advantage of the swimming pool by using EBRP's portable pump to draft water into our apparatus tanks. He also coordinated the pick-up of equipment and began preparations for us to leave the scene for reassignment.

Finding an escape route proved time-consuming. We were in a burned out canyon with roads either still blocked by fire or else blocked by debris for a radius of 1/2 mile in all directions. I recruited a civilian man and his wife to drive me in their compact car. The small car was able to get past all the fallen power lines easier than large apparatus. We first attempted to exit via lower Tunnel Road. This was blocked by 2 vehicles and part of a house that had burned and fallen onto the road from a street above. Next, we tried Charing Cross Road, but this was blocked by a traffic jam of burning vehicles and dead bodies.

We returned to Buckingham where I now enlisted the aid of our civilian volunteer. He had a jeep 4-wheel-drive wagon. Using a pike pole, we cleared fallen wires and began exploring upper Tunnel Road. Shortly past upper Bay Forest Drive, we had to turn back because heavy smoke and fire was blocking our visibility to see fallen wires. This was not a suitable exit route for large apparatus nor a good way to leave with civilians. The other Lieutenant and Firefighter were able to use this route about 45 minutes later when they borrowed Engine 24's brush wagon. I enlisted a Lieutenant from EBRP. The civilian, the Lieutenant, and myself used the EBRP brush wagon and the winch to drag the vehicles off lower Tunnel Road.

We cleared the road all the way to Hiller Drive. We encountered a convoy of three mutual aid apparatus – San Leandro, Alameda and another jurisdiction. I stopped the first rig and requested assistance, explaining the situation – no water, trapped civilians. The officer refused my request, saying that he had prior orders. I asked that he check back with Command, but he explained that he was not able to get through on the radio. The three rigs left us.

We returned to Buckingham, organized the civilians and their vehicles and led them down Tunnel Road. Our civilian volunteer coordinated the front of our convoy while the EBRP Lieutenant and I followed the procession. At this point, our volunteer left. We had heard over the radio that his own home on Broadway Terrace was threatened by the fire. (Note: We learned this civilian worked all night cutting trees and saving many houses. )



As we proceeded out to safety, the Lieutenant and I stopped to pick up two dead bodies – a young woman found laying in a driveway at Charing Cross Road and Tunnel Road and also the body of a black male who had been overcome by the fire on Tunnel Road at a location about halfway between Charing Cross and Hiller Drive. We took the bodies to the Command Post on Highway 24 where we checked in for the first time in about an hour.

Eventually, we dropped off the bodies at the Regional Ambulance staging area at Oakland Technical High School. We then returned to Buckingham with the additional force – two military volunteers. Upon our return, Engine 24's Lieutenant had both Engine 8 and Engine 24 ready to depart. The other EBRP's pumper had already left for reassignment. I left EBRP's Lieutenant and the two military volunteers, along with a home owner, to overhaul and firewatch the two houses. EBRP's Lieutenant had the brush wagon with 150 gallons of water and a radio. I instructed him to request us by radio if he needed help.





**Engine 6****1100**

At the second alarm, Engine 6 responded via Skyline to Grizzly Peak. We met up with Command about 1000 feet above Marlborough Terrace and Grizzly Peak. Our Brush Wagon 6 assisted Engine 19 on Buckingham. Other members of the crew and the Pumper remained on Grizzly Peak Blvd. and set up a defensive position along Grizzly Peak back in the area of Grizzly Peak Terrace. The fire was moving uphill and outward on both flanks.

**1110/1115**

Proceeded down Marlborough Terrace across Norfolk onto Buckingham. Stopped at 7101 Buckingham. Brush 24 was blocking the narrow road; they had a line out and were working that vicinity. Training 2 pointed out that the resident from 7101 Buckingham was wetting things down. There was a pool there. Brush 24 took up a defensive position at this structure. The fire was 100 yards away, burning behind 7151 Buckingham, burning up and left of Gwinn Tank, up towards Marlborough Terrace and Grizzly Peak. Battalion 4's car was blocking the driveway access, so we moved the car for access to the driveway. I told the other officer to bring the Tank Wagon up, and turn it around facing downhill.

**1130 – 1140**

Winds began to increase, and we decided to advance our 1 1/2" lines in the backyard area to the pool area to develop a defensive posture, so that if the fire advanced we would be able to wet the area down in front of the fire. The situation changed drastically, when waiting for the water and getting the line in place, the pinetrees in the vicinity erupted in flames. Pineneedles which were on the roof began to burn. The fire and wind picked up and swirled. We were trying to get the line charged – the other officer had placed a ladder near the roof from the garage to use in order to have access to the roof. With the wind, the fire, and the heat – everything turned, and was coming our way moving 50 – 100 yards in less than 15 – 30 seconds. The pinetrees were going, coming from the east. The woman was going downstairs and the other officer was going upstairs. The fire was approaching, and the other officer told her to get into the pool. "Where's the water?", I said. The front of the house was on fire. The hose was uncharged and had already burned off the rig. He pushed her in the pool, and went in after her. I was in the house. An interior window blew out, and the flames came in the house at about 6 feet – just like a blow torch. I went back outside to the pool and got in with them.

**1145/1200 – 1330**

We were in the pool for approximately an hour and a half or two hours. We used the bubble-cover of the pool to protect ourselves, splashing water on the cover so that it wouldn't burn. Everything was on fire – the buildings on both sides, the fence, the brush, all the vegetation. The house was fully engulfed. The wind was blowing at about 50 mph, and the flames blew across the pool going in the wrong direction. The wind was blowing the heat and flame towards the deep-end of the pool, where we were. We needed to get to the shallow end of the pool where there was less heat and flame. We told the woman what we needed to do. The other officer got out of the pool, walked around to the shallow end and got in. I took the wom-

woman, and we went around the pool together towards the other end. We were all afraid of the super-heated gasses and flames burning our lungs. We needed the pool cover so that we could breathe the remaining air; the fire was feeding on air. The embers were raining like a hail storm, while we continued splashing water on the cover. We had no idea of the magnitude of the fire because we had no portable radio. The portable radio had been given to Brush 28 for patrol. The Brush Wagon radio was in the rig.

### 1330

When we came out of the pool, we were concerned about the rig's fuel tank rupturing, so we got back into the pool. We had concerns about electrical power and other hazards, such as trees falling into the pool. Helmets and shields did protect us, but not the woman. She had no protective clothing. We had the beginnings of hypothermia the last 15 minutes in the pool. After getting out of the pool, the feeling was like walking into an open barbeque – the residual heat, the embers and the ash. We had to get back into the pool a couple of times because it was so hot. There were fires on the tires of the brush wagon, which we put out with a bird-bath. The fire had burned all of the wood off the handles of the fire equipment – axes and shovels. There were two air masks (MSA's – Mias Safety Appliances) still usable; the hoses were destroyed and burned.


After the fires were put out, and we discovered that the radios were working, (for time reference) we found out the fire had advanced to Golden Gate and Acacia (and that they were giving up their position), and they were going to set up again on Golden Gate and Contra Costa Road (or Country Club) with 3 homes on Sheridan and Cochrane beginning to burn. [Note: The time in which the streets Golden Gate and Acacia were burning can be verified in the chronology. Engine 6's approximations are just that – approximations.]

We took 15 minutes of oxygen therapy since there was oxygen in the tank, and spent time revitalizing ourselves. Afterwards we spotted apparatus at the corner of Tunnel Road and Buckingham (the large 4-story house still standing). We took Engine 24's Tank Wagon which had been abandoned on Buckingham. We left the woman at the Buckingham house where there were other civilians and Engine 8 crew. At this time, we assisted Engine 24 and Engine 8, and the EBRP Pumper. They had a float pump, and because they had lost their water, they needed water. They were to put their float pump into the pool that we had just left. They wanted this water for their rigs, so they dragged the hose up the street towards 7101, and with assistance of the crew, got the pump into the pool, and proceeded to fill all the tanks. [Note: An estimate of 20,000 – 30,000 gallons of water were pumped from the pool; this in an environment where all the hydrants were dry. Engine 8 had called in dry hydrants at 1215.]

We took the 24 Brush Wagon, and took bolt-cutters to Tunnel Road and Skyline, and cut wire from the poles along Skyline. (This took several hours to do.) We went around Grizzly Peak and Grizzly Peak Terrace, and found the rest of our crew on Grizzly Peak. Up on Grizzly Peak, Truck 15's Captain was in charge of the rest of Engine 6's crew. We were mopping-up in this location until 0400 the following day.




### 2. Grizzly Peak and Grizzly Peak Terrace





2. Bay Forest



**Engine Companies and their response times to Grizzly Peak and Grizzly Peak Terrace, and Bay Forest**

- **Truck 15** 1104
- **Engine 21** 6th alarm
- **Engine 6** 1100
- **EBRP**
- **Engine 27** 6th alarm

**Summary of this location**

At 1104, Truck 15 with Engine 6 and Engine 21 fought fire on the north, east, and south side of Grizzly Peak Blvd., and Grizzly Peak Terrace, containing the perimeter of the fire, and keeping it from spreading across Grizzly Peak Blvd. into the Orinda area. EBRP was also working in this area extending lines into the canyon. Engine 6, and Truck 15 stayed in this area until 0200/21, when they were relieved by EBRP and CDF crews. Engine 21 was released to another Division at approximately 1630.

**Truck 15****1104**

Truck 15 responded on the second alarm to Grizzly Peak Blvd. and Grizzly Terrace. Command assigned Engine 6 and Engine 21 with Truck 15 under my command for this sector. We immediately attacked the fire threatening homes in this area on the north side of Grizzly Peak Blvd. dragging lines from Engine 6. Engine 21 came in on the eastern side with a line. After knocking down the perimeter of this area we set up lines on Grizzly Peak.

When the fire came up the hill we knocked it down and kept it from jumping the road. There was a very strong, hot wind from the Orinda side. Because the pressure was very low, we alternately moved Pumper 6 and 21 down the road from hydrant-to-hydrant, leaving a line connected to the hydrant as we left. I asked the Command for air drops in this area to prevent a new front from moving east below Grizzly Peak Blvd.

The fire jumped the road east of our defenses, and we dragged lines up a fire trail to try and contain it. We did this until we reached the next house on the north side. An EBRPD truck was working on this house and the extension into the canyon. We assisted and contained the perimeter.

We released Engine 21 to another division. Engine 6 and Truck 15 continued knocking down areas which were trying to reignite and spread into trees and growth on both sides of Grizzly Peak Blvd. This line extended from Grizzly Terrace Road (north/west intersection) to beyond 5950 Grizzly Peak Boulevard. The officer and tank wagon driver rejoined us in the very late afternoon after losing the tank wagon to fire and barely saving their own lives in a swimming pool.

**0200/21**

Engine 6 and Truck 15 were relieved by roving EBRPD and CDF trucks.

**Engine 21**

I responded as a C/R officer on Engine 21. We responded on the sixth alarm with an Engineer, two Firefighters and Brush 21.

We responded via Skyline Blvd. to Grizzly Peak Blvd. and finally found fire at the south intersection of Grizzly Peak Terrace and Grizzly Peak Blvd. We operated 1 1/2" lines from both the pumper and wagon. The fire was encroaching on the homes in the Grizzly Terrace subdivision and we moved our lines in response. At this point the pump engine on the wagon failed.

We were no longer needed at the homes as Truck 15, aided by an unidentified Oakland pumper, was in control of that portion of the fire.

We picked up our hose and moved approximately 1/2 mi south on Grizzly Peak Blvd., where the fire appeared to be in danger of crossing into Contra Costa County.

I attempted to protect some homes farther south on Grizzly Peak Blvd. using a large line and straight tip nozzle, from a hydrant. The advance of the fire forced all civilians to flee and I was left with no help on the large line. Due to the above conditions, I was forced to abandon the homes and fire equipment.

I returned to the pumper to supervise and as all was well I returned to my former position as the fire had passed. With the aid of a Firefighter, an EBRPFD brush wagon and some civilians who had returned, we were able to save or extinguish half a dozen house fires.

**Engine 6**

Of the crew of Engine 6, the Engineer and Lieutenant had gone down to Buckingham Blvd. There were only 3 fire personnel working off of Engine 6 at this location. In working with Truck 16, we took the first hydrant on Grizzly Peak Terrace and then stretched lines, and then took another hydrant until Engine 21 showed up. We were essentially leapfrogging from hydrant to hydrant. We went to find another hydrant and went back and found the Firefighter. The fire was crossing the road at the south-east side. There were 300-foot leads, the pressure was really low. Operated in this location until 0200.



**Engine 27****1139**

We turned off Tunnel Road onto Bay Forest Drive. At Bay Forest Court, we took our 1st hydrant and lead 150' up the street. At this time, the fire just started on the end house on Bay Forest Ct. Our Firefighter extinguished that house with the use of the Stang Gun and the 500 gallons in the rig's tank. Then I noted 5 more houses burst into flames. I yelled back to our Firefighter to turn the water on at the hydrant. He responded, "I did. The hydrant is dry". I was overwhelmed with this occurrence.

**1141**

I reported over the radio that "we lost our water from the hydrant". No reply from FDC. We left that 150' of 3" hose in the street and retreated back down Bay Forest to the next hydrant at Bay Forest Place.

Note: The winds were at 60 plus mph and swirling with fire embers, dust and smoke. Spot fires were erupting around us. A Firefighter and I checked this second hydrant and it had water. But we didn't turn this hydrant all the way on. After taking another lead, backwards, up Bay Forest Drive, we again tried to operate the Stang gun, but now we didn't have any water in this hydrant. I ordered this second lead to be left in the street because about 20 structures were on fire and we didn't have any way to protect ourselves without water except to retreat from this sub-division. Yet, we did knock on a few doors, blew the siren and yelled in attempt to evacuate the sub-division. We saw no movement except an Oakland Police Officer (OPD) attempting the same. I requested alot more help to this location but, again, got no response. I realized FDC and Command were doing their best.

At this time I heard a urgent request for help from the Captain of Engine 8 at Buckingham and Tunnel. Even though the rest of my crew thought it too dangerous to go down Tunnel Rd. I ordered it in an attempt to assist Engine 8 and possibly attack the Bay Forest fire from a lower flank position. I did not feel that we couldn't get out of this area if needed. After two turns down Tunnel from Bay Forest Drive, we were forced to stop because of major fire spread across Tunnel Rd. and power lines down and burning in the roadway. I radioed this information in and again no response. We took our third hydrant, here, next to a fifth-wheel trailer, in another attempt to save something in the Bay Forest area. The Firefighter and I checked this third hydrant and had reasonable water but when we tried to charge the suction, we lost the water, again. The fire was advancing very fast and we were in a heavy fire-load area. I now felt threatened and ordered this third lead also be left in the road and we retreated back-up Tunnel Road to Skyline Drive. Now, I'm thinking, where can we find water, when are we going to get help and where can we stop this "Thing". We stopped at the old Tunnel area to check a hydrant. It had very little water. Because of this and the extremely high fire load in this area, I decided that these homes were not savable. [Note: Continue with Engine 27's accounting under Upper Broadway Terrace in this section.]



Grizzly Peak Terrace

### 3. Parkwood Apartments





**Engine Companies responding to the Parkwood Apartments:**

- Engine 1 1115

- Engine 16

- Truck 3 1126

- Orinda Engine

- Task Force from Alameda County

- Task Force 2044 from  
Contra Costa County

**Summary of this location**

Engine 1 arrived at 1115, and the fire was seen on all sides of the apartment complex. The traffic congestion made it extremely difficult to position the apparatus in order to fight the fire. Residents were driving over 5" lines and tearing them. When people had finished evacuating, we were able to extend lines. By mid-afternoon, the water main went dry. We had three main streams which couldn't be supported. The Strike Teams were relocated to other areas. After dark, Engine 1, Truck 3, Engine 16, and the Orinda Fire Department reported to staging.

**Engine 1**

Engine 1 responded on the fourth alarm with Truck 3 from Station 1 to Parkwood Apartments on Caldecott Lane. On arrival, fire could be seen on all sides of the apartment complex and within the apartment complex. Engine 1 dropped a 5" supply line at a hydrant on Caledott Lane. Traffic congestion was extremely heavy, with residents exiting the complex on foot and in cars. This congestion caused a delay in positioning the apparatus. Vehicles exiting the complex ignored the directions of the Oakland Police Department and drove over our supply line, causing damage to the hose which busted when charged by Engine 16. Once the apparatus was positioned, all preconnect lines were charged. Engine 1 started rescue and evacuation of the complex and called for additional help.

Orinda Fire Department arrived and dropped a 5" supply line from a nearby hydrant and began supplying Truck 3 for ladder-pipe operations. Engine 1 used 2 1/2" lines to supply the building's sprinkler system, but due to the falling heated roofing material, the hose lines busted on at least 2 occasions. Engine 1 used the Stang gun to try and extinguish roof fires and the brush that was burning against the building. Strike teams from Hayward, San Leandro, and Alameda arrived and assisted as needed. Orinda and Alameda Fire set up turrett operations, but it became apparent that supply lines were operating off the same main and it would not support three master streams and hand-lines effectively. At this time, the Parkwood Apartments were totally involved.

Engine 1 was later forced to shut down pumping operation due to an electrical fire which damaged electrical wires and pressure hoses. After several hours of firefighting operations, 2 residents of the complex walked out onto the street. One resident indicated that he had been in the swimming pool and the other had stayed in his car parked in the garage. A search was conducted of all cars located in or out of the garage areas by various departments.

Sometime around mid-afternoon, the main that had been supplying our hydrants went completely dry, and we were unable to continue firefighting operations. The Parkwood Apartments became a total loss, and all Strike Teams were relocated to other areas.

### **Engine 16**

Engine 16 with a crew of 3 was ordered by Command to Tunnel Road and Bay Forest. This order was changed to the Parkwood Apartments at the time we were at Tunnel Road and Hiller. At the Parkwood Apartments, my first order was to turn the engine around facing out in the event the fire overtook us. We connected to the hydrant south of the first building, and played our turret at the fire coming down the hill. We next stretched a 2 1/2" line to the side of the first building (east) to protect it from fire on the hill and trees. This line was never used due to the lack of fire personnel and water. I wish to point out that one of my first radio requests was for fire personnel and supplemental water due to the dead-end main. Engine 16's operations later included an attempt to supply equipment, suppress fire initially on the roof of the first building, suppress fire running throughout the first building, and to initiate search and rescue operations. We also directed mutual aid companies attempting to supplement water supplies by bringing a lead from the Caltrans hydrant at the exit from Tunnel (Bore) #3. We constantly conferred with the Captain and mutual aid company-commanders for input and suggestions to improve our operations.

At a point late in the afternoon, we met with the Captain and suggested a portion of our personnel be released due to the inability to operate effectively, and because there was an obvious need for these crews to be elsewhere on the fire-line.

### **1700 /approximately**

With only a small portion of one building yet to be consumed by fire, the water system failed completely at Parkwood.

### **Truck 3**

#### **1127**

Truck 3 had changed quarters for unit Truck 1. Truck 3 and Engine 1 went to the Parkwood Apartments to assist in the rescue and the evacuation of the complex. When rescue and evacuation were complete, all of the structures at the Parkwood Apartments were fully involved in fire.

#### **1300**

Engine 16, an engine from Orinda, Engine 1, and a command vehicle were on the scene. Set up master streams and attempted to save the front wing of the front building.

#### **1400**

San Leandro FD and Hayward FD were on the scene. Set up more master streams.



**1530**

San Leandro FD and Hayward Fire Department were released to the Command Center.

**1600**

The water supply runs dry. Truck 3, and Orinda's engine, Engine 16 and Engine 1 make a sweep of the garages.

**1800**

Truck 3, Engine 1, Engine 16, and Orinda's engine return to the Command Center for reassignment. Engine 1's rig was 6/6 (inoperable) at the Parkwood Apartments.

**1830**

Truck 3 was newly designated as part of Strike Team 45 (with Engine 1, Engine 16, and engines from Orinda and Alameda). Strike Team 45 was dispatched to Broadway Terrace and Pinewood.



**Parkwood Apartments**



4. Hiller Highlands




### Summary of this location

Hiller Highlands was overcome with fire almost immediately after the first few minutes of the initial fire spread. As the fire exploded in 3 major directions – up towards Grizzly Peak, down towards Parkwood Apartments, and across Marlborough Terrace heading west – the Hiller Highlands area had no protection against the fire. The wind whipped the fire across this area with an avalanche of flame, flying debris, and overwhelming heat. Everything was torched as the fire advanced down the hill. The fire was unrelenting, with both civilian and Firefighter alike trying to escape. The devastation was total, with all structures and vegetation succumbing.



Hiller Highlands

5. Claremont Canyon – Amito, Alvarado, Gravatt, and Besito





**Engine Companies responding to the Claremont Canyon:**

- CDF Engine 1661
- CDF Engine 1674
- \*\*\* • CDF Engines 1663, 1664, 1683 Rispin
- Orinda Strike Team Amito and Alvarado
- \*\*\* • Lawrence Berkeley Lab FD Engine 1 Siler and Alvarado
- \*\*\* • Moraga P.U.
- \*\*\* • EBRP 5675
- \*\*\* • EBRP P.U.
- \*\*\* • Contra Costa County Engines 4 and 15
- \*\*\* • Marin Engine 1577 Alvarado below Siler
- \*\*\* • Novato Engine 61
- \*\*\* • Engine 1565 (??)
- \*\*\* • Berkeley Fire Department (??)
- \*\*\* • Hayward Engine 2
- \*\*\* • Pleasanton

[Note: CDF information has listed all of the above "\*\*\*\*" personnel resources which were either sent to this area, and/or worked in this area. There is no clarification as to the time these resources appeared. It is to be assumed that the Contra Costa engine companies on this list were a part of the Orinda Strike Team mentioned in CDF reports; this again is not confirmed.]

**Summary of the Claremont Canyon area:**

It is difficult to describe a summary chronology of this area, specifically because of where it is situated in relationship to the fire's spread, and because of what was happening around it.

The Claremont Canyon was in direct line with the initial western movement of the fire spread. As the Engineer from Engine 19 recalls, their escape route was being followed by the advance of the fire. As Engine 19 and crew, and evacuating civilians were trying to make their way to Claremont Avenue, fire blew through the upper ridges of the area moving as fast as the evacuating residents. Because of the rapid movement, fire personnel were prohibited by circumstance to try and stay the spread until it had reached the area of Alvarado, Amito, and Besito. The first firefighting personnel to reach the Claremont Canyon area to fight fire were East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP), and the California Department of Forestry (CDF). CDF had arrived at Grizzly Peak and Fish Ranch (the CDF staging area from the previous day). The concern from CDF was that fire might spread into the State Responsibility Area (SRA). With the CDF helicopter making drops, CDF's next goal was structure protection for the Claremont Canyon area.

**CDF Battalion Chief****1300**

I moved down Claremont Canyon to assess the area. Drove through the Claremont Canyon and Alvarado Drive. I had the [CDF] engines remain here. I went up Alvarado Road and proceeded to Amito. The fire was encroaching on Amito, Besito, and Drury. I felt the situation had changed, and that the major immediate goal was structure protection, so I radioed the 2 CDF engines (1661 and 1674) and had them proceed up Alvarado to Amito. With the Fire Captain, the Helitac crew, and the EBRP Pumper, we set up action along Alvarado on Besito and Amito (on a ridge line). It was important to keep the road clear. There were individuals with hoses who attempted to save their own houses – people who had not evacuated. There were people who were evacuating, and people in bewilderment, who did not yet believe that anything was happening. We saw no police at that time. There were no other engines or water tenders at this time. We tried to keep mobile. We didn't hook up to hydrants at this time. We still had water.

**1315 – 1330**

I proceeded down Amito to Gravatt. There was a wall of flame. This was the first indication of the fire flowing rapidly down the hill. There were lots of embers, and people were trying to evacuate down Gravatt. The hydrant at the corner of Gravatt and Amito was still working.

**1335**

I made another call to my dispatcher, and told him what I was doing. He informed me that the ICP was on Hiller and Tunnel Road. I told him I decided not to go to the ICP at this time. I felt I was getting alot accomplished by staying on Amito and fighting structures there. I also told the dispatcher that the situation was grave. That there weren't any Strike Teams where I was



fighting, that people were coming back to their homes. We were losing numerous structures, that winds were at least 35 mph, and that they were down-slope, and that spotting conditions are tremendous, and that we couldn't stop the wildland fire. I told him we were making stands on sections of structures that we could hold.

**1345**


I went back to the staging area at Grizzly Peak and Fish Ranch Road, where they told me where the ICP was located. At this time a Strike Team from Orinda had arrived, and they followed me into Amato and Alvarado to make a stand. Also had some EBRP people. The Orinda Strike Team started taking up positions along Alvarado below Amato Drive, and they were having a hard time holding structures. The fire continued to spread with the wind, and we were not able to hold the structures.



Claremont Avenue and Alvarado



6. Claremont Hotel and surrounding areas



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**Engine Companies responding to the Claremont Hotel and surrounding areas:**

- Division C Commander 1300
- Engine 10 1830/1900
- Engine 19 1830/1900
- Engine 25 1830/1900
- Engine 15 1830/1900
- Truck 18 1300
- Piedmont Engine 1
- Berkeley Fire Department
- Strike Team from San Francisco 1310
- San Francisco additional 100 crew
- Alameda Strike Team ALA-0012 – Claremont at Alvarado 1510
- Hayward Strike Team 1
- Marin County 1513 P.U. – Claremont Avenue east of the Claremont Hotel near the park
- Marin Engine 1570
- Strike Team 9160C 1600

[Note: Some of the areas depicted in this section also overlap into the Vicente – Bridge/Tunnel Road area (the next section). There might have been engine companies beginning a fire stand on Alvarado and Tunnel in the middle of the Berkeley firefighting actions (noted in the next section) and these same companies continuing on Alvarado in a different area. Both of these areas mention (claim) these companies so that there is no confusion about who was in a particular area. The important information is that engine companies were in the area; what the area is called is incidental.]

As noted on the map on the previous page, the following streets are included in this section:

- The Short Cut
- Alvarado Place
- Eucalyptus Path
- Slater Lane
- Evergreen Path Lane
- Alvarado/Gravatt
- Tunnel Road
- Claremont Avenue



**Summary of the Claremont Hotel area**

Because of previous experiences in fighting the 1923 and 1970 Oakland fires, the Oakland Fire Department had the insight and planning experience to know that the Claremont Hotel was in eminent danger of being destroyed in this fire. The Claremont Hotel is known to be the second-largest wood-frame structure in the United States, and there was concern about the hotel's flammable nature. While the fire was being fought in the Claremont Canyon shortly after 1300, the Oakland Fire Department was planning a major offensive to prevent further spread of the fire west towards the Claremont Hotel. A Division C commander was authorized to "save the area".

The first defensive line was established along the east-side of the hotel. Defensive operations were established by setting up Stang guns and aerial apparatus. San Francisco Engine 17 also set up a defensive position on the southeast side of the hotel. San Francisco Engines 6 and 13 were directed to the rear parking lot of the hotel, with San Francisco Engine 25 leading a one 3" line from the engine to the hydrant on Tunnel Road. In order to strengthen perimeter defense, 1000 feet of 3" line with "wye" outlet was led across the parking lot and up the steep hill behind the hotel to Alvarado Road. Another 100 feet of 1 1/2" line led from the Piedmont engine – connected by a "wye" outlet to another section of Alvarado Road. As a precautionary plan, OFD Truck 18 was utilized for the aerial water tower it carried, placed in the middle of the parking lot of the hotel in case it was needed to hit the fire "head on".

Part of the San Francisco Strike Team began their attack by advancing up Eucalyptus Path, meeting with Hayward Strike Team 1. Both San Francisco and Hayward laid handlines to the upper Alvarado area, overcoming extreme fire conditions.

The Fremont Patrol Unit 4 – a Brush Truck was detailed to saturate the foliage and combustible shingle roofs near Alvarado Road.

The defensive strategy of the Oakland Fire Department worked. The advance of the fire was stopped along Alvarado Road.

**Division C****1300**

Designated as Division C commander by OFD by Command at approximately 1300. Orders were to protect the Claremont Hotel utilizing mutual aid Strike Teams. Requested 2 type-1 Strike Teams and a ladder truck company through OFD Fire Dispatch Center (FDC). Established Division C command in the upper parking lot of the Claremont Hotel off of Tunnel Road. The first arriving units were OFD Truck 18 commanded by the Lieutenant and a Piedmont Fire Department Engine commanded by the Lieutenant. Shortly after the arrival and deployment of these units, a type-1 Strike Team from San Francisco – commanded by their Chief – committed this resource to Division C. The Piedmont engine developed mechanical problems, and was taken out of service.



Three San Francisco engines were stationed along the rear (the west-side) of the hotel, with each pumper utilizing a private hydrant. The company officers were instructed to set up master streams (Stang guns) and wet down the trees and brush next to the hotel. Another San Francisco pumper replacing the disabled Piedmont engine, supplied water to OFD Truck 18's ladder pipe. The fifth San Francisco engine was positioned in the lower parking lot next to Tunnel Road, conducting wet-down operations in the brush and trees. The San Francisco Chief directed operations, extending a 3" hose line through a breach fence to protect homes on Alvarado Road. Additional San Francisco units arrived and were deployed under the command of the San Francisco Assistant Chief.

**2100**

Division C command was passed to the San Francisco Assistant Chief at Division C's request. There was some confusion regarding whom the San Francisco Strike Teams were reporting to – the Berkeley Fire Department or the Oakland Fire Department. The plan of action was to stop the fire at the hotel. After discussion between the OFD initial Division C and the Berkeley Deputy Chief, it was agreed that the San Francisco units should remain in place to stop the fire, as previously committed.

**Engine 10**

We moved down Claremont toward the Claremont Hotel, finding dry hydrants along the way. Since the fire was not immediately threatening the Claremont Canyon area, we reported to Division B, commanded by Battalion 4 from the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD). We set up a defensive position on Tunnel Road and Alvarado. We worked our way up Alvarado to Sunset Trail, using hand-lines from an unidentified Pumper on Alvarado. As sundown approached, the firestorm was losing its intensity. With a number of hand-lines in place and the fire's progress toward the hotel halted, we were replaced on the hand-lines by Berkeley and San Francisco Firefighters. We attempted to move to Alvarado and Gravatt, but unsuccessfully, being stopped by pumpers and hose on the lower approach and power lines on upper Alvarado off of Claremont. We encountered spot fires in brush on Claremont above Alvarado. After expending our water supply, we left the California Department of Forestry (CDF) crews in charge. After informing Battalion 4 (SFFD) of the situation in his sector [Division], we responded to the call for assistance from Division A in charge.

**Engine 15**

We relocated and reported to Division C at the Claremont. At the Claremont, we formed a Strike Team with Engine 25, Engine 15, Engine 10, and Engine 19 and responded to 16 Alvarado Road. There we set up two 2 1/2" lines to the rear of this address, to back up lines at Alvarado and Bridge. Our lines were not used and Engine 15 returned to Division C staging. Engine 15 was assigned to assist San Francisco Fire units at Alvarado and Evergreen. The road was impassable so we hand-carried hose up Eucalyptus Path and returned to the Claremont.

**Engine 25****1330**

Under the direction of Operations, we were directed with Engine 10, Engine 15, Engine 19, and Engine 5 to Claremont and Alvarado Road. At this location, we filled our tanks with a live hydrant and looked for our Division Leader. After a discussion with our Division Leader and learning of no specific plan or need at this location, and combined with a desperate need for help at other locations, we called for another assignment.

We contacted Division C who was in need of help to protect the threatened Claremont Hotel area. At this time, Engine 25, Engine 10, Engine 15 and Engine 19 were set up at a fire stop between #10 to #50 Alvarado Road. Engine 19 supplied Engine 25 from the hydrant on the corner of Tunnel Rd. and Alvarado Rd.

**1400 – 1600**

Engine 25 set up its Stang gun and two 3" lines between dwellings on Alvarado. Used 1100' 3", 200' 2 1/2". We stayed in this defensive position until directed to shut down and pick up our lines.

**Engine 19****1500 – 1530**

Engine 15, Engine 10, Engine 25, and a Firefighter driving Engine 19, pulled out of Marlborough and came to Grizzly Peak and Marlborough. Under the direction of the Captain from Engine 25, we freelanced. We had some equipment. We had 4 engines, a Tank Wagon, and crews. We proceeded down Claremont Avenue, stopped at a hydrant and filled all the water tanks. We dispersed the equipment so that we would all have firefighting capabilities, and proceeded to the Claremont Hotel to hook up with our command there. But we never got to the Claremont.

**(2 hours) 1730 – 1800**

On approaching the Claremont, the Berkeley Fire Department was screaming for help on Tunnel Road and Alvarado, which was very close to our location. We proceeded to Tunnel Road and Alvarado. Engine 19 pumped Engine 15, Engine 10 and Engine 25 leads up Alvarado and Tunnel Road, Tunnel Road and Bridge Street until the fire passed.

**1830 – 1900**

When released from this assignment by the Berkeley Fire Department, we went back to the Claremont to hook up with someone from Oakland. Division C was in charge.



**Truck 18****1300**


Truck 18 responded. We were dispatched from a phone call from Dispatch Operations and instructed to report to Ashby and Claremont Avenue. At this location we met the command of Division C. Division C instructed us to set up our ladder-pipe to protect the Claremont Hotel from fire and flying embers. Our water was initially supplied by an engine company from the Piedmont Fire Department. Piedmont's Engine had mechanical problems and they were replaced by an engine company from San Francisco. Truck 18's ladder-pipe was used for only about 10 minutes. It was not needed because the fire did not burn that far down the hill and other companies had placed hand-lines up the hill to stop the fire. Truck 18 remained in this location until approximately 0130.



The Claremont Hotel



### 7. Vicente, Bridge, Alvarado, Grand View, and Tunnel Road



**Engine Companies responding to this location:**

- **OFD Engine 19** – Tunnel Road and Alvarado Road 1730/1800
- **OFD Engine 15** – Tunnel Road and Alvarado Road 1730/1800
- **OFD Engine 10** – Tunnel Road and Alvarado Road 1730/1800
- **OFD Engine 25** – Tunnel Road and Alvarado Road 1730/1800
- **Berkeley Engine 1** – Vicente Road; Bridge Road and Alvarado
- **Berkeley Engine 3** – Vicente Road; Bridge Road and Alvarado 1225
- **Berkeley Engine 2** – Vicente Road and Tunnel Road 1225
- **Berkeley Engine 5** – Roble Road
- **Berkeley Truck 2** – Roble Road
- **Berkeley Truck 5** – Roble Road
- **Berkeley Engine 6** – Roble Road
- **Berkeley Engine 7** – El Camino Real 1411
- **Berkeley Engine 11** – El Camino Real after 1411
- **Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Engine 48A** 1414  
– El Camino Real
- **Albany Engine 3** – Roble Court
- **Albany Engine A-25** – Vicente Road; Roble Road 1315
- **Emeryville Engine 3** – Roble Road 1430
- **NAS Alameda Engine 1** – Roble Road 1344
- **Strike Team – South Alameda County 1, and Task Force 12** – Alvarado/Bridge Road
- **Strike Team – Marin County 2143C**  
– Alvarado/Bridge Road



### Summary of this location

At 1207, the Berkeley Fire Department received a call saying that the fire was "...coming over the hill." [Note: Although the fire hadn't reached Vicente at 1207, the fire did reach Vicente at 1224. The address 32 Vicente Road – presumably where this call had come from – was the first house lost on Vicente.] BFD Engine 3 was dispatched to investigate the call. The Berkeley Lieutenant working off of Engine 3 attempted to determine the size and the direction of the fire by going east on Vicente from Tunnel Road to see if he could find the eastern flank of the fire. He stopped at Vicente and Vicente Place in Oakland and was able to see the fire from a distance. He continued up to Grandview and Westview and saw the rapidly moving fire sweeping down the far ridge. The fire appeared to be about 1/4 to 1/2 mile away. There was no fire visible on Vicente, Grandview, or Gravatt at this time.

Berkeley had already pulled a first alarm assignment at 1215 for Tunnel Road, and evacuations for the upper Tunnel Road area were already in progress. Berkeley Engine 3 tried returning to Tunnel to join the Berkeley first alarm units, but stopped on Vicente because of the numerous spot fires on the roofs in the area. Berkeley Engines 2 and 5 arrived at Tunnel with the Captain of Engine 5 revealing that there was fire below and west of their position. Because of possible entrapment by the fire, Berkeley Engine 5 was to begin firefighting operations in the Roble Road (Berkeley) area. Berkeley established a Roble Command and remained in this area for 16 hours.

Fire conditions along Roble Road were extreme, with winds and spot fires on all sides. Berkeley Engine 5 took a defensive position in front of 55 Roble Road and laid a supply line from the hydrant at the intersection of Roble Court. Fire was continually being fought on Roble Road throughout the day, with houses being lost in the lower-numbered part of the block because of intensive heat and fire. Berkeley Engine 6 was also assigned to the Roble Road area.

Berkeley Engine 1 was assigned to assist Engine 3 on Vicente. Fires along Vicente were increasing in intensity, with Berkeley Engine 3 asking for more assistance. Albany Engine A-25 was assigned to assist with firefighting in this area. At 1333, Albany Engine A-25 communicated that the fire was about to "...roll over us." They were then assigned to the Berkeley Roble Command. Berkeley Engines 1 and 3 were reassigned to Bridge Road and Alvarado Road.

At 1247, fire conditions at the Berkeley Tunnel Road Command Post became untenable. The Berkeley Tunnel Road Command Post was moved to Tunnel Road and Bridge Road.

At an undocumented point in time, the Berkeley Tunnel Command made a decision to make a stand on Tunnel Road and Alvarado Road. This order was broadcast to all Berkeley fire units. [Note: The preliminary chronology of the Berkeley report does not state a time for this action.]


Four Oakland engine companies (Engines 10, 15, 19, and 25) left the Grizzly Peak, Marborough Terrace area, and headed for the Claremont Hotel, but the Berkeley Fire Department was calling for help. [Note: It is assumed that the Oakland Fire Department personnel were responding



to the call made on the radio by the Berkeley Fire Department. Unfortunately, the Berkeley report does not acknowledge the response by the Oakland engine companies in this area.] All four engines proceeded to Tunnel Road and Alvarado. Engine 19 pumped Engine 15, and Engine 10 and Engine 25 had leads going up Alvarado and Tunnel Road, and Tunnel Road and Bridge until the fire passed. They were released by the Berkeley Fire Department and went back to the Claremont Hotel to hook up with other Oakland engine companies.

At 1411, Berkeley Engine 7 reported that structures were in flames along the lower portion of El Camino Real. Their crew set up operations, but because conditions were so extreme, they were forced to abandon their apparatus to the fire. After the winds changed, the crew was again able to reclaim their equipment and begin firefighting. Berkeley Engine 11 assisted in this area. This position was then moved to The Uplands between El Camino and Hillcrest. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Engine 48A joined this operation. Berkeley Engine 7 remained on El Camino until they were relieved at 1900.

8. Roble Road/ Chabot Road



**Engine Companies responding to the Roble Road/Chabot Road area:**

- 2 San Francisco engines
- Colma Fire Department
- Berkeley Fire Department
- San Bruno Fire Department
- Marin Fire Department

**Director of Training/Division B****1200/1300**

Went back to the Command Post, told Operations they needed resources over at Chabot Road, but there were no resources. A Strike Team from San Francisco had just come in, a 5-Engine Strike Team. Command said we could have 2 of those Engines and that the other 3 should go over to assist Golden Gate and Broadway. Directed those 3 engines from that Strike Team to College Prep school and encountered the Captain from Truck 15, and directed him to take command of that area, and direct the activities of the San Francisco engines.

[Note: Refer to the Eustice/Brookside stand described by the Captain of Truck 15 in the Rockridge section.] I took the other 2 engines to the other side of the freeway to Chabot Road to establish other operations on Chabot Road to prevent the fire from spreading past Chabot Road.

**1300**

All of upper Chabot Road was involved. The fire had burned down to the area of the Rock La Fleche development center, and the Chabot Road Tennis Club. Took the 2 engines to Chabot and Reata, and established a defensive line at Chabot and Reata Court. My attempt was to save the houses at Reata Court and to keep the fire from burning down Chabot Road. There was a good open area behind Chabot School and the tennis courts that abutted onto the freeway, and we could probably keep the fire from going into Roanoke and Hill Crest, and the Uplands area. We had one of the engine companies bring water from Roanoke to Reata, and work up Reata Court, the other engine company went to Chabot road and Rock La Fleche center. Another engine company from Colma pumped a lead up Reata Court, and those 3 engines worked for an hour to an hour and a half. I went back up Roanoke to Hill Crest and the Uplands, [in Berkeley] to see if the fire had gotten into this area. Encountered Berkeley companies that were operating at the end of Hill Crest Road. The fire had burned up behind Reata Court, the hillside behind Rock La Fleche Center, and was coming up into the homes in back of Hill Crest, and Hill Crest Court. Hill Crest dead-ends in a court and overlooks Chabot Canyon. One Berkeley company was working at the end of Hill Crest, but they were overwhelmed by the amount of fire they had to deal with. There were also many civilians working who were trying to help them. One of the engines was parked at the Uplands, they tried to move it but they were understaffed at doing their work in this location.



**1300**

During this time when working this Chabot area, I became Division B Command.

**1300/1400**

San Bruno company was working on Roanoke, using a lot of volunteer help to move and extend hose lines, to keep the fire from burning Roanoke and Reata Court. They attacked Hill Crest towards Roanoke to prevent further damage on Roanoke and on Hill Crest. One of the San Francisco engine companies disengaged from what they had been doing, and brought in a water supply from Chabot Road and Roanoke (they were working in the rear houses on Roanoke from below the area that was overrun with fire).

**After 1400**

There was a real concern about the fire along the freeway. The fire was being pushed along the freeway, and was threatening the homes near Chabot School on Patton. There were no companies at Patton. I went back to the Command Van. There was another Strike Team at the Command Van on Broadway and Highway 24 – this team was from Marin. This was a type-3 Strike Team. We went under the freeway at Patton. The first engine company from this Strike Team was used to extinguish the fire along the freeway and to protect the homes on Patton and to protect homes on Chabot and Patton to the end of the burn area. This assignment was covered over through to the next hour. This Strike Team was left in command of this assignment

**1500**

Went back to Roanoke and the Hill Crest area, making sure that this area was secured and under control. At this time I was reassigned by Command as Branch 3 Director. The operational area of Branch 3 was unclear – what had been Division A. Wanted to meet up with Battalion 44 who had been the director of Division A.

9. Rockridge, Golden Gate, Contra Costa Road, Buena Vista Avenue, Acacia, Brookside, Margarido, Country Club



[Note: Because of the numerous fire-stands made in the Rockridge area, and because there are too many fire-stands to describe and illustrate in this report, engine companies are listed with their associated fire-stand street names and intersections. This should not limit the understanding of what was happening in the Rockridge area, but expand the basic knowledge of actions in the area. Indications for specific times for these fire-stands are made wherever possible. As a general comment, the Rockridge area was either a second or third firefighting location for Oakland Fire Department engine companies. It was *the* priority area for Strike Teams coming from outside of the area.]

#### Engine companies responding to the Rockridge area

- **Battalion 44 became Division A Command** 1205
- **Engine 2** – Buena Vista and Contra Costa Road; 1205  
Golden Gate and Acacia
- **Engine 3** – Broadway and Golden Gate, and Brookside
- **Truck 15/Captain** – Brookside and Eustice
- **Engine 8** – Ocean View and Margarido
- **Engine 17** – Eustice and Golden Gate
- **Engine 18** – Broadway and Golden Gate 1208  
Buena Vista Avenue and Buena Vista Place 1300  
Glenbrook and Bowling 1803  
Clarewood and Harbord 0600/21
- **Engine 19 split crew** – Broadway and Brookside
- **Engine 13** – Golden Gate/Golden Gate Place off of Broadway
- **Truck 1** – Buena Vista Place and Buena Vista Avenue
- **Engine 25** – Beechwood Drive and Glenbrook
- **Engine 21** – Beechwood Drive and Glenbrook
- **Engine 26** – Hill Road and Golden Gate Avenue  
Golden Gate and Acacia  
Acacia Avenue and Country Club Drive
- **Engine 29** – Buena Vista off of Broadway Terrace  
Contra Costa Road  
Beechwood and Country Club Drive



- **Engine 5** – Broadway and Rockridge Blvd.; Margarido and Acacia
- **Engine 15** – Glenbrook and Westminster
- **Engine 36** – Rockridge Boulevard and Prospect Steps 1400
- **Albany Engine 26**
- **Alameda Engine 1**
- **Alameda NAS Engine 2**
- **San Francisco Engine 8**
- **San Francisco Engine 29**
- **CDF Strike Team 9110C**
- **CDF Strike Team 9160C**
- **CDF Strike Team 9170C**

#### **Summary of the Rockridge Area**

The Rockridge area became a location of intense struggle between what was needed and what was available. There were never enough resources, fire personnel, or water supplies. Fire escalated in this area soon after it was spotted by Oakland Fire Department Engine 2 at approximately 1200 noon. Other sources have stated that fire was seen in the Rockridge area at 1130, but this can not be substantiated through any reports currently available.

Shortly after 1200, Oakland Battalion 44 took command of the area, making immediate requests for Strike Teams and resources. Because of the overwhelming demand for fire personnel, the immediate requests were lost. The fire continued to escalate, moving resources which were available further and further out. Fire-stands which began on Contra Costa Road and Buena Vista Avenue were abandoned because of insufficient personnel to hold the line. Other fire-stands were started on Golden Gate Avenue, Acacia, Beechwood, and Margarido; some of which were successful. As they were made available, resources and Strike Teams were quickly moved into the area, with fire-fighting continuing on through the early hours of Monday morning.

The list of fire personnel made available to the Rockridge area might not be complete. There were stories that some Strike Teams self-deployed to this area, without first going through the staging process. This was noted for a San Mateo Strike Team. Another source for confusion is trying to place each engine company or Strike Team at a given location for a given period of

time. Because of the nature of the firefighting environment – wind movement, rapid fire spread, and depleted water supplies – engine companies tried to stay as mobile as possible. Because of the large area covered by this section, not all engine company reports will fit together into a coherent flow; there was too much going on, with too much area being covered.

### **Battalion 44**

#### **1205**

Met Engine 2 Captain on Highway 13. This Captain stated the fire had jumped Highway 24 and was burning the upper Rockridge area, near the Lake Temescal parking lot, in the 6500 block of Broadway. Returned to Broadway Terrace with Engine 2 following, and notified Oakland 2 to assign Battalion 44 to the incident. I made a radio report to Operations at this time, telling him that the fire had already crossed Temescal and was in the area along Contra Costa Road. I came up Broadway Terrace the first street off of Broadway Terrace is Buena Vista, I went down the length of Buena Vista, which is a winding street on a down-slope. There was a tremendous amount of smoke. Began to look for the best location to set up a defensive action along Buena Vista Avenue with Engine 2. Engine 26 was somewhere in the area was asking for companies. My goal was to get companies along Buena Vista to make a stand. First set up at Buena Vista and Contra Costa Road where evacuation procedures had been started by the California State Police and Acme Western Ambulance #223. We were able to stay in this area for about an hour (Buena Vista and Contra Costa Road). I told Command that we needed resources, that there were about 50 structures on fire.

The smoke made it difficult to determine the extent of the fire but it appeared that a majority of the homes along Contra Costa Road were already involved. With conditions deteriorating, and with limited fire resources, the fire position became untenable.

### **Director of Training**

#### **1200**

The Oakland Fire Department Chief was at the Command Post, as well as the Captain of Training and other members of Truck 1. I stayed for a few minutes, and relayed information, observations and suggestions. At that time Command asked me to try and discover what the extent of the fire was on the other side of the freeway, if it had jumped Highway 13 and Highway 24 into the Chabot Canyon area. The fire was coming down Chabot Canyon and had already burned a half dozen homes in the upper Chabot Canyon and Roble Road area, and all the way to the end of Chabot Road. We needed to get resources at that location.

Encountered the Lieutenant from Engine 3 at Golden Gate and Broadway, Contra Costa and College Prep. Tried to establish contact with Battalion 44 to see if we could link up and if he had any available resources.

#### **1200 /1300**

Tried to connect with Battalion 44 and was involved briefly at Buena Vista between Acacia and Hill in the area around Chaumont Pass.



Engine 2 was attempting to make a stand, and control fire operations in back of Buena Vista working the rear yards from Contra Costa. The fire was already burning houses on Contra Costa Road. Engine 2 was on Buena Vista. They were disengaging from this location. I attempted to hold them there, to stop them so that other resources could help them make a stand to keep the fire from spreading on Buena Vista. Engine 2 had a good hydrant supply, and a 5" lead, but the fire was beginning to burn on either side of Buena Vista. I told them to hold, that a stand could be made, went around the block and encountered Engine 29. Got 29 to bring in a lead from Hill Road out Buena Vista, and City of Alameda Engine company. Got them in place on Buena Vista. Wanted them to hook up with Engine 2, but Engine 2 was too far away. The fire was starting to cut off Engine 2's escape route, so told them to disengage. Drop their lines and drive out Buena Vista to Acacia. I went out ahead of them and at Golden Gate and Acacia, found Battalion 44 along with the Engine 2 officer and Engine 26, attempting to establish a [Divisional] Command Post location and a good place to hold the fire at the intersections of Ocean View, Golden Gate, and Acacia. Conferred with Battalion 44, he was in charge of Division A. Engine 2 worked with Engine 26 until the poor water supply drove them out.



Rockridge



**Engine 2**

I spotted a solid sheet of flame covering a section of the hill above the north parking lot at Lake Temescal. I reported this to Battalion 2 and was told to go to work over there.

Right after that, while we were headed over there (driving south in the north-bound lanes of Highway 13) I spotted Battalion 44 on Highway 13. I informed him of the fact that the fire had jumped Highway 24 and was headed up into the upper Rockridge area and we headed over there together with Engine 2 behind us.

Engine 2 stopped in the 6000 block of Buena Vista and went to work there taking a 6" lead and deploying two 1 1/2" hose lines. I continued down Buena Vista with Division A and we stopped at the corner at Contra Costa Place. The fire was spreading rapidly in a south-western direction. All we could do at that time operationally was to get people to evacuate, and try to get a size-up of the rapidly deteriorating situation. I was trying to direct volunteer help in making sure occupants were notified to evacuate while also trying to give Division A a picture of what was happening. In the meantime, he was ordering additional resources. When it became apparent that we would be over-run by fire on all sides before any help would arrive, Division A ordered us to pull out of the area and re-group at Golden Gate and Acacia.

Down there, Engine 2 was put to work with Engine 26, and Engine 29. We had a nice wide intersection to make a stand. Initially, we were going to deploy our Stang guns. The limited water supply and high winds rendered this operation ineffective. We then started deploying 1 1/2" hose lines up into the back yards of 5 different houses. At least one of the lines we pulled clear up to Buena Vista houses. We were holding back a lot of fire when our water supply became sporadic and the fire started flanking us on three sides. We were then ordered out.

By this time Division A had moved down to the corner of Broadway Terrace and Country Club Dr. When we reported to him down there, he told us to deploy along Beechwood Dr. With only 3 engines and poor water supply, we were again driven back. We retreated back to the corner of Beechwood, Acacia, and Country Club Drive. Again we went to work with Engine 26, and Engine 29 joined us a short time later. After getting about 4 lines deployed, we were again in danger of losing our water. Soon after that, we lost our water completely.

As the fire was approaching, we made ready to retreat once again but since I had already ordered water tenders, I had one of the engines hook back up the hydrant and monitor their incoming pressure. Within about ten minutes, we had both [water] tenders and hydrant pressure back. We were then able to redeploy hand-lines and were able to make an effective stand, saving houses on Acacia, Country Club, and Beechwood.

### Engine 13

Engine 13 was instructed to report to the Command Post at Lake Temescal. We exited the freeway by following the CHP escorts and headed up Broadway. As we passed Golden Gate, the visibility was nil due to the heavy smoke and flames. Informed Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) of the situation and requested new orders. Due to heavy radio traffic, Engine 13 did not receive any new orders. At this point, Engine 13 decided to make a stand along Golden Gate and Golden Gate Place off of Broadway.

Since we were a single engine company, this area appeared to be the most defensible. We evaluated the area and took a 5" lead from Brookside and Broadway. While we were setting up our operation, Engine 3 asked if they could assist us. (Engine 3 also had attempted to reach the Command Post at Lake Temescal.) Requested Engine 3 to pump into Engine 13's 5" lead because it was off a red-top hydrant. Engine 13 "schoolyarded" a 3" line up Golden Gate in order to protect several homes and the College Prep campus. At this point about a dozen civilians assisted us in stretching our 3" line. This line was placed into operation and knocked down some hot spots in the eucalyptus trees above College Prep.

Engine 17 came down Golden Gate and Engine 18 arrived from Broadway. It was decided that Engine 18 and Engine 17 would go up to Buena Vista and Buena Vista Place and hook up to a hydrant there. Engine 13 would support them with the 3" line via a stairway from Golden Gate to Buena Vista.

The operations up in this area included dragging lines between several homes and meeting the wind and flames head-on. The changing conditions dictated where the lines would go and what could be saved. Oakland Truck 1 and San Francisco Engine 8 arrived during this action and assisted us with labor. San Francisco Engine 8 also began a relay operation by plugging into the hydrant Engine 18 was using and taking Engine 13's 3" line into San Francisco Engine 8. They then supplied Engine 18, Engine 13, and Engine 17. This make-shift Task Force was able to save approximately 18 homes in the area.

While we were working on Buena Vista, Engine 13's Engineer and Firefighters worked the flanks on Broadway and later along Golden Gate. They used a 2 1/2" preconnect and a 1 1/2" preconnect. The engineer took this action on his own and was effective in protecting our left flank and heel.

When this area was under control Engine 13, Engine 18, Truck 1 and Engine 17 met and agreed that Engine 17 would stay in the area to sweep-up. All other units would pick-up and report to staging on Highway 24. Engine 13 remained at staging until we were given a new assignment.

After about one hour in staging, Engine 13 and Engine 17 (Engine 17 with a new crew) were sent to Florence and Modoc. The captain instructed Engine 13 to take the hydrant and protect the homes on Florence. Engine 17 was sent in the opposite direction with similar orders.



Engine 13 set-up to protect the homes on Florence by pulling 2 1-1/2" lines into the backyards off of Florence. Observed that structures on Proctor Ave. were still savable Engine 13 pulled their lines over fences and began operating. We were assisted by a California Department of Forestry (CDF) crew with an 1-1/2" line doing a pump-and-go operation.

Later, someone began operating on Proctor Ave. Encountered Hosewagon 19 with their crew working the north side of Proctor.

**0030/21**

Engine 13 remained in this area until we were relieved by a fresh crew. Engine 13's crew returned to staging at Broadway Terrace and Margarido.

**Engine 17****1157**

First responded toward Grandview but were blocked by massive black smoke at Highway 13 and Highway 24. We were next instructed by Command to take Broadway Terrace and respond to the Rockridge area by Golden Gate. Arriving at Eustice and Golden Gate we found fire in the Eucalyptus and fields above College Prep School. We attacked this fire with our stang and advanced our 1 1/2" lines. Then taking a lead up Eustice, we extinguished the rest of the area above the school. We left our lead on Eustice, knowing that we would need it later. Then, we took a lead from the hydrant at Eustice and Brookside east to the fifth house on the left, fighting that house fire for over half an hour using Stang gun and advancing 1 1/2" lines.

We returned to our lead above College Prep on Eustice and again fought back the fire in the trees and field above the school.

We spotted fire coming over the Buena Vista hill and positioned our rig and stang to protect the adjacent exposures, regretfully the fire came over the entire ridge engulfing every two story house on the street. The Captain from Engine 15 arrived with San Francisco's Engine 29. He instructed them to position east of us by two houses and to take water from us. Since we only had a hydrant with one 3" outlet – we used a divider with two leads – but still had to take turns using water with San Francisco's Engine 29. Soon after, we were overcome by the firestorm and retreated to regroup.

**Summary****1157 – 2100**

Fought in the area of Eustice, Golden Gate, Brookside, Buena Vista.

**2100 – 0200**

Responded to Pinewood and Broadway.



**Engine 26**

Engine 26 responded to the fire from quarters on the 6th alarm. Route of response was Highway 580 to Highway 13 to the Broadway Terrace off ramp. Radio traffic seemed to indicate that Lake Temescal was to be a staging area. Engine 26 attempted to enter the South Gate of Lake Temescal which was locked. Unable to enter, we then proceeded down Broadway Terrace in an attempt to locate the fire boundaries.

**Initial Operation: Hill Road And Golden Gate Avenue**

Engine 26 proceeded up Golden Gate Avenue to find the best location to begin operations. At roughly Hill Road and Golden Gate Avenue we met Battalion 44 and Engine 2 and I believe Emeryville Engine 4. At that location hose-lines were placed in operation. It quickly became very evident that this location was untenable. Hose-lines were disconnected and we retreated. Oakland Police Department (OPD) officers were advised to evacuate everyone in the area.

**Second Operation: Golden Gate And Acacia Avenues**

The next area of operation was Golden Gate and Acacia Avenues. We attempted with Engine 2 and Emeryville Engine 4, to set up a defensive attack. Despite an outstanding effort by all involved, it soon was obvious that we would again be unable to hold that location. Hose lines were disconnected and left. We retreated.

**Third Operation: Acacia Avenue And Country Club Drive**

At Acacia and Country Club we met Truck 8 and Engine 29, Alameda Engine 1 and NAS Engine 2. We now had a sizeable force to go along with Engine 26 and Engine 2, to mount an attack. We connected to hydrants at Country Club and Beechwood and Country Club and Bowling and had barely enough water to supply one 1 1/2" hose line. I stopped a passing EBMUD Truck and asked him what was happening. He informed me that he would try and open a zone valve and might be able to increase the pressure 10 lbs? Division A was contacted and informed that the area looked good to hold if we could get water. NAS Engine 2 laid a 5" supply line up Acacia to Engine 29. Several 2500 gallon water tenders arrived. Hand-lines were now in operation. A steady supply of water tenders became available, and with an unbelievable effort over the next several hours by all involved, we held the fire at this location.

**Engine 15**

Engine 15 with San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) Firefighters were transferred to Division A at Broadway Terrace and Country Club. We responded to Glenbrook and Westminster, where Engine 15 took an orange-top hydrant and supplied one 2 1/2" line to protect structures. We were able to extinguish and save a house at 98 Westminster with the help of 2 Cal - Trans [water] tenders.



**Truck 8**

Truck 8 was reassigned to Broadway Terrace and Country Club Drive and reported to Division A who assigned Truck 8 to the 6000 block of Acacia. On arrival, Truck 8 observed multiple structures and trees heavily and fully involved. Truck 8 laddered multiple structures in an attempt to extinguish roof fires, and to halt the spread of fire to uninvolved homes. Truck 8 worked in this area with multiple mutual companies and OFD units.

**2100**

Truck 8 was assigned to Estates Drive and Florence to assist engine companies in cutting off the fire in that area. Truck 8 began to cut trees in this area in hopes that it would contain the fire.

**Rockridge**



**Truck 15 Captain**

The Director of Training gave me his radio and appointed me "College Prep Division" and assigned a San Francisco Task Force under San Francisco Battalion 3 to my division. He started up Brookside to Eustice while I took San Francisco Engine 8 upwind to Golden Gate to extinguish spot fires threatening the unfinished building at the northeast corner of the school. The spot fire was extinguished by civilians while San Francisco Engine 8 used their tank on a brush fire on Broadway above Golden Gate exposing houses on Buena Vista Place.

I scouted up the stairs to Buena Vista and Buena Vista Place. A Lieutenant and other crews were being hampered by a lack of water pressure, but otherwise holding several structure fires. An Engineer at Golden Gate and Broadway was pumping with zero incoming pressure and unable to supply more. I then checked with a Lieutenant and crew at Eustice and Golden Gate. He was attempting to hold several structures with one crew. I went to the San Francisco Battalion 3 at Eustice and Brookside and brought another San Francisco engine company to Eustice and Golden Gate. We attempted to position this pumper 100' south on Golden Gate and utilize the monitor. This was unsuccessful because of lack of water.

At this time, the entire curve above Eustice ignited; 10 to 15 buildings with surrounding eucalyptus trees, forcing us back from the intersection. With the volatile College Prep canyon behind us, I decided to retreat to Golden Gate and Broadway. I then assigned a Lieutenant to go back up Golden Gate to Buena Vista and assist the other Lieutenant, and reassigned the San Francisco companies to San Francisco Battalion 3 at Brookside and Eustice. I warned companies operating downwind from Golden Gate of the intensity of the fire and we evaluated the upper curve of Brookside.

I then used a make-up company of volunteers and a San Francisco pumper to attack two structures halfway between Broadway and Eustice on Brookside. These two structures were 300' north of a line I thought we could hold going west from Eustice and Brookside. We were joined by a San Francisco engine crew and knocked down the two structures. We followed the fire up to houses on the back of Oceanside, extending hoses and using buckets and swimming-pool water to stop fires in the back of houses on Oceanview.

I scouted Oceanview to the south to Manchester and decided to try to move some companies to make a stand at Oceanview and Manchester. On returning to Eustice and Brookside, I was informed that civilian and Firefighter crews were holding the College Prep canyon between Broadway and Eustice, Golden Gate and Brookside, enabling us to move downwind. Arriving at Eustice and Brookside, San Francisco Battalion 3 informed me that he had been named Division G supervisor and had been assigned a Task Force from Marin County. A Fairview Captain also had been designated a division supervisor. We subordinated ourselves to Division G.

We established a perimeter on Brookside at Eustice, leaving units to hold the north spread on Brookside and to move up between houses to Oceanview. We drove in the Chief's buggy to Oceanview and Manchester via Broadway and positioned Marin County units at that intersection and 200' west on Manchester to cut off the fire on Oceanview and Manchester. The Marin



County units operated downhill to the back of houses on Margarido.

I scouted down Margarido to the hydrant near Rockridge Blvd. South. We backed a San Francisco pumper in and laid hose from the hydrant back up Margarido. San Francisco crews extinguished an apartment house on the east-side of Margarido and were working on structures on Manchester when the water failed and a house further north on Margarido ignited. Marin County crews operating on the back of the house from Manchester were entirely without water pressure and unable to control the structure.

Division G with assistance from a Captain, set up a 5" relay from Broadway and Oceanview. The first pumper had problems, but was quickly replaced. By this time, the crews on Margarido were in full retreat. Restored water pressure and fresh San Francisco crews enabled us to set up portable hydrants on Margarido and attack and suppress the house fire, saving the structures near the original hydrant.

Contact had been made with Oakland crews further down Rockridge before the retreat. This was reestablished and the north perimeter tied together at this point.



Rockridge



**Engine 29****1150**

Engine 29 received a call from FDC, and was ordered to report to the staging area at Lake Temescal. While responding on Highway 13, I observed helicopters making drops in the fire area, and heard much activity on the radio. After some difficulty getting through on channels 1 and 2, Division A responded and we were ordered to Buena Vista off of Broadway Terrace. Just past Hill Road, we were met by an Alameda engine company. Looking down Buena Vista, I could see many houses burning on the high-side of the street.

I ordered both engines to turn around so that they would be facing out. Then the Alameda officer and I agreed that he would take the one available hydrant, and that we would work from his engine. We were now able, with the significant help of civilians, to drag big lines into place. I positioned the Alameda crew uphill in the yard of an unburned house, and told them to try to hold that position if and when the fire came at them. The main concern here was not the fire burning down Buena Vista, but fire burning down from the street above Contra Costa Road. My crew and I walked down Buena Vista, and placed a line between the last burning house, and the first unburned house. Here, near what I believe is called Belalp Path, which is a walkway from Buena Vista to Contra Costa, we were able to make an effective stand.

At one point here our operation was so successful that we advanced the line up the stairs on to Contra Costa Road. We were apparently the first engine company on Contra Costa, and there were many houses burning. It soon became obvious that our line here would be futile, and since our escape route was becoming threatened, we went back down to Buena Vista. The Firefighter volunteered to remain on Contra Costa and assist the civilians that were evacuating the area. He rejoined us later on Buena Vista. Back at our previous position, we were still very effectively fighting fire. We were even able to stretch lines farther down Buena Vista, and began to work off of another hydrant. In my opinion, we would have succeeded in stopping all of the fire in front of us on Buena Vista. However, a problem developed in our rear.

I was told for the second time by Division D, that the way we had come in was beginning to close, due to fire burning down from Contra Costa. This time he added that we should leave now. Both crews and all of the remaining civilians were told that we were abandoning the area immediately. We took the nozzles, left the hose in the street, put the civilians on the rigs, and drove down Hill Road, past burning houses, to the staging area on Broadway Terrace at Country Club Drive. There I reported to Division A. After a short break, we were sent to Beechwood and Country Club and told to report to the Beechwood Command Captains.

I met with the Captains on Beechwood and Country Club. The operation on Beechwood had not been going well due primarily to a lack of personnel. Houses were burning on Beechwood, and on both sides of Acacia, the next street over. A Captain and a truck crew were working a big line on the north side of Acacia, but there was no line on the south-side. I took the hydrant at Acacia and Beechwood, and immediately pulled a line to stop the fire on the south side of Acacia. The two lines together were stopping the spread of the fire down Acacia. The Captains

worked on Beechwood. Again we were being effective, and would have stopped the fire there, when we ran out of water.

When the hydrants went dry, we all began to pack up and prepared to leave. The truck was now parked in a bad spot, so it left. Just as we were all about to leave, one of the Captains received communication that water tankers [tenders] were enroute to Oakland, and that we would get the first ones. We made the decision to stand by and wait.

At this time I would like to commend my crew, as well as those Captains for remaining calm and professional in the face of extreme adversity. The helpless feeling caused by not being able to fight the fire that was now raging unchecked toward us was offset by the pride I felt being associated with the Oakland Fire Department.

Finally, the [water] tenders arrived. With the water they supplied we were able to redeploy our lines on Acacia and Beechwood. While we had waited for the [tenders] tankers, we had watched a house on each side of Acacia burn. Where we made our new stand with the lines, the fire was stopped, and all of the houses behind us saved. After our stand, and when relief was finally sent, our crews returned to the staging area for a much needed and deserved break.

Because Engine 29 had lines out that were still in use, my crew caught a ride to the staging area in the old Command Van. After the break, my regular Engineer was sent back to Engine 29. I was given the Engineer from Engine 2, my regular Firefighters, another Firefighter and a volunteer CDF Firefighter, and then sent to a trouble spot at the corner of Hill Road and Golden Gate. Hill Road, where we had made our earlier escape, was almost completely devastated. There was a house on the corner that was being threatened from two directions. We put a bigline between the house and the fires. The house is still standing. We were also able to put two 1-1/2" lines in operation on Golden Gate to protect houses there. We stayed there until relieved by a Strike Team.



[Note: Several of the reports which follow describe the water-relay operation in Rockridge on Rockridge Boulevard South, Broadway, and Margarito. Although all these reports are similar, they are all written by different fire personnel. At the end of these descriptions, a diagram created by a member of this team is used to illustrate the operation.]

### **Engine 36 (OES Engine 227) The Rock Ridge Stand**

#### **1400**

Engine 36 spots fire at Rock Ridge Boulevard and Prospect Steps. We connect to a red-top hydrant at Rock Ridge Place and Rock Ridge Boulevard South. Stretch 400' 1 1/2" attack line for structure working at Prospect Steps. Volunteers stretch 600' 2 1/2" attack line to F/O 6178 Rock Ridge. Line stays dry, insufficient water. Engine 36 calls for assistance via land line. Wind strong from the northeast. Multiple structures working at Prospect Steps and Margarito.

#### **1500**

Engine 41 (Albany Engine 1 with Albany crew and 5 OFD members – 8 Firefighters total) drops supply line to Engine 36. Returns to Broadway and Rock Ridge to pump lead. Engine 36 charges 2 1/2". Engine 41 splits crew. Half work the large line on Rock Ridge, half assist Engine 36 at 6156 Rock Ridge. Wind strong from the northeast. Six working structures between 5926 Margarito and 6001 Margarito Dr.

#### **1600**

Engine 36 and Engine 41 holding positions. Lose 6156 and 5959 Rock Ridge. San Francisco Engine Company arrives and stretches 1 1/2" lines to F/O 5929 Margarito for exposure protection. Units arrive from Colma and Richmond. Individuals from the Palo Alto Fire Department and the Mare Island Fire Department arrive. Cyclonic wind conditions of high heat, heavy smoke and embers.

#### **1700**

Perimeter below Margarito established. Eight structures on the west-side of Margarito fully involved but the remaining exposures are out of immediate danger. Engine 36's large line is extended with two 1 1/2" lines for exposure protection on Margarito. Four structures fully involved – 5950, 5940, 5934, 5926 – with 5960 saved. There are two additionally involved houses – 5964, 5972.

#### **1900**

Roof fire at 6000 Margarito. Handled by an SFFD engine. At this point, the Margarito section of the fire was contained with no further structures involved. The balance of the night and following morning was spent cooling hot spots and waiting for relief.

**Engine 36 (OES Engine 227)****1245**

Put OES Engine 227 in service as Engine 36.

**1331**

Responded to a structure fire on the 4400 block of Montgomery started by flying embers from The Oakland Tunnel Fire. After this response, we were told to report to the fire. On arrival at Rockridge and Broadway, noticed that fire was advancing to the bottom of the hill and threatening the homes in the flat lands. There were no fire apparatus in the area. The Engineer and I decided that this would be a good place to start firefighting, hoping we could get back-up through the land-line or whatever means possible to help stop the fire at the bottom of the hill and to keep it from spreading in the southerly direction up and over the hill.

A decision was made not to bring lead in from Broadway and Rockridge, since we did not have enough hose. Instead, we went to Rockridge and Rockridge Place and worked off of that hydrant. On arrival at Rockridge and Rockridge Place, the hydrant was a red-top and green-cap which was a low-flow hydrant. We decided that due to the fire conditions and hydrant capabilities, that it was best to leave the engine at the hydrant and "school-yard" leads into the fire. Thanks to several neighbors in the area and their tremendous help, the operation went smoothly.

We began firefighting operations at Prospect Steps and Rockridge. Fire conditions were heavy, with winds and fire blowing to the west from the top of the hill. Immediate residences were being threatened: 6128 and 6140 Rockridge, with 2 multiple-unit apartments at 5985 and 5971 Margarido, and a garage behind 6140 Rockridge were already fully involved. At this time trees and bushes and a fence at Prosect Steps and Rockridge were burning and threatening the front of 6128 Rockridge. We extinguished the trees, bushes, and fence and advanced a big line to behind 6140 Rockridge and extinguished trees and bushes coming down the hill. The uinits on 5985 and 5971 Margarido started collapsing into themselves and not down the hill, which eliminated the immediate threat of fire and debris coming down the hill and threatening 6128 and 6140 Rockridge. The westerly winds let up and changed to a south-easterly direction.

We withdrew the big line from behind 6140 Rockridge and advanced up Prospect Steps to 6144. I decided at this time that a set of baby lines would be more productive than the bid line. With the help of the neighbors, and with the Firefighters the baby-lines were set up. While the baby lines were being brought up, I tried to contact FDC from 6150 Rockridge. I told them that I needed back-up immediately, as well as water supply from Broadway. [Note: 2 other calls were made to FDC throughout this entire incident.] The Engineer knowing of the problem, stopped a police officer in a patrol car and told him to go to staging and to tell them about the need for back-up and water. The message was relayed to staging. The civilians were helping the Engineer as best as they could. One volunteer was a retired Engineer from another city. After assessing proper pumping procedures, this volunteer helped with pumping. The Engineer went to



staging and asked about help for the operation.

There were baby-lines in front of 6144 Prospect Steps [on/or??] Rockridge to set up a fire curtain. We did not have enough water to aggressively attack the fire, but only enough to wet down the roofs and walls trying to delay the fire advance. The fire was moving in a southerly direction on Margarido, with 5959 Margarido and 6144 Rockridge on fire. We saved 6150 Rockridge. Lines were being moved between 6144 and 6145 trying to save 6156. We worked for about half an hour and were not successful. At this time, a Task Force had arrived consisting of the Richmond Fire Department, the San Francisco Fire Department, the El Cerrito Fire Department, and the Colma Fire Department.

A OFD Lieutenant riding with one of the Task Force engines said that he was hooking up a water supply from Broadway and was going to bring the Colma engine and spot them in front of 5156 [6156??] Rockridge. When Colma's rig arrived with water and more hose lines, I decided to make a firefight at 6156 Rockridge and to try and save 6178 and 6172 which were immediately above 6156. We encountered exposure problems with a large redwood tree and large pine trees across the street. We took 3 1/2" lines off of the Colma rig and started firefighting on the front stairs and back-side of the 6156 house. The Lieutenant and crew advanced a big line up the hill and around to the front of 6178 Rockridge and started a water curtain. The Colma rig started Stang gun operations to extinguish fire at 5156 [6156??] Rockridge.

We were successful in stopping the fire in the southerly direction. After this operation was under control, we moved lines up the hill between 6178 and 6172 Rockridge to help the Lieutenant and his crew with water supply and firefighting on Margarido between 6006 and 5960. We spent the remainder of the evening and the morning hitting hot spots.



**Engine 41****1230**

This Lieutenant reported to Engine 1, and was assigned to Albany Engine 26, under the command of their Lieutenant and crew. An OFD Firefighter was also a part of this crew. This entire crew became Oakland Engine 41.

**1430**

Engine 41 went into service at Engine 21.

**1500**

Called the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC), and was asked to respond to Rockridge Boulevard South and assist Engine 36 (an Oakland Office of Emergency Services – OES Engine). Along with other Oakland fire personnel who responded to this location, Engine 41 found Engine 36 pumping from the red-top hydrant at Rockridge Boulevard South and Rockridge Place. Heavy fire was seen up Rockridge and on Margarido. Engine 36 Engineer was desperate for water. Rockridge Boulevard North was checked for hydrants; none were found. Engine 41 was directed to drop a supply line from Engine 36 to the green-top hydrant at Broadway and Rockridge Boulevard South. All 1 1/2" hose was pulled off prior to dropping the supply line. Engine 36 crew was attacking the fire with 1 1/2" lines between Prospect Steps and Rockridge Boulevard. A 2 1/2" line was laying dry on Rockridge Boulevard. The Engine 41 1 1/2" hose was extended off the 2 1/2" line and this was used on Rockridge Boulevard protecting 6172 and 6178.

Noticing the direction and intensity of the fire spread, more help was needed in the area. There was no radio contact. After numerous calls to FDC with a citizen's phone, Engine 41 finally got through to communicating that more engines were needed for Rockridge Place. Engine 41 requested 3 more engine companies. Engines 36 and 41 were working together trying to protect exposures on Rockridge Boulevard. An engine company from Colma arrived on the scene and they positioned in front of 6156 Rockridge Boulevard, facing out in case the fire were to jump past. Civilians stretched a supply line from Colma's engine to Engine 36 and the Stang gun was put into operation to assist the hand-lines. These lines and the Stang gun saved the structures at 6150 and 6172 Rockridge Boulevard, and prevented the fire from jumping past the crew.

A San Francisco Engine Company arrived and was directed to drop another supply line from Engine 36 down to Engine 41. The San Francisco engine then returned and pumped into the Colma engine.

At this time, there were no firefighting crew in the area of Rockridge Boulevard and Margarido; the fire was consuming everything in this area. From a retired Firefighter's house, a call was made to FDC that 2 – 3 engines were needed on Margarido.

An El Cerrito engine and a Richmond engine arrived later in the evening. A citizen reported a

fire in the rear of 6067 Rockridge Place. Two unknown Firefighters were directed to take a Tank Wagon that was parked near Engine 36 down and extinguish the fire. Engine 5 arrived and pumped into Engine 41 from Lawton and Broadway. In working up Margarido, Engine 41 ran into a San Francisco engine company who had a supply line from Ocean View and Margarido. They worked inside 6000 Margarido pulling ceilings and extinguishing an attic and roof fire. This building was heavily damaged, but saved. The hydrant in front of 5972 Margarido had no water. Hose lines were extended to 5960, 5978, and 5980 Margarido and these buildings were saved. Everything around them was destroyed. Late in the evening after the main body of fire had passed, these lines were used up and down Prospect Steps between Rockridge Boulevard South and Manchester, extinguishing fire in the destroyed buildings.

Discussed this operation with Division B personally since radio contact was impossible. This operation had been extremely hazardous because of wires and transformers which were falling. There was no way of knowing if the power had been shut off.

The citizens in this area were extremely helpful pulling hose and cutting down trees and brush with chain saws.

**0500/21**

OFD fire personnel returned to Engine 1 for additional orders.

**0930/1000**

Albany crew was relieved. Additional Albany crew had arrived in a private pick-up truck.


Nine structures were saved in this operation. A total crew count for this operation includes:

- Oakland OES 36 – Lieutenant, Engineer, and 2 Firefighters
- Albany Engine 36 (Oakland Engine 41) – 4 Lieutenants, 1 Engineer, 6 Firefighters
- Oakland Engine 5 – Lieutenant, 2 Firefighters
- San Francisco engine and crew
- Colma engine and crew
- El Cerrito engine and crew
- Richmond engine and crew



[Note: The following diagram, created by a member of OES Oakland Engine 36, illustrates a water-relay operation conducted by 8 engine companies in the area of Rockridge Boulevard. The dots indicate hydrants and the rectangles indicate the placement of engine companies. This operation took place at approximately 1530. The engine companies include: Albany, Colma, El Cerrito, Oakland Engine 5, OES Engine 36, Richmond, and 2 engines from San Francisco.]

### The Water-relay Operation on Rockridge Boulevard South





[Note: The following report was written to the Albany Fire Department by an Oakland Fire Department Lieutenant. Although it is presented here as a reflection of what the Albany fire personnel did in this operation, it also reflects the actions of all of the fire personnel who worked on this particular operation.]

### Albany

Engine 26 was assigned to Rockridge Boulevard and Rockridge Road to assist an Oakland OES Engine [36] at approximately 1500. Engine 26 pumped from a hydrant at Broadway and Rockridge to supply the OES engine. The Albany Firefighters, along with Oakland personnel, removed the 1 1/2" hose and started working up Rockridge from the OES engine. There was plenty of work for everyone. Many individual homes were saved with the combined efforts of your personnel, Oakland, San Francisco, and Colma Firefighters. As the evening progressed and the situation warranted it, the lines were extended further up the hill into the fire area. Doing this was no easy task. The Firefighters were working in an area where wires were down, PG&E transformers were falling, trees were being cut down and flames were moving all around us. The Firefighters would take a stand and when told to relocate, they did so without any reluctance or hesitation. I did not hear one word of complaint, nor did I hear anyone ask for relief, or complain of being tired. After the fire had moved on late in the evening, we were able to stop and take stock of our area. Albany, San Francisco, Colma and Oakland Firefighters were instrumental in keeping the fire from extending down Rockridge Lane toward Broadway. The Firefighters assisted in saving structures on Margarido Drive above Rockridge, an area which suffered heavy losses. The Firefighters were not relieved until approximately 1000/21 after 19 hours on the fire line.

The Albany members included 2 Lieutenants, an Engineer, and 3 Firefighters. At all times, Albany Firefighters acted in a heroic and professional manner. I would be willing and proud to respond to any emergency situations with them.




Rockridge

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10. Lower Broadway Terrace, Hermosa, Florence, Proctor, Agnes, Alta, Clarewood



**Engine companies responding to the Lower Broadway Terrace area:**

- Engine 1
- Truck 3
- Truck 15 as Engine 29 – Recall 0100/21
- Engine 16 1815
- Engine 24 1525 – 2300
- Engine 20
- Engine 10
- Orinda Fire Department
- Strike Team 4152C – Division M
- Strike Team 4050C – Division M
- Strike Team 2804A – Division M – Sheridan/ Broadway Terrace 0700/21
- Strike Team 4154A – Division M
- Strike Team 2144 – Division M
- Strike Team 5802B– Division M
- Strike Team 3001 – Division M
- Strike Team 9110C – Florence, Proctor, Harbord off Clarewood 1750
- Strike Team 3225A – Division N
- San Francisco Water Tenders (2) – Division N
- Engine 1166 – Division N
- Strike Team 2144A – Division P
- Strike Team 4250C – Division P

- **Strike Team 5801B** – Division P
- **Water Tenders (2)** – Division P
- **Strike Team 4153C**
- **Strike Team 5025A**
- **Strike Team 2375A**
- **Strike Team 2042A**
- **Strike Team 2043A** 2030  
2400
- **Strike Team 2200A**– Westminster /Glenbrook  
Acacia/ Manchester
- **Strike Team 2375A**– Broadway Terrace and Clarewood
- **Strike Team 9170C**– Branch 3

#### **Summary of this location**

This area was intricately involved with the Rockridge area – with fire spread, with fire personnel, and with water supply. Those engine companies and Strike Teams listed for Rockridge, were probably also firefighting in this lower Broadway Terrace area. Time in this area becomes a nebulous concept. Major fire-stands were fought throughout the early hours of Monday morning, with strong fire perimeters established at midnight. Clarewood, Harbord, Maxwellton, and Moraga streets were important firefighting areas. Saving schools was a major agenda: The saving of Holy Names High School near Hermosa and Florence, the saving of St. Teresa on Clarewood and Harbord, the saving of Hillcrest School on Hermosa and Mandaly.



**Engine 24****1815**

At this time I was able to contact Division A via the department radio. I was ordered to Broadway Terrace and the Hermosa area. Extinguished 2 roofs on Broadway Terrace below Hermosa (south-side). Worked in small court on Broadway Terrace, and saved 6 homes in this court. Lost three homes that faced on Hermosa. Worked in this area until approximately 0100. There was a Richmond company which stayed for about 2 hours, but as soon as the fire was knocked down, they left the area. I was relieved by a Lieutenant and 3 Firefighters.

**Engine 10**

After an assignment on Chabot Road, we were assigned to Hilltop Crescent and Maxwellton (5500 block), setting up a defensive position along with OFD Engine 25 and flanked by Piedmont Fire and OFD Engine 13. The fire was moving upgrade from the cemetery. After fire was knocked down, primarily by Piedmont streams, we moved to Clarewood and Harbord Drive. I left Fremont Engine 10 to overhaul a structure at this location and proceeded to Clarewood and Clarewood Court. We used the Stang gun on brush and trees on the Mountain View Cemetery and Claremont Country Club.

**Engine 20****1525 -2300**

Engine 20 responded to Piedmont and Ramona Avenues. Smoke and cinders only. Engine 20 then investigated the source of cinders and found a eucalyptus grove on the north end of Mountain View to be the source. Engine 20 spent time until dusk making a fire break on the south-end of the grove. At dusk Engine 20 left the cemetery as the fire was now out of control on the north-end of the grove and heading north and east as the winds had changed. Engine 20 then followed Moraga Avenue north and reported the fire movement to Oakland 1. Engine 20 turned onto Maxwellton from Moraga Avenue and followed this to Hilltop. The fire was approaching at Stark Knoll Place and Hilltop. Engine 20 asked for a Task Force to Stark Knoll and Hilltop. Engine 20 took a lead from here to the top of Stark Knoll. We operated 4 hand-lines until the fire was knocked down. The Task Force arrived and covered from Stark Knoll to Clarewood.

**Engine 16****1830**

From Command we were assigned as a group to Broadway Terrace above Highway 13. Engine 16 led from a hydrant at Broadway Terrace and Glenwood Glade, heading north. Suppression activities were initiated in this area. Proceeding north up the hill, I came upon 3 homes on Leo Way which hadn't been burned. We advanced a 1 1/2" line to this area from Broadway Terrace. Unable to hold the fire, we next advanced a 3" line to this area. The end result was that two homes were saved, and one home heavily damaged.

**Truck 15 as Engine 29 – Recall****2100**

We found an unused engine – Engine 29 and proceeded to find houses that were saveable along Beechwood and Glenbrook. During this time, we were joined by other Oakland Firefighters that were not committed to another assignment. We continued to work in this area until around midnight and then proceeded to Division A Command Post for food and a little rest.

**0100/21**

Engine 29 with a crew of 9 was ordered to relieve Engine 24 in the area of Hermosa and Broadway Terrace. We extinguished 2 house fires on a small court off of Broadway Terrace just below Hermosa. We then received orders to relieve Engine 13 in the area of Harbord Drive and Modoc. We worked in that area for about an hour and then returned to Division A Command Post to await further orders.

**0300**

We were ordered by Division A to head a Task Force and proceed to the end of Abbott Dr. (Piedmont) and set up lines of protection for the houses threatened by the fire moving down the canyon from Maxwellton. We stayed in this area wetting down brush until the fire died out.

**0800**


Now using Engine 13, we returned to Division A Command Post for another assignment. We then spotted several small fires burning around Acacia, Lincolnshire & Glenbrook Drives and proceeded to overhaul the structures on those streets.

**0930**

Upon returning to Division A Command Post, Division V ordered us to deliver Engine 13 back to its quarters and the crew was to report to Alameda Naval Air Station for rest. I returned home at about 1130.



**11. Upper Broadway Terrace – Swainland, Glenwood Glade, Farallon, Pineneedle, Capricorn, Aquarius, Mountain Blvd.**





**Engine Companies responding to Upper Broadway Terrace**

- Engine 4 1300
- Engine 21
- Engine 23
- Engine 27
- Engine 8 1630
- Engine 1 | Strike Team 45
- Truck 3
- Engine 16
- Orinda Fire Department
- Engine 27 C/ Recall 1500
- Engine 16/Engine 3 Recall
- Narrative (civilian working with Engine 16/Engine3)
- Strike Team #231 (??)
- Strike Team from Santa Cruz
- Strike Team 2803A – Broadway Terrace and Capricorn
- Vallejo Task Force – Broadway Terrace and Capricorn
- Strike Team 2301A – Broadway Terrace and Uranus
- Strike Team 2305 – Capricorn
- Strike Team 9460C – Mountain and Florence; Capricorn and Broadway Terrace
- 3 Water Tenders (??) – Glenwood Glade
- Strike Team 2276 – Merriwood

- **Strike Team 2304** – Taurus
- **Strike Team 2350** – Merriwood and Broadway
- **1 Water Tender (??)** – Pineneedle
- **Strike Team 4151C** – Farallon
- **Strike Team 2738** – Broadway Terrace and Balsom
- **Strike Team 2031A** – Skyline (Division H)
- **Strike Team 2350C**
- **Strike Team 4151C**
- **Strike Team XAL001**

#### **Summary of the upper Broadway Terrace area**

The upper Broadway Terrace area was one of the later areas where Strike Teams were deployed, although there were at least 3 engine companies (Engines 4, 23, and 27) in the upper Broadway Terrace/ Skyline area before 1300. At 1330, the Aerial Observer in the ARGUS helicopter relayed information that the fire had crossed the Swainland Ridge and was burning up towards Grizzly Peak and Skyline. At 1430, the Aerial Observer in Eagle 5 reported that the fire had advanced to Mountain Blvd. At this same time, water drops were being made on the Swainland Ridge to slow the spread of the fire. At 1500, the first Strike Team was sent to the area of Broadway Terrace and Capricorn. The fire was too extreme for firefighting, so they relocated to another area in lower Broadway Terrace. The CDF Battalion Chief in charge of Branch 2, made a major effort in planning an attack on this area. After careful reconnaissance of the area, and after Strike Teams finally arrived in the area, the upper Broadway Terrace area was protected from further spread of the fire.

#### **Engine 27 C/ Recall**

##### **1500**

Lead a Strike Team from Redwood City (5 Engines and 1 Battalion Chief) to Broadway Terrace and Capricorn. We could not stay there because fire was all around. We relocated to Broadway Terrace and Cross Street, and protected houses not yet involved in fire.

**CDF Battalion Chief/Branch 2 with OFD retired Assistant Chief****1600 – 1630**

Met with a Battalion Chief from CDF. Because I had the knowledge of the area, and the CDF Chief had a radio and rig, we were to work together. I knew many people in Oakland with whom I could make contacts for resources and places. We got together and took over Branch 2.

We were to check the perimeters of the fire. We drove Highway 13 to Broadway Terrace, Broadway Terrace to Florence, and Florence to Broadway Terrace. There were powerlines down all over. Broadway Terrace was our established perimeter, from Highway 13 to the top of Skyline. We needed to determine what was happening in these areas.

**1700**

We drove up each individual road to see how far the fire had progressed on each side. We went Skyline to Grizzly Peak and then Skyline down to Highway 13.

**1730**

The fire burned up to the top of Broadway Terrace and Skyline, but not across Broadway Terrace. The winds at this time had died down appreciably. The Lieutenant from Engine 4 was working on structures on Broadway Terrace and Pineneedle. We wanted to know how many companies were in the area, because we wanted to get an idea of what we needed in terms of resources. He mentioned that Engine 27 was around the corner. The Lieutenant from Engine 4 needed a hydrant wrench, and asked us for one. He needed to turn his hydrant off. There were no companies on Broadway Terrace until Broadway and Skyline. There were no resources available to bring into Branch 2. We proceeded up Broadway Terrace to plan what was needed, but we had no resources available.

Broadway Terrace was an excellent place to make a stand considering the winds had died down, but there were no resources available. CDF Battalion had called the Plans Chief, asking them for available resources, and giving them an assessment, but the Plans Chief said they had none. The Plans Chief was at the Command Post. We were communicating, but we did have problems with communications with Oakland Command. Branch 1 (CDF 1611) overheard our communication about resources, and told us that we could have 2 engines. We made it clear that we could really do something with resources.

There were some EBRP engines in this area on top of Skyline heading towards Grizzly Peak. We were trying to establish (an anchor point) the final perimeter of the fire to complete the line. What we had in our favor was the wind, which had died down, the topography, and the hydrants on Broadway Terrace which were still good. We started going down Broadway Terrace and a Strike Team from Santa Clara was coming up the hill. Strike Team (radio #2301) – 5 engine companies type-1. We asked him to take up a section of the line at Broadway Terrace at Skyline to Crown. He was successful in making this line.



**1830**

We went back down via Thornhill to ICP for resources. [The retired A/C was instrumental in talking to people who would know about what resources were available. In my mind, I felt we needed a minimum of 20 engine companies, although I told Command 40. Command said this was a 'no-go'. We also discussed this situation with CDF Battalion Chief 1612 (who was Plans Chief) who was able to get us 2 Strike Teams of type-1 engines. We positioned a Strike Team at the bottom of Broadway Terrace near Highway 13, and started building from the bottom up, establishing locations all along Broadway Terrace.

**1900**

There were 2 Strike Teams brought into Broadway Terrace and Duncan. There were several structures already on fire. The Strike Team leaders assigned their crews as they saw fit. [Note: at 1645 there were 2 CDF engines on the scene to cover Mountain and Broadway Terrace.] 2 Strike Teams at the bottom of Broadway Terrace and 1 Strike Team at the top. There were 2 additional engines at Mountain. The Lieutenant from Truck 15 became staging [manager] (for Branch 2, staging was at Thornhill east of Highway 13). This made it easier to have control of the engines and their assignments.

**1930**

We received 2 more Strike Teams of type-1 engines, and placed them at Broadway Terrace and Leo, and Broadway Terrace and Mountain. The hydrants were good, and we began to see the beginning of a perimeter of the fire in this area.

**2000 – 2400**

During this period of time, we received about 9 or 10 Strike Teams (all type-1) and 1 type-3 Strike Team. As they arrived, they checked in at staging, and they were assigned specific locations on Broadway Terrace. The plan was going very well, because we had good resources. At this time we had good communication with the Incident Command Post. We continued to put resources in place. At midnight we felt that things were coming together and that perimeters were being established.

**0200/21**

The perimeter was established and holding. There was a planning meeting at the Command Post. I started to divide the Branch up into 3 Divisions.

- Division H with Strike Team 2301 from Broadway Terrace from Skyline to Uranus.
- Division I with Strike Team 2304 from Uranus down to the middle portion of Broadway Terrace.
- Division J with no assignment, but covering Highway 13 to the middle of Broadway Terrace.

**0230**

The retired Oakland A/C left.

The Staging manager was able to contact the procurement officer for Oakland to get reducers

(adapters 2 1/2" - 3") which are used by outside fire personnel on hydrants in Oakland. These adapters were handed out to those Strike Teams coming in. The 5" master streams were working.

**0630**

There was a briefing at the Command Post, and told them things were going really well.

**Engine 4**

Engine 4 was assigned to Broadway Terrace and Skyline Blvd. Engines 23 and 27 were already at this location. Lines were already out and houses were being defended on the west-side of the intersection.

Engine 4 proceeded south on Broadway Terrace from Skyline. All the houses on the west-side of Broadway Terrace were fully involved. All the houses on the east-side were intact and unburned.

Engine 4 noticed high voltage towers and wires which straddled Broadway Terrace from east to west. Radioed Command to find out if these wires were energized. Operations mentioned that they were not energized. Houses were burning below the towers and wires.

Engine 4 took a 3" 400' lead (supply line) from the hydrant at Balsam and Broadway Terrace. Used 200' 2 1/2" line to defend the structures on the east-side of Broadway Terrace; also used a 3" line to 2 1 1/2" line, and a 200' of 1 1/2" line from a discharge. Two civilians as well as 2 Firefighters from Truck 8 operated the lines. These civilians stayed and assisted for many hours. One of the civilians was a PG&E employee experienced with burned telephone poles and wires. We disconnected from the hydrant at Balsam and Broadway Terrace and removed all nozzles from the hose-lines and dragged all lines attached to the Pumper down to the next hydrant at Broadway Terrace and Pineneedle. Hooked up there with the soft suction to the steamer connection and continued to put out spot fires on the east-side of the street, and wet down those structures, while putting water on burning buildings and trees on the west-side.

Two houses on the south-east corner of Broadway Terrace and Pineneedle were on fire. One with an attic fire, and the other fully involved. Engine 23 stretched 1 1/2" lines to the house with the attic fire.

**1300**

Radioed for air strikes at this location. Air strikes began at 1500 just south of this location, and on Farallon Way. In total, there may have been 5 or 6 air strikes in this location by S2 bombers.

Proceeded around the corner to Farallon Way to check the exposure next to the fully-engulfed house. The fire had not reached this house. Stretched a 3" line from Engine 4 to the side yard of 6575 Farallon Way and both Engine 4 Firefighters defended this house – the first house on the ridge, east of Broadway Terrace.



An East Bay Regional Parks member with a Tank Wagon was using a 1" line in the backyard of Farallon Way. The line was in the rear yard of 6575 and worked down Farallon Way in the rear yards.

**1350**

Radioed for more engine companies.

**1400**

Engine 4 disconnected from the hydrant at Pineneedle and Broadway Terrace and repositioned on Farallon Way at a hydrant half way down the street. Engine 21 had gone down Pine-needle from Broadway Terrace to Farallon Way earlier in this situation. Engine 4 pumped into Engine 21. Engine 21 and Engine 4 operated big lines from a flat roof on Farallon Way toward Broadway Terrace to the west. Engine 27 was also fighting fire from this roof.

**1500**

The water-main on Broadway Terrace went dry. At this time, one big line was operating directly on the hydrant pressure from Broadway Terrace. The Engine 4 crew defending 6575 Farallon Way had no water. Engine 4 crew joined Engine 21 crew.

Put one of Engine 4 Firefighters in charge. Engine 4 Lieutenant returned to Broadway Terrace to see if any help had arrived. Radioed that the water-main on Broadway Terrace was dry. Was informed that Engine's 4 location was on a list for needing help.

Below Merriwood, houses on the west-side of Broadway Terrace were burning. Some Strike Teams spread out along the length of Broadway Terrace to defend the houses on the east-side of the street.

Arriving on Virgo and Uranus streets, there were 2 engines accompanying Engine 4. There were 4 or 5 houses on the east-side of the street fully involved. A 3" line hooked to the hydrant and divided into 2 1 1/2" lines was already in place. Two civilian crews were using these lines. One Strike Team engine was positioned by the hydrant at Uranus, the other was positioned behind near Virgo. Neither engine had 3" to 2 1/2" reducers. We put the 2 1 1/2" lines in the tank filler to supply this Pumper. Remained at this location for about an hour assisting with lines and operating nozzles.

After helping with this operation, walked up Broadway Terrace to Merriwood, meeting the Services Officer. Took a ride up to Pineneedle where Engine 4 was sitting, out of water and almost out of fuel. The water-main on Broadway was dry.

Engine 23 arrived at this location and used their Tank Wagon on an involved house whose attic had been worked on previously. There was not enough water for this fight. Engine 23 ran out of fuel and left for Engine 6 to refuel.



**2300/2330**

Engine 4 remained on the scene and directed 2 or 3 other Strike Teams to defend Farallon Way and Broadway Terrace down to Merriwood.

EBRP tender arrived at this location. Met with Strike Team leaders and led them down Farallon Way to inspect the fire line. Some of the fences and houses had begun to reignite. All of the other Oakland rigs were gone.

Remained on Farallon throughout the night. There was one good hydrant on Farallon Way which was still usable. After the structure survey, the Strike Teams agreed and positioned along Farallon Way.

The house at the entrance to Pineneedle on Broadway Terrace had an attic fire. There was a charged 1 1/2" line charged at the door. Spent 45 minutes going from room to room punching holes in the ceiling and putting out the attic. After this, returned to Engine 4. The situation on the west-slope quieted down.

**1900**

Returned to Pineneedle and Broadway Terrace below Merriwood and Crown streets. The PG&E civilian and Engine 4 Lieutenant escorted a strike team down beyond Merriwood. This civilian was helpful with assessing the conditions of the power-poles and downed wires. Wires were draped across Broadway Terrace, and civilian and Strike Team Firefighter cleared the road of wires.

**Truck 3****1830**

Truck 3 was newly designated as part of Strike Team 45 (with Engine 1, Engine 16, and engines from Orinda and Alameda). Strike Team 45 was dispatched to Broadway Terrace and Pinewood. Spread pumpers out, operated handlines and master streams from this location.

**2000**

Spread out on to Caldwell, Monzal and Mountain Blvd., using 1 1/2" lines with hydrant pressure, and in some cases garden hose to save homes which were beyond the reach of the pumper hand lines.

**0100/21**

Relieved at the scene by a Strike Team from Santa Cruz. Returned to Engine 24. Called the Command Center from Engine 24.

**Engine 27**

We met up with the Engine 23 Lieutenant just north of Broadway Terrace. The hydrant at this location had water. We decided to attempt a stand in this area. There is a private paralleling road on the east side of Skyline Drive. This road starts near the intersection of Skyline and Broadway Terrace and ends about 1/2 mile down Skyline with many homes on it. Engine 27 took a lead from Engine 23 north on Skyline to the end of this private road. Then we saw a small pick-up with 2 Firefighters in it. They were trying to get to Engine 8. We informed them that they couldn't go down Skyline or Tunnel. I told them that we could use their help and they decided to stay with us until about 1700. Also at this time we got help from an unidentified EBRP Firefighter. We worked in this area off Skyline for about 35 minutes, wetting down the area very thoroughly. Even after this, the fire spread was so very fast through the very thick brush and trees that we were forced to retreat back to Broadway Terrace and Skyline.

At this location, Engine 23 Lieutenant and I decided that with water we may be able to stop the fire here. We started stretching lines (2-1/2 & 1-1/2) to form about a 400' front. Engine 27 took the hydrant at Broadway Terrace and positioned near this intersection with most of their lines going down Broadway Terrace. Engine 23 took the hydrant on Skyline about 500' down from Broadway Terrace and led up Skyline to within 150' of Engine 27. Engine 2's lines are stretched down Skyline and will use their Stang gun extensively. Before all these links are in place and before the fire arrives, our Firefighter and I take Brush 23 down Broadway Terrace to Pinehaven Road to evacuate citizens from their homes and the area. This was a very hectic task, as there were many people and autos blocking the roads. We operated the siren during this operation in an attempt to alert everyone we could. We also evacuated Gwin Road on this operation.

**1345 – 1415**

Our Firefighter and I went back up Broadway Terrace to our fire stand. The fire was almost there. Engine 23 Lieutenant has taken the Broadway Terrace side and I took the Skyline side with our crews and four volunteers divided in between. We started flowing lots of water. The pressure was minimal. The fire and winds were intense. The smoke was thick on us. I looked up at our fire stand and all the players, the Firefighters, professional and volunteer, were very intense. The other player, the fire, I can only describe it as, alive and coming! This was a very hard and long fire fight for all of us. Words on paper cannot express the feeling. If any of the ten Oakland Firefighters and four volunteers would have quit, we surely would have lost more structures. We didn't save every house in this area which I thought we could have saved at first. I truly believe our actions at this point were to prevent the fire from consuming more territory. Without this successful stand the fire probably would have taken everything to Thornhill or Colton.

Near the end of this stand, our Firefighter, one of our volunteers, and I took Brush 23 up the same private road which parallels Skyline, to work on the fire still advancing on homes. With the help of another firefighter and volunteer, we used many garden hoses and the 1-1/2" from Brush 23 to stop even more structures from being lost.



**1610**

Engine 4 arrived and took a position 300' down Broadway Terrace. Engine 21 arrived about 1630 and took a lead down Farallon Way. Engines 23, 27, 4, 21 and few more volunteers made many more fire stops in this area until about 2010. [Note: One of our firefighters learned at this time that his house on Proctor was probably destroyed. He was undaunted. He should be commended.]

**2010**

We were requested to the Taurus/Capricorn area. We went down Colton to Mountain, right on Mountain to Florence Terrace, right on Florence Terrace. At the corner of Capricorn and Florence Terrace we were prevented from going up Florence Terrace because of so many out of city fire rigs. I handed out our last four 3" to 2-1/2" reducers to these rigs. We turned left on Capricorn and traveled about 800' before we were blocked again by another rig. We turned around, and took a 5" lead 300' back Capricorn. We operated our Stang gun on the structures not burning on the lower side of Taurus. I walked up the hill-side to Taurus to assist a Palo Alto Strike Team. There were many houses burning on the upper-side of Taurus. While I was assisting one Firefighter with a big line, he asked me how the fire-fight was going in other areas? I stated fine, but that it had been a real tough day for us.

**2230**

I walked back down to Engine 27; the rig needed fuel, and we needed food. I couldn't get through on the radio and we were not assigned to any other unit. There wasn't anymore that we could do here, so I ordered us back to staging at Highway 24 and Golden Gate.

There, I requested through channels that we be given permission to return to quarters for a much needed sleep. That request was denied. We filled the rig with fuel and reported to the staging Captain as ordered. We slept the night in his fire department car. The next morning I was given permission to go back up in the hills to get the hose we left in various locations. After this, we were ordered to NAS Alameda for release from the incident and for us to return to quarters.



**Engine 8****1630**

We picked up three fresh Firefighters in addition to our regular crew and were reassigned to join Division G which was commanded by a San Francisco Battalion Chief at Ocean View And Margarido. While attempting to reach our assignment, we drove up Brookside Drive, where we encountered Engine 3's Firefighter who was single-handedly defending a two story house with a 2" "big line". He needed more hose, so we took time out to give him 150' of 1-1/2" hose and nozzle to extend the "big line".

Upper Brookside was blocked by fire, so we doubled back and used Ocean View Drive. Our first duty in Division G was to assist with the 5" hose relay that San Francisco was going to provide. An off-duty Captain from Engine 15 and the San Francisco Battalion Chief had made arrangements for a long relay. Since I had worked fires in this area before and had knowledge of the water system, it was my job to meet the incoming San Francisco rigs, set up a San Francisco pumper at Ocean View and Broadway, and with San Francisco's hose tender, lead up Ocean View.

We used Engine 8 at a "Y" point at Ocean View and Margarido. Here the 5 inch hose slit down Magarido to the San Francisco crews working that area. (Engine 8's crew was now working beside the San Francisco crews). The other half of the "Y" supplied Engine 8, which in turn was pumping into a 3" hose lead supplying a series of relay pumpers up Ocean View, down Manchester and eventually extending to Acacia where a San Rafael Task Force was operating.

**2030**

The advance of the fire was stopped in this neighborhood by the San Rafael and San Francisco's crews. Radio communication and coordination between San Francisco and San Rafael was nonexistent. My other task here was to act as runner and liaison between these two departments.

**2200**

Things had quieted down considerably. The demand for high volumes of water had dropped, and we were able to remove Engine 8 from the relay. We used this opportunity to return to station 8 where we refueled, grabbed a bite to eat and phoned home to our families. We then returned to the Command post on Highway 24. On the way there, radio traffic indicated some confusion over refueling of apparatus. We happened by a diesel/gasoline tanker truck and waved him down. He was from the Alameda Naval Air Base and had already been refueling rigs but he had no radio. I assigned OFD to ride with him. I gave them a map and my portable radio. They drove around all night refueling apparatus.

Upon reaching command, we encountered a Lieutenant and a fresh crew that he had assembled. He and his crew were eager to fight fire. We were exhausted.

**Engine 1**

Just after dark, Engine 1 crew, Truck 3, Engine 16, and the Orinda Fire reported to the staging area. We became Strike Team 45 and were reassigned to Broadway Terrace and Pinewood for structure protection. On arrival, it appeared that almost every house in the immediate area was burning. Electrical wires were down on every street and that made accessibility to structures very difficult. Strike Team 45 placed apparatus on both Broadway Terrace and Pinewood Street. Every available hose line was put into operation for structure protection. Once hose lines were in position, no protected structures were lost. I was instructed by a Captain to head a Strike Team from the Richmond Fire Department. I took the Richmond Strike Team to the area of Broadway Terrace and Capricorn where we assisted other engine companies with structure protection for several hours. Richmond Fire was later reassigned and I rejoined my crew.

**0300/21**

Strike Team 45 was relieved by the Santa Cruz County Fire Department.

**Engine 21****1630**

By radio, I asked for a new assignment. The radio traffic was such that I could not raise Command. We went down Broadway Terrace and met up with Engine 4 and the crew of Engine 27. Some civilians guided us to a defensive position at the south end of Farallon Way. Engine 4 pumped from a hydrant into Engine 21 and we operated; a Stang gun, large lines, baby lines and a red line at various times to stop the fire below us at Broadway Terrace and Pinehaven. When relieved by a Strike Team from Fresno, we picked up what was left of our hose. Our entire crew had not eaten all day and our Firefighter was concerned about the condition of his home. We returned to Highway 13 and Moraga via Thornhill Drive, and from there to the former location of the Firefighter's home. From there we went to staging where we were relieved.



**Engine 23****1127**

Engine 23 responded on the sixth alarm. We were informed by FDC to respond to the intersection of Bay Forest and Tunnel Road. While responding we heard via radio transmissions that the companies in the area of Bay Forest were experiencing extreme fire conditions and loss of hydrant pressure. When Engine 23 reached Skyline and Broadway Terrace, I attempted to contact FDC to inform us who was Division Leader in the area we were responding to, and where exactly to go to assist the endangered companies. Due to the vast amount of radio traffic, FDC was unable to supply us with adequate information. From our location it was obvious that the area of Bay Forest and Tunnel was becoming totally involved, so we continued on in the original direction towards Tunnel Road on Skyline Blvd.

Near the vicinity of Tunnel Road and Highway 24 we came upon Engine 27 traveling east-bound toward us. The Lieutenant informed us that they had lost their water supply in the Bay Forest area, and all the hydrants between us and Tunnel and Bay Forest were inadequate. Engine 27 was forced to retreat from their position due to the rapid advance of the fire. At this time the Lieutenant and I decided to check the water supply in the hydrants in this area until an adequate supply could be found and then determine where to make a stand against the fire's advance.

Approximately midway between Highway 24 and Broadway Terrace we found an adequate water supply, and from there we made several moves establishing the best defensive and tactical position, taking into account safety. We first attempted a stand at 1/2 mile down Skyline, setting up lines and taking leads to cover an area of many homes with a cleared area where we assumed the fire could be halted. We underestimated the magnitude of the advance of the fire. At this point we started reassessing properties, to determine if they were saveable. We repositioned our companies (Engine 23 and Engine 27) in the area of Broadway Terrace and Skyline. Engine 27 at the hydrant at the intersection and Engine 23 at 600' down Skyline. Engine 23 took a 300' lead towards Engine 27's location. Engine 23 used its Stang gun, 2-1/2 and 1-1/2 lines on homes and surrounding vegetation, above and below our location. Engine 27 positioned 2-1/2 and 1-1/2 lines down Broadway Terrace.

During this process of setting up lines, we were also having to forcibly evacuate many stubborn residents. The Lieutenant and the Firefighter took the Tank Wagon 23 and drove this whole area making sure the residents knew they must leave and what the safest route was. In this area despite the low pressure and minimally adequate streams we prevented the fire from crossing our established fire line, many homes were saved directly due to soaking the surrounding fuel with our lines, and then fighting back the persistent flame advance. I then had 2 Firefighters take Tank Wagon 23 to extinguish beginning structure fires above us on a small private driveway.

The fire now has been stopped in this area but it has gone laterally towards the east and back up towards us along the lower part of Broadway Terrace. Engine 4 and Engine 21 arrived, and



along with Engine 23 and Engine 27 worked down Broadway Terrace, Farallon Way, and Pine-needle setting up lines off roof tops, on hillsides, and various other locations. During this time several air bombers dropped retardant on advancing flames. This was a vital assist, but was useless once the fire had reached and involved structures. -

**1800**

Strike Team #231 arrived and informed me they were to assist in preventing any flare-ups, and put out any spot fires in Division F. Engine 23 picked up its lines and proceeded to assist Engine 4 and Engine 21 on several still-persistent fire areas along Farallon Way and Pineneedle.

**2300**

I informed FDC that my crew needed food, the engine needed fuel, and our Tank Wagon needed repairs to the priming pump, also the transmission fluid appeared to be getting low on the engine. I told FDC that we would go to Station 6 to get food and diesel fuel. After fueling and eating we rested awhile then proceeded to Station 24 for unleaded fuel for our Tank Wagon. From here we reported to staging located on Highway 24 and reported to the Captain. We were instructed to rest until there were further instructions. In the meantime, I had Shop 2 look at, and repair our apparatus.

**Engine 15/Captain – Recall**

I contacted FDC Dispatch Operations after arriving at Engine 15 and requested that I be allowed to drive my truck to the Montclair area loaded with hose and nozzles. My request was granted, as long as a Firefighter who had also arrived from off-duty, accompany me. This Firefighter and I gathered 3" and 1 1/2" hose and nozzles from Engines 15 and 5. As we made our way up Broadway Terrace, we stopped several mutual aid companies to seek required fittings which were unavailable at the stations.

**Between 1730/1800**

Upon arriving at Broadway Terrace and Uranus, we observed the fire progressing up the western slope threatening homes in the immediate area. I contacted FDC again via a resident's home-phone to inform him of the immediate need for a Strike Team/engine companies. Subsequently, we drove to Engine 6 in search of a 3" WYE and/or reducers. The WYE was obtained. We immediately returned to Broadway Terrace and Uranus to find most of the structures partially to fully involved, threatening to communicate with fire brands and embers to the structures across the street. Our 3" lead from a green-top hydrant F/O 12001 Broadway Terrace provided sufficient pressure to operate 2 x 1 1/2' lines with the much needed assistance of 10 to 12 resident/civilian volunteers at the scene for approximately 2 1/2 to 3 hours. This impromptu fire brigade was also joined by 2 off-duty Firefighters who also responded to the area. The situation was becoming more untenable as time passed. Fortunately, an engine company from Mt. View arrived some 2 – 3 hours into the fire operation. Without a reducer they were unable to utilize the hydrant. A charged 1 1/2" line was placed into the tank fill to provide ample pressure and water for the Stang gun. Mountain View Fire relieved us after acquiring a reducer 3" to 2 1/2" from a Montclair resident, who collected at least 20 from old Engine 14 for



needed distribution to mutual aid companies. The hose was rolled up, loaded into the pickup and we relocated our operations to Glenwood Glade with 6 of the resident volunteers. We saved several homes by hooking up to a Water Tender from Clayton located in F/O of 52 Glenwood Glade.

**After 2400**

Made brief contact with the Captain of Truck 3 and crew. They provided our crew with a sumptuous dinner and a reducer (3" to 2 1/2"). Our Firefighter and I returned to Broadway Terrace and Uranus.

**0200/21**

We encountered at least 6 mutual aid companies stacked up at Merriewood and Sherwood.

**0900**

We reported to the command post after a pit-stop at Station 15. I was placed on staff status and sent up by chopper by the OFD Chief for video documentation. Our Firefighter returned to Station 15 and I remained on staff the remainder of the day.



Proctor Road / Florence area near lower Broadway Terrace



**Engine 16 /Engine 3 – Lieutenant – Recall**

(Times are approximations.)

**1100**

Off duty at home, observed extremely large column of black smoke from my home in Martinez, called 911 and learned the fire was in Oakland. Equipped myself to respond to the fire and drove in to Oakland. Listening to the radio on the way in, I learned that BART was shut down, and the Caldecott Tunnel was closed to traffic. In Orinda, I found people using the on-ramp to come down off the freeway. Drove past them and showed ID to CHP officer at road-block. He escorted me through the tunnel.

**1130**

On coming out of the Caldecott Tunnel, I observed fire on both sides of the freeway. The wind was blowing hard from the north. The Parkwood Apartments were fully involved and, seeing crews working at the scene, I stopped there to work first. Captain from Engine 16 had finished checking the remaining building to make sure all occupants were clear. The roof was fully involved. I assisted in trying to hook up 5" hose to supply Truck 3 ladder-pipe, but the hose had been burned through, and the replacement hose sprang leaks when it was charged. I then went down to the Command Post at Brookside and Broadway.

**1200**

I found an Engineer at Brookside and Broadway, pumping from the hydrant with Engine 3. I asked him where the rest of the crew was, and he indicated they were working further up on Brookside somewhere. I proceeded up Brookside until I found a Firefighter working alone with Tank Wagon 26. He had no water supply other than the tank, so I continued up Brookside to Ocean View, looking for a hydrant. On seeing a resident up on his roof, trying to wet down a pine tree next to his house with a garden hose, I advised him he was in danger as the wind was blowing in that direction and the fire would be working that way soon. He refused to leave at that point. I went back down to the Firefighter and advised him there were no hydrants on the upper end of Brookside. He decided to move the Tank Wagon further down Brookside as we could see the fire would burn across that area, judging by the wind at that time. Houses on East Brookside were beginning to burn by this time. Some people were trying to fight the fire with garden hoses, but the effort was futile. At that point, a San Francisco Engine company showed up at Eustice and Brookside. They hooked up to the hydrant on the corner and extended a 3" line to fight the fire on Brookside. However, their hose was too short to really reach the buildings which were burning, so with help from two off-duty Alameda fire fighters, we extended the line further up the street. However, the fire was moving rapidly up and across Brookside by this time and we were forced to pull back down the street. Lines were set up on Eustice to douse the heavy brush and eucalyptus which bordered the College Prep School and houses on that street. Other lines were extended up to houses on the west-side of Brookside. Fire had started in the long, dry grass in backyards of the houses facing on Ocean View, and the wind was pushing it into the houses on West Brookside above Eustice. I had a line in place there, but the water pressure was hopelessly inadequate at this point, and I could



not even reach the fire. I began to extend the line, but then a San Francisco Firefighter told me they were going to pull out to try to get ahead of the fire up on Ocean View and Margarido, so those lines were abandoned. I asked them to wet down the roof of the house on the north corner of Eustice and Brookside before they left, as the shake roof was burning along the porch and front of the house. The fire had passed through there so rapidly that this house and the two behind it were largely undamaged and I didn't want to lose them after all. Everything above that point was fully involved by that time.

The San Francisco crew pulled out. Then Larkspur and San Rafael pulled in, but had no sooner laid out hose, than they got the word to join up with San Francisco, so they left too. I re-joined the two Alameda Firefighters and the Firefighter with Tank Wagon 26. By this time, he had a water supply, but the pressure was still inadequate. The Alameda Firefighters and some civilians were fighting spot fires started by flying embers in the front yards of houses on West Brookside, across from the college. I advised them to watch the wind carefully, as they were working in heavy brush areas, and would be at risk if the wind suddenly shifted. At this point, the Lieutenant from Engine 3 came up to ask for help in moving San Francisco's abandoned 3" hose down to the college as there was a private hydrant on the grounds with good pressure. The brush and eucalyptus on the south side of the college were reigniting. We set up the line with a nozzle off Engine 3 and were able to keep the fire from spreading to the college buildings. This was an important "save" as it kept the fire from spreading down Broadway, and enabled the San Francisco Task Force to narrow the path of the fire in the Margarido/Ocean View area. I asked student volunteers to patrol the perimeter of the college on a regular basis to look for spot fires. This was done with good results. Several small fires were extinguished before they could get out of hand because of their help.

The Lieutenant sustained an eye injury during this effort, and I suggested he go down to the first-aid station at the Command Post for treatment. I told him I would stay with his crew. We were later told he had been taken to the hospital, so I remained with Engine 3 for the rest of the night. Once the college area was secured, I went back up to the street level, and found the house on the corner was still smoldering under the shingles at the edge of the roof. Feeling generally outraged at the number of houses we had already lost, I decided we weren't going to lose the three left on that block. I saw a volunteer pick up the garden hose in the front yard, and asked him to keep playing the hose stream along the roof where it was smoldering until I could get back with an ax and a big line nozzle from Engine 3, which was still pumping down at Broadway and Brookside. I got the ax and nozzle and collected a couple of volunteers on the way back to help pull some more of San Francisco's 3" hose up to the hydrant on the corner of Eustice and Brookside. In the meantime, a man with a private Foam Tanker had wet down the remaining houses on both sides of Brookside at the fire's edge. This was of enormous help in keeping the fire from spreading any further until we could get a line into place. Two Firefighters came up from the College at this point, and I explained I wanted to set up the big line for a water curtain between the last house burning on West Brookside at Eustice and the pink stucco house next door which was still whole. They took care of that side of the street, while the volunteer and I worked on the roof of the corner house, stripping shingles until all the burning wood was removed and extinguished. The volunteer moved on up the hill, put-

ting out spot fires behind the houses, and I cleared the debris out of the hallway of the house so I could shut the front door in case of looters. By this time, Engine 3 had moved up to where we were working, and the crew continued to wet down the area as best they could, until the houses on fire had largely burned down to the point where we felt they were not going to endanger the remaining buildings on the street. I moved down the street to check on the civilians still working the area. The college was still secure and the school director indicated teachers and students were going to remain on fire watch at the college all night. I told him we would leave the hose and nozzle in place for their use. Moving further down the street, I found the Alameda firefighters had extended hose up West Brookside through yards up to Ocean View and Margarido, and needed a water supply to fight spot fires up there. We dragged more 3" hose into place and hooked it up to the private hydrant at the college to supply that line and I showed the school director how to re-connect his line if necessary as I couldn't locate a siamense to keep both lines going at once. It was dark by the time we left this area and went down to the command post to eat and rest for awhile.

**1800**

We were directed to join up with Engine 16, Truck 3, Orinda and Alameda Fire to form a Strike Team and go to Broadway Terrace and Glenwood Glade, above Highway 13. Engine 3 positioned at the hydrant on the corner. We had good pressure and we were able to supply the other three engine companies. The fire was burning on the north-side of Pinewood where there was heavy brush and trees along the houses. Three houses on the south-side were still relatively untouched, though the trees and bushes were burning. Engine 3 took a line up the driveway of the next house up on Broadway Terrace, putting out fire as they went. I then directed them to keep wetting down the roofs of those three houses from the rear, to keep the fire from extending up Broadway Terrace. The Engineer and I assisted Truck 3 and Engine 16 firefighters in extending more lines up through the yards of houses on north Broadway Terrace. Engine 16 took their lines all the way up to Avoca and saved several houses in that area. As we were surrounded on all sides by fire at this time, I began patrolling the whole area at intervals to check on the safety of the various crews fighting fire, to look for rekindled buildings, and to see if the situation was deteriorating, as we could have been trapped in the area if the wind had changed again. We had to move lines back and forth several times during the night as buildings we had not realized were still smoldering suddenly took off again. We remained in this area until relieved by the CDF task force at about midnight or 0030 hours.

**0030**

We were directed to go to Engine 24 and wait there until called. We stayed there until about 0430-0500. We were then moved back to the Command Post and remained there until about 0700 or 0730 hours. We were then told to go to Raimondi Park at 18th and Wood and wait until a crew came to relieve us there. We were relieved at about 0900-0930 hours. The relieving crew took us back to Engine 3 as they had to pick up a battery for the portable radio. We went off-duty at about 0930. I returned to Engine 16 and the Captain told me we were to return to work at 0700 the 22st.



**Narrative**

[Note: Narrative of volunteer activity by an employee of EBMUD. He had had previous experience working for the forestry service on wildland fires, and was of considerable help to those of us working the Broadway-Brookside area on the afternoon of 10/20/91. This report was submitted with the previous report from Engine 16's Lieutenant/Engine 3. The information it contains is critical to the understanding of the fire situation. It is printed here accordingly.]

**1100**

I drove quickly over to the 57th and Telegraph freeway entrance and headed east on Highway 24. I debated about getting off at the first exit, but the flames and smoke looked about a mile away, so I went on. Before I got to the next exit, I saw two lanes of cars racing back down the freeway toward me, blaring their horns for us to turn back. Cars were backed up at the freeway exit. I squeezed around them, bullied my way across creeping traffic coming down the frontage road, bumped up over a low curb and parked, put on my boots and hard hat, and grabbed my shovel.

I walked a couple of hundred yards along the freeway, east, then south toward the fire. I went along a steep brushy hillside and could see flames above me, but none below. As the houses came into view, I could see that they were fully involved, a whole block of them. I continued south and downhill, and saw fire creeping slowly down toward a large group of buildings nestled in a brushy, steep little valley. This turned out to be the College Prep School, near Lake Temescal.

The school was deserted. I found a hydrant and standpipe, with pressure, but no hose to hook up to it. I located and began dragging garden hoses toward the line of fire on the east side of the school – Golden Gate. I went back and cleared tangled hose, and turned on the water. The hose had a nice squeeze-type spray nozzle on it. I began spraying the burning line of brush.

I worked along the line of burning brush, knocking down flame, listening to explosions and the roarings of crowning trees getting closer on the hill just above. A eucalyptus roared into flame. Fearing falling branches, or "widow-makers", I dropped my hose and ran about 50 yards. The wind abated, the flames lessened. I returned to the hose and dowsed several burning embers near the edge of the school building before returning to the burning line of brush. I'd lost ground. I retreated along the line I had just dowsed and sprayed out new flare-ups and hot spots, sprayed my heated face and arms, soaked my shirt, and attacked a tangle of brush, the flames about 4 feet high. I heard an explosion and glanced uphill just as two houses collapsed to the ground together, then flared up in a 40 foot bonfire.

Suddenly, there were four more people working alongside me, dragging another garden hose, shoveling. There were no formal introductions, although we did say "hi". Later I found out they worked at the school. For the next hour, we fought the flames as they tried to work their way downhill to the school. I had the last brush line about put out when I felt the hose being jerked



out of my hands. Wind roared up the hill as several trees whooshed into flame. I yelled "no", and the guy yanking on my hose said, "we need it over here. We're about to lose a building." Sure enough, I looked over to the south and saw a fresh 3-foot high advancing line of flame less than 15 feet from the building. As the man who had grabbed my hose battled that line, another man and I scouted the school for more hose. We discovered a small flare-up at the north end of the school. We doused it with fire extinguishers. We rounded up several more.

Fire engines arrived above. A loudspeaker told us, "Get out, evacuate". The wind increased, smoke swirled, there were new and louder explosions. One of the men asked me if I could drive a van out. I said "sure". We went up to the road. There were several school vans parked. On the other side of the road – Eustice – brush burned fiercely. The man was frantically trying to dole out the correct keys to the vans off a key ring as the fire raged. I moved one van downhill and parked it near a police blockade. I then worked my way back up the hill. Two of the others had already parked their vans and come back also. We resumed the fight, now helping Oakland Engine 3 and Engine 16 and wetting down the buildings. This was the 3" line we hooked up to the private hydrant at the school, using hose left by a San Francisco engine and a nozzle off Engine 3. Houses continued to burn and collapse up on the hill. There were crews up there, trying to make a stand at a stucco house and halt the fire spread – on Brookside at Eustice.

The Firefighters' big hoses seemed to have ended the immediate threat to the school. A school worker brought up a case of sodas. We went back to squirting small hot spots and helping the Firefighters direct water above the road toward the burning houses and brush. I walked up the steps at the south entrance to the school – Eustice and Brookside – and rested as I watched the house immediately across the street finish burning and collapse, dragging down power and phone lines. Just south of the steps was a house, still standing, flames licking at the porch roof and the eaves. A garden hose lay in the yard. I knocked down the flames, but the roof line continued to smolder, the fire having worked its way under the shingles.

A man driving a tanker truck full of detergent-foam type suppressant was rolling up hose. He'd come up, from some company, as a volunteer, and was trying to drive the truck, run pumps, drag hose, and fight fire, all by himself – the fire companies had moved out by this time to head off the fire on Margarido Drive and vicinity. I helped him hose down the smoldering roof of the house and roll up his hose. I considered going along with him. We could work as a 2-man crew. But the house was still smoldering. The school might still be in danger. He thanked me and said goodbye and headed down hill.

I climbed up on the roof the the smoking house with an Oakland Firefighter from Engine 16 – the Lieutenant from the previous report. I chopped away with my shovel, she with her ax, for the next hour, digging out all the fire along the roofline and dousing it with the garden hose. Houses continued to burn and collapse just uphill from us – on Brookside. Other crews continued to attack and retreat. I saw trucks from San Rafael, from Larkspur, from San Francisco. [Note: His time sense is a little off here, this had actually happened before we began working on the roof.

**Engine 16 Lieutenant]** We got the roof fire completely out, climbed down the trellis, shook hands and said good-bye. She returned to her crew and the firefight across the street. I went behind the house and began dousing hot spots and burning piles of leaves, working my way up to the house next door, cooling down a pile of burning boards, piles of coals, [probably charcoal], a flaming trellis. It began to get dark. I noticed I was hungry, not having eaten all day. I walked down back through the school, said good-bye to the other tired folks. They were arranging a watch to stay all night in case of more flare-ups. I walked back out to my car.

#### **Truck 15 C/ Recall**

On 10/20/91 I reported on duty on Buena Vista Avenue. I went to Contra Costa Road at #6198. The wind was very strong and the fire was coming up from the east and the west. The heat and fire was so intense that it blew up over the area and I had to retreat to about 6200 Buena Vista Street. I borrowed a chain-saw from a mutual aid company and proceeded to cut down trees around the house at 6200 Buena Vista. I also used garden hoses to put out spot fires and to wet down this house. All the time the fire and winds were swirling very strongly in this area. There were two other houses on the west side that held on which I also cleared brush and wet down. I tried to save a rancher on the east-side of 6200 but the fire broke windows and got inside. I broke the skylight in this house in hopes that it would stop the fire from mushrooming out. It worked. At one time all the lower houses were burning and I retreated to Broadway Terrace and assisted with hose lines in the vicinity of Florence Avenue for about 1 hour. I returned to 6200 Buena Vista and continued protecting the still-standing structures. Most of the time I worked alone.



Broadway Terrace near Skyline






Proctor



Broadway Terrace





Upper Broadway Terrace



Upper Broadway Terrace

## **5. Overview of the Chronology of Engine Companies**

This section of the report covers the events of the Oakland Tunnel Fire through the actions of the fire personnel of the Oakland Fire Department. This section can be read as a time-line for each Oakland engine and truck company involved in the fire. The engine companies are presented as they arrived at the fire. The companies on the A-shift arrived through the 6 alarms transmitted; other Oakland Fire Department engine company shifts responded through the recall process; Strike Teams from other jurisdictions responded through mutual aid requests as the fire escalated.

The important points to think about when referring to this section of the report is that each engine company had a different perspective on the fire. There were those companies who arrived during the first half-hour of the blaze and spent their whole "on-duty" time in one location. There were other engine companies who moved to different locations as the fire escalated or changed patterns of movement. The arrival of Strike Teams from other counties and jurisdictions made the whole fire-fighting personnel force more accessible to movement as the fire escalated.

Another point to consider when reading these accounts is that communication between the engine companies were minimal – at best. Many engine companies had no idea what other engine companies were doing. In some cases, engine companies were split up, either due to the escalation of the fire, or through the inaccessible roads needed for civilian evacuation, and fire suppression. There are stories which might present a varied account of the same location, depending on the time of the event or other companies involved with fire suppression at the location. These varied accounts expand the information base which has already been presented to the citizens of Oakland through video and varied print media.

An important note about these accounts is that fire personnel interacted with both civilian and fire-professional alike. These stories might involve citizens, but they in no way reflect the experiences or stories of the non-profession Firefighter. There were those citizens who became part of a firefighting team, helping with hose, ax, and apparatus. This report cannot possibly do justice to those who experienced the Oakland Tunnel Fire in this capacity.

Read this section of the report as a comprehensive accounting of the events of the Oakland Tunnel Fire as they relate specifically to the Oakland engine companies. An understanding of what took place – through the eyes of the fire personnel – will shed some light on the complexity of the Oakland Tunnel Fire.

## **5. CHRONOLOGY OF ENGINE COMPANIES    THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE**

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### **AT THE SCENE**

ENGINE 19                      0853

ENGINE 24                      0853

### **PATROLS**

ENGINE 4                        1006

ENGINE 27                      1006

PATROL 28                      1015

### **FIRST ALARM**

ENGINE 10                      1102

ENGINE 16

ENGINE 6                        1100

TRAINING 2                    1104

### **SECOND ALARM**

TRUCK 15                       1104

TRUCK 1                        1105

ENGINE 25                      1107

### **THIRD ALARM**

ENGINE 5

ENGINE 4                        1107



**FOURTH ALARM**

ENGINE 15 1115

TRUCK 8

ENGINE 27 1115

ENGINE 1 1115

ENGINE 8

**SIXTH ALARM**

ENGINE 2 1150

ENGINE 13 1150

ENGINE 17 1157

ENGINE 23 1127

TRUCK 3 1126

ENGINE 26 1126

ENGINE 21 1126

**LATER RESPONSE**

ENGINE 3 1200

ENGINE 18 1208

TRUCK 18 1300

ENGINE 20 1217

ENGINE 29 1150

ENGINE 36 1400

ENGINE 38 1215

## **5. CHRONOLOGY OF ENGINE COMPANIES    THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE**

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|           |      |
|-----------|------|
| ENGINE 39 | 1200 |
| ENGINE 41 | 1230 |
| ENGINE 48 | 1600 |

### **OAKLAND FIRE DEPARTMENT MIXED AND RECALL CREWS**

The following list of "Engine Companies" do not represent their respective engines, but represent those fire personnel who were recalled, and are either normally a part of the engine company, or who worked as part of the engine company during the Oakland Tunnel Fire.

|                      |      |
|----------------------|------|
| ENGINE 20            |      |
| ENGINE 21            | 1400 |
| ENGINE 29 B          | 1400 |
| ENGINE 26 B          | 1400 |
| ENGINE 18/UNIT 7     | 1200 |
| TEAM 8               | 1600 |
| CREW 10              | 1700 |
| ENGINE 8 /           | 1730 |
| VALLEJO TASK FORCE 1 |      |
| ENGINE 8             | 2300 |
| ENGINE 15            | 1730 |
| ENGINE 40            |      |
| ENGINE 16 C          | 1700 |
| ENGINE 16/ENGINE 3   | 1130 |
| NARRATIVE (Civilian) | 1100 |
| TRUCK 15             |      |
| TRUCK 15 C           | 1330 |
| TRUCK 15             |      |
| VAL REC              | 1200 |
| FIRE INSPECTOR       | 1400 |

**AT THE SCENE**

ENGINE 19      0853

ENGINE 24      0853

**PATROLS**

ENGINE 4      1006

ENGINE 27      1006

PATROL 28      1015



### AT THE SCENE

#### ENGINE 19/ENGINEER

[Note: Because Engine 19 was split during the fire, there are two reports from Engine 19.]

##### 0853

Engine 19 was dispatched to the burn area at 7150 Marlborough Terrace to initially observe the fire area from the previous day and retrieve equipment left from the previous evening. We parked the rigs on Marlborough Terrace in front of the hydrant, and proceeded to turn the hydrant off to break up the line. Shortly after beginning this procedure, the Engine 19 Engineer noticed some smoke coming from the burn area of the previous day. Engine 19 donned brush jackets and helmets, charged the lines again, and started overhauling hot spots on both the right and left flank of the previous burn area for about an hour. There was a 1 1/2" 900' line going from the Gwinn Tank down to the right side of the fire to the bottom of the hill. We took the lead from the Lieutenant of Engine 24 and broke the 900' line into two, to help overhaul the flare-up at the top. We hooked up a divider to these two hoses to put out the hot spots at the top of the hill. The two Firefighters from Engine 19 took the top hot spots, and Engine 24 took the left side at the bottom of the hill. After awhile, the Engine 19's Lieutenant told the Engineer to take the brush rig down Marlborough and pick up the 2 Firefighters from Engine 19 who had been putting out hot spots at the bottom of the hill. After a 15-20 minute wait for them to finish their hot spots and retrieve hose, he was told to come back up Marlborough; the East Bay Regional Park's (EBRP) crew was going to bring these other 2 firefighters back up.

##### 1058

Engine 19 saw fire running across the brush at the lower right flank of the original burn area. Engine 19's Lieutenant called for "a box" – the first alarm. Engine 19 and Engine 24 tried to put the fire out which had spread to the deck of the house near 7150 Buckingham Blvd. At this time, the EBRP crew was working on the right side of the fire with Engine 19's Firefighters. In a short period of time, the fire had jumped Buckingham, and within a 5-10 minute time span over-ran the entire crew working the fire area. In addition to the Engine 19 Engineer, other fire personnel including Engine 24's Firefighter and Lieutenant, 2 media people from Channel 2, Battalion Chief 4-A, and the Lieutenant from Training 2, all sensed apprehension about being trapped, so Engine 19 – taking all of the crew – retreated from this original position.

The Engine 19 crew got separated. Engine 19 Engineer worked on evacuating residents from homes on Norfolk, Strathmoor, Drury, Amato, and Alvarado, working a way to Claremont Avenue. The Engineer sent civilians to keep Claremont clear, because people were evacuating on to Claremont. Traffic was not allowed to go up Claremont, because of the evacuation.

Engine 19 Engineer went back to the station to pick up the hose wagon in order to lay 5" line and have access to flow large amounts of water. A private citizen drove the brush rig, and the Channel 2 camera crew stayed with the crew, following instructions from the fire personnel, and helping with some of the evacuations.

Went to Tunnel Command at Broadway and Brookside off of the on-ramp of Highway 13 to get guidance on the situation. But there was confusion and chaos. So we went off freelancing.

Engine 19 Engineer linked up with Battalion 44 and worked with him for several hours.

**1300 – 1400**

Worked on Beechwood with an Alameda crew. After about an hour there was no water pressure.

**1700 – 1900 ??**

Worked near Holy Names and saved it.

**2330 – 2400**

Our last stand.

**0330**

Relieved of duty.

Engine 19 crew consisted of an Engineer, a Lieutenant, and 2 Firefighters.

**OBSERVATIONS**

There was a lack of command, due to poor radio communications. There needs to be training in mass evacuations. (We saw no police until we got to Claremont and Alvarado.) People evacuating in cars should pick up people who are walking out of an evacuation area. Cars should not be allowed to turn around on the streets in the hill area. We need more drills to prepare for basic firefighting. We also need rig maintenance.

**ENGINE 19/LIEUTENANT**

**0700**

Left for work.

**0730**

The Lieutenant from Station 24 called and asked if I would be interested in picking up hose left from the previous day. I agreed.

**0745**

Captain from Engine 1 called and asked if I would pick up hose from the previous day.

**0845 [Note: This time has been logged as 0851 and 0853.]**

We arrived. Engine 19 and our Tank Wagon and Engine 24 and their Tank Wagon met at the hydrant with the lead at Marlborough Terrace. Went to the area of Saturday's fire. Walked up to where the lead went across into the very steep terrain. You couldn't see the burn area from the street. There were 8 people walking in the burn area. Engine 24's Firefighters and myself went down the burn area finding hot spots in the north-east flank – well within the burn area. The Lieutenant from Engine 24 and Engine 19's crew went up the hill towards the top of the Tank and found hot spots in that area. At this time, I put both engines out of service. Battalion 2 was on the scene above the area. **[Note: Battalion 2 was on the scene at 0854.]**

**0900**

Winds from the north were gusting at about 15 mph, and building. We were extinguishing hot spots. Engine 24's Lieutenant notified East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP) to pick up their hose. EBRP responded that they had no one available to do that. Battalion 2 notified them that they needed to respond.

There were 3 areas of hot spots.

- Below the Gwinn Tank
- The north-east flank near Westmoreland (part of a very steep canyon. Westmoreland parallels Marlborough Terrace.)
- The south-east flank where EBPR hose originated, and ended at Buckingham.

Engine 24 took the area near the top of the Tank. Engine 19 took the area of the north-east flank. The south-east flank was where the EBRP hose was extended from the Tank to Buckingham Blvd. Their hose extended for about 1300' of 1 1/2" hose.

These hot spots were all part of the original burn area. The south-east flank was the origin of Saturday's fire, near the television aerial. The hot spots were emanating from the roots of the oak tree in the south-east flank.

Within this time, we had extinguished hot spots and picked up some hose. Battalion 2 had asked Engine 16 to come and help pick up hose. We used the hose from the Tank to extin-



guish the hot spots. This was EBRP hose. The hose on the north-east was left attached to the hydrant and flaked at the top of the burn area. I helped pull down Engine 1's hose at the bottom of the burn area. There was lead line and baby line which Engine 16 and myself pulled out. On Engine 16, we proceeded back to the hydrant on Marlborough. Engine 16 said they would deliver the hose to Engine 1. They left. Engine 19, and Engine 24 were still left with their Tank Wagons. Engine 19's Firefighters were on the south-east flank of the fire helping bringing EBRP hose to them down the hill from the Tank to Buckingham. At this point, Engine 24 said they needed fuel for their Tank Wagon. They were going to go to Engine 6 to refuel and return to quarters, leaving Engine 19 in charge.

EBRP was on the scene at this time. One of their supervisors was at the hydrant on Marlborough with Engine 24 and Engine 19. He knew of the hose that had been flaked at the north-east flank. He had crews working the hot spot underneath the oak tree, and he had crews picking up hose. I dispatched my Engineer down to Buckingham to pick up the Firefighters. He took the Tank Wagon. I was left with the EBRP supervisor at the hydrant area. The EBRP supervisor was going to check on his crews in the burn area, walking along the hose out-of-sight. We had tried regular communications with our portable radios. He was able to transmit and receive on our channel – White Fire. I was able to receive on White Fire. I was not able to broadcast. He walked into the burn area. I contacted my Engineer and asked if he had been able to locate our Firefighters. The Engineer was down on Buckingham at the point of origin of the original fire. At this time I heard someone mouth-whistle and yelling for me to charge the lead. I went to the hydrant to turn the hydrant on. I could see a small amount of smoke at the north-east flank of the area. The lead was charged. I started to go towards the burn area through the unburned area. As I was in the brush, I asked for Engine 24 to return to the scene.

**1058**

I asked the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) to transmit a box – the first alarm. The wind was blowing from the north, the north-east. The wind had progressively increased throughout the morning. Getting into the burn area, looking down towards Buckingham, the smoke had started to "column". I still didn't see any flames. FDC asked if I had wanted the same assignment that Engine 24 had asked for – the first alarm assignment.

**1102**

No. I asked for a second alarm. I also requested FDC to start California Department of Forestry (CDF). EBRP had also asked for CDF. I still saw no flames. At this time I was the Incident Command, and my task was to disburse the companies in the best way possible. I knew I needed to get to higher ground to see the fire. I turned my back to the smoke and climbed towards the top of the hill where the [Gwinn] Tank is located. It was very steep terrain. I went no more than a 150 feet and it took a minute to climb. When I got to the top and turned around, I saw open flames on **both flanks**. I deployed the companies through the third alarm in positions where I thought we could contain the fire in the boundries of Grizzly Peak Blvd., Buckingham Blvd., and Marlborough Terrace.

At this point, the fire was coming up the hill at an unbelievable speed. At the [Gwinn] Tank,

## **5. CHRONOLOGY OF ENGINE COMPANIES    THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE**

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there were some resources. There were EBPR lines made up already. There was an EBPR Firefighter with a Brush rig. There was an Inspector from Patrol 28, and a citizen. I had placed the third alarm assignments. I had heard Battalion 2 take over as Command. And I went to do some firefighting near the Gwinn Tank. I had the EBPR Firefighter and the Inspector make up another hose-line, and in the process fighting fire around the Tank. My situation deteriorated; I was no longer doing offensive firefighting – I was getting into a defensive stance against the fire. I was looking for a way out. The EBPR's Firefighter disappeared, and our situation deteriorated. I tried to gain entry into the pumping station – a concrete block with a steel-clad door, but we couldn't do this. There's an access road to the Gwinn Tank off of Grizzly Peak, but this was impassible. I put the citizen in front of an open hydrant underneath the water. The Inspector and I made a water curtain, putting the hose in a 'fog pattern', and we sat down in the fog pattern. The fire crowned in the pine trees around the Tank. We were sitting in the water curtain, and the citizen was in the water stream. I had my doubts about making it out of the area. I radioed to the Incident Command, and told him what our situation was – that we were trapped.

### **1300 – 1330**

We stayed here for what seemed like six days – it felt like six days. We were in a firestorm. The wind was coming from several directions at the same time. The fire brands were blowing, the trees were glowing. We sat for a period of time. There was an access road, the house directly behind the Tank was totally involved. There was the EBPR and the Oakland crew trying to extinguish the flame from the outside. They couldn't get inside because the roof had already collapsed. The underpinnings on the house were burned. The inspector left in his Tank Wagon to see if he could be of assistance somewhere else. [Note: In terms of a time frame, the Lieutenant from Engine 19 was "digging out" of his entrapment at the same time Battalion 44 was asking for his second order of 10 Strike Teams for the Contra Costa, Golden Gate, Acacia area. This was a little after 1200.]

### **(1 – 1 1/2 hours)**

EBRP and Engine 5 were trying to extinguish the fire. We were given the assignment of trying to reverse pump to a zone hydrant. This was to augment the water supply on Marlborough. We worked at this, but it didn't work. We couldn't pump from one to the other. We couldn't augment the water.

### **1500 – 1530**

Engine 15, Engine 10, Engine 25, and a Firefighter driving Engine 19, pulled out of Marlborough and came to Grizzly Peak and Marlborough. Under the direction of the Captain from Engine 25, we freelanced. We had some equipment. We had 4 engines, a Tank Wagon, and crews. We proceeded down Claremont Avenue, stopped at a hydrant and filled all the water tanks. We dispersed the equipment so that we would all have firefighting capabilities, and proceeded to the Claremont Hotel to hook up with our command there. But we never got to the Claremont.

### **(2 hours) 1730 – 1800**

On approaching the Claremont, the Berkeley Fire Department was screaming for help on Tun-



nel Road and Alvarado, which was very close to our location. We proceeded to Tunnel Road and Alvarado. Engine 19 pumped Engine 15, Engine 10 and Engine 25 leads up Alvarado and Tunnel Road, Tunnel Road and Bridge Street until the fire passed.

**1830 – 1900**

When released from this assignment by Berkeley Fire, we went back to the Claremont to hook up with someone from Oakland. Division C was in charge. I later on complained of chest pains, and went to the hospital because of smoke inhalation.

**OBSERVATIONS****Wind**

If there had been no wind, there wouldn't have been any fire. If the wind hadn't stopped, where would the fire have gone. No wind, no fire.

**Management**

The Assistant Chief Battalion 2 had mentioned that it was the most critical fire day in the last five years, but in retrospect, it was the worst day in the history for a fire. We had the very best personnel on the scene, who had the best capabilities of management. This Assistant Chief was the best person to have had at the scene of a fire of this magnitude. This Chief knows the water supply and terrain. The CDF command deals specifically with wildland fires, and the Oakland Fire Department deals with structure fires, and life-hazards.

Getting Strike Teams from all over the state of California took an incredible amount of work, and yet these Strike Teams and mutual aid agencies did arrive. By Sunday evening, we had hundreds of engine companies fighting this fire.

The Command structure was very large, integrating all of these jurisdictions. Aspects of the command system are as large as big government. There were vast amounts of bureaucratic time to make a system this size work. The Incident Command worked as fast as it was able.



**ENGINE 24/LIEUTENANT****Prior to 0800 roll-call**

The C-shift officer of Engine 24 told me that there had been a fire the previous day in back of 7151 Buckingham. As a precaution, they had left 700' of hose at the hydrant at Marlborough in case of a rekindle on the north flank of the fire area. I called the officer on duty at Engine 19, and coordinated with this Lieutenant to get those hoses out of there. We both agreed to move the hose out of there as soon as possible. **[Note: The weather conditions were similar to the 1970 fire.]**

**0830 [Note: This time has been logged as 0851 and 0853.]**

Rendezvous with Engine 19 in front of 7185 Marlborough Terrace below Grizzly Peak to recover 700' of hose left from the previous day's fire. I noticed hot spots in the burn area – first on the north flank (Marlborough side) in the duff under the pine trees, and second in the duff near the Gwinn Tank (Grizzly Peak side - east flank). Access to these areas was through Grizzly Peak. We each had crews of 2 Firefighters each. We took our crews and walked into 100 yards of heavy brush. We followed the 3" hose from the hydrant to the unburned area. We went to work, with 3 people in each crew working up towards the Gwinn Tank. EBRP had hose from the hydrant at the Gwinn Tank. The wind was blowing from the east – light and variable.

**0920**

Requested East Bay Regional Park Fire Department (EBRPFD) to assist in retrieving 1200' of their hose from the south flank. We went down the south flank, and with 2 of my Firefighters, we broke the EBRP hose at 600' to drag the hose to Buckingham since it was easier to drag part of the hose down the terrain, with the other 2 Firefighters dragging the other 600' hose up to the Gwinn Tank. It was extremely heavy brush and steep terrain. We put a nozzle on the hose, and we were able to use it to overhaul the area directly below the Gwinn Tank. We saw hot spots underneath the pine trees. Engine 19 was working on the north flank. There were hot spots on the north side. We saw that in the burn area, about 30-50' from the south flank, under a live oak tree, smoke was coming up. We notified EBRP to come in from Buckingham, because we couldn't get to it from our side with our lines. Winds were light to moderate.

**0930 – 0940**

EBRPFD arrived on the scene– 2 Firefighters at the Gwinn Tank in a pick-up truck. Engine 24 notified EBRPFD (coming in with hand crews) to work the hot spot near the south flank near the live oak tree. The EBRPFD crew went down the hill to move their hose to Buckingham (overhauling the area). They noticed hot spots below where Engine 19's crew was working on the north flank of Marlborough Terrace. I worked in the area underneath the Gwinn Tank and the upper part of the north flank. The winds were still light to moderate from the east.

We worked for 2 to 2 1/2 hours. During this period of time, Assistant Chief Battalion 2 had upgraded the situation to a first alarm status – extreme fire conditions, which meant that we would be getting another engine company to help us with the situation – Engine 16. In declar-

ing a first alarm status, the Assistant Chief also prepared 3 roving patrols to patrol the area of Skyline. Engines 4, 27, and Patrol 28. Battalion 3 and Battalion 4 had each dispatched 1 Flat Truck for patrol. Engine 28 came out of Engine 6 quarters; it was a brush rig. The Battalion 3 area extended from the San Leandro border to Redwood Road along Skyline. The Battalion 4 area extended from Redwood Road to Snake Road/Colton to the Berkeley line.

**1045**

We couldn't see any smoke; the area looked like it had been knocked out. Battalion 2 had left me in command of the area when he left. I conferred with Engine 19. Engine 24 and Brush 24 left the area to refuel at Engine 6 (Skyline and Snake - the closest point for refueling diesel). All the lines were charged, none of the hose had been picked up. EBRP was working down below with Engine 19. I Left Engine 19 in command. I left Marlborough Terrace to Grizzly. At about Skyline, Engine 19 called.

**1045 – 1055**

Engine 19 notified me via radio to return to the scene. There was a flare-up on the north flank. The winds had picked-up tremendously.

**1058 – 1104**

Returned via Grizzly Peak Blvd. Stopped south of the Gwinn Tank to check the condition. Noticed the flare-up on the south flank below the antenna. I was 1/4 mile below Marlborough Terrace. I asked for a first-alarm assignment at the same time that Engine 19 had put in for a first alarm assignment (putting a "box" in place). [Note: A box represents 3 engine companies and a chief officer.] The winds were strong, blowing parallel to Buckingham Blvd. out of the east. Responded down Marlborough Terrace to Norfolk, and then to Buckingham Blvd. I bypassed a hydrant (7151) and spotted at the hydrant in front of 7180 Buckingham Blvd. This hydrant was used to thwart the fire which was moving down the canyon. The second alarm had already been called.

**1105 – 1120/1130**

There were 4 of us from Engine 24. Two other Firefighters had become stranded from Engine 19, so we now had 5 Firefighters. But my Tank Wagon driver had gone up the hill, so I had 4 Firefighters – a 5-person crew. I used the Stang gun with a 1 1/2" tip on the head of the fire. The winds turned the stream 90 degrees from the fire. Used a 2 1/2" pre-connect on the east bank of Buckingham, and a 1/2" pre-connect on the east-side of 7185 Buckingham. The winds were strong. Hose was aimed at the 3 houses on Buckingham Blvd. Saved a 4-story shingle-sided dwelling and a 1-story dwelling. Some time during this fight, Engine 8 responded to the fourth alarm, and arrived on the scene at about the sixth alarm.

Engine 8 took the hydrant in front of the 4-story house. I worked with Engine 8 and EBRPFD 5675. Engine 8 used the Stang gun to try and cut the fire off. Evacuating civilians had been put into the 4-story house for protection. They were being protected in the basement, with both Engine 24, and Engine 8 keeping the fire away from the house.

At this time, we were surrounded by fire, 360 degrees. Engine 24 had 5 people; Engine 8 had



## **5. CHRONOLOGY OF ENGINE COMPANIES    THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE**

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4 people; EBRP had approximately 4 people. There were also approximately 8 - 10 civilians in this house; the owner of the house from across the street, and a volunteer civilian firefighter. We were trapped in this area. We couldn't go down Tunnel Road or Buckingham, because the fire was moving across and down, with power poles/lines burning. Cars were burning and houses were burning, with debris falling down the streets. There was no egress from this area. The fire was moving down the canyon. The people who had come down Buckingham had been coming on foot. Cars had stalled in the roads. We had to save the houses because of the civilians we were protecting.

### **1100 – 1700**

We were in this area from the on-set of the fire. The hydrant in front of 7180 stayed good for about 2 hours. We lost water at about 1300-1330. [Note: The transcripts indicate that this time was 1215 - 1230.] The main bulk of the fire had burned around us and down the hill, burning houses, and smouldering brush, with hot spots and smoke.

### **1500 – 1600**

After the initial firestorm, the Captain from Engine 8 started walking east on Tunnel Road. There was no exit. He took the Brush rig (or 4-wheel vehicle) and with bolt cutters, proceeded to clear away cars, power lines, and fire debris. After he cleared the road he came back. There were hot spots burning, and the house across the way was burning (7200 Buckingham). We needed firefighting water. We still had homes burning, we still had hot spots. Our Engineer dragged 3" hose up the hill and put a EBRP float-pump into the swimming pool at 7151 Buckingham. He got us water for Engine 24. Used chain-saws to fall trees next to 7180 Buckingham.

### **1630 – 1700**

Worked in a mop-up procedure. Tried to make contact with Oakland 2, but there was no response. We left the area via Tunnel Road West to Hiller to Caldecott Road. Proceeded to the Parkwood Apartments and contacted Engine 1 Captain for information on where Command was set up. Tried to contact Broadway Terrace Command, but there was no response. Proceeded to Engine 24 quarters to get cleaned up and to get something to eat. On arriving, I contacted FDC via the department phone, and was instructed to go to Broadway Terrace and Pineneedle.

### **1730 – 1800**

Left Engine 24 quarters and proceeded north on Highway 13 to Broadway Terrace off-ramp. Encountered a garage fire at 52 Glenwood Glade, and took a 800' lead, and used a 2 1/2" pre-connect, a 1 1/2" pre-connect and a Stang gun to extinguish all the fire. I then turned the structure over to a volunteer who used a garden hose to overhaul the house.

### **1815**

At this time I was able to contact Division A via the department radio. I was ordered to Broadway Terrace and the Hermosa area. Extinguished 2 roofs on Broadway Terrace below Hermosa (south-side). Worked in small court on Broadway Terrace, and saved 6 homes in this court.



sa (south-side). Worked in small court on Broadway Terrace, and saved 6 homes in this court. Lost three homes that faced on Hermosa. Worked in this area until approximately 0100. There was a Richmond company which stayed for about 2 hours, but as soon as the fire was knocked down, they left the area. I was relieved by a Lieutenant and 3 Firefighters.

**0100 – 0130/21**

Proceeded to Broadway Terrace Command for rest. I went back to Station 24 to clean up.

**0300 – 0800**

Ordered to Broadway Terrace and Country Club Command to stage.

**0800**

Ordered to Engine 24 quarters for hill patrol.

**OBSERVATIONS**

I was out of communication with FDC for 7 – 8 hours. Couldn't get through. There was one point where there was a clear channel, and I gave them a size-up of the situation, that Engine 24, Engine 8, and EBRP engine were in the Buckingham area – that we had fire surrounding us, and that we did have a hydrant that was working. Did communicate with Division A in Branch 3 after 1800.

From 1100 – 1800, I was a phantom company. FDC knew in what area I was, but they didn't know where.

Weather was a prime factor. The fire in a 2-acre area from the day before was stopped by 8 engine companies when the weather was mild, with no wind. Twenty-four hours later, we lose 3,000 homes. The temperature was in the 90's, the winds were from the east at 50 mph. The fuel index was extremely low that day.

Engine 8's support during the fire was a tremendous help in saving homes and lives in this area. We couldn't have done it without them, because we were completely surrounded. The fire and winds were vortexing.

No communication with the Oakland Police Department, or CDF, or other agencies.

Better eye protection for the fire personnel. Better wildland firefighting helmet with ear flaps for the face. "Shake and Bake" wildland rescue shelters. Individual canteens for Firefighters, because of dehydration.

Two of the Firefighters needed medical attention for eye problems. After 96 hours in the field, I took myself to the hospital to have my blood gases checked, to see what my carbon monoxide was (from the fire). There is very little you can do for this. One of my Firefighters has walking pneumonia, and the other Firefighter is having pulmonary evaluations.

**PATROLS**

**ENGINE 4**

**1000**

Engine 4 and spare Engine 111 with a crew of 4 – a Lieutenant, an Engineer and 2 Firefighters were dispatched by phone by Battalion Chief 4-A to be a hill-patrol. We were instructed to patrol the area between Colton Blvd. and Joaquin Miller Road.

**1041**

Engine 4 was southbound on Skyline Blvd. when an alarm for 13685 Campus Drive was transmitted. Engine 4 requested to be assigned to this incident, and was assigned. This incident was soon cancelled.

**1045**

Engine 4 was at Joaquin Miller Road when the first alarm (1058) for the Oakland Tunnel Fire was transmitted. Engine 4 requested to be assigned to this incident, and was assigned.

[Note: More information about Engine 4 appears with the Third Alarm Reports in this section.]

**ENGINE 27/LIEUTENANT****0900**

We were ordered to patrol the hill area in the 3rd battalion.

**0920**

As we left quarters, I noted winds at approximately 30 to 35 mph. The winds were 40 mph at 102 and E. 14th Street, and 45 mph at Grass Valley and Skyline.

**0935**

At Skyline and Keller, the winds were 55 plus mph.

**1041**

We responded to a wood-chip fire where the owners of the property extinguished the fire. At about this time I noted the first alarm on the Tunnel Fire.

Then the second alarm was struck. I instructed our Engineer to proceed closer to our north limit of Redwood Road and Skyline. On the fourth alarm, I instructed our Engineer to cross Redwood Road and start toward the fire. I heard Command order the sixth alarm. At this point, I ordered our response to the fire via Skyline Drive.

I called Oakland 2 and had us assigned to the incident, but there was no reply from the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC). As we went around a curve at about Ascot Drive, I saw the largest column of smoke that I had ever seen. This smoke column was traveling very fast in both the east and west directions; east being up into the hills and west toward the bay. As we arrived at the intersection of Skyline and Grizzly Peak, I made the decision to take Skyline Drive after hearing the radio traffic and observing the smoke travel.

[Note: More information about Engine 27 appears with the Sixth Alarm Reports in this section.]



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**FIRST ALARM**

ENGINE 10            1102

ENGINE 16

ENGINE 6            1100

TRAINING 2        1104

**ENGINE 10****1102**

Engine 10 responded on the first alarm. Under direction of Battalion 2, we took a position on Marlborough Terrace at the 7100 block. We took a lead from the hydrant at approximately 7150 Marlborough, supplying a 3" line for Engine 19 and placing three preconnected hand lines in position to protect homes on the lower side of the street. Engines 25, 4 and 15 supported our position from behind us, up Marlborough towards Grizzly Peak. We were able to defend our position but the velocity of the fire driven by the strong winds (50 mph+) pushed the fire storm over our position and through houses on our right flank. Houses beyond the reach of our streams were rapidly and totally engulfed in flames.

Unable to extend lines, we were forced to take a defensive stand, allowing homes to burn while attempting to protect homes that were not yet involved. After some period of time we were forced to abandon our position on Marlborough because the hydrant stopped flowing. When our tanks were depleted we moved, searching for a water source. The Captain was group leader at this time. Radio communication was extremely heavy and difficult during this period.

We moved down Claremont toward the Claremont Hotel, finding dry hydrants along the way. Since the fire was not immediately threatening the Claremont Canyon area, we reported to Division B, commanded by Battalion 4 from the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD). We set up a defensive position on Tunnel Road and Alvarado. We worked our way up Alvarado to Sunset Trail, using hand-lines from an unidentified pumper on Alvarado. As sundown approached, the fire storm was losing its intensity. With a number of hand-lines in place and the fire's progress toward the hotel halted, we were replaced on the hand-lines by Berkeley and San Francisco Firefighters. We attempted to move to Alvarado and Gravatt, but unsuccessfully, being stopped by pumpers and hose on the lower approach and power lines on upper Alvarado off of Claremont. We encountered spot fires in brush on Claremont above Alvarado. After expending our water supply, we left the California Department of Forestry (CDF) crews in charge. After informing Battalion 4 (SFFD) of the situation in his sector, we responded to the call for assistance from Division A in charge.

Upon arrival at Division A, we were assigned to take a position on the perimeter of the fire. We took a lead from the hydrant in front of 5700 Glenbrook and received additional water supply from Oakland Fire Department Engine 18 drafting from a swimming pool. We supplied an engine (Oak Knoll Hospital) on Bowling and took hand-lines to the rear of 63 Beechwood. Utilizing OFD personnel, firefighters from various agencies, and civilians, we were able to save the house at 63 Beechwood and all the houses on Glenbrook in the vicinity of 5700. The utilization of appropriated chain-saws was instrumental in our successful efforts.

Our next assignment was to the area of Golden Gate and Chabot on Chabot Rd. Our next assignment was to Hilltop Crescent and Maxwellton (5500 block), setting up a defensive position along with OFD Engine 25 and flanked by Piedmont Fire and OFD Engine 13. The fire was



moving upgrade from the cemetery. After fire was knocked down, primarily by Piedmont streams, we moved to Clarewood and Harbord Drive. I left Fremont Engine 10 to overhaul a structure at this location and proceeded to Clarewood and Clarewood Court. We used the Stang gun on brush and trees on the Mountain View Cemetery and Claremont Country Club properties from this location. The balance of the morning was spent at Division A staging, Broadway Terrace and Country Club.

**0800/21**

We were directed to report to staging at NAS. After a discussion with one of the Battalion Chiefs, some personnel were sent home.

**0700**

We were ordered to return to duty.

**1200**

Engine 10, Engine 25, Engine 26, Engine 5, Truck 15 and a spare engine were directed to return to their own quarters. An Engineer was sent to the hospital from NAS. He was later put off-duty with smoke inhalation and a bruised breast bone.

**1300**

Engine 10 returned to quarters and went in service.

**1930**

We were assigned to the Public Information Office (PIO) at Station 19 and remained there until we were relieved on Tuesday, October 22nd. Engine 10 has since returned to Tunnel Command numerous times for hot spots and patrol.

### **ENGINE 16/CAPTAIN**

Engine 16 with a crew of 3 was ordered by Command to Tunnel Road and Bay Forest. This order was changed to the Parkwood Apartments at the time we were at Tunnel Road and Hiller.

At the Parkwood Apartments, my first order was to turn the engine around facing out in the event the fire overtook us. We connected to the hydrant south of the first building, and played our turret at the fire coming down the hill. We next stretched a 2 1/2" line to the side of the first building (east) to protect it from fire on the hill and trees. This line was never used due to the lack of fire personnel and water. I wish to point out that one of my first radio requests was for fire personnel and supplemental water due to the dead-end main.

Engine 16's operations later included an attempt to supply equipment, suppress fire initially on the roof of the first building, suppress fire running throughout the first building, and to initiate search and rescue operations. We also directed mutual aid companies attempting to supplement water supplies by bringing a lead from the Caltrans hydrant at the exit from Tunnel (Bore) #3. We constantly conferred with the Captain and mutual aid company-commanders for input and suggestions to improve our operations.

At a point late in the afternoon, we met with the Captain and suggested a portion of our personnel be released due to the inability to operate effectively, and because there was an obvious need for these crews to be elsewhere on the fire-line.

### **1700 /approximately**

With only a small portion of one building yet to be consumed by fire, the water system failed completely at Parkwood.

### **1800/approximately**

Through Command, we determined to assemble our resources at Command - Highway 24 at Broadway.

### **1830**

From Command we were assigned as a group to Broadway Terrace above Highway 13. Engine 16 led from a hydrant at Broadway Terrace and Glenwood Glade, heading north. Suppression activities were initiated in this area. Proceeding north up the hill, I came upon 3 homes on Leo Way which hadn't been burned. We advanced a 1 1/2" line to this area from Broadway Terrace. Unable to hold the fire, we next advanced a 3" line to this area. The end result was that two homes were saved, and one home heavily damaged.

### **0130/21**

Our group was relieved. We reported to Station 24 for R&R and did not return to the fire.

**ENGINE 6/LIEUTENANT****0800**

The wind was generally strong and coming from the east. I noticed this when I was coming from home. Having arrived at work, I learned of the fire from the previous day and the area where it was located.

**0853 – 0900**

Engine 24 and Engine 19 were in the area of the previous day's fire. There was a little incident, and Command responded. The situation was controlled. Command came by Station 6. He ordered both Battalion 3 and Battalion 4 to designate 1 flat-land engine company from each Battalion for hill patrol. At roll call at 0800, I heard that there was going to be a Brush 28-patrol, a special patrol from Station 6 to the Berkeley line. This has been done before. While monitoring the radio during the morning, Command had stated that "these are the worst fire conditions in 50 years" – with low humidity and with winds out of the east. Command's intent was to have patrols all along Skyline and Grizzly Peak Blvd. from one end of the city to the other.

**1100**

I was monitoring the situation because I knew that Engine 24 and Engine 19 were in the location. There was a fire beginning again on both flanks and that he was requesting a full assignment, and subsequently requested to make it a second alarm. At that point Engine 6 responded via Skyline to Grizzly Peak. We met up with Command about 1000 feet above Marlborough Terrace and Grizzly Peak. Our Brush Wagon 6 assisted Engine 19 on Buckingham. Other members of the crew and the Pumper remained on Grizzly Peak Blvd. and set up a defensive position along Grizzly Peak back in the area of Grizzly Peak Terrace. The fire was moving up-hill and outward on both flanks.

**1110/1115**

Proceeded down Marlborough Terrace across Norfolk onto Buckingham. Stopped at 7101 Buckingham. Brush 24 was blocking the narrow road; they had a line out and were working that vicinity. Lieutenant from Training 2 pointed out that the lady from 7101 Buckingham was wetting things down. There was a pool there. Brush 24 took up a defensive position at this structure. The fire was 100 yards away, burning behind 7151 Buckingham, burning up and left of Gwinn Tank, up towards Marlborough Terrace and Grizzly Peak. Battalion 4's car was blocking the driveway access, so we moved the car for access to the driveway. There was a big driveway and a turnaround area, so I told the other officer to bring the Tank Wagon up, and turn it around facing downhill.

**1130 – 1140**

Winds began to increase, and we decided to advance our 1 1/2" lines in the backyard area to the pool area to develop a defensive posture, so that if the fire advanced we would be able to wet the area down in front of the fire. The situation changed drastically, when waiting for the water and getting the line in place, the pinetrees in the vicinity erupted in flames. Pineneedles



which were on the roof began to burn. The fire and wind picked up and swirled. We were trying to get the line charged – the other officer had placed a ladder near the roof from the garage to use in order to have access to the roof. With the wind, the fire, and the heat – everything turned, and was coming our way moving 50 – 100 yards in less than 15 – 30 seconds. The pinetrees were going, coming from the east. The woman was going downstairs and the other officer was going upstairs. The fire was approaching, and the other officer told her to get into the pool. "Where's the water?", I said. The front of the house was on fire. The hose was uncharged and had already burned off the rig. He pushed her in the pool, and went in after her. I was in the house. An interior window blew out, and the flames came in the house at about 6 feet – just like a blow torch. I went back outside to the pool and got into the pool with them.

**1145/1200 – 1330**

We were in the pool for approximately an hour and a half or two hours. We used the bubble-cover of the pool to protect ourselves, splashing water on the cover so that it wouldn't burn. Everything was on fire – the buildings on both sides, the fence, the brush, all the vegetation. The house was fully engulfed. The wind was blowing at about 50 mph, and the flames blew across the pool going in the wrong direction. The wind was blowing the heat and flame towards the deep-end of the pool, where we were. We needed to get to the shallow end of the pool where there was less heat and flame. We told the woman what we needed to do. The other officer got out of the pool, walked around to the shallow end and got in. I took the woman, and we went around the pool together towards the other end. We were all afraid of the super-heated gasses and flames burning our lungs. We needed the pool cover so that we could breathe the remaining air; the fire was feeding on air. The embers were raining like a hail storm, while we continued splashing water on the cover. We had no idea of the magnitude of the fire because we had no portable radio. The portable radio had been given to Brush 28 for patrol. The Brush Wagon radio was in the rig.

**1330**

When we came out of the pool, we were concerned about the rig's fuel tank rupturing, so we got back into the pool. We had concerns about electrical power and other hazards, such as trees falling into the pool. Helmets and shields did protect us, but not the woman. She had no protective clothing. We had the beginnings of hypothermia the last 15 minutes in the pool. After getting out of the pool, the feeling was like walking into an open barbeque – the residual heat, the embers and the ash. We had to get back into the pool a couple of times because it was so hot. There were fires on the tires of the brush wagon, which we put out with a bird-bath. The fire had burned all of the wood off the handles of the fire equipment – axes and shovels. There were two air masks (MSA's – Mias Safety Appliances) still usable; the hoses were destroyed and burned.

After the fires were put out, and we discovered that the radios were working, (for time reference) we found out the fire had advanced to Golden Gate and Acacia (and that they were giving up their position), and they were going to set up again on Golden Gate and Contra Costa Road (or Country Club) with 3 homes on Sheridan and Cochrane beginning to burn. [Note: The time in which the streets Golden Gate and Acacia were burning can be verified in the chronology. Engine 6's approximations are just that – approximations.]

We took 15 minutes of oxygen therapy since there was oxygen in the tank, and spent time revitalizing ourselves. Afterwards we spotted apparatus at the corner of Tunnel Road and Buckingham (the large 4-story house still standing). We took Engine 24's Tank Wagon which had been abandoned on Buckingham. We left the woman at the Buckingham house where there were other civilians and Engine 8 crew. At this time, we assisted Engine 24 and Engine 8, and the EBRP Pumper. They had a float pump, and because they had lost their water, they needed water. They were to put their float pump into the pool that we had just left. They wanted this water for their rigs, so they dragged the hose up the street towards 7101, and with assistance of the crew, got the pump into the pool, and proceeded to fill all the tanks. [Note: An estimate of 20,000 – 30,000 gallons of water were pumped from the pool; this in an environment where all the hydrants were dry. Engine 8 had called in dry hydrants at 1215.]

We took the 24 Brush Wagon, and took bolt-cutters to Tunnel Road and Skyline, and cut wire from the poles along Skyline. (This took several hours to do.) We went around Grizzly Peak and Grizzly Peak Terrace, and found the rest of our crew on Grizzly Peak. Up on Grizzly Peak, Truck 15's Captain was in charge of the rest of Engine 6's crew. We were mopping-up in this location until 0400 the following day.

#### 0400/21

Went back to the firehouse. Talked to Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) about being back, and about rigs from Strike Teams being there.

Engine 6 went off-duty on the 21st. We went back into service on Tuesday and Wednesday (the 22nd and the 23rd) and retrieved equipment from Grizzly Peak. We did no fire-fighting on these days.

#### OBSERVATIONS

- Communications were archaic. Operating this fire with four channels was ludicrous.
- We need a tactical channel for each Branch.
- Should have generators for the pumps – alternate back-up generators for the water tanks, or special underground service for the pumps to the tanks. That would be a minimum request.
- There should be a minimum of 16 – 20 channels for communication so that each Branch would have communication to report back to Command. Could get direct orders to know what to do, and then report back for tracking purposes.
- Roads – taking an urban area and putting it into a forested area.

The fire kept burning because of the wind, and no amount of water would have stopped it.



**TRAINING 2/LIEUTENANT**

This particular area had experienced a wildland fire the previous afternoon at 1212 and that evening had been patrolled to maintain control over remaining hot spots and control flare-ups. At 0851 on October 20th, Engines 19, 24, and 16 were dispatched to maintain control in the previous day's burn area. Control was achieved and additional companies that had been sent to assist Engine 19 were being released. An increase of strong winds was experienced, causing many additional hot spots to flare up. With the increase of activity, Engine 19 requested a full first alarm assignment to be dispatched, which was immediately followed by a request for a second alarm assignment. Battalion 2 who had responded on the original alarm, took command of the fire.

Battalion Chief 4-A responded from quarters on the alarm and on information being given over the radio network. Battalion 4 was assigned to the scene and in position to assist Battalion 2. Training 2 was preparing a Pumper apparatus for drafting at the Training Division when the second alarm was sounded. An Engineer assigned to Engine 16, and myself responded to the fire scene at the corner of Buckingham and Tunnel Road, and assisted with fire operation size-up, giving information to Battalion 4, and requesting through Oakland 2 to have PG&E respond and to turn off the power for the entire area. Fire conditions deteriorated at a rapid pace, putting fire crews in jeopardy. At one point in time, the entire street was filled with flying brands, whipped into a frenzy by high winds which sometimes appeared to create a whirling environment. This was an impossible situation to control with hand-lines; the streams were destroyed, broken up, or deflected so badly that they could furnish little or no protection to firefighters, or penetration to the immediate fire for extinguishment. Under command of Battalion 4, Brush Wagon 19, the Engineer, Firefighter, and this Lieutenant did what had to be done to terminate suppression activities and move to a safer position.

The apparatus was moved along Buckingham to the intersection of Norfolk. At this point, Battalion 4 – now Division A – left the apparatus having the balance of the crew proceed with evacuation of the endangered homes, working along Norfolk, up Strathmoor, Drury Road to Amito. Here a position was taken to insure that vehicles and civilians were headed out of the fire area. While at this intersection, flames could be observed closing from Drury Road and Dawn Street, to the south of Amito, across the canyon toward Perth. Flames could be observed on a long front. Once it was decided that nothing more could be done in the way of evacuation, the apparatus was moved down Amito to Alvarado Road. At this intersection, Oakland Police Officers were stationed for traffic control, the Brushwagon was filled with water. The route then proceeded up Alvarado Road to Claremont Avenue, on Claremont to Grizzly Peak Blvd. On Grizzly Peak Blvd. above Claremont Canyon Regional Preserve, the fire was observed as it consumed trees and brush, burning up to the roadway and jumping across.

Brushwagon 19 was then driven down Claremont to Tunnel Road, the fire was observed progressing toward the Claremont Hotel, down the hill in the area of Gravatt and Alvarado. The roads were identified, and this information was passed on to Command when we returned.



My services were put to use establishing a list of resources in use and their locations – incoming resources were logged in as assigned.

On the morning of October 21st, I gathered equipment that was requested for an information center at Engine 19, and then proceeded to the Command Post where I was assigned to do a fly-over with the Eagle 5 (East Bay Regional Park). The area was fogged in, but what could be seen was complete destruction. While doing a "drive-through" with the Los Angeles County Fire Department stress-debriefing team, what I had glimpsed in Eagle 5 was confirmed.

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**SECOND ALARM**

TRUCK 15      1104

TRUCK 1      1105

ENGINE 25      1105



### TRUCK 15/CAPTAIN

**1104**

Truck 15 responded on the second alarm to Grizzly Peak Blvd. and Grizzly Terrace. Command assigned Engine 6 and Engine 21 with Truck 15 under my command for this sector. We immediately attacked the fire threatening homes in this area on the north side of Grizzly Peak Blvd. dragging lines from Engine 6. Engine 21 came in on the eastern side with a line. After knocking down the perimeter of this area we set up lines on Grizzly Peak.

When the fire came up the hill we knocked it down and kept it from jumping the road. There was a very strong, hot wind from the Orinda side. Because the pressure was very low, we alternately moved Pumper 6 and 21 down the road from hydrant-to-hydrant, leaving a line connected to the hydrant as we left. I asked the Command for air drops in this area to prevent a new front from moving east below Grizzly Peak Blvd.

The fire jumped the road east of our defenses, and we dragged lines up a fire trail to try and contain it. We did this until we reached the next house on the north side. An EBRPD truck was working on this house and the extension into the canyon. We assisted and contained the perimeter.

We released Engine 21 to another division. Engine 6 and Truck 15 continued knocking down areas which were trying to reignite and spread into trees and growth on both sides of Grizzly Peak Blvd. This line extended from Grizzly Terrace Road (north/west intersection) to beyond 5950 Grizzly Peak Boulevard. The officer and tank wagon driver rejoined us in the very late afternoon after losing the tank wagon to fire and barely saving their own lives in a swimming pool.

**0200/21**

Engine 6 and Truck 15 were relieved by roving EBRPD and CDF trucks.

Though water pressure was very low, we never ran out of water. The wind was very strong and hot coming from the north through the evening. Four houses were lost on the downhill-side of Grizzly Peak Blvd (5937, 5943, 5947 & 5895) just beyond our protecting lines.

Note: Distance covered on Grizzly Peak Blvd. = .55 miles

### OBSERVATIONS

In the area protected by Truck 15, Engine 6, and Engine 21. This area was from Grizzly Peak Terrace to 5999 Grizzly Peak Road.

- Hydrants and water system on Grizzly Peak Blvd. has very low pressure but we did not run out of water. This area is supplied by a hilltop tank.
- The house at the end of Woodside Way was initially saved by the sprinkler system on the

exterior under the deck, possibly saving several other structures in the area.

- Two EBRPFD rigs were working in this area, three women on one rig with Engine 6, one man with another rig at 5950 Grizzly Peak Blvd.
- Engine 6 lost electrical power and rigged up a generator to pump fuel that afternoon.
- The wind was at our back all afternoon.

**TRUCK 1/CAPTAIN ENGINE 1****1105**

Truck 1 responded on the second alarm. While enroute to Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace, Truck 1 was redirected via radio to Highway 24 and the Tunnel Road off-ramp to assist at the Command Post. Upon arrival, I was given several assignments by Command. While working on these assignments, the fire intensified and flying brands and embers rained down on the Parkwood Apartments, the Command Post, and crossed Highway 24, and started spot fires on the hillside below the PG&E transmission lines.

**1118 (Fourth Alarm)**

At this time, I ordered Engine 1 via radio to evacuate all civilians from the Parkwood Apartment complex. I also ordered our Firefighter to Acting Lieutenant and take command of Truck 1. I continued to assist at the Command Post. It then became necessary to relocate the Command Post stopping at several locations and eventually to Highway 24 and Broadway. I continued to assist the Command Post and the staging area at Country Club and Broadway Terrace with logistics and updates for Division M.

**1900**

I was teamed up with Division B. I continued to assist Division B and Division M.

**1100/21**

I was relieved and went off-duty.

[Note: More information about Engine 1 appears with the Fourth Alarm Reports in this section.]



**TRUCK 1/ACTING LIEUTENANT****1105**

Truck 1 responded on the second alarm. With the Captain, and 2 Firefighters I responded to the hill fire at Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace via Highway 24. While enroute up Hiller Drive. Operations ordered Truck 1 to report to the Command Post at Highway 24 and Tunnel Road off-ramp directly across from the Parkwood Apartments. The wind came up from nowhere and the fire spread to the N/E side of Highway 24 to the Parkwood Apartments then down the side of Highway 24. At the same time, the fire jumped to the east-side of Highway 24.

The Captain ordered me to act as officer of Truck 1 and for one of the Firefighters to assist Command. Shortly thereafter truck 1 was ordered to Golden Gate and Broadway. We spotted the truck on Broadway and I ordered the crew to don their brush gear. We assisted the Lieutenant of Engine 18 at Buena Vista Place and below the curve on Buena Vista Ave. During this time one of the Firefighters was working with Engine 13. We lost water a couple of times.

**2000**

I reported to Tunnel Command. I was ordered to report to the staging area at Division A. Upon arrival at Division A staging, we were ordered to rest and stand by.

**2300**

We were ordered to return to quarters.

**0800**

We were relieved by a Lieutenant and four Firefighters. I was ordered to assemble a crew, pick up Engine 2 and go in service at Station 2.

**1400**

I was relieved and I returned home.

### **ENGINE 25/CAPTAIN**

#### **1107**

Engine 25 responded on the second alarm to the intersection of Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace. Engine 25 used the hydrant at 7160 Marlborough and worked on 7 dwellings. Saved 7156, 7160, 7126, 7130, 7145 and 7165. We worked with Engine 4, Engine 10, Engine 15, Engine 19, a crew from Contra Costa County Fire and their Captain. Used 600' 3", 800' 1 1/2", 200' 2 1/2" and 1 Stang gun.

#### **1300**

We continued our fire attack for approximately 2-3 hours until the fire main on Marlborough went dry. (1215). After a 20 to 30 minute attempt to re-charge, the main failed. We reloaded our equipment and hose and abandoned our position.

#### **1330**

Under the direction of Operations, we were directed with Engine 10, Engine 15, Engine 19, and Engine 5 to Claremont and Alvarado Road. At this location, we filled our tanks with a live hydrant and looked for our Division Leader. After a discussion with our Division Leader and learning of no specific plan or need at this location, and combined with a desperate need for help at other locations, we called for another assignment.

We contacted Division C who was in need of help to protect the threatened Claremont Hotel area. At this time, Engine 25, Engine 10, Engine 15 and Engine 19 were set up at a fire stop between #10 to #50 Alvarado Road. Engine 19 supplied Engine 25 from the hydrant on the corner of Tunnel Rd. and Alvarado Rd.

#### **1400 – 1600**

Engine 25 set up its Stang gun and two 3" lines between dwellings on Alvarado. Used 1100' 3", 200' 2 1/2". We stayed in this defensive position until directed to shut down and pick up our lines.

#### **1630 – 1730**

We contacted Division A. We were directed to St. Theresa's Church at the dead-end of Mandalay Rd. At this location, we met Truck 8 and 2 Water Tenders with the plan to establish a fire stop at the church. After checking the surrounding hydrants for water supply, and finding that they were on dead-end mains, we abandoned our plan and checked back with Division A.

#### **1800 – 0300**

We joined with the Division C Task Force at Broadway Terrace and Country Club Drive. We assisted on Beechwood Drive and Glenbrook Drive with on-going dwelling fires. We relayed water from tenders to engines. Assisted Engine 18 with drafting from a swimming pool. We used 600' 3", 200' 2 1/2", 500' 1 1/2" and 12' ladder.

**0300**

We returned to the Division A Command Center for R&R.

**0800 to 1200**

From this location, we were sent to Alameda Naval Air Base for R&R until told to return to quarters.



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**THIRD ALARM**

ENGINE 5

ENGINE 4      1105

## **ENGINE 5**

Engine 5, worked to help save one dwelling at 7150 Marlborough Terrace, while losing another, behind the water tank, in the same area. We were then instructed to shuttle water, to the crews working on Alvarado Blvd. at Claremont Ave. Later we were sent to Broadway and Rockridge Blvd., the Engine set up and pumped to boost pressure into a San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) Pumper. The Engineer stayed in this position for several hours while the crew accompanied two water tenders to Margarido and Acacia, where they helped with extinguishment. Hours later, the engine and crew were sent to the staging area on Broadway Terrace, spending the rest of the night extinguishing spot fires.

Early the next morning, we were sent to Alameda Naval Air Station, securing the Engine, then allowed to go home.

The crew consisted of myself, the Acting Engineer, and Firefighter. This Firefighter later reported sustaining an injury to her right knee. Reports were made and sent in.



**ENGINE 4/LIEUTENANT****1000**

Engine 4 and spare Engine 111 with a crew of 4 – a Lieutenant, an Engineer and 2 Firefighters were dispatched by phone by Battalion Chief 4-A to be a hill patrol. We were instructed to patrol the area between Colton Blvd. and Joaquin Miller Road

**1041**

Engine 4 was southbound on Skyline Blvd. when an alarm for 13685 Campus Drive was transmitted. Engine 4 requested to be assigned to this incident, and was assigned. This incident was cancelled.

**1045**

Engine 4 was at Joaquin Miller Road when the first alarm (1058) for the Oakland Tunnel Fire was transmitted. Engine 4 requested to be assigned to this incident, and was assigned.

**1105**

We arrived at Grizzly Peak Blvd. and Marlborough Terrace, behind Engine 25. Engine 15 was also at this location. Two civilians – one in a car, and one on a motorcycle – were blocking the intersection. Engine 15 crew directed these people away from the scene.

Engine 25 went down Marlborough Terrace with Tank Wagon 25 ahead of Engine 4. Engine 10 had preceded both Engine 4 and Engine 25. Engine 25 was parked in front of 7160 Marlborough Terrace. Engine 4 was parked next to the green-top hydrant about 150 feet up the hill from Engine 25. Engine 10 was parked in front of 7145, with another hydrant.

Engine 4 conferred with the Captain of Engine 25, and stretched a 1 1/2" line to the rear of 7156. The fire was blowing up the hill to the east behind the houses on the east-side of the street. The fire was also advancing up the west-side of the hill behind the houses on the west-side of the street. The houses at the south-end of the street were fully involved with flame. All the houses below 7126 were totally involved as was 7155, which had burned from the rear.

Engine 4 operated the 1 1/2" line behind 7156 and 7160 against the advancing fire from the south. Engine 4 extended this 200' line with 300' of 1 1/2" line from the hose bed, and then extended it again with 100' of 1 1/2" from the high-rise pack. Engine 4 Lieutenant and Engine 4 Firefighter operated this line against the fire that had jumped the Marlborough Terrace road to the north of 7160. Engine 4 continued to use this line on the north, south, and on the east sides of 7156 and 7160. The Engine 4 crew operating this line received word that there was a large flare-up on the north side of 7160, closer to the street. Engine 4 took this line from the rear of 7160 to the north-side. A large volume of fire was seen racing up the west-side of Marlborough Terrace threatening Engine 4 Pumper and crew. Engine 4 had 100' of 3" line hooked into a hydrant supplying Engine 4, Engine 25, and Engine 19. Engine 4 Engineer made up a 3" big line with a nozzle to defend the apparatus and crew from the advancing fire up the west slope, and helped Engine 4 Firefighter in this same defense. The other Engine 4 Firefighter

was defending the apparatus and crew with a line directed from the east side of the street to the fire advancing up the west slope, keeping both crew and Pumper wet. This fire was eventually knocked down. Engine 4 Lieutenant and Firefighter continued to operate on the south and west-sides of the the structures 7160 and 7156 Marlborough Terrace.

The Captain from Contra Costa County – Engine 4 and Tender 15 arrived. OFD Engine 4 requested relief from the lines in this area. OFD Engine 4 was relieved, and met with other Contra Costa officers and directed them to areas down to 7155 Marlborough Terrace. The fire needed to be stopped at this location in order to prevent it from jumping the road.

When making up these lines, a civilian woman's screams were heard coming from the west and down-slope of this fire position at 7155. An Engine 4 Firefighter responded by proceeding through the rear yard at 7156 Norfolk Road. Every house on the west-side of Norfolk Road was fully engulfed in flame, including the house where it was believed the woman's screams had been heard. It was too hot to approach any of these houses. **[Note: After the fire, a disabled elderly woman was discovered on Norfolk Road.]**

The house at 7156 Norfolk Drive had not started to burn. OFD Engine 4 instructed Contra Costa and Engine 25 to stretch a 3" line through the rear yard of 7155 and 7156 Norfolk Drive to protect 7156. One line was stretched through the kitchen area and through the 2-story deck of the house. Contra Costa put a line on the north side of the house. Everything on the west-side of the street was fully involved, as was property to the north – on the west-side.

The fire around this area got larger and hotter. Water turned instantly to steam. When it became too hot to maintain, both the Contra Costa Captain and the Lieutenant from OFD Engine 4 agreed to retreat up the slope. **[Note: After the fire, 7156 remained the only house on Norfolk Drive fully intact.]**

Returning to Marlborough Terrace, Engine 4 Lieutenant discovered that Engine 4 Engineer had helped Engine 10 drag a big line up to the homes on the west-side of the street and had helped Engine 25 Firefighter put a 24' ladder on to the roof of a house on the east-side of the street. The crews from Engine 19, Engine 10, Engine 25, Engine 15, and Engine 4 continued to defend 7126, 7144, 7145, 7156, and 7160 Marlborough Terrace. **[Note: After the fire, all of these houses remain intact and undamaged.]**

### 1230

The water-main on Marlborough Terrace went dry. The Engineer operating the pumps from Engine 19, Engine 4, and Engine 25 shut them down. The Lieutenant from Engine 4 radioed Command. After answering questions about location, Engine 4 Lieutenant became Division F. Spoke with Operations, and reported the water-main going dry. Operations asked if there was a suction hydrant. The answer was no. Operations directed an engine stationed on Grizzly Peak to try pumping into a suction hydrant they were near. The attempt failed. Called about an ETA on water supply; the answer was that there was none. There was fire on all sides in this location, and no water to fight the fire. This position was abandoned by order of Operations.



All the available officers in this area met to prepare to abandon the position. A second concern was that there was a house up-slope and to the east, built on stilts, fully involved with flames. If it burned through, it would fall on to Marlborough Terrace and block the only means of egress. Boulders had already fallen onto the road. Engine 15 and the Contra Costa County crews moved up Marlborough Terrace to prepare hand lines off their rigs – about 1500 gallons of water still remained in the tender. Engines 4, 19, 10, and 25 proceeded to pick up as much hose as possible and to back out of Marlborough Terrace. A car was blocking the egress and was moved by the fire personnel to Marlborough Terrace and Grizzly Peak.

When the companies had arrived on Grizzly Peak, Engine 4 Lieutenant took this same car down Marlborough Terrace and ordered two civilians near 7126 to abandon the area, relating that there was no water and that the fire personnel were leaving. Engine 4 asked that they inform their neighbor at 7145 to leave. The Engine 4 Lieutenant radioed command for reassignment for the crew.

Engine 4 was assigned to Broadway Terrace and Skyline Blvd. Engines 23 and 27 were already at this location. Lines were already out and houses were being defended on the west-side of the intersection.

Engine 4 proceeded south on Broadway Terrace from Skyline. All the houses on the west side of Broadway Terrace were fully involved. All the houses on the east-side were intact and unburned.

Engine 4 noticed high voltage towers and wires which straddled Broadway Terrace from east to west. Radioed Command to find out if these wires were energized. Operations mentioned that they were not energized. Houses were burning below the towers and wires.

Engine 4 took a 3" 400' lead (supply line) from the hydrant at Balsam and Broadway Terrace. Used 200' 2 1/2" line to defend the structures on the east-side of Broadway Terrace; also used a 3" line to 2 1 1/2" line, and a 200' of 1 1/2" line from a discharge. Two civilians as well as 2 Firefighters from Truck 8 operated the lines. These civilians stayed and assisted for many hours. One of the civilians was a PG&E employee experienced with burned telephone poles and wires. We disconnected from the hydrant at Balsam and Broadway Terrace and removed all nozzles from the hose-lines and dragged all lines attached to the Pumper down to the next hydrant at Broadway Terrace and Pineneedle. Hooked up there with the soft suction to the steamer connection and continued to put out spot fires on the east-side of the street, and wet down those structures, while putting water on burning buildings and trees on the west-side.

Two houses on the south-east corner of Broadway Terrace and Pineneedle were on fire. One with an attic fire, and the other fully involved. Engine 23 stretched 1 1/2" lines to the house with the attic fire.



**1300**

Radioed for air strikes at this location. Air strikes began at 1500 just south of this location, and on Farallon Way. In total, there may have been 5 or 6 air strikes in this location by S2 bombers.

Proceeded around the corner to Farallon Way to check the exposure next to the fully-engulfed house. The fire had not reached this house. Stretched a 3" line from Engine 4 to the side yard of 6575 Farallon Way and both Engine 4 Firefighters defended this house – the first house on the ridge, east of Broadway Terrace.

An East Bay Regional Parks member with a Tank Wagon was using a 1" line in the backyard of Farallon Way. The line was in the rear yard of 6575 and worked down Farallon Way in the rear yards.

**1350**

Radioed for more engine companies.

**1400**

Engine 4 disconnected from the hydrant at Pineneedle and Broadway Terrace and repositioned on Farallon Way at a hydrant half way down the street. Engine 21 had gone down Pine-needle from Broadway Terrace to Farallon Way earlier in this situation. Engine 4 pumped into Engine 21. Engine 21 and Engine 4 operated big lines from a flat roof on Farallon Way toward Broadway Terrace to the west. Engine 27 was also fighting fire from this roof.

**1500**

The water-main on Broadway Terrace went dry. At this time, one big line was operating directly on the hydrant pressure from Broadway Terrace. The Engine 4 crew defending 6575 Farallon Way had no water. Engine 4 crew joined Engine 21 crew.

Put one of Engine 4 Firefighters in charge. Engine 4 Lieutenant returned to Broadway Terrace to see if any help had arrived. Radioed that the water-main on Broadway Terrace was dry. Was informed that Engine's 4 location was on a list for needing help.

The house at the entrance to Pineneedle on Broadway Terrace had an attic fire. There was a charged 1 1/2" line charged at the door. Spent 45 minutes going from room to room punching holes in the ceiling and putting out the attic. After this, returned to Engine 4. The situation on the west slope quieted down.

**1900**

Returned to Pineneedle and Broadway Terrace below Merriwood and Crown streets. The PG&E civilian and Engine 4 Lieutenant escorted a strike team down beyond Merriwood. This civilian was helpful with assessing the conditions of the power-poles and downed wires. Wires were draped across Broadway Terrace, and civilian and Strike Team Firefighter cleared the road of wires.

Below Merriwood, houses on the west side of Broadway Terrace were burning. Some Strike Teams spread out along the length of Broadway Terrace to defend the houses on the east-side of the street.

Arriving on Virgo and Uranus streets, there were 2 engines accompanying Engine 4. There were 4 or 5 houses on the east-side of the street fully involved. A 3" line hooked to the hydrant and divided into 2 1 1/2" lines was already in place. Two civilian crews were using these lines. One Strike Team engine was positioned by the hydrant at Uranus, the other was positioned behind near Virgo. Neither engine had 3" to 2 1/2" reducers. We put the 2 1 1/2" lines in the tank filler to supply this pumper. Remained at this location for about an hour assisting with lines and operating nozzles.

After helping with this operation, walked up Broadway Terrace to Merriwood, meeting the Services Officer. Took a ride up to Pineneedle where Engine 4 was sitting, out of water and almost out of fuel. The water-main on Broadway was dry.

Engine 23 arrived at this location and used their Tank Wagon on an involved house whose attic had been worked on previously. There was not enough water for this fight. Engine 23 ran out of fuel and left for Engine 6 to refuel.

#### **2300/2330**

Engine 4 remained on the scene and directed 2 or 3 other Strike Teams to defend Farallon Way and Broadway Terrace down to Merriwood.

EBRP tender arrived at this location. Met with Strike Team leaders and led them down Farallon Way to inspect the fire line. Some of the fences and houses had begun to reignite. All of the other Oakland rigs were gone.

Remained on Farallon through the night. There was one good hydrant on Farallon Way which was still usable. After the structure survey, the Strike Teams agreed and positioned along Farallon Way.

#### **0330**

Engine 4 left the scene, and returned to Station 6 to refuel. At Station 6, phoned the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) and informed them that Engine 4 would be out-of-service for 2 hours for rest and recuperation. There was no food at Station 6. Received calls from Station 1 about food.

#### **0130/21**

Food arrived at Engine 6.

#### **0230**

To relieve the Engine 4 crew, a crew with a Firefighter and acting Lieutenant arrived in a Foam 2 vehicle. The relief crew worked with Engine 4 to restore hose and do inventory.

## **5. CHRONOLOGY OF ENGINE COMPANIES    THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE**

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**0300**

Engine 4 reported in to Branch 3 and was told to report to the lower Broadway Terrace Command Center.

**0600**

Engine 4 was told to report back to Station 4 where 2 units from Treasure Island were stationed. Engine 4 crew remained at Station 4.

**1000**

Division A informed Engine 4 that they were no longer needed on active duty.



**FOURTH ALARM**

ENGINE 15      1115

TRUCK 8

ENGINE 27      1115

TRUCK 3        1115

ENGINE 1

ENGINE 8

**ENGINE 15/LIEUTENANT****1115**

Engine 15 responded to the fire on the 4th alarm. Engine 15 with the Command Post responded to Grizzly Peak and Claremont. I left one of our Firefighters and the Command Post there and proceeded to Grizzly and Marlborough Terrace. There we took a 300' lead of 5" hose and put the Stang gun in operation aimed downhill to protect the Microwave tower. The wind made our stream ineffective so we changed to a smaller tip with better results. The fire was blown across the road uphill toward the Tower; we were able to extinguish it as the wind subsided briefly.

Engine 15 relocated per Command to Marlborough Terrace to assist Engine 4. We took a lead off Engine 4 and set up two 1 1/2" lines to protect Engine 4's flank. Our crew moved down the road to assist Engine 10, and Engine 25 lay 1 1/2" lines to protect structures. We remained there until our water supply was depleted. We relocated and reported to Division C at the Claremont.

At the Claremont, we formed a Strike Team with Engine 25, Engine 15, Engine 10, Engine 19 and responded to 16 Alvarado Road. There we set up two 2 1/2" lines to the rear of this address, to back up lines at Alvarado and Bridge. Our lines were not used and Engine 15 returned to Division C staging. Engine 15 was assigned to assist San Francisco Fire units at Alvarado and Evergreen. The road was impassable so we hand-carried hose up Eucalyptus Path and returned to the Claremont.

Engine 15 with San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) Firefighters were transferred to Division A at Broadway Terrace and Country Club. We responded to Glenbrook and Westminster, where Engine 15 took an orange-top hydrant and supplied one 2 1/2" line to protect structures. We were able to extinguish and save a house at 98 Westminster with the help of 2 Caltrans [water] tenders.

**2330**

Engine 15 returned to Division A staging.

**0230**

Engine 15 and Engine 20 were assigned to fire watch at Proctor and Julia.

**0530**

Returned to staging.

**0800**

Sent to N.A.S. Alameda for R&R.

**1100**

Return to quarters.

**TRUCK 8****0800**

Truck 8 was initially assigned to an extrication at 621 Caldwell Rd. incident number 130631.

As Truck 8 returned to quarters we were dispatched to Grizzly Peak and Marlborough to assist at structures that were involved. On arrival, Truck 8 observed heavy fire and high winds on both sides of Grizzly Peak. Engine 5 was on the scene and we assisted in placing lines to structures and brush. Truck 8 and Engine 5 were joined by two other mutual aid units and attempted to contain and extinguish fire in our immediate area.

Truck 8 was then reassigned to Broadway Terrace and Country Club Drive and reported to Division A who assigned Truck 8 to the 6000 block of Acacia. On arrival, Truck 8 observed multiple structures and trees heavily and fully involved. Truck 8 laddered multiple structures in an attempt to extinguish roof fires, and to halt the spread of fire to uninvolved homes. Truck 8 worked in this area with multiple mutual companies and OFD units.

**1900**

Truck 8 was reassigned to Country Club Command and was placed in staging for approximately 2 hours.

**2100**

Truck 8 was assigned to Estates Drive and Florence to assist engine companies in cutting off the fire in that area. Truck 8 began to cut trees in this area in hopes that it would contain the fire.

**0400/21**

Truck 8 was again reassigned to Highway 24 at Broadway. Truck 8 remained in staging.

**1000**

We were moved to Raimondi Park.



### ENGINE 27/CAPTAIN

**0900**

We were ordered to patrol the hill area in the 3rd battalion.

**0920**

As we left quarters I noted winds at approximately 30 to 35 mph, at 102 and E. 14th at 40 mph, at Grass Valley and Skyline at 45 mph.

**0935**

At Skyline and Keller, the winds were at 55 plus mph.

**1041**

We responded to a wood-chip fire where the owners of the property extinguished the fire. At about this time I noted the first alarm on the Tunnel fire. Then the second alarm was struck. I instructed our Engineer to proceed closer to our north limit of Redwood Road and Skyline.

On the fourth alarm, I instructed our Engineer to cross Redwood Road and start toward the fire. I heard Command order the sixth alarm. At this point, I ordered our response to the fire via Skyline Drive. I called Oakland 2 and had us assigned to the incident but there was no reply from FDC. As we went around a curve at Ascot Drive, I saw the largest column of smoke that I have ever seen. This smoke column was traveling very fast in both an east and west direction; east being up into the hills and west toward the bay. As we arrived at the intersection of Skyline and Grizzly Peak, I made the decision to take Skyline Drive after hearing the radio traffic and observing the smoke travel.

**1139**

We turned off Tunnel Road onto Bay Forest Drive. At Bay Forest Court, we took our 1st hydrant and lead 150' up the street. At this time, the fire just started on the end house on Bay Forest Ct. Our Firefighter extinguished that house with the use of the Stang Gun and the 500 gallons in the rig's tank. Then I noted 5 more houses burst into flames. I yelled back to our firefighter to turn the water on at the hydrant. He responded, "I did. The hydrant is dry". I was overwhelmed with this occurrence.

**1141**

I reported over the radio that "we lost our water from the hydrant". No reply from FDC. We left that 150' of 3" hose in the street and retreated back down Bay Forest to the next hydrant at Bay Forest Place.

Note: The winds were at 60 plus mph and swirling with fire embers, dust and smoke. Spot fires were erupting around us. A Firefighter and I checked this second hydrant and it had water. But we didn't turn this hydrant all the way on. After taking another lead, backwards, up Bay Forest Drive, we again tried to operate the Stang gun, but now, we didn't have any water in this hydrant. I ordered this second lead to be left in the street because about 20 structures were on

fire and we didn't have anyway to protect ourselves without water except to retreat from this sub-division. Yet, we did knock on a few doors, blew the siren and yelled in attempt to evacuate the sub-division. We saw no movement except an Oakland Police Officer (OPD) attempting the same. I requested alot more help to this location but, again, got no response. I realized FDC and Command were doing their best.

At this time I heard a urgent request for help from the Captain of Engine 8 at Buckingham and Tunnel. Even though the rest of my crew thought it too dangerous to go down Tunnel Rd. I ordered it in an attempt to assist Engine 8 and possibly attack the Bay Forest fire from a lower flank position. I did not feel that we couldn't get out of this area if needed. After two turns down Tunnel from Bay Forest Drive, we were forced to stop because of major fire spread across Tunnel Rd. and power lines down and burning in the roadway. I radioed this information in and again no response. We took our third hydrant, here, next to a fifth-wheel trailer, in another attempt to save something in the Bay Forest area. The Firefighter and I checked this third hydrant and had reasonable water but when we tried to charge the suction, we lost the water, again. The fire was advancing very fast and we were in a heavy fire-load area. I now felt threatened and ordered this third lead also be left in the road and we retreated back-up Tunnel Road to Skyline Drive. Now, I'm thinking, where can we find water, when are we going to get help and where can we stop this "Thing".

We stopped at the old Tunnel area to check a hydrant. It had very little water. Because of this and the extremely high fire load in this area, I decided that these homes were not savable. As we are leaving this area, going back toward Broadway Terrace, we come upon a car with husband and wife. We stop them. The wife is extremely distraught about leaving her auto at the old Tunnel area. I believe she may try to re-enter the area. I decide to escort her back to her auto.

After this we met up with the Engine 23 Lieutenant just north of Broadway Terrace. The hydrant at this location has water. We decided to attempt a stand in this area. There is a private paralleling road on the east side of Skyline Drive. This road starts near the intersection of Skyline and Broadway Terrace and ends about 1/2 mile down Skyline with many homes on it. Engine 27 took a lead from Engine 23 north on Skyline to the end of this private road. Then we saw a small pick-up with 2 Firefighters in it. They were trying to get to Engine 8. We informed them that they couldn't go down Skyline or Tunnel. I told them that we could use their help and they decided to stay with us until about 1700. Also at this time we got help from an unidentified EBRP Firefighter. We worked in this area off Skyline for about 35 minutes, wetting down the area very thoroughly. Even after this, the fire spread was so very fast through the very thick brush and trees that we were forced to retreat back to Broadway Terrace and Skyline.

At this location, Engine 23 Lieutenant and I decided that with water we may be able to stop the fire here. We started stretching lines (2-1/2 & 1-1/2) to form about a 400' front. Engine 27 took the hydrant at Broadway Terrace and positioned near this intersection with most of their lines going down Broadway Terrace. Engine 23 took the hydrant on Skyline about 500' down from



Broadway Terrace and led up Skyline to within 150' of Engine 27. Engine 2's lines are stretched down Skyline and will use their Stang gun extensively. Before all these links are in place and before the fire arrives, our Firefighter and I take Brush 23 down Broadway Terrace to Pinehaven Road to evacuate citizens from their homes and the area. This was a very hectic task, as there were many people and autos blocking the roads. We operated the siren during this operation in an attempt to alert everyone we could. We also evacuated Gwin Road on this operation.

### 1345 – 1415

Our Firefighter and I went back up Broadway Terrace to our fire stand. The fire was almost there. Engine 23 lieutenant has taken the Broadway Terrace side and I took the Skyline side with our crews and four volunteers divided in between. We started flowing lots of water. The pressure was minimal. The fire and winds were intense. The smoke was thick on us. I looked up at our fire stand and all the players, the Firefighters, professional and volunteer, were very intense. The other player, the fire, I can only describe it as, alive and coming! This was a very hard and long fire fight for all of us. Words on paper cannot express the feeling. If any of the ten Oakland Firefighters and four volunteers would have quit, we surely would have lost more structures. We didn't save every house in this area which I thought we could have saved at first. I truly believe our actions at this point were to prevent the fire from consuming more territory. Without this successful stand the fire probably would have taken everything to Thornhill or Colton.

Near the end of this stand, our Firefighter, one of our volunteers, and I took Brush 23 up the same private road which parallels Skyline, to work on the fire still advancing on homes. With the help of another firefighter and volunteer, we used many garden hoses and the 1-1/2" from Brush 23 to stop even more structures from being lost.

### 1610

Engine 4 arrived and took a position 300' down Broadway Terrace. Engine 21 arrived about 1630 and took a lead down Farallon Way. Engines 23, 27, 4, 21 and few more volunteers made many more fire stops in this area until about 2010. [Note: One of our firefighters learned at this time that his house on Proctor was probably destroyed. He was undaunted. He should be commended.]

### 2010

We were requested to the Taurus/Capricorn area. We went down Colton to Mountain, right on Mountain to Florence Terrace, right on Florence Terrace. At the corner of Capricorn and Florence Terrace we were prevented from going up Florence Terrace because of so many out of city fire rigs. I handed out our last four 3" to 2-1/2" reducers to these rigs. We turned left on Capricorn and traveled about 800' before we were blocked again by another rig. We turned around, and took a 5" lead 300' back Capricorn. We operated our stang gun on the structures not burning on the lower side of Taurus. I walked up the hillside to Taurus to assist a Palo Alto Strike Team. There were many houses burning on the upper-side of Taurus. While I was as-



sisting one Firefighter with a big line, he asked me how the fire fight was going in other areas? I stated fine, but that it had been a real tough day for us.

**2230**

I walked back down to Engine 27; the rig needed fuel, and we needed food. I couldn't get through on the radio and we were not assigned to any other unit. There wasn't anymore that we could do here, so I ordered us back to staging at Highway 24 and Golden Gate.

There, I requested through channels that we be given permission to return to quarters for a much needed sleep. That request was denied. We filled the rig with fuel and reported to the staging Captain as ordered. We slept the night in his fire department car. The next morning I was given permission to go back up in the hills to get the hose we left in various locations. After this, we were ordered to NAS Alameda for release from the incident and for us to return to quarters.

**1100/21**

We returned to normal service at Engine 27's quarters.

**OBSERVATIONS**

I would like to give my personal assessment of the air drops at the Broadway Terrace/Skyline area. Many of these air drops came down directly on top of us. Many were very close to us. I believe because of the high winds and intense heat that the retardant divided into very small droplets and were vaporized almost immediately. The retardant didn't have any effect on extinguishing or preventing fire in the structures. It did not appear to have any effect on the thick brush and tree cover. The only effect it had, was that it gave some of us a sense of relief; it was very impressive.

### ENGINE 1/LIEUTENANT

Engine 1 responded on the fourth alarm with Truck 3 from Station 1 to Parkwood Apartments on Caldecott Lane. On arrival, fire could be seen on all sides of the apartment complex and within the apartment complex. Engine 1 dropped a 5" supply line at a hydrant on Caldecott Lane. Traffic congestion was extremely heavy, with residents exiting the complex on foot and in cars. This congestion caused a delay in positioning the apparatus. Vehicles exiting the complex ignored the directions of the Oakland Police Department and drove over our supply line, causing damage to the hose which busted when charged by Engine 16. Once the apparatus was positioned, all preconnect lines were charged. Engine 1 started rescue and evacuation of the complex and called for additional help.

Orinda Fire Department arrived and dropped a 5" supply line from a nearby hydrant and began supplying Truck 3 for ladder-pipe operations. Engine 1 used 2 1/2" lines to supply the building's sprinkler system, but due to the falling heated roofing material, the hose lines busted on at least 2 occasions. Engine 1 used the Stang gun to try and extinguish roof fires and the brush that was burning against the building. Strike teams from Hayward, San Leandro, and Alameda arrived and assisted as needed.

Orinda and Alameda Fire set up turrett operations, but it became apparent that supply lines were operating off the same main and it would not support three master streams and hand-lines effectively. At this time, the Parkwood Apartments were totally involved.

Engine 1 was later forced to shut down pumping operation due to an electrical fire which damaged electrical wires and pressure hoses. After several hours of firefighting operations, 2 residents of the complex walked out onto the street. One resident indicated that he had been in the swimming pool and the other had stayed in his car parked in the garage. A search was conducted of all cars located in or out of the garage areas by various departments.

Sometime around mid-afternoon, the main that had been supplying our hydrants went completely dry, and we were unable to continue firefighting operations. The Parkwood Apartments became a total loss, and all Strike Teams were relocated to other areas.

Just after dark, Engine 1 crew, Truck 3, Engine 16, and the Orinda Fire reported to the staging area. We became Strike Team 45 and were reassigned to Broadway Terrace and Pinewood for structure protection. On arrival, it appeared that almost every house in the immediate area was burning. Electrical wires were down on every street and that made accessibility to structures very difficult. Strike Team 45 placed apparatus on both Broadway Terrace and Pinewood Street. Every available hose line was put into operation for structure protection. Once hose lines were in position, no protected structures were lost.

I was instructed by a Captain to head a Strike Team from the Richmond Fire Department. I took the Richmond Strike Team to the area of Broadway Terrace and Capricorn where we assisted other Engine companies with structure protection for several hours. Richmond Fire was

later reassigned and I rejoined my crew.

**0300/21**

Strike Team 45 was relieved by the Santa Cruz County Fire Department, and we reported to Station 24 for food and rest.

**0500**

From Station 24 we reported back to the staging area and were released from staging to 18th Street and Wood – Raimondi Park. We were then relieved by a fresh crew.

**0900**

Engine 1 crew reported back to their station.



**ENGINE 8/CAPTAIN****Prior to the Alarm**

Engine 8 had been "covered in" to Station 19 and from there was dispatched with Truck 8 to an auto extrication/rescue. We completed the extrication assignment.

**4th alarm**

Engine 8 was attempting to go in service after the previous assignment. Because our location was so close to the fire (Highway 13 and Broadway Terrace), I elected to respond directly to the fire. I attempted to notify FDC of my actions on both radio channel 1 and channel 2, but was unsuccessful. Consequently, Engine 8 does not show on the dispatch records as ever having been assigned to the fire.

Command assigned us via radio to 7140 Buckingham. We were unable to reach that address due to other apparatus and civilian vehicles blocking the street. At this time we observed a fast moving brush fire threatening 7235 Buckingham – a large, three story house. Our initial action was to take a 200' supply lead from the hydrant at Tunnel Road and Buckingham. We then "pumped at the scene" in front of the driveway of 7200 Buckingham. Here we joined Engine 24 who was operating from another hydrant just around the corner from us. Engine 24 was providing water to the crews at 7151 Buckingham and also supplying a 300' 1" inch line to the upper corner of 7235 Buckingham. Their 1" inch line was being staffed by a civilian volunteer, who had shown up with full firefighting gear and was quickly put to work.

Engine 8's first water on the fire came from our Stang deck gun equipped with a 1-1/8 inch "big line" tip. One of Engine 8's Firefighters operated the Stang gun and directed it toward the brush fire that was threatening the three-story shingle house. Engine 8's second line was a 1-1/2 inch preconnect staffed by our Chabot College "ride along" student. This line supplemented the Stang gun's flow. The three lines – the Stang, the 1-1/2 inch preconnect, and Engine 24's pre-connect were stopping the downward advance of the fire on what was then the right flank. Other areas of the fire were not yet visible from our location.

I broke into and searched the three-story shingle house. It was newly constructed and not yet occupied. I then coordinated with Engine 24's Lieutenant. Things were getting hectic at 7151 Buckingham. The bottom of the fire had apparently jumped the road and was threatening the crews and their apparatus. Soon, the crew members from Engine 19, along with Engine 16's separated Engineer, retreated from their positions to join pumper 24. About this time we were also joined by two East Bay Regional Parks apparatus, which skidded sideways around the corner – due to their exit from the firestorm. Two to three civilian vehicles also drove through the fire and careened to a stop in this traffic jam.

In the background I could hear a public address horn announcing to residents, "Evacuate the area. This fire is out of control...Evacuate the area". This was apparently the Oakland Police Officer who saved hundreds of lives before losing his own.

At this time I discussed our situation with Engine 24's Lieutenant and the EBRP's officers. We all concurred that it was best for us to abandon our position and "get the hell out of here". The road above was obviously impassable. Upon checking the roads below, though, we realized that it was too late to leave. The roads below were also impassable. Houses that only 15 minutes earlier had been untouched and occupied by neighbors were now completely involved in fire. PG&E high-voltage transmission lines had fallen and were jumping around in the street. Power transformers were exploding and throwing huge balls of fire into the treetops.

Engine 8's Engineer informed me that he was having water supply problems. He was having difficulty keeping up his fire flow. Thinking that the friction loss in 200 feet of 3-foot supply-line might be the cause, we began dragging a second 200 foot lead to the hydrant. Upon reaching the hydrant, we realized our water problem – heat from a burning dwelling had melted a hole in the supply lead. Water was leaking away at about 100 gallons per minute. Replacing the damaged hose was impossible due to the heat from the fire and because a high voltage PG&E-line had fallen across the 4-way hydrant valve. Surrounding the hydrant was an entanglement of fallen wires and broken power poles. Firefighters – possibly EBRP were attempting to cool the supply line with a 1" inch preconnect from Engine 8.

By this time the fire had completely surrounded us. We were attempting to save three houses and ourselves. Two of the houses were on the west-side of Buckingham and had heavy landscaping and trees around them. The other house was on the east-side of the street. Since it was a newer house, the landscaping was not yet in place but heavy brush still remained on the upper left side where we had earlier stopped the right flank of the fire. There was also about an acre of unburned brush to the right and below this shingle house. Our apparatus, the civilian vehicles and the EBRP's rigs were in the street between. Eventually one of these three houses caught fire. We didn't have the labor-force or water to save it. We allowed a controlled burn while attempting to keep it from spreading to the last two houses. At this point, if either of the last two houses caught fire, it would mean the automatic exposure of the apparatus and the loss of our water supply. It was imperative that we save both buildings.

I placed the civilians inside the shingle house as a safe refuge. My ultimate plan was to use the basement garage of this building as the safe refuge area for these people and the Firefighters in the event that either house caught fire. I hoped that the concrete walled basement garage would provide us with protection from the fire while the house above burned – the idea being that we would leave the basement after enough of the outside fuel had been consumed.

Over the radio, I could hear communications about evacuating the burning Parkwood Apartments which were located in the canyon below. I had also heard reference to the fire jumping Highway 24. About this time the already high winds became ferocious. I could feel a barometric pressure change in my ears. The wind began swirling around us like a tornado. I realized that the "eye of the firestorm" was passing over us. About this time also, the unburned acre of brush below the shingle house caught fire and a 20-foot wall of fire began a run toward our position. A 2-inch preconnect line was hastily put into place. The fire had reached an extremely critical peak. There was debris and burning embers flying everywhere. Firestreams were



evaporating before they even hit the fire. It became difficult to breathe – as though the oxygen was being sucked from the air. Trees were exploding in fire above us while homes and brush burned around us.

The firestorm took 5 to 8 minutes to pass. Much of the fuel below us had been consumed. We used this period to replace the damaged hydrant hose.

### 1215

After making the repair, we turned on the hydrant again – the hydrant was dry. The only water we had left was 500 gallons on Engine 8, 500 gallons on the EBRP pumper, and 300 gallons on a brush wagon. Running out of water presented a new challenge. There was still plenty of fuel surrounding our position – mainly unburned trees around one house and heavy brush next to the shingle house where we had stopped the fire earlier. The wind had calmed and the fire around us had subsided considerably at this point. Houses had been reduced to burning piles of debris and the brush was slowly burning itself down. Unfortunately, I was worried about the wind storm returning. During the height of the storm, I estimate that between Engine 8 and Engine 24, we were flowing 1600 to 1800 gallons of water per minute. If the still smoldering brush reignited or if either of the remaining houses caught fire, the 1300 gallons aboard our apparatus would not be enough water.

I made a risky decision. I took advantage of the calm winds and enlisted the skills of the EBRP crew. They were more experienced with backfires than Oakland firefighters. I had them remove some of the remaining fuel by burning the brush next to the shingle house. I next enlisted the skills of our civilian volunteer. He used Engine 24's chain saw to fell a number of trees between our other house and the neighboring burned-out buildings.

I moved the civilians from the shingle house to an outside location down the street at the intersection of Tunnel Road and Buckingham. This area had been absolutely untenable ten minutes earlier but now was relatively safe. All the homes, brush and fuel in this area had pretty much been consumed. We also moved the civilian cars and one EBRP's 4-wheel drive truck to this location. The purpose of this was to provide comfortable seating for the civilians and also to divide resources in case the two houses caught fire.

I left Engine 24 Lieutenant in charge while I attempted to locate an escape route from the burned-out canyon. During that period, the Lieutenant was joined by another Lieutenant and Firefighter and a female civilian. They had "rode out" the fire by staying in a swimming pool when the left flank of the fire had gotten out of control. The Lieutenant left his civilian with Engine 24's Lieutenant, borrowed 24's brush wagon and eventually worked his way up to the rest of his crew on Skyline Blvd. The Lieutenant took advantage of the swimming pool by using EBRP's portable pump to draft water into our apparatus tanks. He also coordinated the pick-up of equipment and began preparations for us to leave the scene for reassignment.

Finding an escape route proved time-consuming. We were in a burned out canyon with roads either still blocked by fire or else blocked by debris for a radius of 1/2 mile in all directions. I re-



cruited a civilian man and his wife to drive me in their compact car. The small car was able to get past all the fallen power lines easier than large apparatus. We first attempted to exit via lower Tunnel Road. This was blocked by 2 vehicles and part of a house that had burned and fallen onto the road from a street above. Next, we tried Charing Cross Road, but this was blocked by a traffic jam of burning vehicles and dead bodies.

We returned to Buckingham where I now enlisted the aid of our civilian volunteer. He had a jeep 4-wheel-drive wagon. Using a pike pole, we cleared fallen wires and began exploring upper Tunnel Road. Shortly past upper Bay Forest Drive, we had to turn back because heavy smoke and fire was blocking our visibility to see fallen wires. This was not a suitable exit route for large apparatus nor a good way to leave with civilians. The other Lieutenant and Firefighter were able to use this route about 45 minutes later when they borrowed Engine 24's brush wagon. I enlisted a Lieutenant from EBRP. The civilian, the Lieutenant, and myself used the EBRP brush wagon and the winch to drag the vehicles off lower Tunnel Road.

We cleared the road all the way to Hiller Drive. We encountered a convoy of three mutual aid apparatus – San Leandro, Alameda and another jurisdiction. I stopped the first rig and requested assistance, explaining the situation – no water, trapped civilians. The officer refused my request, saying that he had prior orders. I asked that he check back with Command, but he explained that he was not able to get through on the radio. The three rigs left us.

We returned to Buckingham, organized the civilians and their vehicles and led them down Tunnel Road. Our civilian volunteer coordinated the front of our convoy while the EBRP Lieutenant and I followed the procession. At this point, our volunteer left. We had heard over the radio that his own home on Broadway Terrace was threatened by the fire. (Note: We learned this civilian worked all night cutting trees and saving many houses. )

As we proceeded out to safety, the Lieutenant and I stopped to pick up two dead bodies – a young woman found laying in a driveway at Charing Cross Road and Tunnel Road and also the body of a black male who had been overcome by the fire on Tunnel Road at a location about halfway between Charing Cross and Hiller Drive. We took the bodies to the Command Post on Highway 24 where we checked in for the first time in about an hour.

Eventually, we dropped off the bodies at the Regional Ambulance staging area at Oakland Technical High School. We then returned to Buckingham with the additional force – two military volunteers. Upon our return, Engine 24's Lieutenant had both Engine 8 and Engine 24 ready to depart. The other EBRP's pumper had already left for reassignment. I left EBRP's Lieutenant and the two military volunteers, along with a home owner, to overhaul and firewatch the two houses. EBRP's Lieutenant had the brush wagon with 150 gallons of water and a radio. I instructed him to request us by radio if he needed help.

### **1530/1600**

Engine 8 checked in at the Command Center. We dropped off a firefighter and picked up a few extra firefighters. After getting some food and drink, we were reassigned to another sector of

the fire.

Houses Saved:    7200 Buckingham and 7235 Buckingham.

Apparatus:    Two Oakland pumpers, a brush wagon, EBRP's pumper and brush wagon, training division car.

Civilian Vehicles:    Approx. 6 cars and 2 pick-up trucks

Civilian People:    Six people who stayed in the shingle house, one homeowner who fought the fire, and one volunteer.

Fire Personnel:

Oakland Engine 24:    Lieutenant, Engineer, and Firefighter

Oakland Engine 8:    Captain, Engineer, Firefighter, and Ride-along

Other Oakland

Firefighters:    Three Firefighters,

EBRP's Fire Personnel: Five

Injuries: There were no serious injuries although several relatively minor injuries did result, such as minor radiation burns to eye cornea, scorched vocal cords, smoke induced bronchitis, etc.

### 1600 – 2300

After leaving Buckingham, Engine 8 checked in at Command where we dropped off our firefighter who was exhausted at this time. He had been part of the morning mop up crew and had been fighting fire since 0900 hours.

### 1630

We picked up three fresh firefighters in addition to our regular crew and were reassigned to join sector [Division] G which was commanded by a San Francisco Battalion Chief at Ocean View And Margarido. While attempting to reach our assignment, we drove up Brookside Drive, where we encountered Engine 3's Firefighter, who was single handedly defending a two story house with a 2" "big line". He needed more hose, so we took time out to give him 150' of 1-1/2" hose and nozzle to extend the "big line".

Upper Brookside was blocked by fire, so we doubled back and used Ocean View Drive. Our first duty in sector G was to assist with the 5" hose relay that San Francisco was going to provide. The off-duty Captain from Engine 15 and the San Francisco Battalion Chief had made arrangements for a long relay. Since I had worked fires in this area before and had knowledge of the water system, it was my job to meet the incoming San Francisco rigs, set up a San Francisco pumper at Ocean View and Broadway, and with San Francisco's hose tender, lead up Ocean View.

We used Engine 8 at a "Y" point at Ocean View and Margarido. Here the 5" hose slit down Magarido to the San Francisco crews working that area. (Engine 8's crew was now working be-



side the San Francisco crews). The other half of the "Y" supplied Engine 8, which in turn was pumping into a 3" hose lead supplying a series of relay pumpers up Ocean View, down Manchester and eventually extending to Acacia where a San Rafael Task Force was operating.

**2030**

The advance of the fire was stopped in this neighborhood by the San Rafael and San Francisco's crews. Radio communication and coordination between San Francisco and San Rafael was nonexistent. My other task here was to act as runner and liaison between these two departments.

**2200**

Things had quieted down considerably. The demand for high volumes of water had dropped, and we were able to remove Engine 8 from the relay. We used this opportunity to return to station 8 where we refueled, grabbed a bite to eat and phoned home to our families. We then returned to the Command post on Highway 24. On the way there, radio traffic indicated some confusion over refueling of apparatus. We happened by a diesel/gasoline tanker truck and waved him down. He was from the Alameda Naval Air Base and had already been refueling rigs but he had no radio. I assigned OFD to ride with him. I gave them a map and my portable radio. They drove around all night refueling apparatus.

Upon reaching command, we encountered a Lieutenant and a fresh crew that he had assembled. He and his crew were eager to fight fire. We were exhausted.

**2300**

We turned over the pumper for reassignment. His reports cover the rest of the night.

At Command, my crew and I checked in and placed ourselves on reserve status. We hitched a ride with Prevention 4 and returned to Station 8 for R & R.



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**SIXTH ALARM**

|           |      |
|-----------|------|
| ENGINE 2  | 1150 |
| ENGINE 13 | 1150 |
| ENGINE 17 | 1157 |
| ENGINE 23 | 1127 |
| TRUCK 3   | 1127 |
| ENGINE 26 | 1126 |
| ENGINE 21 | 1126 |

**ENGINE 2**

Engine 2 was dispatched as an extra company at approximately 1150. After I called FDC to ask if they wanted the air van to respond. As we were driving up Highway 24 we were forced to pull over as the east-bound lanes were being used as west-bound lanes by drivers trying to escape the fire area. At that time, I happened to look back and spotted a solid sheet of flame covering a section of the hill above the north parking lot at Lake Temescal. I reported this to Battalion 2 and was told to go to work over there.

Right after that, while we were headed over there (driving south in the north-bound lanes of Highway 13) I spotted Battalion 44 on Highway 13. I informed him of the fact that the fire had jumped Highway 24 and was headed up into the upper Rockridge area and we headed over there together with Engine 2 behind us.

Engine 2 stopped in the 6000 block of Buena Vista and went to work there taking a 6" lead and deploying two 1 1/2" hose lines. I continued down Buena Vista with Division A and we stopped at the corner at Contra Costa Place. The fire was spreading rapidly in a southwestern direction. All we could do at that time operationally was to get people to evacuate, and try to get a size-up of the rapidly deteriorating situation. I was trying to direct volunteer help in making sure occupants were notified to evacuate while also trying to give Division A a picture of what was happening. In the meantime, he was ordering additional resources. When it became apparent that we would be over-run by fire on all sides before any help would arrive, Division A ordered us to pull out of the area and re-group at Golden Gate and Acacia.

Down there, Engine 2 was put to work with Engine 26, and Engine 29. We had a nice wide intersection to make a stand. Initially, we were going to deploy our Stang guns. The limited water supply and high winds rendered this operation ineffective. We then started deploying 1 1/2" hose lines up into the back yards of 5 different houses. At least one of the lines we pulled clear up to Buena Vista houses. We were holding back a lot of fire when our water supply became sporadic and the fire started flanking us on three sides. We were then ordered out.

By this time Division A had moved down to the corner of Broadway Terrace and Country Club Dr. When we reported to him down there, he told us to deploy along Beechwood Dr. With only 3 engines and poor water supply, we were again driven back. We retreated back to the corner of Beechwood, Acacia, and Country Club Drive. Again we went to work with Engine 26, and Engine 29 joined us a short time later. After getting about 4 lines deployed, we were again in danger of losing our water. Soon after that, we lost our water completely.

As the fire was approaching, we made ready to retreat once again but since I had already ordered water tenders, I had one of the engines hook back up the hydrant and monitor their incoming pressure. Within about ten minutes, we had both [water] tenders and hydrant pressure back. We were then able to re-deploy hand-lines and were able to make an effective stand, saving houses on Acacia, Country Club, and Beechwood.



**2300**

We were then able to come down to Division A at Country Club and Broadway Terrace and get some food, drink and a break.

After this we were formed back up into a Strike Team and spent the rest of the night patrolling and putting out hot-spots. Additionally, I also assisted Division A in placing Strike Teams in places where they would be most beneficial.

**0730**

We returned to Station 2 the next morning with two inoperative radios, about 1/2 our normal hose load and four exhausted Firefighters.

### ENGINE 13

#### 1150

Engine 13 was dispatched to rescue civilians trapped in the Caldecott Tunnel. As Engine 13 approached the tunnel, the California Highway Patrol (CHP) had blocked east-bound traffic. Engine 13 maneuvered around the CHP road-block and headed toward the Tunnel. We were met by CHP vehicles approaching us. They were escorting west-bound traffic out of the Tunnel via the east-bound lanes. Engine 13 pulled over and let all the vehicles pass. Since the west-bound lanes of the tunnel were clear Engine 13 requested other orders.

Engine 13 was instructed to report to the Command Post at Lake Temescal. We exited the freeway by following the CHP escorts and headed up Broadway. As we passed Golden Gate, the visibility was nil due to the heavy smoke and flames. Informed Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) of the situation and requested new orders. Due to heavy radio traffic, Engine 13 did not receive any new orders. At this point, Engine 13 decided to make a stand along Golden Gate and Golden Gate Place off of Broadway.

Since we were a single engine company, this area appeared to be the most defensible. We evaluated the area and took a 5" lead from Brookside and Broadway. While we were setting up our operation, Engine 3 asked if they could assist us. (Engine 3 also had attempted to reach the Command Post at Lake Temescal.) Requested Engine 3 to pump into Engine 13's 5" lead because it was off a red-top hydrant.

Engine 13 "schoolyarded" a 3" line up Golden Gate in order to protect several homes and the College Prep campus. At this point about a dozen civilians assisted us in stretching our 3" line. This line was placed into operation and knocked down some hot spots in the eucalyptus trees above College Prep.

Engine 17 came down Golden Gate and Engine 18 arrived from Broadway. It was decided that Engine 18 and Engine 17 would go up to Buena Vista and Buena Vista Place and hook up to a hydrant there. Engine 13 would support them with the 3" line via a stairway from Golden Gate to Buena Vista.

The operations up in this area included dragging lines between several homes and meeting the wind and flames head-on. The changing conditions dictated where the lines would go and what could be saved. Oakland Truck 1 and San Francisco Engine 8 arrived during this action and assisted us with labor. San Francisco Engine 8 also began a relay operation by plugging into the hydrant Engine 18 was using and taking Engine 13's 3" line into San Francisco Engine 8. They then supplied Engine 18, Engine 13, and Engine 17. This make-shift Task Force was able to save approximately 18 homes in the area.

While we were working on Buena Vista, Engine 13's Engineer and Firefighters worked the flanks on Broadway and later along Golden Gate. They used a 2 1/2" preconnect and a 1 1/2" preconnect. The engineer took this action on his own and was effective in protecting our left

flank and heel.

When this area was under control Engine 13, Engine 18, Truck 1 and Engine 17 met and agreed that Engine 17 would stay in the area to sweep-up. All other units would pick-up and report to staging on Highway 24. Engine 13 remained at staging until we were given a new assignment.

After about one hour in staging, Engine 13 and Engine 17 (Engine 17 with a new crew) were sent to Florence and Modoc. The captain instructed Engine 13 to take the hydrant and protect the homes on Florence. Engine 17 was sent in the opposite direction with similar orders.

Engine 13 set-up to protect the homes on Florence by pulling 2 1-1/2" lines into the backyards off of Florence. Observed that structures on Proctor Ave. were still savable Engine 13 pulled their lines over fences and began operating. We were assisted by a California Department of Forestry (CDF) crew with an 1-1/2" line doing a pump-and-go operation.

Later, someone began operating on Proctor Ave. Encountered Hosewagon 19 with their crew working the north side of Proctor.

#### **0030/21**

Engine 13 remained in this area until we were relieved by a fresh crew. Engine 13's crew returned to staging at Broadway Terrace and Margarido.



### ENGINE 17/LIEUTENANT

**1157**

First responded toward Grandview but were blocked by massive black smoke at Highway 13 and Highway 24. We were next instructed by Command to take Broadway Terrace and respond to the Rockridge area by Golden Gate. Arriving at Eustice and Golden Gate we found fire in the Eucalyptus and fields above College Prep School. We attacked this fire with our stang and advanced our 1 1/2" lines. Then taking a lead up Eustice, we extinguished the rest of the area above the school. We left our lead on Eustice, knowing that we would need it later. Then, we took a lead from the hydrant at Eustice and Brookside east to the fifth house on the left, fighting that house fire for over half an hour using Stang gun and advancing 1 1/2" lines.

We returned to our lead above College Prep on Eustice and again fought back the fire in the trees and field above the school.

We spotted fire coming over the Buena Vista hill and positioned our rig and stang to protect the adjacent exposures, regrettably the fire came over the entire ridge engulfing every two story house on the street. The Captain from Engine 15 arrived with San Francisco's Engine 29. He instructed them to position east of us by two houses and to take water from us. Since we only had a hydrant with one 3" outlet – we used a divider with two leads – but still had to take turns using water with San Francisco's Engine 29. Soon after, we were overcome by the firestorm and retreated to regroup.

### Summary

**1157 – 2100**

Fought in the area of Eustice, Golden Gate, Brookside, Buena Vista.

**2100 – 0200**

Responded to Pinewood and Broadway.

**ENGINE 23/ LIEUTENANT**

**1127**

Engine 23 responded on the sixth alarm. We were informed by FDC to respond to the intersection of Bay Forest and Tunnel Road. While responding we heard via radio transmissions that the companies in the area of Bay Forest were experiencing extreme fire conditions and loss of hydrant pressure. When Engine 23 reached Skyline and Broadway Terrace, I attempted to contact FDC to inform us who was Division Leader in the area we were responding to, and where exactly to go to assist the endangered companies. Due to the vast amount of radio traffic, FDC was unable to supply us with adequate information. From our location it was obvious that the area of Bay Forest and Tunnel was becoming totally involved, so we continued on in the original direction towards Tunnel Road on Skyline Blvd.

Near the vicinity of Tunnel Road and Highway 24 we came upon Engine 27 traveling east-bound toward us. The Lieutenant informed us that they had lost their water supply in the Bay Forest area, and all the hydrants between us and Tunnel and Bay Forest were inadequate. Engine 27 was forced to retreat from their position due to the rapid advance of the fire. At this time the Lieutenant and I decided to check the water supply in the hydrants in this area until an adequate supply could be found and then determine where to make a stand against the fire's advance.

Approximately midway between Highway 24 and Broadway Terrace we found an adequate water supply, and from there we made several moves establishing the best defensive and tactical position, taking into account safety. We first attempted a stand at 1/2 mile down Skyline, setting up lines and taking leads to cover an area of many homes with a cleared area where we assumed the fire could be halted. We underestimated the magnitude of the advance of the fire. At this point we started reassessing properties, to determine if they were saveable. We repositioned our companies (Engine 23 and Engine 27) in the area of Broadway Terrace and Skyline. Engine 27 at the hydrant at the intersection and Engine 23 at 600' down Skyline. Engine 23 took a 300' lead towards Engine 27's location. Engine 23 used its Stang gun, 2-1/2 and 1-1/2 lines on homes and surrounding vegetation, above and below our location. Engine 27 positioned 2-1/2 and 1-1/2 lines down Broadway Terrace.

During this process of setting up lines, we were also having to forcibly evacuate many stubborn residents. The Lieutenant and the Firefighter took the Tank Wagon 23 and drove this whole area making sure the residents knew they must leave and what the safest route was. In this area despite the low pressure and minimally adequate streams we prevented the fire from crossing our established fire line, many homes were saved directly due to soaking the surrounding fuel with our lines, and then fighting back the persistent flame advance. I then had 2 Firefighters take Tank Wagon 23 to extinguish beginning structure fires above us on a small private driveway.

The fire now has been stopped in this area but it has gone laterally towards the east and back up towards us along the lower part of Broadway Terrace. Engine 4 and Engine 21 arrived, and

## **5. CHRONOLOGY OF ENGINE COMPANIES    THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE**

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along with Engine 23 and Engine 27 worked down Broadway Terrace, Farallon Way, and Pine-needle setting up lines off roof tops, on hillsides, and various other locations. During this time several air bombers dropped retardant on advancing flames. This was a vital assist, but was useless once the fire had reached and involved structures.       -

### **1800**

Strike Team #231 arrived and informed me they were to assist in preventing any flare-ups, and put out any spot fires in Division F. Engine 23 picked up its lines and proceeded to assist Engine 4 and Engine 21 on several still-persistent fire areas along Farallon Way and Pineneedle.

### **2300**

I informed FDC that my crew needed food, the engine needed fuel, and our Tank Wagon needed repairs to the priming pump, also the transmission fluid appeared to be getting low on the engine. I told FDC that we would go to Station 6 to get food and diesel fuel. After fueling and eating we rested awhile then proceeded to Station 24 for unleaded fuel for our Tank Wagon. From here we reported to staging located on Highway 24 and reported to the Captain. We were instructed to rest until there were further instructions. In the meantime, I had Shop 2 look at, and repair our apparatus.

### **0730**

We were told to go to Raimondi park for a meal, and to be released to our quarters by the Captain.

### **1030**

We turned our apparatus over to the Captain and crew and were released from duty. We were returned to quarters via A/C Transit.



**TRUCK 3**

**1127**

Truck 3 had changed quarters for unit Truck 1. Truck 3 and Engine 1 went to the Parkwood Apartments to assist in the rescue and the evacuation of the complex. When rescue and evacuation were complete, all of the structures at the Parkwood Apartments were fully involved in fire.

**1300**

Engine 16, an engine from Orinda, Engine 1, and a command vehicle were on the scene. Set up master streams and attempted to save the front wing of the front building.

**1400**

San Leandro FD and Hayward FD were on the scene. Set up more master streams.

**1530**

San Leandro FD and Hayward Fire Department were released to the Command Center.

**1600**

The water supply runs dry. Truck 3, and Orinda's engine, Engine 16 and Engine 1 make a sweep of the garages.

**1800**

Truck 3, Engine 1, Engine 16, and Orinda's engine return to the Command Center for reassignment. Engine 1's rig was 6/6 (inoperable) at the Parkwood Apartments.

**1830**

Truck 3 was newly designated as part of Strike Team 45 (with Engine 1, Engine 16, and engines from Orinda and Alameda). Strike Team 45 was dispatched to Broadway Terrace and Pinewood. Spread pumpers out, operated handlines and master streams from this location.

**2000**

Spread out on to Caldwell, Monzal and Mountain Blvd., using 1 1/2" lines with hydrant pressure, and in some cases garden hose to save homes which were beyond the reach of the pumper hand lines.

**0100/21**

Relieved at the scene by a Strike Team from Santa Cruz. Returned to Engine 24. Called the Command Center from Engine 24.

**0530**

Reported to the Command Center.

**0730**

Sent to our own quarters.

**ENGINE 26**

Engine 26 responded to the fire from quarters on the 6th alarm. Route of response was Highway 580 to Highway 13 to the Broadway Terrace off ramp. Radio traffic seemed to indicate that Lake Temescal was to be a staging area. Engine 26 attempted to enter the South Gate of Lake Temescal which was locked. Unable to enter, we then proceeded down Broadway Terrace in an attempt to locate the fire boundaries.

**Initial Operation: Hill Road And Golden Gate Avenue**

Engine 26 proceeded up Golden Gate Avenue to find the best location to begin operations. At roughly Hill Road and Golden Gate Avenue we met Battalion 44 and Engine 2 and I believe Emeryville Engine 4. At that location hose-lines were placed in operation. It quickly became very evident that this location was untenable. Hose-lines were disconnected and we retreated. Oakland Police Department (OPD) officers were advised to evacuate everyone in the area.

**Second Operation: Golden Gate And Acacia Avenues**

The next area of operation was Golden Gate and Acacia Avenues. We attempted with Engine 2 and Emeryville Engine 4, to set up a defensive attack. Despite an outstanding effort by all involved, it soon was obvious that we would again be unable to hold that location. Hose lines were disconnected and left. We retreated.

**Third Operation: Acacia Avenue And Country Club Drive**

At Acacia and Country Club we met Truck 8 and Engine 29, Alameda Engine 1 and NAS Engine 2. We now had a sizeable force to go along with Engine 26 and Engine 2, to mount an attack. We connected to hydrants at Country Club and Beechwood and Country Club and Bowling and had barely enough water to supply one 1 1/2" hose line. I stopped a passing EBMUD Truck and asked him what was happening. He informed me that he would try and open a zone valve and might be able to increase the pressure 10 lbs? Division A was contacted and informed that the area looked good to hold if we could get water. NAS Engine 2 laid a 5" supply line up Acacia to Engine 29. Several 2500 gallon water tenders arrived. Hand-lines were now in operation. A steady supply of water tenders became available, and with an unbelievable effort over the next several hours by all involved, we held the fire at this location.

**2100**

We were relieved by several Task Forces, and returned to the Command Post at Broadway Terrace and Country Club for R&R.

**0900/21**

We were sent to the Naval Air Station.



**ENGINE 21**

I responded as a C/R officer on Engine 21. We responded on the sixth alarm with an Engineer, two Firefighters and Brush 21.

We responded via Skyline Blvd. to Grizzly Peak Blvd. and finally found fire at the south intersection of Grizzly Peak Terrace and Grizzly Peak Blvd. We operated 1 1/2" lines from both the pumper and wagon. The fire was encroaching on the homes in the Grizzly Terrace subdivision and we moved our lines in response. At this point the pump engine on the wagon failed.

We were no longer needed at the homes as Truck 15, aided by an unidentified Oakland pumper, was in control of that portion of the fire.

We picked up our hose and moved approximately 1/2 mile south on Grizzly Peaks Blvd., where the fire appeared to be in danger of crossing into Contra Costa County.

I attempted to protect some homes farther south on Grizzly Peak Blvd. using a large line and straight tip nozzle, from a hydrant. The advance of the fire forced all civilians to flee and I was left with no help on the large line. Due to the above conditions, I was forced to abandon the homes and fire equipment.

I returned to the pumper to supervise and as all was well I returned to my former position as the fire had passed. With the aid of a Firefighter, an EBRPD brush wagon and some civilians who had returned, we were able to save or extinguish half a dozen house fires.

When the above position was contained, we loaded all available hose (some was abandoned over the side of the hill to speed up operations) and by radio, I asked for a new assignment. The radio traffic was such that I could not raise Command. I estimate this was at about 1630. We went down Broadway Terrace and met up with Engine 4 and the crew of Engine 27. Some civilians guided us to a defensive position at the south end of Farallon Way. Engine 4 pumped from a hydrant into Engine 21 and we operated; a Stang gun, large lines, baby lines and a red line at various times to stop the fire below us at Broadway Terrace and Pinehaven. When relieved by a strike team from Fresno, we picked up what was left of our hose. Our entire crew had not eaten all day and our Firefighter was concerned about the condition of his home. We returned to Highway 13 and Moraga via Thornhill Drive, and from there to the former location of the Firefighter's home. From there we went to staging where we were relived.

After eating, I was sent to FDC to finish my shift. The pumper and wagon were turned over to a relief crew and the others were returned to Station 21 to act as guides for a fire company for Sausalito.

**2130**

We were relieved. We used all of our hose, a Stang gun, and 2 tanks.



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**LATER RESPONSE**

|           |      |
|-----------|------|
| ENGINE 3  | 1200 |
| ENGINE 18 | 1208 |
| TRUCK 18  | 1300 |
| ENGINE 20 | 1217 |
| ENGINE 29 | 1150 |
| ENGINE 36 | 1400 |
| ENGINE 38 | 1215 |
| ENGINE 39 | 1200 |
| ENGINE 41 | 1230 |
| ENGINE 48 | 1600 |

**RECALL**

|                      |      |
|----------------------|------|
| ENGINE 20            |      |
| ENGINE 21            | 1400 |
| ENGINE 29 B          | 1400 |
| ENGINE 26 B          | 1400 |
| ENGINE 18/UNIT 7     | 1200 |
| TEAM 8               | 1600 |
| CREW 10              | 1700 |
| ENGINE 8 /           | 1730 |
| VALLEJO TASK FORCE 1 |      |
| ENGINE 8             | 2300 |
| ENGINE 15            | 1730 |
| ENGINE 40            |      |
| ENGINE 16 C          | 1700 |
| ENGINE 16/ENGINE 3   | 1130 |
| NARRATIVE            | 1100 |
| TRUCK 15             |      |
| TRUCK 15 C           | 1330 |
| TRUCK 15             |      |
| VAC REL              | 1200 |

**ENGINE 3****1200**

Engine 3 was dispatched, and told to report to the parking lot at Lake Temescal. Arrived at the intersection of Broadway and Golden Gate, and Engine 13 relayed information that the road was not passable due to the fire conditions. The Lieutenant from Engine 13 asked if it was possible to pump into the 5" lead that they had taken from the red-top hydrant at Brookside and Broadway. Engine 3 did this. A few minutes later, a couple of San Francisco Engines arrived. The Division B ordered Engine 3 Lieutenant to take an Engine 3 Firefighter and go with the San Francisco units up Brookside Avenue to try and make a fire stand.

Engine 3 spotted at the hydrant at Eustice and Brookside and deployed big lines on the multiple house fires, burning trees, and shrubbery found in this location. This hydrant did not have water pressure, so this position was held for only 30 minutes before being forced to disconnect the hoses and leave them in the street, moving the apparatus down Brookside to a hydrant at Claremont Path.

The Engine 3 Firefighter and the Lieutenant went back up to Eustice and with civilian help, deployed the hose to a private hydrant located on the grounds of College Prep School, and back towards the fire. Saving this school was critical to the success of these operations in this area. This line was operated for hours, hitting flare-ups in the trees, wetting down roofs, putting up water curtains to break up radiant heat, and extinguishing burning vegetation on the school grounds. The Lieutenant from Engine 16 became a part of this operation.

Pumper 3 was brought up later in the afternoon and connected to the hydrant at Eustice and Brookside and worked on protecting houses in this location until ordered back to staging.

**1900**

Ordered back to staging. Engine 3 was made part of a Strike Team which was sent to protect homes in the Broadway Terrace and Pinewood areas and worked this neighborhood until 0200.

**0200/21**

Engine 3 was sent to Station 24 to rest, and then to staging at Raimondi Park.

**OBSERVATIONS**

College Prep School consists of multiple wood-frame buildings with wood shingle siding, exterior wooden walkways and stairs, a large building in the framing stages of construction, and wooden construction materials, all nestled among towering eucalyptus trees on about 5 acres of land. The streets that border the school are Broadway, Golden Gate, Eustice, and Brookside.

If the school had caught fire, the house across the street on Brookside would have been destroyed and the Command Post on Highway 24 would have been endangered. The massive



amounts of burning materials emitted into the air and blown downwind would probably have resulted in a whole new fire front opening in the heavily wooded residential areas between Highway 24 and the intersection of College and Claremont.

The actions of Engines 13 and 18 operating Golden Gate Avenue, and Engine 3 along Eustice, Brookside and on the school property prevented this from happening. The help of the San Francisco units and the civilians to our 3 engine companies was an important part of this operation.

**ENGINE 18/LIEUTENANT**

**1208**

On Broadway and Golden Gate assisting Engine 13 advance hose up Golden Gate.

**1300**

At Buena Vista Avenue and Buena Vista Place. Connected to a green-top hydrant protecting structures on both streets. The fire and 30 mph winds were coming from the northeast.

**1830**

At Glenbrook and Bowling, taking a defensive position to the fire raging on Beechwood.

**0600/21**

At Clarewood and Harbord, extinguishing a rekindle of a dwelling fire at 5301 Clarewood.

**0800**

Return to Station 18 quarters.

**1000**

Released to go home.

**TRUCK 18/LIEUTENANT**

**1300**

Truck 18 responded. We were dispatched from a phone call from Dispatch Operations and instructed to report to Ashby and Claremont Avenue. At this location we met the command of Division C. Division C instructed us to set up our ladder-pipe to protect the Claremont Hotel from fire and flying embers. Our water was initially supplied by an engine company from the Piedmont Fire Department. Piedmont's Engine had mechanical problems and they were replaced by an engine company from San Francisco. Truck 18's ladder-pipe was used for only about 10 minutes. It was not needed because the fire did not burn that far down the hill and other companies had placed hand-lines up the hill to stop the fire. Truck 18 remained in this location until approximately 0130.

**0130/21**

We were instructed to report to Tunnel Command on Highway 24, where we remained until approximately 0700.

**0700**

Truck 18 reported back to quarters.

CREW: Lieutenant, and 3 Firefighters.



**ENGINE 20/LIEUTENANT**

**1217**

Engine 20 responded from station 20 to 556 - 30th St. for an outside fire. Finished at 1244.

**1244**

Cover in Station 5 per fire alarm.

**1317 – 1322**

Engine 20 responded from Station 5 to 40th St and Telegraph. Smoke scare.

**1329 – 1426**

Engine 20 responded from Station 5 to another fire assisted by Truck 4.

**1525 – 2300**

Engine 20 responded to Piedmont and Ramona Avenues. Smoke and cinders only. Engine 20 then investigated the source of cinders and found a eucalyptus grove on the north end of Mountain View to be the source. Engine 20 spent time until dusk making a fire break on the south-end of the grove. At dusk Engine 20 left the cemetery as the fire was now out of control on the north-end of the grove and heading north and east as the winds had changed. Engine 20 then followed Moraga Avenue north and reported the fire movement to Oakland 1. Engine 20 turned onto Maxwellton from Moraga Avenue and followed this to Hilltop. The fire was approaching at Stark Knoll Place and Hilltop. Engine 20 asked for a Task Force to Stark Knoll and Hilltop. Engine 20 took a lead from here to the top of Stark Knoll. We operated 4 hand-lines until the fire was knocked down. The Task Force arrived and covered from Stark Knoll to Clarewood.

**2300**

FDC sent us to R&R on Broadway Terrace.

**2330 – 0130**

We were at R&R.

**0130 – 0500**

Engine 20 was sent with Engine 15 to Proctor and Julia to knock out hot spots.

**0500 – 0830**

We returned to R&R on Broadway Terrace.

**0830**

We were released back to our companies.

**1000**

Engine 20 was sent home.

**ENGINE 29/CAPTAIN****1150**

Engine 29 received a call from FDC, and was ordered to report to the staging area at Lake Temescal. While responding on Highway 13, I observed helicopters making drops in the fire area, and heard much activity on the radio. After some difficulty getting through on channels 1 and 2, Division A responded and we were ordered to Buena Vista off of Broadway Terrace. Just past Hill Road, we were met by an Alameda engine company. Looking down Buena Vista, I could see many houses burning on the high-side of the street.

I ordered both engines to turn around so that they would be facing out. Then the Alameda officer and I agreed that he would take the one available hydrant, and that we would work from his engine. We were now able, with the significant help of civilians, to drag big lines into place. I positioned the Alameda crew uphill in the yard of an unburned house, and told them to try to hold that position if and when the fire came at them. The main concern here was not the fire burning down Buena Vista, but fire burning down from the street above Contra Costa Road. My crew and I walked down Buena Vista, and placed a line between the last burning house, and the first unburned house. Here, near what I believe is called Belalp Path, which is a walkway from Buena Vista to Contra Costa, we were able to make an effective stand.

At one point here our operation was so successful that we advanced the line up the stairs on to Contra Costa Road. We were apparently the first engine company on Contra Costa, and there were many houses burning. It soon became obvious that our line here would be futile, and since our escape route was becoming threatened, we went back down to Buena Vista. The Firefighter volunteered to remain on Contra Costa and assist the civilians that were evacuating the area. He rejoined us later on Buena Vista.

Back at our previous position, we were still very effectively fighting fire. We were even able to stretch lines farther down Buena Vista, and began to work off of another hydrant. In my opinion, we would have succeeded in stopping all of the fire in front of us on Buena Vista. However, a problem developed in our rear.

I was told for the second time by Division D, that the way we had come in was beginning to close, due to fire burning down from Contra Costa. This time he added that we should leave now. Both crews and all of the remaining civilians were told that we were abandoning the area immediately. We took the nozzles, left the hose in the street, put the civilians on the rigs, and drove down Hill Road, past burning houses, to the staging area on Broadway Terrace at Country Club Drive. There I reported to Division A. After a short break, we were sent to Beechwood and Country Club and told to report to the Beechwood Command Captains.

I met with the Captains on Beechwood and Country Club. The operation on Beechwood had not been going well due primarily to a lack of personnel. Houses were burning on Beechwood, and on both sides of Acacia, the next street over. A Captain and a truck crew were working a big line on the north side of Acacia, but there was no line on the south-side. I took the hydrant



## **5. CHRONOLOGY OF ENGINE COMPANIES      THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE**

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at Acacia and Beechwood, and immediately pulled a line to stop the fire on the south side of Acacia. The two lines together were stopping the spread of the fire down Acacia. The Captains worked on Beechwood. Again we were being effective, and would have stopped the fire there, when we ran out of water.

When the hydrants went dry, we all began to pack up and prepared to leave. The truck was now parked in a bad spot, so it left. Just as we were all about to leave, one of the Captains received communication that water tankers [tenders] were enroute to Oakland, and that we would get the first ones. We made the decision to stand by and wait.

At this time I would like to commend my crew, as well as those Captains for remaining calm and professional in the face of extreme adversity. The helpless feeling caused by not being able to fight the fire that was now raging unchecked toward us was offset by the pride I felt being associated with the Oakland Fire Department.

Finally, the [water] tenders arrived. With the water they supplied we were able to redeploy our lines on Acacia and Beechwood. While we had waited for the [tenders] tankers, we had watched a house on each side of Acacia burn. Where we made our new stand with the lines, the fire was stopped, and all of the houses behind us saved. After our stand, and when relief was finally sent, our crews returned to the staging area for a much needed and deserved break.

Because Engine 29 had lines out that were still in use, my crew caught a ride to the staging area in the old Command Van. After the break, my regular Engineer was sent back to Engine 29. I was given the Engineer from Engine 2, my regular Firefighters, another Firefighter and a volunteer CDF Firefighter, and then sent to a trouble spot at the corner of Hill Road and Golden Gate. Hill Road, where we had made our earlier escape, was almost completely devastated. There was a house on the corner that was being threatened from two directions. We put a bigline between the house and the fires. The house is still standing. We were also able to put two 1-1/2" lines in operation on Golden Gate to protect houses there. We stayed there until relieved by a Strike Team.

We returned to staging, took another break, and then were made a part of an Oakland strike team. We stood by the rest of the night, and were returned to quarters in the morning.

Again, my crew was comprised of myself, Engineer, and 2 Firefighters. My crews performance was exemplary.



**ENGINE 36 (OES ENGINE 227)/LIEUTENANT  
The Rock Ridge Stand**

[Note: The water-relay operation in this area was one of many major operations of the fire. We are presenting 2 reports which clarify this operation. For more information on this operation, refer to the Rock-ridge area in Section 4: The Chronology of Location.]

**1400**

Engine 36 spots fire at Rock Ridge Blvd. and Prospect Steps. We connect to a red-top hydrant at Rock Ridge Place and Rock Ridge Blvd. South. Stretch 400' 1 1/2" attack line for structure working at Prospect Steps. Volunteers stretch 600' 2 1/2" attack line to F/O 6178 Rock Ridge. Line stays dry, insufficient water. Engine 36 calls for assistance via land line. Wind strong from the northeast. Multiple structures working at Prospect Steps and Margarido.

**1500**

Engine 41 (Albany Engine 1 with Albany crew and 5 OFD members – 8 Firefighters total) drops supply line to Engine 36. Returns to Broadway and Rock Ridge to pump lead. Engine 36 charges 2 1/2". Engine 41 splits crew. Half work the large line on Rock Ridge, half assist Engine 36 at 6156 Rock Ridge. Wind strong from the northeast. Six working structures between 5926 Margarido and 6001 Margarido Dr.

**1600**

Engine 36 and Engine 41 holding positions. Lose 6156 and 5959 Rock Ridge. San Francisco Engine Company arrives and stretches 1 1/2" lines to F/O 5929 Margarido for exposure protection. Units arrive from Colma and Richmond. Individuals from the Palo Alto Fire Department and the Mare Island Fire Department arrive. Cyclonic wind conditions of high heat, heavy smoke and embers.

**1700**

Perimeter below Margarido established. Eight structures on the west-side of Margarido fully involved but the remaining exposures are out of immediate danger. Engine 36's large line is extended with two 1 1/2" lines for exposure protection on Margarido. Four structures fully involved – 5950, 5940, 5934, 5926 – with 5960 saved. There are two additionally involved houses – 5964, 5972.

**1900**

Roof fire at 6000 Margarido. Handled by an SFFD engine. At this point, the Margarido section of the fire was contained with no further structures involved. The balance of the night and following morning was spent cooling hot spots and waiting for relief.

### ENGINE 36(OES ENGINE 227)//ACTING LIEUTENANT

**1245**

Put OES Engine 227 in service as Engine 36.

**1331**

Responded to a structure fire on the 4400 block of Montgomery started by flying embers from The Oakland Tunnel Fire. After this response, we were told to report to the fire. On arrival at Rockridge and Broadway, noticed that fire was advancing to the bottom of the hill and threatening the homes in the flat lands. There were no fire apparatus in the area. The Engineer and I decided that this would be a good place to start firefighting, hoping we could get back-up through the land-line or whatever means possible to help stop the fire at the bottom of the hill and to keep it from spreading in the southerly direction up and over the hill.

A decision was made not to bring lead in from Broadway and Rockridge, since we did not have enough hose. Instead, we went to Rockridge and Rockridge Place and worked off of that hydrant. On arrival at Rockridge and Rockridge Place, the hydrant was a red-top and green-cap which was a low-flow hydrant. We decided that due to the fire conditions and hydrant capabilities, that it was best to leave the engine at the hydrant and "school-yard" leads into the fire. Thanks to several neighbors in the area and their tremendous help, the operation went smoothly.

We began firefighting operations at Prospect Steps and Rockridge. Fire conditions were heavy, with winds and fire blowing to the west from the top of the hill. Immediate residences were being threatened: 6128 and 6140 Rockridge, with 2 multiple-unit apartments at 5985 and 5971 Margarido, and a garage behind 6140 Rockridge were already fully involved. At this time trees and bushes and a fence at Prosect Steps and Rockridge were burning and threatening the front of 6128 Rockridge. We extinguished the trees, bushes, and fence and advanced a big line to behind 6140 Rockridge and extinguished trees and bushes coming down the hill. The units on 5985 and 5971 Margarido started collapsing into themselves and not down the hill, which eliminated the immediate threat of fire and debris coming down the hill and threatening 6128 and 6140 Rockridge. The westerly winds let up and changed to a south-easterly direction.

We withdrew the big line from behind 6140 Rockridge and advanced up Prospect Steps to 6144. I decided at this time that a set of baby lines would be more productive than the bid line. With the help of the neighbors, and with the Firefighters the baby-lines were set up. While the baby lines were being brought up, I tried to contact FDC from 6150 Rockridge. I told them that I needed back-up immediately, as well as water supply from Broadway. **[Note: 2 other calls were made to FDC throughout this entire incident.]** The Engineer knowing of the problem, stopped a police officer in a patrol car and told him to go to staging and to tell them about the need for back-up and water. The message was relayed to staging. The civilians were helping the Engineer as best as they could. One volunteer was a retired Engineer from another city. After assessing proper pumping procedures, this volunteer helped with pumping. The Engineer went to



staging and asked about help for the operation.

There were baby-lines in front of 6144 Prospect Steps [on/or??] Rockridge to set up a fire curtain. We did not have enough water to aggressively attack the fire, but only enough to wet down the roofs and walls trying to delay the fire advance. The fire was moving in a southerly direction on Margarido, with 5959 Margarido and 6144 Rockridge on fire. We saved 6150 Rockridge. Lines were being moved between 6144 and 6145 trying to save 6156. We worked for about half an hour and were not successful. At this time, a Task Force had arrived consisting of the Richmond Fire Department, the San Francisco Fire Department, the El Cerrito Fire Department, and the Colma Fire Department.

A OFD Lieutenant riding with one of the Task Force engines said that he was hooking up a water supply from Broadway and was going to bring the Colma engine and spot them in front of 5156 [6156??] Rockridge. When Colma's rig arrived with water and more hose lines, I decided to make a firefight at 6156 Rockridge and to try and save 6178 and 6172 which were immediately above 6156. We encountered exposure problems with a large redwood tree and large pine trees across the street. We took 3 1/2" lines off of the Colma rig and started firefighting on the front stairs and back-side of the 6156 house. The Lieutenant and crew advanced a big line up the hill and around to the front of 6178 Rockridge and started a water curtain. The Colma rig started Stang gun operations to extinguish fire at 5156 [6156??] Rockridge.

We were successful in stopping the fire in the southerly direction. After this operation was under control, we moved lines up the hill between 6178 and 6172 Rockridge to help the Lieutenant and his crew with water supply and firefighting on Margarido between 6006 and 5960. We spent the remainder of the evening and the morning hitting hot spots.

#### **0900/21**

We were relieved. After picking up hose, we returned to Engine 10, and reloaded hose for the rig to remain in service.

#### **OBSERVATIONS**

Because of communications, if the Engineer had not gone to staging to again request help, I'm sure the fire would have advanced up the hill on the southern-side of Rockridge, destroying 40 other homes.



**ENGINE 38/LIEUTENANT**

**1130**

I was on Military Leave at Government Island. I observed the fire and asked my commanding officer to be excused.

**1215**

I reported to Engine 21 and phoned 42 to report on duty. "42", Firefighter, told me to take a crew, and staff the spare at Engine 21. I informed her, that there were no apparatus at Engine 21. She then told me to report to Engine 25, and staff the spare Tank Wagon. We went to Engine 25, and again there was no apparatus to be found. I asked her about the spare at Engine 17, (Crown #100) and she said that nobody knows if it's there or not.

We went to Engine 17, and found the spare parked in the backyard. We loaded some hose, scrounged up some nozzles and other equipment, fueled up and reported to 42 that we were available for assignment. 42 told us to go in service at Engine 25, as Engine 38.

**1700**

We were dispatched to Broadway Terrace and Leo Way. Upon arrival, there were several houses burning. We dug a lead to the hydrant at Broadway Terrace and Leo Way, and used our stang gun on the largest area of fire west of Broadway Terrace while extinguishing three house fires on Leo Way, with 3-1 1/2" lines we had no big line nozzles. We were at this location for about 2 1/2 hrs. before a Task Force showed up to assist us. We remained at our location extinguishing and overhauling until approximately 0730/22.

**ENGINE 39**

**1200**

Was recalled from home. Reported to Engine 20 and was told to go to Engine 16 and put their spare Brush Wagon – in service with 2 Firefighters as Engine 39. We were met at Engine 20 by an engine from Piedmont with 4 men.

**1300**

We were sent to the parking lot of the Claremont Hotel. We supplied 18 trucks ladder-pipe with 2 leads from Piedmont's engine, and advanced several hose-lines from the parking lot to protect the homes on Alvarado Road above the parking lot.

**1500**

We led a Strike Team of 5 engines and a Battalion Chief from Redwood City to Broadway Terrace and Capricorn. The fire was all around us so we relocated to Broadway Terrace and Cross St. to protect homes not yet involved but threatened by fire.

**2000**

We took the Brush Wagon and hit spot fires in the area. During the night we worked with several crews and made an interior attack and saved a home at 149 Beechwood.

**0200/21**

We went back to staging and remained there.

**0800**

We were sent to base.

**1000**

We were sent back to Engine 16.

### ENGINE 41

#### 1230

This Lieutenant reported to Engine 1, and was assigned to Albany Engine 26, under the command of their Lieutenant and crew. An OFD Firefighter was also a part of this crew. This entire crew became Oakland Engine 41.

#### 1430

Engine 41 went into service at Engine 21.

#### 1500

Called the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC), and was asked to respond to Rockridge Blvd. South and assist Engine 36 (an Oakland Office of Emergency Services – OES Engine). Along with other Oakland fire personnel who responded to this location, Engine 41 found Engine 36 pumping from the red-top hydrant at Rockridge Blvd. South and Rockridge Place. Heavy fire was seen up Rockridge and on Margarido. Engine 36 Engineer was desperate for water. Rockridge Blvd. North was checked for hydrants; none were found. Engine 41 was directed to drop a supply line from Engine 36 to the green-top hydrant at Broadway and Rockridge Blvd. South. All 1 1/2" hose was pulled off prior to dropping the supply line. Engine 36 crew was attacking the fire with 1 1/2" lines between Prospect Steps and Rockridge Blvd. A 2 1/2" line was laying dry on Rockridge Blvd. The Engine 41 1 1/2" hose was extended off the 2 1/2" line and this was used on Rockridge Blvd. protecting 6172 and 6178.

Noticing the direction and intensity of the fire spread, more help was needed in the area. There was no radio contact. After numerous calls to FDC with a citizen's phone, Engine 41 finally got through to communicating that more engines were needed for Rockridge Place. Engine 41 requested 3 more engine companies. Engines 36 and 41 were working together trying to protect exposures on Rockridge Blvd. An engine company from Colma arrived on the scene and they positioned in front of 6156 Rockridge Blvd., facing out in case the fire were to jump past. Civilians stretched a supply line from Colma's engine to Engine 36 and the Stang gun was put into operation to assist the hand-lines. These lines and the Stang gun saved the structures at 6150 and 6172 Rockridge Blvd., and prevented the fire from jumping past the crew.

A San Francisco Engine Company arrived and was directed to drop another supply line from Engine 36 down to Engine 41. The San Francisco engine then returned and pumped into the Colma engine.

At this time, there were no firefighting crew in the area of Rockridge Blvd. and Margarido; the fire was consuming everything in this area. From a retired Firefighter's house, a call was made to FDC that 2 – 3 engines were needed on Margarido.

An El Cerrito engine and a Richmond engine arrived later in the evening. A citizen reported a fire in the rear of 6067 Rockridge Place. Two unknown Firefighters were directed to take a



Tank Wagon that was parked near Engine 36 down and extinguish the fire. Engine 5 arrived and pumped into Engine 41 from Lawton and Broadway. In working up Margarido, Engine 41 ran into a San Francisco engine company who had a supply line from Ocean View and Margarido. They worked inside 6000 Margarido pulling ceilings and extinguishing an attic and roof fire. This building was heavily damaged, but saved. The hydrant in front of 5972 Margarido had no water. Hose lines were extended to 5960, 5978, and 5980 Margarido and these buildings were saved. Everything around them was destroyed. Late in the evening after the main body of fire had passed, these lines were used up and down Prospect Steps between Rockridge Blvd. South and Manchester, extinguishing fire in the destroyed buildings.

Discussed this operation with Division B personally since radio contact was impossible. This operation had been extremely hazardous because of wires and transformers which were falling. There was no way of knowing if the power had been shut off.

The citizens in this area were extremely helpful pulling hose and cutting down trees and brush with chain saws.

**0500/21**

OFD fire personnel returned to Engine 1 for additional orders.

**0930/1000**

Albany crew was relieved. Additional Albany crew had arrived in a private pick-up truck.

Nine structures were saved in this operation. A total crew count for this operation includes:

- Oakland OES 36 – Lieutenant, Engineer, and 2 Firefighters
- Albany Engine 36 (Oakland Engine 41) – 4 Lieutenants, 1 Engineer, 6 Firefighters
- Oakland Engine 5 – Lieutenant, 2 Firefighters
- San Francisco engine and crew
- Colma engine and crew
- El Cerrito engine and crew
- Richmond engine and crew

**OBSERVATIONS**

- Need for portable radios
- Need to install 3" to 2 1/2" reducers on hydrant outlets for outside agencies
- Need for extra hose clamps for extending lines
- Need for information about power cuts to fire personnel on the scene

**ENGINE 48**

Engine 48 was Engine 29's Foam Wagon. Hose and equipment was borrowed from several fire houses, and placed on the rig. We were dispatched after a call for any available units over the speaker. We responded from Engine 20 and reported to the OFD retired Assistant Chief. He dispatched us to Glenwood Glade. The area was blocked by engines.

**1630 – 2030**

Mountain Blvd, north of Broadway Terrace. Saved 4 – 5 homes on the west-side of Mountain, and 2 on the east-side. Stopped the fire advance at this point.

**2030 – 0300**

At 7050 Broadway Terrace. Saved 2 homes, lost 1, and extinguished 2 heavily damaged homes.

**0300 – 0730**

Extinguished hot spot along Mountain to approximately the 700 block, and along Pinewood west of Mountain.

**0800**

Returned to Engine 20.

**RECALL**

**ENGINE 20A/LIEUTENANT**

I was recalled from vacation for the Tunnel Command Fire. I took the OFD bus to the Branch 3 staging area at Broadway Terrace and Country Club Drive. My crew consisted of 2 Firefighters and another Lieutenant.

We took a 3" big line off of Engine 26 up Acacia Street to Quail Lane. Engine 29 was working on houses on the right side of the street, so we protected houses and extinguished fire on the left side. We also took a 1 1/2" line off Engine 29 to help with firefighting. We protected two houses on Acacia Avenue and a house behind on Mendocino.

After controlling that area, we extinguished an attic fire on Beechwood Drive. We then assisted another Lieutenant and crew on a tudor house up Beechwood Drive.

After being sent back to Branch 3 staging, assisted Battalion 44 at staging until the change of shift.



**RECALL**

**ENGINE 21**

**1400**

I picked up an Engineer and 2 Firefighters, and proceeded to Station 1. We were bussed to Country Club and Bowling, and given instructions to make a stand to stop the fire's progress at Beechwood and Glenbrook. As we did not have an apparatus, we made a "schoolyard" lead at Country Club and Beechwood, to Beechwood and Glenbrook, and set up operations with a large line.

At some point hours later, we used Engine 25 and used the Stang gun to dump the tank on one of the few remaining houses still standing near Beechwood and Yorkshire, with the intention of coming back to it when the fire's progress could be checked at Glenbrook.

**1930**

When the winds stopped, about 4 crews joined us in going back to extinguish and overhaul the same dwelling (a total of about 2.5 hours). Upon completion, we were sent to staging for R&R. After an hour of R&R, we were given Engine 19 apparatus and sent to Maxwellton and Amy. From there we extinguished spot fires.

**1000**

Checked out at Station 1.

**RECALL****ENGINE 29B****1400**

I was told to come in for a recall and report to Station 20 with my gear.

**1530**

I reported to Station 20 and was told to report to the Lieutenant at the Station. When I got to Station 1, Dispatch Operations told me to accompany the Lieutenant and Captain and Engineer to Raimondi Park for Staging Operations. Throughout the day and night, my job responsibilities included, but were not limited to:

- Checking in mutual-aid apparatus, firefighting equipment, personnel, and support staff as per ICS Form 211.
- Assist in staging this equipment within the confines of Raimondi Base.
- Maintain gate security utilizing the Marines assigned to Raimondi Base.
- Direct support staff (Red Cross, Salvation Army, media, city personnel) to their proper personnel/locations.
- Act as a liaison with city volunteer groups.
- Train other Firefighters in the proper usage of ICS Form 211.
- Coincide efforts with the Engineer to lead convoys of Strike Teams to Forward Staging.

**1000/21**

I was released by the Lieutenant of Raimondi Base IC. I was told to go home.

**0700/22**

I reported to Station 1.

### **RECALL**

#### **ENGINE 26B/CAPTAIN**

##### **1400**

I reported on duty from home to Station 26. I called Battalion 3's quarters and found the Captain who directed me to report to Station 20.

##### **1600**

I had driven a group of Firefighters to Station 1 and been assigned to a crew awaiting an apparatus. Soon afterward Dispatch Operations reassigned me to a single detail of taking inventory of Battalion Chief 4's belongings at Battalion 4's quarters. Upon completion of that task he assigned me to work with a Firefighter and staff OFD stations with full crews and equipment. I remained on that assignment until it was completed early in the morning of the 21st. I was released later that morning.

##### **0700/ 21**

Reported to my regular station.

### **OBSERVATIONS**

During the recent disaster my major assignment was to restaff stations with personnel and equipment. Following are some broad-minded recommendations to improve this function.

- Create and include within Battalion 2's disaster plans a position of staffing co-ordinator. A checklist of duties and station staffing priorities must be available in Battalion 2's Office.
- Assign and train a number of Officers in these duties.
- Train a number of Station 1 Firefighters to be a liaison to any Officer assigned to position.
- Make available a dispatcher and council for the specific purpose of non-disaster staffing and responses.
- Include within the communications network a direct link with base-camp for ordering replacement apparatus.
- Set-up a requirement to assign from base-camp, a minimum number of Strike Teams to be diverted to station restaffing dependent upon disaster needs.



**RECALL****TRUCK 18/UNIT 7****1200**

I was called back to duty and asked to report to Station 20. At Station 20 I received a crew. I was told to go to Engine 23 to pick-up Spare 39 and wait for orders. On arrival at Engine 23 a crew had already been assigned at Engine 23 and placed it in service as Engine 39. Notifying Battalion 42 of the situation, we were to report to Station 1 for assignment. Arriving at Station 1 we were assigned Unit 7 and boarded an AC transit bus to the fire.

**1400**

Unit 7 arrived at the fire and reported to the Command Center at Country Club and Broadway Terrace. From the Command Center, Units 1-5 and 7 were transported to the intersection of Florence and Modoc, where Units 1-5 were given assignments; Unit 7 was left unassigned. With the group leader not returning, a crew from the Alameda Sheriff's department requested assistance for their lone man on a hose line in the backyard of a home on Florence. We took the line and extended it through 2 backyards to Agnes. We later established a 2 1/2" support line from Alameda. I established a point where a possible fire break could be set-up and maintained without extreme bodily harm to crew. At one point a Piedmont Captain requested us to leave the scene because a fire-line or break would be established at Modoc and not Agnes. Our staying proved beneficial and resulted in the preservation of a number of homes on Agnes and Modoc. Number 43 Agnes was the house chosen as that stopping point because of its structural integrity. That line was maintained.

**1900**

We received a brief rest period of 15 minutes. At this point we came in contact with Engine 19's Engineer and Hose-Wagon 4 which were not in use. Now we had a turret, a booster line, 500' of 5" hose, 100' of 3", a 3" to 5" Siamese and 5" hydrant adapter. We fought fire at the base of the hill to Holy Names High School, at Dulwitch. We joined with the Piedmont Fire Department at the intersection of Julia and Proctor, where we remained for the better part of the night saving a number of homes along Julia and Proctor. Minor clash with a Chief from CDF over hydrant use or as the Chief put it "Don't tie up the hydrant!!"

**0330/21**

We drove the area and saw that all fires of any magnitude were being dealt with. My crew, and a Lieutenant reported to Division Command at Country Club and Broadway Terrace.

**0830**

Crew was relieved to report to Station 1 to be released.

**0700/22**

Reported back to assigned Stations.

**RECALL****TEAM 8/CAPTAIN**

I reported to Engine 1 as part of the Recall. At Engine 1, I signed in and was directed to make up a team, or crew. I received a Lieutenant to act as an Engineer, and Firefighter. We were given the designation - Team 8.

**1600**

We were dispatched with seven other crews via AC Transit bus to Tunnel Command. I reported to Operations who told me to take all crew to Division A to relieve crews on the fire line. BC Division A told me to take the crews to Country Club, Beechwood and Acacia to augment crews on the fire line, not relieve them. This left us without radios, and the teams soon disintegrated. I was never sure who was in charge of this area, perhaps a Battalion Chief from Alameda. We all operated in this area until a firm fire-line was established. Without a radio, it was difficult to get a feel for how things were going.

**2400**

With the fire line holding, we liberated Engine 29. We made up a nine-person crew and went in search of more fire. We were first to relieve Engine 24, but never found them. Along the way we stopped to load hose we found in the street, as we had virtually no equipment. We stopped to put out a few small fires in various dwellings. We were then assigned to a small dead-end street below Hermosa and Broadway Terrace. Here we extinguished a couple of exposure fires, saving three houses that were uninvolved.

We were then directed to relieve Engine 13 at Florence and Modoc. As they were hooked up to a hydrant, we just swapped rigs. We remained at this location for approximately 1 hour, and then went to Branch 3 Command Post for refreshments.

We were then sent to the end of Abbott Way, where we found a 5" lead laying in the street. We hooked up the Pumper and pulled handlines to protect houses in this area. We then reported back to Branch 3.

**0800/21**

We were released.



**RECALL****CREW 10/CAPTAIN**

I was assigned Crew 10 from the staffing pool at Station 1. The crew consisted of myself, Engineer, and 2 Firefighters. We were transported via bus to Country Club and Beechwood where we joined other crews already in operation. The following is a description of our efforts which started approximately one hour before dark:

**1700 to 2000**

My crew advanced 1 1/2" lines into the rear yards of two houses at the intersection of Country Club, Acacia and Beechwood. We protected the above dwellings, threatened by two fully involved dwellings to their immediate rear. As the above buildings became less threatened we moved or laid new lines up Beechwood and onto Glenbrook, where we again protected uninvolvement homes from neighboring fully involved buildings.

**2000 to 2400**

We continued protecting homes on Glenbrook which were being threatened by fully involved homes on Beechwood (it appeared most of Beechwood was burning). Throughout this time period we had to return to numerous homes we had protected earlier to extinguish roof, attic and exterior fires. By about 2200 hours the wind had died down and adequate lines had been placed in the rear yards of the Glenbrook homes to stop any further fire spread from the homes involved on Beechwood. At midnight we were relieved by a mutual aid Strike Team.

**0100 to 0800**

We returned to the Command Post on Broadway Terrace and Beechwood where we staged until released.

**COMMENTS**

Winds

**1700 to 1900**

Very strong with gusts, lots of flying brands.

**1900 to 2100**

Moderately strong.

**2100 - 2400**

Light winds.

Water Supply - Initially supplied by tenders and Engine 26 located on Country Club. Later we were supplied by a pumper which drafted from a swimming pool on Glenwood. From 1700 to 2000 very few lines were available. From 2000 hours on adequate lines were available.

All operations in this report were in conjunction with other crews.

Crew leaders: 2 Captains, and 3 Lieutenants.



**RECALL****ENGINE 8 LIEUTENANT /VALLEJO TASK FORCE 1****1730**

I reported on-duty at Station 1. At that time I was assigned a crew consisting of an Engineer, and 2 Firefighters. We, along with other crews, were bussed to the Staging area on Highway 24. Our crew was assigned to operate with Vallejo Task Force 1, which consisted of three type-1 Engines and a [water] tender. Our assignment was to report to crews already in operation at Broadway Terrace and Pineneedle.

Our Task Force never reached Pineneedle. As we advanced up Broadway Terrace, we were blocked by a Strike Team from Santa Clara which had set up operations just downhill from Uranus. Since we were unable to get further up the hill, we set our defensive operation up at approximately the 11000 block of Broadway Terrace.

The water supply from above was already in use, so we relay-pumped up hill from a hydrant below our position. The major winds had already died down by the time we got into position so we were able to pick homes not too fully involved in flames and try to save them. After extinguishing the fires within reach, our assignment was to knock out hot spots on both sides of the road as far as our lines and water supply would let us.

We stayed on the line with Vallejo throughout the night and rotated out with them to NAS Alameda on October 21st. On Tuesday the 22nd, the Oakland members were released from their assignment to Vallejo. After being released, we were given transportation back to Station 1. The Firefighters went home for much needed rest, Engineer reported on-duty at his own station. I was reassigned to Oakland Operations at NAS Alameda working at Demobilization.

**RECALL****ENGINE 8**

As a recall officer for Engine 8, I took over the command of some apparatus from Highway 24 Staging. The crew was composed of an Engineer and 2 Firefighters. We were assigned to a three-company Task Force of Oakland Fire Department Personnel. The assignment was to protect the Claremont Country Club.

**2300/2330**

We arrived at the Claremont Country Club. The fire was not moving down to our location so we reported to Broadway Terrace Staging.

Division A assigned our Task Force to relieve the crews at Country Club Drive and Avoca. We worked on hot spots for the next 3 to 4 hours. We then picked up hose and returned to Broadway Terrace Command.

**0400/0500??**

We were ordered to rest until morning. At that time, we were assigned to remain on the engine and to report to Station 8 for the next 24 hours.

**RECALL****ENGINE 15/CAPTAIN**

I contacted FDC Dispatch Operations after arriving at Engine 15 and requested that I be allowed to drive my truck to the Montclair area loaded with hose and nozzles. My request was granted, as long as a Firefighter who had also arrived from off-duty, accompany me. This Firefighter and I gathered 3" and 1 1/2" hose and nozzles from Engines 15 and 5. As we made our way up Broadway Terrace, we stopped several mutual aid companies to seek required fittings which were unavailable at the stations.

**Between 1730/1800**

Upon arriving at Broadway Terrace and Uranus, we observed the fire progressing up the western slope threatening homes in the immediate area. I contacted FDC again via a resident's home-phone to inform him of the immediate need for a Strike Team/engine companies. Subsequently, we drove to Engine 6 in search of a 3" WYE and/or reducers. The WYE was obtained. We immediately returned to Broadway Terrace and Uranus to find most of the structures partially to fully involved, threatening to communicate with fire brands and embers to the structures across the street. Our 3" lead from a green-top hydrant (F/O 12001 Broadway Terrace) provided sufficient pressure to operate 2 x 1 1/2' lines with the much needed assistance of 10 to 12 resident/civilian volunteers at the scene for approximately 2 1/2 to 3 hours. This impromptu fire brigade was also joined by 2 off-duty Firefighters who also responded to the area. The situation was becoming more untenable as time passed. Fortunately, an engine company from Mt. View arrived some 2 – 3 hours into the fire operation. Without a reducer they were unable to utilize the hydrant. A charged 1 1/2" line was placed into the tank fill to provide ample pressure and water for the Stang gun. Mountain View Fire relieved us after acquiring a reducer 3" to 2 1/2" from a Montclair resident, who collected at least 20 from old Engine 14 for needed distribution to mutual aid companies. The hose was rolled up, loaded into the pickup and we relocated our operations to Glenwood Glade with 6 of the resident volunteers. We saved several homes by hooking up to a Water Tender from Clayton located in F/O of 52 Glenwood Glade.

**After 2400**

Made brief contact with the Captain of Truck 3 and crew. They provided our crew with a sumptuous dinner and a reducer (3" to 2 1/2"). Our Firefighter and I returned to Broadway Terrace and Uranus.

**0200/21**

We encountered at least 6 mutual aid companies stacked up at Merriewood and Sherwood.

**0900**

We reported to the command post after a pit-stop at Station 15. I was placed on staff status and sent up by chopper by the OFD Chief for video documentation. Our Firefighter returned to Station 15 and I remained on staff the remainder of the day.



**RECALL****ENGINE 40**

On Arrival at Station 1 a Firefighter and I were assigned to an engine from naval supply, our designation was Engine 40. We were told to go to Chabot Rd. where I encountered Division B. He had us work on a building, cooling the surrounding area.

Later we were sent to Margarido and Beechwood area. At this time the engine was having an air-leak problem. The Firefighter and myself assisted other companies in the area. We made stands on several occasions, stopping the fire from consuming the remaining houses on the block. The Firefighter was injured when a cinder blew into his eye. He was sent to the hospital at this point.

I worked the rest of the night with several other Oakland members on a spare rig in the Broadway Terrace area.

**RECALL****ENGINE 16C/LIEUTENANT****1700 to 2000.**

My crew, which included myself and 3 Firefighters, were assembled at Engine 1 and sent to Beechwood and Country Club Drive, via a bus. We assisted several crews at that location in stretching hose-lines, staffing hose-lines and succeeding in stopping the advancement of the fire at that location.

**2000 – 0200**

We continued handling hose-lines and extinguishing as much fire as possible.

**0200 – 0600**

We were at the Broadway Terrace Command Post.

**0600**

We were given Engine 21, along with an Engineer, and instructed by Division A to respond to Buena Vista for a house fire. We extinguished the fire and were then instructed to proceed to Station 21.

**1000**

We went back in service at Station 21.

**1400**

We were relieved and sent home.

**RECALL****ENGINE 16 LIEUTENANT/ENGINE 3**

(Times are approximations.)

**1100**

Off duty at home, observed extremely large column of black smoke from my home in Martinez, called 911 and learned the fire was in Oakland. Equipped myself to respond to the fire and drove in to Oakland. Listening to the radio on the way in, I learned that BART was shut down, and the Caldecott Tunnel was closed to traffic. In Orinda, I found people using the on-ramp to come down off the freeway. Drove past them and showed ID to CHP officer at road-block. He escorted me through the tunnel.

**1130**

On coming out of the Caldecott Tunnel, I observed fire on both sides of the freeway. The wind was blowing hard from the north. The Parkwood Apartments were fully involved and, seeing crews working at the scene, I stopped there to work first. Captain from Engine 16 had finished checking the remaining building to make sure all occupants were clear. The roof was fully involved. I assisted in trying to hook up 5" hose to supply Truck 3 ladder-pipe, but the hose had been burned through, and the replacement hose sprang leaks when it was charged. I then went down to the Command Post at Brookside and Broadway.

**1200**

I found an Engineer at Brookside and Broadway, pumping from the hydrant with Engine 3. I asked him where the rest of the crew was, and he indicated they were working further up on Brookside somewhere. I proceeded up Brookside until I found a Firefighter working alone with Tank wagon 26. He had no water supply other than the tank, so I continued up Brookside to Ocean View, looking for a hydrant. On seeing a resident up on his roof, trying to wet down a pine tree next to his house with a garden hose, I advised him he was in danger as the wind was blowing in that direction and the fire would be working that way soon. He refused to leave at that point. I went back down to the Firefighter and advised him there were no hydrants on the upper end of Brookside. He decided to move the Tank Wagon further down Brookside as we could see the fire would burn across that area, judging by the wind at that time. Houses on East Brookside were beginning to burn by this time. Some people were trying to fight the fire with garden hoses, but the effort was futile. At that point, a S.F. Engine company showed up at Eustice and Brookside. They hooked up to the hydrant on the corner and extended a 3" line to fight the fire on Brookside. However, their hose was too short to really reach the buildings which were burning, so with help from two off-duty Alameda fire fighters, we extended the line further up the street. However, the fire was moving rapidly up and across Brookside by this time and we were forced to pull back down the street. Lines were set up on Eustice to douse the heavy brush and eucalyptus which bordered the College Prep School and houses on that street. Other lines were extended up to houses on the west-side of Brookside. Fire had started in the long, dry grass in backyards of the houses facing on Ocean View, and the wind was



pushing it into the houses on West Brookside above Eustice. I had a line in place there, but the water pressure was hopelessly inadequate at this point, and I could not even reach the fire. I began to extend the line, but then a San Francisco Firefighter told me they were going to pull out to try to get ahead of the fire up on Ocean View and Margarido, so those lines were abandoned. I asked them to wet down the roof of the house on the north corner of Eustice and Brookside before they left, as the shake roof was burning along the porch and front of the house. The fire had passed through there so rapidly that this house and the two behind it were largely undamaged and I didn't want to lose them after all. Everything above that point was fully involved by that time.

The San Francisco crew pulled out. Then Larkspur and San Rafael pulled in, but had no sooner laid out hose, than they got the word to join up with San Francisco, so they left too. I re-joined the two Alameda Firefighters and the Firefighter with Tank Wagon 26. By this time, he had a water supply, but the pressure was still inadequate. The Alameda Firefighters and some civilians were fighting spot fires started by flying embers in the front yards of houses on West Brookside, across from the college. I advised them to watch the wind carefully, as they were working in heavy brush areas, and would be at risk if the wind suddenly shifted. At this point, the Lieutenant from Engine 3 came up to ask for help in moving San Francisco's abandoned 3" hose down to the college as there was a private hydrant on the grounds with good pressure. The brush and eucalyptus on the south side of the college were reigniting. We set up the line with a nozzle off Engine 3 and were able to keep the fire from spreading to the college buildings. This was an important "save" as it kept the fire from spreading down Broadway, and enabled the San Francisco Task Force to narrow the path of the fire in the Margarido/Ocean View area. I asked student volunteers to patrol the perimeter of the college on a regular basis to look for spot fires. This was done with good results. Several small fires were extinguished before they could get out of hand because of their help.

The Lieutenant sustained an eye injury during this effort, and I suggested he go down to the first-aid station at the Command Post for treatment. I told him I would stay with his crew. We were later told he had been taken to the hospital, so I remained with Engine 3 for the rest of the night. Once the college area was secured, I went back up to the street level, and found the house on the corner was still smoldering under the shingles at the edge of the roof. Feeling generally outraged at the number of houses we had already lost, I decided we weren't going to lose the three left on that block. I saw a volunteer pick up the garden hose in the front yard, and asked him to keep playing the hose stream along the roof where it was smoldering until I could get back with an ax and a big line nozzle from Engine 3, which was still pumping down at Broadway and Brookside. I got the ax and nozzle and collected a couple of volunteers on the way back to help pull some more of San Francisco's 3" hose up to the hydrant on the corner of Eustice and Brookside. In the meantime, a man with a private Foam Tanker had wet down the remaining houses on both sides of Brookside at the fire's edge. This was of enormous help in keeping the fire from spreading any further until we could get a line into place. Two Firefighters came up from the College at this point, and I explained I wanted to set up the big line for a water curtain between the last house burning on West Brookside at Eustice and the pink stucco house next door which was still whole. They took care of that side of the



street, while the volunteer and I worked on the roof of the corner house, stripping shingles until all the burning wood was removed and extinguished. The volunteer moved on up the hill, putting out spot fires behind the houses, and I cleared the debris out of the hallway of the house so I could shut the front door in case of looters. By this time, Engine 3 had moved up to where we were working, and the crew continued to wet down the area as best they could, until the houses on fire had largely burned down to the point where we felt they were not going to endanger the remaining buildings on the street. I moved down the street to check on the civilians still working the area. The college was still secure and the school director indicated teachers and students were going to remain on fire watch at the college all night. I told him we would leave the hose and nozzle in place for their use. Moving further down the street, I found the Alameda firefighters had extended hose up West Brookside through yards up to Ocean View and Margarido, and needed a water supply to fight spot fires up there. We dragged more 3" hose into place and hooked it up to the private hydrant at the college to supply that line and I showed the school director how to re-connect his line if necessary as I couldn't locate a siamese to keep both lines going at once. It was dark by the time we left this area and went down to the command post to eat and rest for awhile.

#### **1800**

We were directed to join up with Engine 16, Truck 3, Orinda and Alameda Fire to form a Strike Team and go to Broadway Terrace and Glenwood Glade, above Highway 13. Engine 3 positioned at the hydrant on the corner. We had good pressure and we were able to supply the other three engine companies. The fire was burning on the north-side of Pinewood where there was heavy brush and trees along the houses. Three houses on the south-side were still relatively untouched, though the trees and bushes were burning. Engine 3 took a line up the driveway of the next house up on Broadway Terrace, putting out fire as they went. I then directed them to keep wetting down the roofs of those three houses from the rear, to keep the fire from extending up Broadway Terrace. The Engineer and I assisted Truck 3 and Engine 16 firefighters in extending more lines up through the yards of houses on north Broadway Terrace. Engine 16 took their lines all the way up to Avoca and saved several houses in that area. As we were surrounded on all sides by fire at this time, I began patrolling the whole area at intervals to check on the safety of the various crews fighting fire, to look for rekindled buildings, and to see if the situation was deteriorating, as we could have been trapped in the area if the wind had changed again. We had to move lines back and forth several times during the night as buildings we had not realized were still smoldering suddenly took off again. We remained in this area until relieved by the CDF task force at about midnight or 0030 hours.

#### **0030**

We were directed to go to Engine 24 and wait there until called. We stayed there until about 0430-0500. We were then moved back to the Command Post and remained there until about 0700 or 0730 hours. We were then told to go to Raimondi Park at 18th and Wood and wait until a crew came to relieve us there. We were relieved at about 0900-0930 hours. The relieving crew took us back to Engine 3 as they had to pick up a battery for the portable radio. We went off-duty at about 0930. I returned to Engine 16 and the Captain told me we were to return to work at 0700 the 22st.

**NARRATIVE**

[Note: Narrative of volunteer activity by an employee of EBMUD. He had had previous experience working for the forestry service on wildland fires, and was of considerable help to those of us working the Broadway-Brookside area on the afternoon of 10/20/91. This report was submitted with the previous report from Engine 16's Lieutenant/Engine 3. The information it contains is critical to the understanding of the fire situation. It is printed here accordingly.]

**1100**

I drove quickly over to the 57th and Telegraph freeway entrance and headed east on Highway 24. I debated about getting off at the first exit, but the flames and smoke looked about a mile away, so I went on. Before I got to the next exit, I saw two lanes of cars racing back down the freeway toward me, blaring their horns for us to turn back. Cars were backed up at the freeway exit. I squeezed around them, bullied my way across creeping traffic coming down the frontage road, bumped up over a low curb and parked, put on my boots and hard hat, and grabbed my shovel.

I walked a couple of hundred yards along the freeway, east, then south toward the fire. I went along a steep brushy hillside and could see flames above me, but none below. As the houses came into view, I could see that they were fully involved, a whole block of them. I continued south and downhill, and saw fire creeping slowly down toward a large group of buildings nestled in a brushy, steep little valley. This turned out to be the College Prep School, near Lake Temescal.

The school was deserted. I found a hydrant and standpipe, with pressure, but no hose to hook up to it. I located and began dragging garden hoses toward the line of fire on the east side of the school - Golden Gate. I went back and cleared tangled hose, and turned on the water. The hose had a nice squeeze-type spray nozzle on it. I began spraying the burning line of brush.

I worked along the line of burning brush, knocking down flame, listening to explosions and the roarings of crowning trees getting closer on the hill just above. A eucalyptus roared into flame. Fearing falling branches, or "widow-makers", I dropped my hose and ran about 50 yards. The wind abated, the flames lessened. I returned to the hose and dowsed several burning embers near the edge of the school building before returning to the burning line of brush. I'd lost ground. I retreated along the line I had just dowsed and sprayed out new flare-ups and hot spots, sprayed my heated face and arms, soaked my shirt, and attacked a tangle of brush, the flames about 4 feet high. I heard an explosion and glanced uphill just as two houses collapsed to the ground together, then flared up in a 40 foot bonfire.

Suddenly, there were four more people working alongside me, dragging another garden hose, shoveling. There were no formal introductions, although we did say "hi". Later I found out they worked at the school. For the next hour, we fought the flames as they tried to work their way downhill to the school. I had the last brush line about put out when I felt the hose being jerked



out of my hands. Wind roared up the hill as several trees whooshed into flame. I yelled "no", and the guy yanking on my hose said, "we need it over here. We're about to lose a building." Sure enough, I looked over to the south and saw a fresh 3-foot high advancing line of flame less than 15 feet from the building. As the man who had grabbed my hose battled that line, another man and I scouted the school for more hose. We discovered a small flare-up at the north end of the school. We doused it with fire extinguishers. We rounded up several more.

Fire engines arrived above. A loudspeaker told us, "Get out, evacuate". The wind increased, smoke swirled, there were new and louder explosions. One of the men asked me if I could drive a van out. I said "sure". We went up to the road. There were several school vans parked. On the other side of the road – Eustice – brush burned fiercely. The man was frantically trying to dole out the correct keys to the vans off a key ring as the fire raged. I moved one van downhill and parked it near a police blockade. I then worked my way back up the hill. Two of the others had already parked their vans and come back also. We resumed the fight, now helping Oakland Engine 3 and Engine 16 and wetting down the buildings. This was the 3" line we hooked up to the private hydrant at the school, using hose left by a San Francisco engine and a nozzle off Engine 3. Houses continued to burn and collapse up on the hill. There were crews up there, trying to make a stand at a stucco house and halt the fire spread – on Brookside at Eustice.

The Firefighters' big hoses seemed to have ended the immediate threat to the school. A school worker brought up a case of sodas. We went back to squirting small hot spots and helping the Firefighters direct water above the road toward the burning houses and brush. I walked up the steps at the south entrance to the school – Eustice and Brookside – and rested as I watched the house immediately across the street finish burning and collapse, dragging down power and phone lines. Just south of the steps was a house, still standing, flames licking at the porch roof and the eaves. A garden hose lay in the yard. I knocked down the flames, but the roof line continued to smolder, the fire having worked its way under the shingles.

A man driving a tanker truck full of detergent-foam type suppressant was rolling up hose. He'd come up, from some company, as a volunteer, and was trying to drive the truck, run pumps, drag hose, and fight fire, all by himself – the fire companies had moved out by this time to head off the fire on Margarido Drive and vicinity. I helped him hose down the smoldering roof of the house and roll up his hose. I considered going along with him. We could work as a 2-man crew. But the house was still smoldering. The school might still be in danger. He thanked me and said goodbye and headed down hill.

I climbed up on the roof the the smoking house with an Oakland Firefighter from Engine 16 – the Lieutenant from the previous report. I chopped away with my shovel, she with her ax, for the next hour, digging out all the fire along the roofline and dousing it with the garden hose. Houses continued to burn and collapse just uphill from us – on Brookside. Other crews continued to attack and retreat. I saw trucks from San Rafael, from Larkspur, from San Francisco. **[Note: His time sense is a little off here, this had actually happened before we began working on the roof.**



**Engine 16 Lieutenant]** We got the roof fire completely out, climbed down the trellis, shook hands and said good-bye. She returned to her crew and the firefight across the street. I went behind the house and began dousing hot spots and burning piles of leaves, working my way up to the house next door, cooling down a pile of burning boards, piles of coals, [probably charcoal], a flaming trellis. It began to get dark. I noticed I was hungry, not having eaten all day. I walked down back through the school, said good-bye to the other tired folks. They were arranging a watch to stay all night in case of more flare-ups. I walked back out to my car.

## RECALL

### TRUCK 15 C/FIREFIGHTER

On 10/20/91 I reported on duty on Buena Vista Avenue. I went to Contra Costa Road at #6198. The wind was very strong and the fire was coming up from the east and the west. The heat and fire was so intense that it blew up over the area and I had to retreat to about 6200 Buena Vista Street. I borrowed a chain-saw from a mutual aid company and proceeded to cut down trees around the house at 6200 Buena Vista. I also used garden hoses to put out spot fires and to wet down this house. All the time the fire and winds were swirling very strongly in this area. There were two other houses on the west side that held on which I also cleared brush and wet down. I tried to save a rancher on the east-side of 6200 but the fire broke windows and got inside. I broke the skylight in this house in hopes that it would stop the fire from mushrooming out. It worked. At one time all the lower houses were burning and I retreated to Broadway Terrace and assisted with hose lines in the vicinity of Florence Avenue for about 1 hour. I returned to 6200 Buena Vista and continued protecting the still-standing structures. Most of the time I worked alone.

**RECALL****TRUCK 15****1330**

Recalled to duty from home.

**1430**

Reported to man-power pool at Station 1.

**1540**

Responded to Command Van by A.C. Transit bus with about 30 Firefighters.

**1600**

Responded by bus to area of Country Club Road and Broadway Terrace with about 6 four-person augmentation crews and reported to Division A.

**1620**

Division A ordered relief crews to the area of Country Club Road and Acacia Road. My crew consisted of the following fire personnel: 2 Captains, a Lieutenant, and 2 Firefighters.

Condition: At least a dozen large homes fully involved and another dozen threatened. The different crews spread out and assisted companies already on the scene. We worked hand lines to save one house on the north side of Beechwood and Country Club which kept the houses on the south side of Beechwood from igniting. At this time, winds were blowing about 30-40 mph out of the north-east. Our basic attack was purely defensive.

**1800**

Everyone realized that the fire had gotten behind us and houses on the north-side of Bowling Dr. were burning. At that time I requested additional companies to protect our flank and thereby hold what we had already saved. Division A informed me that the new line of defense was going to be Country Club and Broadway Terrace and that no companies were available. About an hour later I made a similar request noting that with help, we could prevent the fire from jumping Glenbrook Road, thus avoiding an evacuation down to Broadway Terrace. Division A sent us 4 engine companies and a Water Tender. Those companies were deployed along Glenbrook, Bowling and Lincolnshire Drives. I believe the success of that stand was due largely to the slowing of the wind speed. Once the wind calmed down, we converted to a more aggressive attack and were able to save individual houses that were partially burning or were in immediate danger.

**2100**

We found an unused engine – Engine 29 and proceeded to find houses that were saveable along Beechwood and Glenbrook. During this time, we were joined by other Oakland Firefighters that were not committed to another assignment. We continued to work in this area until

around midnight and then proceeded to Division A Command Post for food and a little rest.

**0100/21**

Engine 29 with a crew of 9 was ordered to relieve Engine 24 in the area of Hermosa and Broadway Terrace. We extinguished 2 house fires on a small court off of Broadway Terrace just below Hermosa. We then received orders to relieve Engine 13 in the area of Harbord Drive and Modoc. We worked in that area for about an hour and then returned to Division A Command Post to await further orders.

**0300**

We were ordered by Division A to head a Task Force and proceed to the end of Abbott Dr. (Piedmont) and set up lines of protection for the houses threatened by the fire moving down the canyon from Maxwelton. We stayed in this area wetting down brush until the fire died out.

**0800**

Now using Engine 13, we returned to Division A Command Post for another assignment. We then spotted several small fires burning around Acacia, Lincolnshire and Glenbrook Drives and proceeded to overhaul the structures on those streets.

**0930**

Upon returning to Division A Command Post, Division V ordered us to deliver Engine 13 back to its quarters and the crew was to report to Alameda Naval Air Station for rest. I returned home at about 1130.



**RECALL****TRUCK 15/CAPTAIN**

I drove in from home on Highway 24. I stopped at Caldecott Lane, and met with the captains from Engine 16, and Truck 3 withdrawing from the Parkwood Apartments. We conferred on the feasibility of saving any of the buildings. I left to find the Command Post and request assistance. At the Command Post, I informed the Director of Training of the situation at the Parkwood Apartments. At this time he gave me his radio and appointed me "College Prep Division" and assigned a San Francisco Task Force under San Francisco Battalion 3 to my division. He started up Brookside to Eustice while I took San Francisco Engine 8 upwind to Golden Gate to extinguish spot fires threatening the unfinished building at the northeast corner of the school. The spot fire was extinguished by civilians while San Francisco Engine 8 used their tank on a brush fire on Broadway above Golden Gate exposing houses on Buena Vista Place.

I scouted up the stairs to Buena Vista and Buena Vista Place. A Lieutenant and other crews were being hampered by a lack of water pressure, but otherwise holding several structure fires. An Engineer at Golden Gate and Broadway was pumping with zero incoming pressure and unable to supply more. I then checked with a Lieutenant and crew at Eustice and Golden Gate. He was attempting to hold several structures with one crew. I went to the San Francisco Battalion 3 at Eustice and Brookside and brought another San Francisco engine company to Eustice and Golden Gate. We attempted to position this pumper 100' south on Golden Gate and utilize the monitor. This was unsuccessful because of lack of water.

At this time, the entire curve above Eustice ignited; 10 to 15 buildings with surrounding eucalyptus trees, forcing us back from the intersection. With the volatile College Prep canyon behind us, I decided to retreat to Golden Gate and Broadway. I then assigned a Lieutenant to go back up Golden Gate to Buena Vista and assist the other Lieutenant, and reassigned the San Francisco companies to San Francisco Battalion 3 at Brookside and Eustice. I warned companies operating downwind from Golden Gate of the intensity of the fire and we evaluated the upper curve of Brookside.

I then used a make-up company of volunteers and a San Francisco pumper to attack two structures halfway between Broadway and Eustice on Brookside. These two structures were 300' north of a line I thought we could hold going west from Eustice and Brookside. We were joined by a San Francisco engine crew and knocked down the two structures. We followed the fire up to houses on the back of Oceanside, extending hoses and using buckets and swimming-pool water to stop fires in the back of houses on Oceanview.

I scouted Oceanview to the south to Manchester and decided to try to move some companies to make a stand at Oceanview and Manchester. On returning to Eustice and Brookside, I was informed that civilian and Firefighter crews were holding the College Prep canyon between Broadway and Eustice, Golden Gate and Brookside, enabling us to move downwind. Arriving at Eustice and Brookside, San Francisco Battalion 3 informed me that he had been named Di-

vision G supervisor and had been assigned a Task Force from Marin County. A Fairview Captain also had been designated a division supervisor. We subordinated ourselves to Division G.

We established a perimeter on Brookside at Eustice, leaving units to hold the north spread on Brookside and to move up between houses to Oceanview. We drove in the Chief's buggy to Oceanview and Manchester via Broadway and positioned Marin County units at that intersection and 200' west on Manchester to cut off the fire on Oceanview and Manchester. The Marin County units operated downhill to the back of houses on Margarido.

I scouted down Margarido to the hydrant near Rockridge Blvd. South. We backed a San Francisco pumper in and laid hose from the hydrant back up Margarido. San Francisco crews extinguished an apartment house on the east-side of Margarido and were working on structures on Manchester when the water failed and a house further north on Margarido ignited. Marin County crews operating on the back of the house from Manchester were entirely without water pressure and unable to control the structure.

Division G with assistance from a Captain, set up a 5" relay from Broadway and Oceanview. The first pumper had problems, but was quickly replaced. By this time, the crews on Margarido were in full retreat. Restored water pressure and fresh San Francisco crews enabled us to set up portable hydrants on Margarido and attack and suppress the house fire, saving the structures near the original hydrant.

Contact had been made with Oakland crews further down Rockridge before the retreat. This was reestablished and the north perimeter tied together at this point.

I returned to the Command Post and was assigned Logistics. After an hour, I was reassigned as Branch 2 Staging Manager at Moraga and Thornhill. I remained there for two shifts, working for the Branch chiefs. I escorted the off-going shift to NAS Alameda and checked out with the Aerial Observer (Battalion Chief 4-B) 2300 October 21st.

**VAC REL/ENGINEER**

**1200**

Responded to Engine 1. I was sent to 16th and Market Street (Lafayette School) where I established Helibase 1 with a portable radio: Eagle 5 – East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP), and CHP 30 were landed. Eagle 5 was used for fire observation, and the CHP 30 was used for possible Medivac.

**1455**

CHP 30 returned to Napa airport for a shift change.

**1550**

CHP 30 returned with a fresh crew.

**1555**

I received a radio message to dispatch CHP 30 for a medivac pick-up at Westmoreland and Norfolk. After their departure, I was sent to Raimondi Park to help establish Helibase 2. On arrival, I assisted in coordinating Raimondi Base, as Strike Teams came down from Engine 1. Arrivals were then directed to Raimondi as the main Base Camp.

**0900/21**

Returned home.



**FIRE INSPECTOR**

Assigned to Operations at 1400 hours for FDC Dispatch Operations.

- Arranged for 12 portable toilets to be delivered to the Command Post.
- Set up with Salvation Army to feed all Firefighters in the field on the line and at the Command Post. Also, arranged for food to be delivered to evacuation centers (5,000 sandwiches made and distributed for October 21, 1991)
- Get batteries for portable radios - had Radio Shop Supervisor bring 52 batteries and four (4) charges to Operations. He and the Inspector then transported them to the Command Post with a generator.
- Arranged with the Red Cross to provide 1,000 hot breakfasts October 21, 1991, Made 5,000.
- O.G.S. Shop Supervisor staffed radio for constant contact between O.P.S. and Shop. Provided fuel, 3 mechanics, tire truck, and set up portable shop at staging and Command Post.
- Contacted evacuation site to see if canteen that was there could be moved up to the fire ground to feed Firefighters.
- Talked with a Major on what OFD's needs might be.
- Directed Pac Bell to install one hard line for direct contact between Chief and Fire OPS; another direct line between OPS and 18th and Wood; eight (8) phone lines at Engine 1 for the press; four (4) phone lines for fire fighter's use in Prevention 4 conference room; six (6) phone lines at 18th and Wood initial base.
- Have Shop send standby mechanic to 18th and Wood.
- Establish contact with OGS on what our needs were to date. Had him arrange for more fuel with Gallagher and Burke.
- 500 cots/sleeping bags arranged to be delivered to base from CDF in Santa Rosa.
- Called to arrange for 200 pounds of ice to be sent to the Command Post at Fish Ranch and Grizzly Peak.
- Contacted Shop through FDC of new change in location for Command Post at Fish Ranch Road and Grizzly Peak.

## **5. CHRONOLOGY OF ENGINE COMPANIES    THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE**

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- Had driver from Gallagher and Burke take 1,000 gallons of diesel fuel to Grizzly Peak and Skyline from 7100 Mountain Blvd. escorted by a Firefighter.
- Arranged for Base Lieutenant Towner to have Firefighters assigned to Base 1 at 18th and Wood for support.
- Accepted 47 cases of sodas from a beverage company.
- Arranged for five (5) more portable toilets to be delivered to Command Van.
- Arranged for the feeding of seven (7) divisions on fire line - 200 fire personnel per division. Sandwiches made at Engine 1 by USCG Cooks and delivered by USCG, Navy and volunteers.
- Arrange for tanker containing 300 gas and 1200 diesel supplied by USMC to Command Post.
- Acting Inspector contacted Oakland Airport Fire Department, Chief for amount and type of fuel we could get from them. Secured 300 gallons of unleaded, 1,000 gallons of 100% octane low lead.
- USMC Captain arranged to supply four (4) G.P. Tents, generator, lights, diesel fuel, 1,000 box lunches, four (4) ton trucks for hauling.
- O.G.S. have garbage cans delivered to 18th and Wood.
- Accepted a load of 125 cases of sodas and 16 pallets of drinking water.
- Call for water and ice from fire ground.
- Had FDC call Shop 2 send new command post.
- Arranged for portable office, generator and light plant from OGS to Command Center at NAS - Alameda.
- Called to get 12 single line phone sets.
- Had FDC call Shop 2, new Command Post at Broadway Terrace and Country Club Road.
- Accept 16 pallets of water from Safeway. Had water distributed between seven (7) divisions, 18th and Wood, and delivered.
- Ordered 12 portable toilets for 18th and Wood.

- Met CDF logistics staff and explained what we had done and where we were to date. I was told he was the person from the State to do the ordering and that he would take over all ordering of supplies and equipment until the end of the incident. Operation moved to NAS Alameda at approximately 0800 hours.

## **DAY TWO**

- Call from OGS, have 50 people at Corp Yard needing to be fed. Arranged with Salvation Army.
- Have FDC notify Shop 2 of new Command Post at Highway 24 and Broadway.
- Had 30 shower and basins delivered by OGS to NAS Alameda and three (3) or four (4) phones for the press.
- Met with RSVP catering who offered her services to feed Firefighters. Contacted Safeway and arranged delivery of food stuff so she could prepare dinner for 180 Firefighters in Oakland Fire Houses.
- Called Lieutenant at 18th and Wood to see what he has and needs.
- Sent driver from Gallagher and Burke to fuel rigs at Pinewood and Broadway Terrace and Margarido and Acacia.
- Met with DMIA, accepting delivery of fuel, sent fuel to 18th and Wood.



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**6. Reports from the Oakland Fire Department Officers and Other Fire Personnel**

The reports from the Oakland Engine/Truck Companies represent the most complete information coming out of the fire scene, but they do not explain how or why they were deployed in their respective locations. Reports from the fire officers and other officials making major decisions about fire-personnel deployment can close the gaps that might be lingering about why certain areas of the fire were covered, and why other areas of the fire lacked significant personnel.

Presenting some of these questions leads the reader to ask others, and there are no guarantees that all questions will be answered. A simplistic response to "... why upper Broadway and not Hiller Highlands. . ." becomes irresponsible. There are no simple answers to any of the questions about the fire. What these reports hope to clarify are some of the complexities that fire officials had to deal with in making decisions about how to fight the fire.

Another interesting point to keep in mind when reading these reports is that many fire officers could not get through to the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) nor to the Incident Command (IC). The decision-making procedures were followed as each fire officer saw fit, given the situations and problems expanding in their significant locations.

Towards the close of Sunday, October 20, 1991, the IC had secured a strong position about how fire-suppression forces were doing in particular areas: there were heavily laid lines in some areas, staying the advance of the fire to a particular perimeter. There were other areas of the fire which were more tenuous. Decisions were more easily made when responding to significant facts about the fire's perimeters, and these facts about the fire came piecemeal throughout the duration of the day.

Read these reports as a first-line commentary as to why the fire was fought as it was.

The following Oakland Fire Department (OFD) officers as well as California Department of Forestry (CDF) personnel, East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP), and the Oakland Police Department are presented in this section. Their formal ranks were temporarily superseded by their fire-command responsibilities during the fire. Each officer's rank is listed, followed by their respective duty/duties during the fire.

- OFD Assistant Chief Battalion 2-A – Incident Command/Operations
- OFD Assistant Chief Battalion 2-C – Incident Command
- OFD Battalion Chief 3-A – Dispatch Incident Command
- OFD Battalion Chief 3-B – Dispatch Operations
- OFD Battalion Chief 3-C – Battalion 44, Division A
- OFD Battalion Chief 4-B – Aerial Observer
- OFD Battalion Chief/Director of Training – Division B, Branch 3
- OFD Captain of Training – Division C
- OFD Captain of Training – Dispatch Captain

- California Department of Forestry Battalion Chief 2 – Branch 2  
and Retired OFD Assistant Chief
- California Department of Forestry Battalion Chief – Plans Chief
- East Bay Regional Parks Park Supervisor
- Oakland Police Department – Lieutenant/Watch Command



**Oakland Fire Department Assistant Chief – Incident Command/Operations****Saturday, October 19, 1991****1230**

I was recalled from home on the second alarm, and I responded to headquarters and stayed for 3 to 4 hours.

As I was coming in from Moraga, I could see that there was a pretty good-sized column of smoke on a fire that had escalated into a 5-alarm. The good thing about the fire was that the smoke column was going straight up, meaning there was no wind. The fire was running up the hill to the Gwinn Tank. I talked to the Assistant Chief (when he returned that afternoon) and discussed the fire, the water supply, and mutual aid, which seemed to have gone really well. There were a lot of helicopters coming from Lake Temescal. I returned home and started monitoring the California Department of Forestry (CDF); they were predicting a red-flag alert for Sunday with gusting north-easterly winds in the coast ranges. This didn't sound good, because this was the culmination of 5 years of drought, and it was only October with no rain.

**Sunday October 20, 1991****0700**

There was a calm in Moraga and the Caldecott Tunnel. At the change of shifts, I discussed with the other Assistant Chief, and Battalion 3 Chiefs, the weather conditions and their potential. I decided to run a Patrol 28. This involves hiring 2 Firefighters to run a brush rig. There was a staffing problem that day. We were having a hard time getting even the minimum amount of people for that shift. The total number of fire personnel per shift is 126. We had to call some promoted people to fill Firefighter positions. This all occurred before 0800. This was urgent. I told Engine 21 (who hires overtime personnel) we really needed to get two more people. I also got calls from some of the hill companies who were reporting that the easterly winds were beginning to blowing over the ridge.

**0800 – 0830**

During roll-call, when we size-up our staffing, I received another call from an off-duty Chief that we were going to have a bad day. I called one of the stations to find out about overtime. The Lieutenant from Engine 24 said that they were going to go up with Engine 19 to the scene of Saturday's fire, to pick up hose which was left, and to look over the fire scene. The Assistant Chief from the previous day's fire had said just that morning that the fire area had been checked thoroughly during the night and that there were no hot spots. He didn't think that we had any problems. He said it was cold the night before, that they had checked.

We couldn't find those 2 Firefighters for Patrol 28. I was trying to figure out where to get a couple of detail people. I had detailed a man from [Engine] 15 up to get a spare brush rig and take it up to Station 6 to get ready for the patrol. I was about ready to detail when Station 21 told me that they had dug out 2 Firefighters that were willing to work 10 hours that day to run

the patrol. I told them to get up to Station 6. I told Engine 24 when he informed me that he was going to go up with Engine 19, to be sure to stay in service, that the wind condition was going to get worse. And that it was a real bad fire hazard time. He assured me he would – that there would be 2 engines up there if anything should break.

**0840 – 0850**

I was listening to my monitor when I heard that Engine 19 had detected 2 hot spots in the middle of the burn area, and that they would have to dig them out. Both Engine 19 and Engine 24 were going to go out of service. I determined I was going to go up and see how bad the wind was, so I got in my car and left.

**0854**

Responded to the Gwinn Tank to observe progress of the overhaul operations. During this time I told fire alarm to cover-in Engine 16 to 24. I wanted to keep the hill companies covered.

**0900 (approximately)**

I got up there really quickly. The wind was starting to blow from the east 20-30 mph – a very dry warm wind. I could see they had several minor hot spots which they were working, and that there really shouldn't be a problem because there were lines which were already laid, including a couple down from the hydrant at the top of the Gwinn Tank. There were a couple of lines that could be hooked up quickly for water. It was basically a dig-out job, however I called dispatch again and told them that East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP) should really come out to retrieve their hose. Engine 19 or Engine 24 had already called them, but I called again saying that we didn't have the fire personnel to pick up thousands of feet of hose, and to overhaul as well. I decided that there was more work for more than just 2 engines, so I called Engine 16 to the scene. Engine 16 was enroute to cover Engine 24. Engine 16 responded. I called fire alarm for Engine 8 to cover [Engine] 19 to keep someone up there. I was thinking about other cover-ins. At this time, it looked like a routine overhaul. They were working on about 70 degree slopes. It's difficult to climb around and dig. The third engine could be used in this situation.

**0915 – 0930**

The winds accelerated. EBRP came up, and I told them what the situation was. I told them that I didn't bring them up to overhaul, because that wasn't their property. They did find hot spots in the middle of the burn area, so they went to work on the hot spots.

**0930**

The winds were really getting bad, so I radioed to the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC), and told them to send a printer message that Patrol 28 was in service patrolling north from 6 Engine due to extreme fire hazard conditions in the hills. I also told FDC to tell Battalion 3 and Battalion 4 to each select a flat-land engine company to patrol the ridges – mainly Skyline Blvd. Engine 4 and Engine 27 became these patrols. The Tunnel Incident Command (IC) reestablished with Engine 19, Engine 24, Engine 16, and Battalion 2 Tunnel Command.



**0930 – 1000**

During this next half-hour, it appeared that the hot spots were all being taken care of, that they were cold, and that there was no more smoke showing.

**1000/1015**

When everything appeared to be under control again, and EBRP had their 2 crews there, working on things and picking up their hose, I left the scene and turned the fire situation over to Engine 19, and Engine 19 became Tunnel Command. I told him that if anything starts outside of the burn area, get a full first alarm assignment. The wind was getting really bad. By the time I left, it must have been 30-40 mph blowing from the north-east. These were the Diablo winds – dry easterly winds blowing out of the valley.

A brush fire was reported in Ridgemont, which is east off of Skyline about 5-6 miles, and a full assignment was sent. At this same time, either Battalion 3 or Battalion 4 was asking whether Argus (the Oakland Police helicopter) was in the area. The police helicopter was not in service – it was not flying [on Sunday]. Engine 27 which was patrolling the hills, found the fire in Ridgemont and took care of it. The comment was made that the winds were strong in the East-Oakland hills as well. At the same time, I had a discussion with the personnel officer about taking Engine 18 to the Drill Tower for training. I thought it was a bad idea considering the fire potential in the hills. Another Truck and an Engine company were tied up with a woman trapped under her car.

I returned to engine quarters via Engine 6, just to see how the wind was in that location, and discussed the patrol with them. The wind was really bad at Engine 6. I left there and went all the way back to Station 1. Engine 1 Captain asked me how it looked up there. I said that if anything started up there today we would be in deep trouble. There are gale-force conditions up there.

**1058**

Immediately I heard Engine 19 Lieutenant on the radio saying "Urgent, we need a full assignment up here, we have a fire outside of the burn in the unburned area. He also said to notify CDF. That the fire was in the same place as Saturday.

**1100**

I responded from Station 1 on-call for the first alarm, and immediately following the second alarm was called by Engine 19 for a flare-up in the unburned area above Buckingham Blvd. I hit Highway 24 going back up, but I couldn't see any real smoke. It wasn't billowing, so I assumed it was hiding in the ravine. I got on the radio to FDC and I told them to make sure to notify CDF and inform them that we needed mutual aid for a wildland fire in their threat zone (the SRA – State Responsibility Area – which is anything on the other side of Grizzly Peak). On the way up Highway 24, just past Temescal, I saw a little smoke. I pulled a third alarm assignment due to size-ups being given by Tunnel Incident Command (IC) Engine 19. Changed response route to Grizzly Peak Blvd. via the Hiller Highlands due to a back-up of traffic at the Tunnel and requested from Engine 19 a spot progress of fire from the top. Engine 19 wanted



me on top, because he couldn't see where the fire was going. So I was going up to the scene to set up the Command Post.

**1115**

Arrived at Grizzly Peak and Marlborough, and turned over by the water tank [Gwinn Tank] where I had been that morning. The fire looked like it was running up the hill, so I stayed on Grizzly Peak. I got out and I looked down, and saw that the fire was coming up the hill very quickly, at least on one side of the hill near Gwinn Tank, and also on the south flank running up against the wind. From the extent of the fire from the top of the hill, I ordered a fourth alarm. When I tried to set up a position on the side of the road near the water tank, the pine trees and the eucalyptus trees caught on fire, and the fire went clear over the car. I had to leave and drive down further east on Grizzly Peak. This happened a second time. The fire was crossing Grizzly Peak and up against the wind towards the engine companies on Marlborough Terrace and Buckingham Blvd., down-hill and laterally.

**1130**

I called for a sixth alarm – the maximum. At the same time I asked to check on CDF for air support at least once or twice. My initial strategy was to get engine companies all around on the streets to protect the houses. We needed air support to do that. The engine companies would get overrun, without the bombers cutting a line around it. This fire was in a ravine (or drainage system) bounded by Grizzly Peak, Marlborough Terrace, and Buckingham Blvd. At this time (right after the sixth alarm), I ordered 5 or 10 engines on mutual aid. I also called for an extra Battalion Chief.

Took command as IC, and directed Battalion Chief 4-A to take charge of the Buckingham area as Division A and ordered an additional chief officer to respond, intending to make him Division B on Marlborough Terrace. Directed incoming companies to Marlborough and Buckingham in response to requests from Engine 19 and Engine 24. The other Assistant Chief was the additional chief responding, and asking about the Command Post vehicle. The Command Van should be in the same location as the day before – at the mouth of the Caldecott Tunnel. All of this conversation was going on back and forth on three different channels. The other Assistant Chief was directed to stay with the Command Van down below. I reaffirmed the need for massive CDF air support, and I wanted an ETA on the air support.

Placed companies to protect Grizzly Peak Estates homes and put the Captain of Engine 15 in charge of that sector. Ordered the Hill Area Disaster Plan to be activated. This was the first time we did this. The Plan is supposed to activate all of the city departments, to set up evacuations, and emergency mode operations, and told the other Assistant Chief to assume Tunnel Command as my position had become untenable. I headed for the Command Post location via Grizzly Peak Blvd., Skyline, and Broadway Terrace, using the car's Public Announcement (PA) system to warn fire-on-lookers to prepare to evacuate. Noticed a tremendous increase in the size and speed of the smoke column (downhill and west, making it impossible to see the fire perimeter or front. At this time, I told FDC that this thing was running wild, that we had about 100 acres burning, houses, brush, and trees were burning in different spots. The fire

was leaving the area of the drainage systems, and heading down to the Parkwood Apartments and the Highway 24 corridor, which is a huge wind tunnel.

At this same time, engine companies started showing up from Claremont and Grizzly [Peak]. Engine 15, Truck 15, Engine 6. I told Engine 15 to save the 2 houses behind the Gwinn Tank. The fire was flashing over Grizzly Peak, and going up the hill. Each time the fire would cross Grizzly Peak, it would move further and further east. I figured that the next place that it was going to go was Grizzly [Peak] Terrace (Estates). They had good water and hydrants, so I thought we could save them. I assigned these engines to the Grizzly Terrace area. Engine 6 Pumper was there, and Engine 21 showed up. These engine companies stayed in this area for several hours saving the Grizzly Terrace area. I had FDC notify Orinda about help since the fire was heading in that direction.

I was in constant communication with the other Assistant Chief, talking about saving the Parkwood Apartments. I couldn't see them from where I was, but he could, and they were starting to go. The area of Bay Forest Drive was also in the path of the fire.

At this time I passed Command to the other Assistant Chief, and I headed down to the Command Van. I took Grizzly Peak to Skyline, down Skyline to Broadway Terrace, and I was going to continue down Bay Forest Drive, but it looked untenable. There was so much smoke, it looked impassable. As I was driving down Broadway Terrace, I was making size-ups and assessments, and at the same time telling people to evacuate. People were jogging and taking pictures of the fire.

During that time, we had severe problems with the amount of channels we had for communication – there were tremendous tactical messages. Everyone at the original scene was trying to get through with messages, and everyone was talking on top of each other, trying to talk to Command and trying to talk to each other. The channels were saturated.

When I got down to the Warren Freeway, I thought I knew where the Command Van was – at the mouth of the Tunnel. But I found the Command Van on Broadway at the power plant next to Lake Temescal. Command had told me that it had become so dangerous, that they had to move it to this new location. This was the second location of the Command Van. When I got to the Command Van, the Chief of the Oakland Fire Department was there, with Command, and with some other people. As I looked up, I saw the fire cross over into the forest before the soccer field, and then jump across the soccer field with a huge mass of material, and then that hill took off. There were masses of people on a knoll under the high-voltage lines watching the fire. We got on the PA system telling them to evacuate. At that same time the fire climbed the hill and the powerlines exploded. The people ran for their lives. We needed to move the Command Van out of that area because of the power plant. We decided to move it in the middle of the freeway, since they had shut the freeway down. We moved the Van on Broadway over Golden Gate on Brookside Drive. The sky was black, and all of the freeway brush had taken off. The Command Van stayed at this location until 0300.



The Incident Command was beginning operations procedures. I was formally made Operations Chief. The OFD Chief and the other Assistant Chief became Command. We were relaying orders for mutual aid, and ordering Strike Teams. Sending Strike Teams to Divisions or sectors. Battalion 44 had a whole new fire in the Rockridge area, and he kept calling for Strike Teams and mutual aid. In addition, we needed to provide equipment and resources to all the other fire fronts. We were continually calling for help, and dispatching those resources which we had. This went on hour after hour; this was a non-ending call for aid. Battalion 44 could have used 100 engine companies where he was.

The channels were all jammed. Most of the time, one couldn't get through to FDC – Oakland 2 or Oakland 1. We were trying to keep volunteers out of the area, since flying embers and debris were constantly in the air.

All throughout the day, we were getting calls about people losing their water supply. The reservoirs were supposed to be 80% full. Couldn't figure out why this happened. It could have been a combination of the fire-flow, the hydrants being used to fight the fire early on, the pipes running wide open in houses which were burning, which could have put a big drain on the system. The pumping plants had problems with filling their reservoirs after the power had been turned off. Some of the original calls for water came early on, before 1200.

We had communication problems. We spent many hours of trying to ascertain how many Strike Teams had been ordered, who was coming, what the ETA's were for the Strike Teams, and where these Strike Teams would be assigned – in Branches and Divisions.

Battalion 44 had his own conflagration in the Rockridge area, and he was calling for all kinds of help, and we just couldn't give it to him, because we didn't have it. The Strike Teams don't come as quickly as you call them.

During the course of the fire, we moved the Operations section of IC into the Haz-Mat Van, which was on the scene. It was easier to handle Operations there.

There was a lot of misinformation being put out. People were reporting that there were Strike Teams going up Shepherd Canyon, and that the helicopters had said that the fire was crossing Redwood Road. Other people were giving out this information, but we couldn't figure out where the information was originating from. This was a false report. The Strike Teams which were seen going over to Shepherd Canyon were responding to 2 other major fires near Moraga. There was the Franklin Canyon fire, where we got a couple of bombers (air support). Their consolidated Chief diverted some of their bombers, because he had been monitoring our fire, and knew we needed that air support. He decided to let Franklin burn. The Franklin fire was eventually put out by ground crews. This occurred very late – 1330 – 1400 in the afternoon. The only communication I had with air support was with CDF helicopter 106 from Lexington Dam. I had talked to them when I was up on Grizzly Peak, telling them where a good landing strip was. I then lost communications with them because of the channel traffic.



We wanted to keep the fire from going past Broadway. But until the wind died down (2000 – 2100), the problem was that burning embers would fly past blocks and blocks [of houses], to where there were no engine companies. Because of the dryness, the backyards and fences, the dry and dead hedges would catch on fire. The streets would be ablaze before engine companies could deal with them. We were playing catch-up with the wind, and it just wasn't possible to continue this. We had a real break when the winds started to calm down.

We were trying to get a resource list together of where everybody was, and what was available. In a normal situation, calling wouldn't be a problem, but all of our communication lines were clogged up. For several hours up until around midnight, I was trying to run Operations with help from several different people. I was relieved by a Chief from Dority Fire District. He became Operations for several hours. There were also CDF and OES people available.

**2400 – 0100/21**

There were briefings at midnight through 0100. I was told to head back to headquarters, that there were enough fresh people to handle things, that the fire had been contained. I don't really know whether it was really contained, because there were houses which were really burning badly. Everyone expected the wind to come up again but it didn't.

**0300**

The Captain from FDC drove me to headquarters, but there was no place to lie down, the place was packed. I needed to rest so he drove me to a hotel, where I spent the next few hours.

**0700 – 2100**

Went back to headquarters. I was asked if I could handle Battalion 2 for that day. I said yes. I became regular Battalion 2 handling the rest of the city. There were several building fires that day, none of which had anything to do with the Tunnel Fire.

**2100**

Dispatch Operations came in and took over Battalion 2 Operations, so that I could go home and rest.

**October 23, 1991**

Mutual aid was still putting out a lot of hot spots, and during the evening hours, the hills would be glowing with the embers being dug out with mop-up operations.

**Oakland Fire Department Assistant Chief – Incident Command****0800**

I was on duty Saturday, October 19th, and was relieved of duty at 0700 Sunday October 20th. I left Station 1 at about 0800, and arrived at home. There were strong east winds when I arrived at home. I called down to the on-duty Assistant Chief that the winds were intense. At that time, he had been dispatched, so the Captain from Engine 1 answered the phone, and took the message.

**0945**

I went out for breakfast, and my pager went off.

**Third alarm**

I called the FDC on the radio in the car and found out there was a third alarm in the same location as the day before – 7151 Buckingham. I was enroute to the area to set up the Command Post at the same location as the previous day – the off-ramp of Highway 24 and Broadway. I arrived at that location and inquired about the fourth alarm. FDC had already sent out the fourth alarm, and in the process I heard the Assistant Chief ask for a sixth alarm, and he reconfirmed this order with FDC. It took a long time for the Command Van to arrive at the location. (The original order location for the Command Van on Sunday was Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace.) I informed the Assistant Chief that I couldn't see the movement of the fire. I was monitoring Channel 2. The fire started exploding up the canyon in a north direction towards the [Gwinn] Tank. It was running north-east, but it was also running against the winds which were north-east. The fire reached the top of Grizzly Peak, and then reversed and went in a southerly direction in a rapid pace. It reached the Parkwood Apartments, and then headed due west. This happened in a matter of minutes – approximately 15 minutes.

The fire had already jumped across Marlborough before it reached the Parkwood Apartments. Marlborough was burning before Parkwood. I sent 3 companies – Truck 3, Engine 1, and Engine 16 to Parkwood. This was before the buildings were involved. I sent for the Oakland Police Department (OPD) to evacuate those buildings.

The Command Van had to be moved when the brush along the freeway started to burn. At this same time, the fire was already moving towards Swainland and Ruthland. When the fire was coming down the ridge where the power lines are, the fire would skip 300-400 yards and then would explode in flame as it was running down the ridge. The power lines were blowing [up]. The smoke was terrible.

The Command Van had to be moved for a third time. The San Francisco Fire Department was already on the scene when the Command Van was moved to the third location.

The fire proceeded to jump Lake Temescal probably due to the lower elevation.

There was a priority for the helicopter when we were going to move the Command Van to the



third location.

We had asked for the freeway to be shut down when we were at the original location of the Command Van. It took a very long time for the CHP to shut down the freeway. There were cars still on the freeway at 1145. They (the CHP) had originally only wanted the freeway shut down going east. I had to explain to them that when cars are coming out of the freeway, you do not want people seeing a firestorm, which would create traffic accidents on the freeway. The freeway was shut down on the Orinda-side of the freeway. People were still evacuating on to the freeway.

Highway 13 was also turned into a one-way-out evacuation route. In planning evacuation orders for the Oakland Police Department, I had to think about how far the fire might spread. I initially thought that if the fire wasn't going to be stopped at Broadway Terrace, that people needed to be evacuated as far away as Shepherd Canyon. Those were the orders I gave to the OPD. Whether people actually evacuated that far out is still not known. Residents were really resistant to the evacuation orders. **[Note: The Aerial Observer made the same comment when he advised evacuation procedures from the Argus Helicopter.]** It would have taken just a slight wind-shift to have had the fire proceed past Broadway Terrace. The fire would have taken off. The massive helicopter and air strikes were essential to keep the fire from spreading. The plan was to slow the fire with the air drops until the Strike Teams arrived on the scene at both the top and the bottom of Broadway Terrace. When Strike Teams arrived, the air and the ground crew were important together.

I needed to get a hold of Orinda for Strike Teams to go up Grizzly Peak once the fire crossed that area. But there are no Strike Teams available from Orinda. Orinda doesn't ordinarily have Strike Teams.

Because of previous fires in the Oakland Hills area, and where the winds carried fire, I knew the winds would carry this fire towards the Claremont Hotel area. I sent the Captain of Training to the Claremont area and assigned him Division C. I sent the second San Francisco Strike Team to the Claremont to set up a water curtain behind the Claremont to protect the area. **[Note: The first San Francisco Strike Team was sent to the Rockridge area.]** There were enough engine companies there – and with San Francisco sending 2 bus-loads of crew – that the Claremont area seemed secured for an attack. Berkeley engine companies were also in the Claremont area. The air tankers were running up and down Claremont Blvd. The reason why the air tankers could operate there and not in other areas is because of the wind and how it was blowing the smoke. Fixed-wing aircraft tankers need visibility – they need to see what they are dropping water on. They were successful in operating around the perimeter of the fire, especially in this area because of the visual clarity.

I sent the Director of Training to the Chabot Road area, and gave him 3 engines to start with – those were the only engines available at that time. Within a couple of hours, he came back with good news that the fire was being kept in the perimeter. Sectoring divisions in the fire came fairly early. In the beginning, Operations had assigned Division A to Battalion Chief 4-A



on Marlborough Terrace. Soon after the fire spread, the Grizzly Peak area became Division A, and Buckingham Blvd. became Division B. Those divisions changed.

Battalion 44 was Division A – Rockridge

[Director of Training was Division B – Chabot Road area]

Captain of Training was Division C – Claremont Hotel

Captain Engine 1 – Division D

CDF Battalion Chief and the retired OFD Assistant Chief became Branch 2 Command – the upper Broadway Terrace area

The freeways determined the perimeters of the Branches.

**Note:** There was some concern about the Claremont Hotel area. The Berkeley Fire Department wanted Division C to give up his San Francisco Strike Team resources so that the Strike Team could help Berkeley. Division C refused to give those resources up. Given the outcome of the fire-fight, Division C had made the right decision. When fire personnel are given an assignment, those personnel assigned to a particular location stay in the location unless a decision is changed by the Incident Command.

I knew with sufficient resources we were going to stop the fire at that perimeter, which we did. The Berkeley Fire Department had access to other resources including the CDF Fire Department which was in full force in the Vicente area.

Strike Teams came in piecemeal, and as soon as they came in to stage, we sent them out. San Francisco was the first Strike Team in Oakland, and they were already working when the Command Van was moved to the final location – Broadway and Brookside. Most of the Strike Teams were in Rockridge, and some of them were in Chabot. Some of the early engines were sent to the Parkwood Apartments, but it was really too late for that area.

There were Strike Teams coming from Contra Costa County, and they were sent to the top [of the fire] because they were able to join the Strike Teams from up above on Broadway Terrace and from below on Highway 13 and Broadway Terrace, and working in conjunction with the aerial strikes.

Communications were a big problem during the fire, both with the companies in the field, and the FDC. There was a lack of communication due to the overwhelmed communication system. There are only two major radio channels: One channel – Channel 2 – which is the normal channel of operations was turned into the tactical channel.

After CDF arrived, goals were set to where they wanted to stop the fire.

- Claremont Avenue to the north to Tunnel Road
- Tunnel Road to Highway 24
- Highway 24 to Broadway
- Broadway to Pleasant Valley
- Pleasant Valley to Moraga

- Moraga to Highway 13
- North of Highway 13 to Broadway Terrace and Grizzly Peak
- Grizzly Peak north to Claremont

I was working with Operations to get resources, and getting those resources to staging. The Assistant Fire Marshal was in charge of staging, and staging included signing in Strike Teams when they arrived, noting their names, and where they were from. This staging process lets us know exactly who we have available for assigning to the scene. .

There was good feedback both from CDF and Oakland on different areas of the fire. CDF was reporting good news from the north near Claremont Avenue towards late afternoon. They felt they could contain it given the goals they had for that area.

The CDF Battalion Chief and his support – a retired OFD Assistant Chief set up a sub-staging area at 13th and Broadway Terrace for their area of upper Broadway Terrace. [Note: This area was 13th and Thornhill – used as a staging area for both Branch 2, and Branch 3 in the latter hours of the evening.]

#### **1900**

Air operations ceased because of visibility.

#### **0300/21**

Turned Operations over to the Assistant Chief Battalion 2-B.

#### **0330**

Returned to the fire scene, and stayed through 1530 that afternoon. There was a reversal of weather conditions.

#### **Concerns for the next day**

CDF was concerned that there was going to be a reversal in the wind, and that the wind would blow through the burned areas, picking up embers and sparks and blowing them into new areas, especially the Contra Costa County area which was particularly dry, and vulnerable.

Special concerns were for the Rockridge area where structures were still burning.

An important concern was to make certain that the fire perimeters were maintained, that there were no flare-ups, given the wind change, and that mop-up would continue throughout the area.



**Battalion Chief 3-A – Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) Incident Command****1041**

There was a Campus Drive report of a hill fire, and Battalion 4 was going to respond. Because of windy conditions and that it was in the hill area, I went up towards the Campus [Drive] fire. While responding, Engine 27 was out on patrols in Battalion 3. Engine 27 was the first on the scene of the [Campus Drive] fire and put the fire out. The assignment was cancelled. At the same time Engine 4 was on the air patrolling the hills at Joaquin Miller Road and Skyline.

**1105**

I had decided to rendezvous with Engine 4 at Joaquin Miller Road and Skyline since I was so close. The second alarm from the Tunnel Fire came over the radio. Told Engine 4 that the best way to respond to the fire was to go down to the freeway – Highway 13 – and they did.

I responded to the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) since I was the unassigned [Battalion] Chief for the day. I went to FDC to run the OFD for the rest of the city.

**1115 – 1118 (after the 4th alarm)**

When I arrived at FDC, the Head of Dispatch and another Captain (referred to here as Dispatch Captain) were there. I asked the Captain if he had contacted the California Department of Forestry (CDF) and requested air operations from them. He said yes, he had. He also said he had requested air support from a private helicopter company. This Captain had been at FDC on Saturday requesting mutual aid, and air support.

**1123**

While we were talking, there had been a report about an apartment fire on 34th or 44th. I decided to respond to the apartment fire, given I was the only Chief at the FDC, and then I thought I would head up to the hill fire, and then return back to dispatch. While I was on the freeway I saw the magnitude of the fire, and decided not to go to the apartment fire.

**1130**

I returned to FDC and coordinated activities for the rest of the city. I confirmed with the Captain about air support from CDF, and he said there was going to be a 20-30 ETA for them to get on the scene.

**1130 – 1215**

During this period of time there was a request for 10 Strike Teams. The supervising dispatch officer was saying that the radio communications and the phones were a mad-house. I decided that we weren't going to be able to do this ourselves and call for mutual aid.

**1130 – 1145**

We needed to pass this off to the Lawrence Livermore Station for mutual aid. [Note: Lawrence Livermore Station called for mutual aid during the earthquake of 1989.] We passed off 4 Strike Teams to Lawrence Livermore. My responsibility was to see that the rest of the city was staffed with



engine coverage. I initiated a call-back for Chiefs, and to get equipment and anything which was needed for Tunnel Command. We were quickly becoming overwhelmed since there were only the three of us: Head of Dispatch, the Dispatch Captain, and myself (along with the dispatchers). Engine 12 was a cover-in engine. I delegated the following activities and functions to manage the various demands of the fire and the rest of the city. I set this up similarly to an Incident Command System (ICS).

**1130 – 1200**

Another Battalion 3 Chief arrived (referred to here as Dispatch Operations). I told him we were going to divide up the work load between us.

Dispatch Operations took accounts of what was left in the city in terms of engine companies. Anything dealing with the Logistics of staging these personnel, and back-filling the companies. If it wasn't related to the Tunnel Fire, then we would handle it here. We had great difficulty with communication, and if we couldn't get through with our radio channels, or phones, then we would send units out to the fire personnel to deal with the problem.

Dispatch Operations was responsible for the following:

- **Operations**
  - Mobilize and deploy fire resources
    - To and for the incident
    - To and for the rest of The City
  - Establish a Base for the Strike Teams
  - Establish staging for recall personnel
  - Provide coverage for the rest of The City
  - Provide emergency response to the rest of The City
  - Provide response to perimeter fires if they cannot be handled by the Tunnel Fire IC.
  - Establish the Base for the Strike Teams just from other cities

With FDC itself, the Head of Dispatch and the Dispatch Captain were in charge, requesting Strike Teams and air support, notifying the Oakland Police Department (OPD), Commands, and other law-enforcement for traffic. We also needed mass care centers.

The Head of Dispatch and the Dispatch Captain were responsible for the following :

- **Fire Dispatch Center**
  - Request Mutual Aid and other support
    - Ordered Office of Emergency Services (OES) Staff Command Team
  - Request Strike Teams
    - First call approximately 1130
      - 10 Strike Teams from Lawrence Livermore Lab
    - Total called:
      - 74 Strike Teams
      - 11 Engines
      - 6 Chiefs
      - 3 Hose-tenders

- 1 Mini-pumper
- 150 relief personnel from San Francisco
- Request Air Support
  - Approximately 1105 from a private company
  - Approximately 1116 from California Department of Forestry (CDF)
- Maintain Communications with Incident Command (IC)
- Respond to requests from fire
- Respond to the rest of The City's needs
- Implement the City Disaster Plan
- Notify Oakland Police Department
  - Liaison with IC at the Command Post
  - Traffic control and perimeter access control
  - Search and rescue
  - Evacuation
  - Mass care centers

A Lieutenant was responsible for Logistics (referred to here as Logistics Lieutenant). I instructed the Logistics Lieutenant that we were going to need radios, portable radios, batteries, equipment, fire personnel, fuel, and anything requested which would help the fire personnel in the field.

We were going to set up Base camp at Raimondi Park on 18th Street and Wood as we had done in the Earthquake of 1989. A Base Lieutenant was chosen for this staging area.

Both the Logistics Lieutenant and the Base Lieutenant were responsible for the following:

- **Logistics**
  - Supply tools/equipment/supplies etc. to the Tunnel Fire
  - Provide transportation to/from/within Base and the Tunnel Fire
  - Provide fuel for apparatus
  - Provide food for all personnel
  - Contact the Red Cross, Salvation Army etc.
  - Anything else related to Logistics
  - Set up Base for Strike Teams and resources

I brought in a Lieutenant for Planning (referred to here as the Planning Lieutenant).

My instructions to him were to find out where the fire was, where it was going to go, and to get some kind of feel for the situation. List addresses and locations of where the fire was being reported. His responsibilities were as follows:

- **Planning**
  - Alert and notify the public
  - Department recall
  - Record and attempt to determine the perimeter of the fire
  - Implement the City Disaster Plan
  - Double-check to insure all notifications were made
  - Define the perimeter lines of the fire

As part of Planning, Battalion Chief 4-B was used as an aerial observer, (referred to here as Aerial Observer) flying over the fire in a helicopter, and relaying information about the fire and the perimeter of the fire.

Because there were some personnel who were required to go to the fires which were called for in The City (the Planning Lieutenant in this case since he was a member of Engine 12), a Fire-fighter took over for him.

There were volunteers coming in to be used as relief personnel. Because of our organized method for deploying personnel, we weren't immediately going to be sending them out as individuals, but they were going to be deployed as units of labor used at a later point in time.

I saw myself as the Incident Command of the FDC. I was the functional and operational officer, giving support wherever it was necessary. I some times sent Strike Teams to the staging area, and communicated with Command to say the Strike Teams were available.

**1130/20 – 1600/21**

I stayed at FDC. These are most of the actions I was responsible for or assisted in implementing during the Tunnel Fire. There were many more tasks performed during this time by all personnel, but most are reflected by tasks listed here.



**Battalion Chief 3-B – Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) Dispatch Operations****Saturday October 19, 1991**

I was working an extra day on a different shift. It was a routine situation of picking up and delivering mail at the different stations.

While I was at Station 19, a call came in for a wildland fire in the neighborhood of Tunnel Road and Buckingham Blvd.

**1213**

The first alarm. Engine 19 responded to the first alarm. Other engines and personnel responding include Engine 24, Engine 6, Battalion 2 and Battalion 4.

**1216**

I drove in the direction of the fire to assist. I got on the radio to give my location and to acknowledge the response to the fire, so that the Assistant Chief on duty would know.

**1219**

The second alarm. Engines responding include Engine 10, Engine 25, Engine 15, and Truck 8 with Battalion 3.

**1221**

The third alarm. Engines responding include Engine 5, and Engine 16.

**1224**

The fourth alarm. Engines responding include Engine 1, Engine 17, and Truck 15.

**1248**

The fifth alarm. Engines responding include Engine 13, and Engine 8.

Mutual aid from Berkeley, CDF responded with a Helitac crew of 11 members, and 6 engine companies. East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP) responded with 2 water tankers, and 2 type-3, and 4 patrols. ARIS was called in as a private aviation company supplying air support. Piedmont covered-in for Station 24, Alameda covered-in for Engine 4, San Leandro covered-in for Stations 20 and 27, and Berkeley 8.

**1223/1230**

I was the first Oakland fire unit on the scene at Buckingham. There was a good column of smoke and flames midway behind the house on 7100 block of Buckingham and preceeded up the hill. There was fairly moderate fuel burning uphill at a moderate rate. The fire was commanded by the Assistant Chief Battalion 2-C who arrived and immediately established Division A and Division B. Division A would be myself, located on Buckingham, and Division B would be Battalion 3-C located off of Marlborough Terrace up at the top.

The area was anchored on the lower flanks on the upslope. One and 1/2" lines were extended to the southern and eastern flanks, and westerly to the northern flanks from below.

Once we got those lines into position, I sent Brush 19 to the end of Westmoreland to see if the fire was exposing any of the houses at that end. I then sent them Truck 15, and Berkeley Engine 3 to that location. They put an extended line from that location to the location of the fire.

The helicopter from ARIS and a Helitac unit from the California Department of Forestry (CDF) were called in. Those helicopters worked the north and west flanks of the fire throughout the afternoon. Division B who was at the top of the hill, had extended lines from the top. Although I didn't see his lines, we would continually talk [via channels] trying to secure the perimeter of the fire. Later on in the afternoon, the Assistant Chief released the fire both to me and Division B, and then finally just to myself. Prior to leaving late that afternoon, there was concern on my part because this was a wildland fire. I physically went up the hill and walked the entire perimeter of the fire – all 4.5 – 5 acres of the area. Starting from Buckingham walked the southern flank back to Gwinn Tank, across west back down to the north and west flanks, and then back down to the bottom. I ordered the crews to leave their lines in position, in case there were going to be hot spots. Prior to leaving the fire itself, I walked back up again to the top of the hill directly behind the home looking for hot spots. This is a common practice of operations. There were no hot spots, so I left the fire scene. There were still some companies in service picking up some remainder of hose, and I put them in command. I think it was Engine 19 who was still on the scene at the time.

**1739**

I left the fire scene. I drove down Buckingham to Norfolk. There was a woman whose car had stalled. I drove to the end of Westmoreland, and stopped to observe the flank. When I stopped, there was a homeowner, a woman who flagged me down, and we discussed vegetation and brush. I drove back down Norfolk and back to Marlborough Terrace, stopped at Marlborough Terrace at the hydrant where we had hose laid, and walked through the brush and back to the hydrant. I drove to the top of Grizzly Peak, and stopped to make an observation. It was very quiet, and very still. The weather was very dry, and there was no fog, and no wind.

**1839**

I finished my drive around the fire area.

**1900/1930**

I called Engine 19 when I returned to quarters, and asked the officer to go back to the scene of the fire to make observations and to be sure that there were no hot spots. I talked to the Lieutenant and told him to take a ride after dinner.

**OBSERVATION**

A consideration in any of these areas is accessibility to get crews and equipment into position. When it is in a primitive area, for example the Buckingham area, every responding unit has to



come from further away. For each subsequent alarm, the crews are taking longer to get there. The way the streets are accessed, it's very difficult. With all of these factors, it is not uncommon to bring in lots of equipment into position. What you are trying to do is to estimate which direction the fire is going to move, and which houses will be threatened. Because the wind was low that day, we had a moderate rate of spread.

**Sunday October 20, 1991**

**0700**

Was relieved by Battalion Chief 4-A. Discussed the preceding shift's activities including the fire on Buckingham Blvd. I related the details of the fire control operations, and told of the hose lines which were left in place at the fire scene, in the event of any hot spots at the fire site.

**0830**

Phoned both Battalion 2 and Battalion 3 from home. Reported to Assistant Chief Battalion 2-A, and Battalion Chief 3-A that there were high winds in the Oakland Hills. Related the details of the fire on Buckingham to the Assistant Chief on-duty.

**1130**

Saw a large plume of smoke in the Oakland Hills, and responded to Station 1.

**1145/1200**

I reported to Battalion Chief 3-A (referred to here as FDC Incident Command)

FDC Incident Command, and the Dispatch Captain were already at FDC when I arrived. They were getting fragmented reports on the radio about the size and extent of the fire. There were also attempts to establish the Incident Command System (ICS) in the field.

Note: Two things happen when there is a major fire.

- We establish a field of support for the Firefighters, getting them equipment, logistical support, and mutual aid support.
- Regardless of what the disaster is, we need to take care of the rest of The City.

Dispatch Incident Command spent all of his time taking care of the needs of the people in the field. Most of my efforts were spent trying to find out what coverage we had to take care of the rest of The City.

At the present time, there is no position (by description) of what I was doing.

We were trying to get things accomplished. We tried to do an inventory of all equipment and apparatus which was available. This is spare and reserve apparatus. There is a list of [what is] available in Battalion 2's office. Most of the equipment and resources were dumped into the



fire [scene].

There is a roster for Firefighters and other OFD personnel. We initially asked Engine 13, and Truck 20 to do the calling, requesting that all the recalled people report down to Station 1. There was a total recall of everyone in the OFD done by telephone.

There are no procedures or protocol for this at the present time.

The following is a list of activities accomplished at FDC:

- Conferred with Dispatch Incident Command, with each of us supporting the fire-dispatch and fire-control activities of the department.
- Organized and managed recall of off-duty personnel.
- Detailed personnel to establish a Base at Raimondi Park.
- Determined in-service fire companies and station coverage.
- Briefed staff from The City manager's office and the Mayor.
- Detailed personnel to survey the fire area by helicopter – both Oakland Police Department's Argus, and the military.
- Consulted with Dispatch Incident Command as needed to coordinate mutual aid response.
- Coordinated with The City's Operation of Emergency Services (OES).
- Managed assignment of relief crews comprised of recall personnel.
- Managed reassignment of returning OFD fire companies.
- Relieved Battalion 2 on the night of October 21st.
- Coordinated early activities of California Department of Forestry (CDF) Damage-Assessment Team.
- Coordinated department staffing on October 22nd.
- Developed reports for staff which were ordered by the OFD Chief.
- Developed recall list for payroll.
- Coordinated partial demobilization of apparatus and equipment.
- Coordinated staffing of Public Information Officers (PIO).
- Provided EBMUD information on the fire perimeter.

Note: Many of the activities in support of the fire-control operations and fire-coverage of the Oakland Fire Department are not outlined in standard operating procedures or policies. In many cases, myself or personnel working under my supervision made decisions without the authority of policies or procedures.

**2300/22**

I remained working at FDC Station 1 until 2300 on October 22, 1991.

**Battalion Chief 3-C – Battalion 44 and Division A Command****1102**

When the fire broke out, I was at the Special Olympics. Someone who was monitoring the radio heard that there had been a second alarm struck for a fire in the hills. As I got out of the pool; the fire was a third alarm. On the fourth alarm, I drove from Coast Guard Island to Station 17, and I arrived at 1115.

**1115**

Placed Battalion 44 (spare chief's car at Station 17) in service. Reports were being received of fires in the hill area east of Redwood Road. Went 'on-air' to determine the movement and direction of the fire, and which areas were threatened. There were massive columns of smoke which were building. There were also reports of secondary fires in the hill area east of the primary fire – one on Redwood Road, and then east on Kellor Road near Skyline. I began moving west toward Montclair, driving north on Highway 13, I could see the column of smoke and how the wind was laying the smoke down. I surmised that it was a fast-moving wildland fire completely out of control on several fronts. I had gotten some of this information from the radio.

**1145**

On approaching Thornhill Blvd. on Highway 13, vehicles were travelling south in the north-bound lanes evacuating the fire area. On approaching Lake Temescal, I could see the fire brands and fire moving south-west across Lake Temescal into the pine forest that parallels Contra Costa Road. The fire was seen spreading west to the Contra Costa Road area, between Broadway and Broadway Terrace. I stopped at the intersection between/near Highway 13 and Highway 24, and I instructed an East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP) police officer to continue directing traffic south on north-bound Highway 13. I talked to him about evacuating the people off of Highway 24. In addition, I told him to continue doing what he was doing, and then to establish some kind of perimeter to keep people off of Highway 13.

**1205**

Met the Captain of Engine 2 on Highway 13. This Captain stated the fire had jumped Highway 24 and was burning the upper Rockridge area, near the Lake Temescal parking lot, in the 6500 block of Broadway. Returned to Broadway Terrace with Engine 2 following, and notified Oakland 2 to assign Battalion 44 to the incident. I made a radio report to Operations at this time, telling him that the fire had already crossed Temescal and was in the area along Contra Costa Road. I came up Broadway Terrace – the first street off of Broadway Terrace is Buena Vista – I went down the length of Buena Vista, which is a winding street on a down-slope. There was a tremendous amount of smoke. Began to look for the best location to set up a defensive action along Buena Vista Avenue with Engine 2. Engine 26 was somewhere in the area and was asking for companies. My goal was to get companies along Buena Vista to make a stand. First set up at Buena Vista and Contra Costa Road where evacuation procedures had been started by the California State Police and Acme Western Ambulance #223. We were able to stay in this area for about an hour (Buena Vista and Contra Costa Road). I told Command that



we needed resources, that there were about 50 structures on fire.

The smoke made it difficult to determine the extent of the fire, but it appeared that a majority of the homes along Contra Costa Road were already involved. With conditions deteriorating, and with limited fire resources, the fire position became untenable.

**1240**

We relocated to Golden Gate and Acacia, at Ocean View. Intended to use Golden Gate from Broadway to Broadway Terrace as a defensive line. Established a Command Post to hold Golden Gate from Broadway Terrace to Broadway.

**1315**

At Acacia and Golden Gate, companies were placed at hydrants to set up a water curtain using Stang guns and handlines. **[Note: In the 35-60 minutes in this area the fire conditions were becoming more severe, driven by the high winds.]** The large burning trees exposed structures, this added fuel to the fire. The Captain of Engine 26 and the Captain of Engine 2 Captain were assisted by volunteers and were directing a valiant effort to save multiple structures at Golden Gate and Acacia. Emeryville Engine 4 commanded by the acting Lieutenant worked on structure protection in the 5300 block of Golden Gate in zero visibility, and in the fire storm attempting to stop the fire spread. Requested resources to form a defensive line, but none arrived. The Captain acting as Battalion 44's aide, obtained information on downwind fire spread, and gave accurate assessments on personnel, water supply, and fire conditions. This aide was re-assigned to Broadway Terrace at Highway 13 to secure any available equipment and to organize and direct mutual aid fire companies working in that area. The Firefighter from Truck Wagon 26 worked the Ocean View area with civilians, attempting to limit the fire spread; they were driven out of the area by the fire storm.

**1400**

Relocated Engines 17 and 18 with their respective Lieutenants from Broadway and Golden Gate to a more mobile defensive posture along the right flank of the fire. Engine 3 Lieutenant was working at the College Preparatory School at 6100 Broadway, and Engine 13 Lieutenant was protecting structures near Buena Vista and Golden Gate. There were reports of multiple roof fires behind this position on Brookside and Ocean View, indicating that the fire was surrounding this fire stand. These companies were ordered to relocate to positions which were downwind of the fire to set up a defensive line to limit the fire spread.

**1430**

Drove down Ocean View (with zero visibility) to Alpine Terrace where roofs were already on fire. Drove along Margarido Drive to Country Club, and observed several well-involved structure-fires. Set up a Divisional Command Post at Beechwood and Country Club, but this location was not practical. Relocated to Broadway Terrace and Country Club to set up a staging area and Divisional Command Post. These natural boundaries could be used – the Claremont Country Club golf course along Margarido toward Broadway (the Rockridge area) on the west, and the golf course and cemetery along Broadway Terrace and Clarewood to Moraga (the



Piedmont line) on the east. The fire could burn into the eucalyptus forest without loss, while fire personnel could concentrate on structure protection. As additional resources arrived, their assignments would be the threatened but still uninvolved structures along the margins of the fire.

**1700**

Oakland personnel arrived via AC Transit to reinforce the personnel on the scene. Numerous requests for additional resources were not filled. The first request for Strike Teams got lost in the confusion of the situation. Later requests for resources were duplicated for other divisions and the companies were never assigned. Battalion 44 remained in this area until midnight as Division A when Branch 3 was established.

**0100/21**

Branch 3 and Division A worked at Broadway Terrace and Country Club the remainder of the evening, regrouping resources and resting personnel, sending out Task Forces and Strike Teams to various assignments. Services 3 personnel worked during the night to keep mutual aid companies supplied with 3" fittings. An off-duty Firefighter in the Supply Van worked to maintain supplies and deliver personnel to the fire area. This Firefighter stayed on the job until relieved at 0900. With assistance from civilians, these personnel completed every task assignment.

San Francisco Public works assisted by setting up their Field Command Post, providing lighting and support services. Red Cross and the Salvation Army provided food, drink, and bedding for the personnel.

Water Tenders from Oakland, Caltrans, and private contractors were utilized to support a weakened water supply. Two type-3 Strike Teams from CDF were utilized to maintain patrol along Clarewood to the Piedmont line. These companies prevented fire from backing across Clarewood and destroying homes and apartments in that area.

As support companies arrived, they were placed with the Oakland units to control structure fires.

Battalion 44 was relieved. Went to the Command Post and was debriefed by Battalion 2, conducted damage assessment in the East Bay Regional Helicopter with the CDF Chief 1602.

**Battalion Chief 4-B – Aerial Observer****1230**

From Station 1, I was assigned as an Aerial Observer and coordinator for the police helicopter Argus. Communicated with the Oakland Police Department about evacuation and street closures, and coordinated with firefighting activities with California Department of Forestry (CDF) from the air.

**1300**

Made a first-perimeter check of the fire. The north-side of the fire-check was behind the Claremont Hotel, up Claremont Canyon to Grizzly Peak. There were homes on Alvarado, Gypsy Lane, and Dartmouth which were burning, but the direction of the fire was burning south-west, and the burn down the canyon walls was slow, and with a heavy cover of smoke and heat thermals, visibility wasn't possible.

Continued up Claremont to Grizzly Peak toward Highway 24. The fire was burning up Marlborough to Grizzly Peak, with the home on the end of Marlborough fully involved where the water tank is, but there were units fighting the fire along Grizzly Peak. We proceeded along Grizzly Peak in a southwesterly direction towards Highway 24.

**1330**

The fire had not crowned on the Swainland ridge where the PG&E powerlines are set up. The fire line had not exceeded to the south-west beyond the crest of the Swainland hill.

While flying in the area of Grizzly Peak, I saw that Contra Costa County had range fires burning, with helicopters providing bucket drops. Called command, with no response, so called Operations telling them we had no aerial coverage at that time. There was another aerial flight by a Firefighter in the Eagle [5] helicopter flying near Claremont. Another perimeter was being mapped, concentrating on the east-side of the fire, and the south-west perimeter to help evacuation directives. They were flying over upper Broadway Terrace and down Swainland and Fairlane giving residents the directions for evacuations which were being announced from the helicopter. Residents were disbelieving of the warnings they were hearing.

**1430/1500**

Water Tankers were on the south-west and east quadrant of the fire. At this point, the fire had jumped Highway 13 to Proctor at about 1430. Continued with evacuations, closing Highway 13, forcing people to use the main arteries.

**1500**

Contacted operations. The fire had crested Swainland hill, burning down the hill slowly, due to the lack of vegetation in this area.

**1500/1530**

Told Operations to get a Task Force to Swainland. Trying to keep ahead of the fire. The next

fire stand would be on Broadway Terrace.

**1600/1630**

The fire fully engulfed the Pinewood/Swainland area, with wind blowing in a southerly direction. Fire brands were flying into the Mountain View Cemetary and starting spot-fires. Florence and Harbor Drive had big problems.

Aerial tankers and helicopters did an excellent job of knocking down the fire line with water taken from Lake Merritt.

**1800 (Dusk)**

The wind was dying and shifting. Tankers were making their last drops before leaving the scene. The helicopter flew until 2100. The last pass was reassuring that the ground forces were making a stand on Broadway Terrace in the north.

The fire was blowing red and yellow flame in a cyclone appearance. One-half mile down wind, fire brands started fires on vegetation, wood shingles, and wood roofs. (Note: the type of construction which went first was the vegetation close to the homes, shake roofs, and roofs which were not tiles. Stucco walls were better than wood-siding.)

Above Highway 13, felt the operations were good. The Eagle took the north-side with a fire department representative. They were landing and carrying their information to the Command Van. Argus was flying south from Grizzly Peak and Fish Ranch Road to Highway 13 and Broadway Terrace.



**Director of Training – Division B Command and Branch 3 Command****1115**

Received a phone call from the head of Dispatch. There was a four-alarm fire at the same location as the day before. I needed to come in to help with operations.

**1115 /1125**

I responded to the fire from Moraga, taking 10 minutes from the Caldecott Tunnel. Saw a huge column of smoke coming from the north-Oakland hill area. Called the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) and relayed the information seen in the hills. Was told to respond to the incident, and not to operations (FDC). Travelled Highway 24 and Fish Ranch road to Grizzly Peak with heavy traffic. Got off at a side street and proceed.

**1140**

At Fish Ranch and Grizzly, met the Command Van and Truck 8 with other Oakland units. They were being redeployed from orders from Operations. A Firefighter driving the Command Van was directed to go back down the hill to Broadway near the North Oakland soccer field. This is a predesignated location for operations.

Followed the Command Van to the east-side of the tunnel. All traffic east-bound had been halted, west-bound was continuing through the tunnel, but was backed up. Encountered either state police or EBRP's police and told him that all traffic on Highway 24 needed to be halted, and that he needed to escort us to the east-bound lanes to take the van to the other side of the Caldecott, going against the normal flow of traffic. We went through the center of the tunnel, and got off at the Tunnel exit, and began to set up the Command Post. Encountered Command setting up as well. We began Command Post operations.

**1140 /1145**

Command was concerned about the Parkwood Apartments, and asked if I would assist at that location. The hillside around Parkwoods was fully involved, but we couldn't see Parkwoods themselves. There was a lot of fire blowing across the freeway. I crossed over the freeway to the other side of the freeway on Caldecott Lane to Parkwoods, but the heat was so intense it was impossible to do this. Tried the maneuver twice, and both times failed. Turned back. Came back across the freeway and at this time, the Command Post had been relocated opposite the PG&E substation at Highway 13 and Highway 24.

**1200**

The Oakland Fire Department Chief was at the Command Post, as well as the Captain of Training and other members of Truck 1. I stayed for a few minutes, and relayed information, observations and suggestions. At that time Command asked me to try and discover what the extent of the fire was on the other side of the freeway, if it had jumped Highway 13 and Highway 24 into the Chabot Canyon area. The fire was coming down Chabot Canyon and had already burned a half dozen homes in the upper Chabot Canyon and Roble Road area, and all the way to the end of Chabot Road. We needed to get resources at that location.

**1200**

Encountered the Lieutenant from Engine 3 at Golden Gate and Broadway, Contra Costa and College Prep. Tried to establish contact with Battalion 44 to see if we could link up and if he had any available resources. There were tremendous problems with communications on the radio. I was trying to report conditions to Command, but never got through; FDC was always busy. The cellular phone was always busy. Gave up portable radio to the Captain from Truck 15 who didn't have a radio. This was in the College Prep area.

**1200 /1300**

Tried to connect with Battalion 44 and was involved briefly at Buena Vista between Acacia and Hill in the area around Chaumont Pass.

Engine 2 was attempting to make a stand, and control fire operations in back of Buena Vista working the rear yards from Contra Costa. The fire was already burning houses on Contra Costa Road. Engine 2 was on Buena Vista. They were disengaging from this location. I attempted to hold them there, to stop them so that other resources could help them make a stand to keep the fire from spreading on Buena Vista. Engine 2 had a good hydrant supply, and a 5" lead, but the fire was beginning to burn on either side of Buena Vista. I told them to hold, that a stand could be made. I went around the block and encountered Engine 29. Got 29 to bring in a lead from Hill Road out Buena Vista with the City of Alameda Engine company. Got them in place on Buena Vista. Wanted them to hook up with Engine 2, but Engine 2 was too far away. The fire was starting to cut off Engine 2's escape route, so told them to disengage. Drop their lines and drive out Buena Vista to Acacia. I went out ahead of them and at Golden Gate and Acacia, found Battalion 44 along with the Engine 2 officer and Engine 26, attempting to establish a [Divisional] Command Post location and a good place to hold the fire at the intersections of Ocean View, Golden Gate, and Acacia. Conferred with Battalion 44, as he was in charge of Division A. Engine 2 worked with Engine 26 until the poor water supply drove them out.

Went back to the Command Post, told Operations they needed resources over at Chabot Road, but there were no resources. A Strike Team from San Francisco had just come in, a 5-Engine Strike Team. Command said we could have 2 of those Engines and that the other 3 should go over to assist Golden Gate and Broadway. Directed those 3 engines from that Strike Team to College Prep school and encountered the Captain from Truck 15, and directed him to take command of this area, and direct the activities of the San Francisco engines. I took the other 2 engines to the other side of the freeway to Chabot Road to establish other operations on Chabot Road to prevent the fire from spreading past Chabot Road.

**1300**

All of upper Chabot Road was involved. The fire had burned down to the area of the Rock La Fleche development center, and the Chabot Road Tennis Club. Took the 2 engines to Chabot and Reata, and established a defensive line at Chabot and Reata Court. My attempt was to save the houses at Reata Court and to keep the fire from burning down Chabot Road. There was a good open area behind Chabot School and the tennis courts that abutted onto the free-



way, and we could probably keep the fire from going into Roanoke and Hill Crest, and The Uplands area. We had one of the engine companies bring water from Roanoke to Reata, and work up Reata Court, the other engine company went to Chabot Road and Rock La Fleche center. Another engine company from Colma pumped a lead up Reata Court, and those 3 engines worked for an hour to an hour and a half. I went back up Roanoke to Hill Crest and The Uplands, [in Berkeley] to see if the fire had gotten into this area. Encountered Berkeley companies that were operating at the end of Hill Crest Road. The fire had burned up behind Reata Court, the hillside behind Rock La Fleche Center, and was coming up into the homes in back of Hill Crest, and Hill Crest Court. Hill Crest dead-ends in a court and overlooks Chabot Canyon. One Berkeley company was working at the end of Hill Crest, but they were overwhelmed by the amount of fire they had to deal with. There were also many civilians working who were trying to help them. One of the engines was parked at The Uplands, they tried to move it but they were understaffed at doing their work in this location.

**1300**

During this time when working this Chabot area, I became Division B Command.

**1300/1400**

San Bruno company was working on Roanoke, using a lot of volunteer help to move and extend hose lines, to keep the fire from burning Roanoke and Reata Court. They attacked Hill Crest towards Roanoke to prevent further damage on Roanoke and on Hill Crest. One of the San Francisco engine companies disengaged from what they had been doing, and brought in a water supply from Chabot Road and Roanoke (they were working in the rear houses on Roanoke from below the area that was overrun with fire).

**After 1400**

There was a real concern about the fire along the freeway. The fire was being pushed along the freeway, and was threatening the homes near Chabot School on Patton. There were no companies at Patton. I went back to the Command Van. There was another Strike Team at the Command Van on Broadway and Highway 24 – this team was from Marin. This was a type-3 Strike Team. We went under the freeway at Patton. The first engine company from this Strike Team was used to extinguish the fire along the freeway and to protect the homes on Patton and to protect homes on Chabot and Patton to the end of the burn area. This assignment was covered over through to the next hour. This Strike Team was left in command of this assignment

**1500**

Went back to Roanoke and the Hill Crest area, making sure that this area was secured and under control. At this time I was reassigned by Command as Branch 3 Director. The operational area of Branch 3 was unclear – what had been Division A. I wanted to meet up with Battalion 44 who had been the director of Division A.



**1500**

There were major problems with Rockridge Road and Rockridge Place South. There was major fire involvement with only one Oakland OES engine company – a recall Firefighter. An Albany Engine was pumping from Rockridge and Broadway. A San Francisco Engine Company ( 1 engine along with civilians) to lay a supply line from the Albany Engine to the OES Engine pump with 2-3 leads. The Albany couldn't supply enough water. There was not enough water to do this because of the water supply in the area. Engine 5 was assigned as a pumping engine company doing relay operations – supplying water to the Albany Company. The San Francisco Engine Company on Rockridge Blvd., picked up an El Cerrito Engine Company and a Richmond Engine Company which had been assigned by Command as single resources and directed these companies to Rockridge Blvd.

**1530**

There was an El Cerrito Battalion Chief who was working with the Richmond Company and was put in charge of the overall operation at Rockridge Blvd. I went to the Division A Command Post located on Broadway Terrace and Country Club working with Division A in Branch 3. Division A was at the Command Post doing resource-identification mapping.

**1600**

**There were not enough resources.** A huge fire area and not enough resources. Upper Rockridge, Buena Vista, Golden Gate, Cross Road, both sides of Broadway and Clarewood were in need of resources.

The goal was to keep the fire from jumping across Broadway Terrace. We needed to cut the fire off from Broadway Terrace - not letting the fire get past Moraga. We needed to confine it to Clarewood and Harbord – not allowing it to go below Broadway Terrace or below Ostrander and Romany Road.

The Helitac units ceased operations. There was no well-defined perimeter of the fire – it was burning in several different locations – we didn't have one general fire-front. The area around Broadway Terrace, Proctor and Agnes, and Alta was a problem. The area of Hermosa was a problem. There were no common perimeters. It was difficult trying to determine where the fire was. We couldn't link companies in a well-defined line because of the change in the fire's direction.

**Between 1700 and 2000**

There was an uncertainty of where to go and who to send out. During evening hours, the Strike Teams arrived, and we were able to send them out.

**After 2000**

Things got better. There was a better idea of where to put companies, because there were more resources.

The first priority was putting Strike Teams along Broadway Terrace along Hermosa, and Cross

Road. A San Mateo Strike Team arrived between 1900/1930. A Santa Clara Strike Team was assigned to the St. Teresa School or Hill Crest School working along Florence. Several single resources were working here.

The Engine 19 Tank Wagon, recall Firefighters and miscellaneous units, reserve engines and standby engine companies were all working here. There was one Firefighter working alone from a street-flusher tank on Hermosa working in a burning garage.

A Marin Company Strike Team was working from Chabot Road self-dispatched due to lack of communication

**2000/2030**

I ran out of gas near Holy Names High School. I called Division D, got picked up, and then we worked together to dispatch units.

Branch 3 became better organized. I was worried about Branch 2. There wasn't a lot going on in Branch 2 – the Montclair area above the Warren Freeway, between Highway 24 and Broadway Terrace. Branch 3 was going to be sharing resources, staging with Branch 2 at the intersection of Moraga Road and Highway 13. It was the decision of Incident Command to link Branch 2 and Branch 3 staging.

**2100**

At Moraga Road and Highway 13 - staging Strike Teams for both Branch 2 and 3.

**2130**

Strike Teams were available for Broadway Terrace and Country Club. They were assigned along Clarewood and Maxwellton. One house was involved at Clarewood and Hilltop Court. A Stanislaus Strike Team was working at Maxwellton, and were linked with units along Moraga Road in Piedmont. There was a San Leandro Strike Team at Harbord and Moraga with their Assistant Chief.

**2200**

I was called back to Command for a Branch director's meeting. The Branch perimeters and responsibilities were clearly defined. This was a planning meeting, giving briefings for the Plans Chief and Operations Chief, so that they could develop plans for the next operational period. Perimeters for the branches were defined for tactical purposes. Redefined the Divisions for Branch 3 – Divisions M, N, O, and P. The perimeters were Broadway, the Warren Freeway, Moraga Road, Pleasant Valley.

**2400**

Branch directors were confident about containment and had established a fairly good line above Clarewood and Harbord to Moraga, except for the area inside the Mountain View Cemetery, Maxwellton, and Moraga Road adjacent to Mountain View Cemetery. A lot of area was not involved. Several Strike Teams were working along Masonic and Florence. Moraga west

along Masonic to Florence and then out Florence to Broadway Terrace. Things looked very good below this line.

Hermosa and Agnes, the Hill Crest School had problems. Above that line on Proctor and upper Florence, we were concerned about the fire spread in this area. A San Leandro Strike Team and other Strike Teams worked this area of Florence, Modoc, and Proctor.

**0200/0300/21**

Progress reports, and situation updates and continued reassigning units to prevent fire from expanding the established perimeters.

**0300**

Planning meeting for day operations for the 21st were presented by the Plans Chief (CDF) for the Branch directors.

**0830 – 1100**

I was relieved as Branch director. Went back to Command and was debriefed with a situation update. Picked up my car at Harbord and returned some stranded Firefighters to quarters.

**1400**

I went to the Command Post at the Naval Air Station in Alameda, and was reassigned as Branch director for night operations.

**2000**

Night operations. Nothing significant occurred. Patrolling and extinguishing hot spots throughout the evening. There were enough resources for this operation.



**Captain of Training – Division C Command****1145**

Reported to the Command Post after taking a circuitous route through the Oakland hills; the Caldecott Tunnel had been closed by the California Highway Patrol (CHP). The Command Post at this time was located on upper Broadway above Highway 13. [Note: The Command Post was relocated twice during the course of this day. First to upper Broadway near the PG&E sub-station below Highway 13, and finally to the east-bound lanes of Highway 24 at the Broadway on-ramp.]

**1300**

I was designated as Division C command by OFD Command at approximately 1300. My orders were to protect the Claremont Hotel utilizing mutual aid Strike Teams. I requested 2 type-1 Strike Teams and a ladder truck company through the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC). Established Division C Command in the upper parking lot of the Claremont Hotel off of Tunnel Road. The first arriving units were Truck 18 commanded by the Lieutenant and a Piedmont Fire Department Engine commanded by the Lieutenant. Shortly after the arrival and deployment of these units, a type-1 Strike Team from San Francisco arrived commanded by their Chief. The Piedmont engine developed mechanical problems and was taken out of service.

Three San Francisco engines were stationed along the rear (the west-side) of the hotel, with each pumper utilizing a private hydrant. The company officers were instructed to set up master streams (Stang guns) and wet down the trees and brush next to the hotel. Another San Francisco pumper replacing the disabled Piedmont engine, and supplied water to Truck 18's ladder pipe. The fifth San Francisco engine was positioned in the lower parking lot next to Tunnel Road, conducting wet-down operations in the brush and trees. The San Francisco Chief directed operations, extending a 3" hose line through a breach fence to protect homes on Alvarado Road. Additional San Francisco units arrived and were deployed under the command of the San Francisco Assistant Chief.

**2100**

Division C Command was passed to the San Francisco Assistant Chief at Division C's request. There was some confusion regarding whom the San Francisco Strike Teams were reporting to – the Berkeley Fire Department or the Oakland Fire Department. The plan of action was to stop the fire at the hotel. After discussion between the OFD initial Division C and the Berkeley Deputy Chief, it was agreed that the San Francisco units should remain in place to stop the fire, as previously committed.

**2115**

I returned to the Command Post and assisted with command operations.

**2300**

Responded to the OFD Training Division to obtain tables, chairs, and office supplies to equip the Public Information Office at Station 19. Was contacted enroute via the OFD radio by Branch 3, and instructed to report to Broadway Terrace and Country Club Drive to debrief the

Engineer and Firefighter from Engine 19. Debriefing was attempted while enroute to the Training Division, and later while enroute to Station 19. A discussion was held dealing with the circumstances [surrounding] the demise of Battalion Chief 4-A, as well as the condition of the fire.

**0100/21**

Reported to Station 19, delivered PIO equipment and furnishings and reported to the Communication's Officer. I was going to be needed for a television interview at 0600.

**0130**

Returned to the Command Post and briefly relieved Operations. Assisted with operations in the Command Post.

**0400**

Reported to the staging area at Moraga Avenue and Thornhill Drive to give the staging officer a replacement battery for his portable radio.



**Captain of the Training Division – Dispatch Captain****Saturday October 19, 1991**

I was working C/R overtime shift at Engine 12. I was assigned a staff car, and I left the station to work on another project. This car has a radio in it. I heard the box assignment for the grass fire in the hills. I could tell that it was escalating. The Chief asked for another company. I headed back to Engine 12. My engine company was dispatched to a medical call. So Engine 12 was not due at the fire.

**Approximately 1200**

There was a sequence of alarms 10 minutes prior to the fire assignment.

The second alarm was called, the Assistant Chief asked for both Battalion Chiefs to respond to the fire. Usually, the first Chief is dispatched to the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) and the second Chief responds to the fire. I decided to go down to headquarters since neither of the Chiefs would be responding for the rest of the city; this was possibly on the third alarm. I thought I could best serve the department by going down to headquarters.

My concern was to just look at the coverage of the city and look at the cover-ins at that time. The third alarm means 6 engines and 2 trucks, with 3 Assistant Chiefs. By listening to the radio traffic, things were starting to build by the third alarm. It was spreading and developing. Civilians and the media were calling. There is a standard set of orders including recalling Chiefs, so Assistant Chief Battalion 2-A was recalled. I ordered the appropriate cover-ins. I also called for mutual aid assistance from Alameda, Berkeley, San Leandro, Emeryville, and Piedmont. I asked the Dispatch Supervisor to assign these.

At the fourth alarm, there was no control over the fire. I asked the on-duty Assistant Chief Battalion if he considered air operations. For the first call to CDF for air operations, there was a delay for some reason. I anticipated the dispatchers doing all of the contacts. They did contact CDF and got the CDF 106 helicopter out of Morgan Hill. At the same time, I made contact with ARIS helicopters in San Jose.

While on the phone with ARIS (during the fourth alarm) I was going to put them on a "yellow alert", which means that there is a fire, and we might need assistance. My intent was to get back on the phone to the Assistant Chief and find out what he's needs were. While I was on the phone with ARIS, there was a fifth alarm. I ordered them, and they responded on my request. Their ETA was 15-20 minutes. CDF's ETA was 30-40 minutes.

The air operations were successful. I got some good feedback 3-4 hours after the helicopters arrived. The CDF helicopter left the scene earlier than the ARIS helicopter. CDF had to respond to another fire elsewhere. I'm not sure that the fire was contained, but it had been controlled. There was 1 helicopter from CDF – 106, and 1 helicopter from ARIS. There are also the usual support trucks for the helicopters. Aerial operations were certainly warranted. They



were called according to appropriate firefighting strategy and tactics. The helicopter is a normal firefighting tool used as part of a risk-management type of decision.

**1800 – 1900**

I stayed at headquarters. I then went back with Engine 12, and back to the Station.

**Sunday October 20, 1991****0800**

I had noticed the wind.

**1050**

I was in the car. I called into the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) to give the supervising dispatcher one of the on-duty Battalion Chief's pager number.

While I was out of the car, the second alarm was transmitted. Battalion Chief 4 was responding to the fire on Campus Drive – I had heard that on the radio.

**Soon after 1100**

The Supervising Dispatcher said that we needed help, the second alarm had come in for the Tunnel Fire. Battalion Chief 3-A (referred to as Dispatch Incident Command) was heading into the FDC. I immediately went down to headquarters. The intensity of this fire was different. Things were happening quicker.

**1105**

I called for the same mutual aid assistance as I had the day before. We needed to make cover-ins and call mutual aid. Called ARIS helicopter, a private company as I had done the previous day. While I was on the phone with them, the sixth alarm was called. I asked for the "fleet", since they have a fleet of 20 helicopters, they were able to provide 3. These are military-type helicopters. These carry 500 gallon water buckets, 3 came on the scene with a 15-20 minute ETA.

**1110/1115**

The switchboard starts lighting up. Every phone line was being used. It was difficult to get a line out. There were 2 dispatchers and a supervisor. There was an inability to answer phones. There was an underlying emergency to help on the phone lines. Media was calling. I told them there was a 5/6 alarm grass fire, with evacuations in the hills. Citizens were calling, reporting the fire in the hills, asking whether they should evacuate. I told them to use their own discretion, but giving them guidance, and I satisfied a requirement about giving directions. In speaking with the citizens, the lines were being tied up, and the Oakland Fire Department communication was bad. There was an interruption in the communication circuitry. We had to cut out the medical calls from 911. Mutual aid calls (other fire department calls) calling in to the OFD. The feeling of being overwhelmed by incoming information. There was no realistic way to alleviate the problem.

**1115**

The CDF dispatcher was put on hold four times. "Do you have air operations?" "Yes." the ETA was 40 minutes. Private and CDF air resources had been made.

**1115 – 1200**

The aerial resources available had been made. We needed to get the Oakland Police Department helicopter Argus, and the California Highway Patrol (CHP) helicopter – HP 30. These needed to land in downtown Oakland. Although these were smaller, they would be useful, although they wouldn't have crew or equipment for water. Argus could be used for the Chief Officer for aerial reconnaissance, to track the fire. I made contact for both of these.

[Note: Battalion Chief 4-B became our Aerial Observer. Argus came on the scene fairly quickly (1130), with the Aerial Observer flying out at approximately 1230.]

The CHP helicopter landed near Lafayette – 18th and Market. This helicopter was used for Medi-Vac situations.

I left the FDC twice, first to get our Aerial Observer to the helicopter, and then later when we had heard about the on-duty Battalion Chief 4-A.

**2000 – 2300**

Throughout the day, I helped out in a supervisory roll. I wasn't helping on the phones, because they had brought in an off-duty Police Dispatcher, and some other dispatchers. They needed to get damage-assessment, so they wanted me to line up a Lieutenant and Firefighter for Eagle 5. The mayor wanted an hour-by-hour assessment of the fire. After these assessments, these helicopters had to go back to Napa to refuel and rest, and they wouldn't return until early morning.

**0120/21**

Command was also interested in getting a preliminary map made. There was a man who was involved in global satellite positioning. This is a technology of using satellites in order to capture an image. With a device you hold in your hand, you click it and it shoots a beam and makes an accurate map. It is more accurate than ordinary topographical maps. I lined up a flight for this satellite mapping.

**0430/0500**

Returned home. The Assistant Chief (Operations) had returned from the fire.

**0700**

Returned to headquarters. My involvement de-escalated, because the need for assistance at FDC had diminished; the call for help had diminished. There were small things to work on.

**October 22, 1991**

A project for Tuesday included reports on demobilization activities. Demobilization activities included the following:

- Equipment inventory – what is missing. Nozzles, radioes, hoses.
- Damage assessment – truck, engine, or vehicle damage
- Injury reports
- Time cards
- Greater Alarm Incident Report – this is the response per company – a directive by the chief officer to capture the major activities.

**October 23, 1991**

I was back in training.

**OBSERVATIONS**

We need more phone lines, at least 50 more lines – more sophisticated communication. There needs to be a communication link to handle the normal calls of a metropolitan department, and then have the ability to escalate that environment into a 5-6 alarm fire. Expand it and exercise its capability into a full-blown mutual aid. This would have an unlimited ability of 50 fold communication system that does that. This is planning and insurance.

A disciplined approach to the Incident Command System. There needs to be training and implementation to handle this in a more aggressive fashion. The ICS is a concept which was developed to fight large wildland fires and has been adopted to fight metropolitan fires. The trend is that the smaller department adapts quickly. There should be a commitment before the fire happens. There should be consistency in terminology, consistency in calling people to a certain event. There should be a strict representation of the Incident Command System. I don't think ICS has been committed to.

Part of the communication problems which occurred with people who didn't have radios. We ran out of radios, and communication channels.

There was a lack of discipline between the people communicating, and/or a lack of discipline within the structure that the people have to work in.



**Battalion Chief – Diablo Battalion – California Department of Forestry (CDF)**

Contra Costa County jurisdiction

**Morning of October 20, 1991**

I was working out of the Sunshine Station in Clayton, California, and received a call from dispatch that there was a mutual aid call from the Oakland Fire Department, and that there was a fire in the Oakland Hills, possibly in the same area as the day before.

**1138**

Left the station and while driving through the Walnut Creek area, I noticed that Oakland had a major fire.

**1200**

I arrived at Highway 24 and Fish Ranch.

**1210**

Drove to Fish Ranch Road and Grizzly Peak.

**1215**

CDF Engine 1661 and 1674 arrived after me. CDF helicopter 106 was already on the scene. I met with the East Bay Regional Rark (EBRP) Police Officer who instigated the staging area at this site, and we made a quick analysis and assessment of the fire situation. With the 2 CDF engines, I drove to Marlborough Terrace and Grizzly Peak where the Incident Command Post was located. Met with an Oakland Fire Department Captain, and a Truck company trying to save 2 structures which were on fire. The CDF crew assisted the Oakland crew in stacking the structures. We were reacting to the situation at hand. There was a power pole burning half way up, so we tried to stop the fire. I tried to get a hold of Oakland Command or Division A, but couldn't reach either of them on the radio.

The smoke was heavy. Structures were burned on Marlborough Terrace and down towards Oakland, and there was no way to determine the perimeter of the fire because of the smoke and visibility. I was trying to assess the fire. I conferred with the Fire Captain of the Helitac unit, and decided to take an independent action which was to keep the fire from spreading into Claremont Canyon. At this time, the wind was blowing south. The CDF bulldozer 1642 arrived. With the 2 CDF engines, the Fire Captain and 6 Firefighters from the Helitac crew, went back to the intersection of Grizzly Peak and Fish Ranch Road. Conferred with the EBRP Police Officer who agreed with the situation. My primary goal was to keep the fire from spreading into the State Responsibility Area (SRA). The helicopter was trying to make drops to keep the fire from going into SRA, so I felt real comfortable that my goal was to move towards structure protection.

**1300**

Moved down Claremont Canyon and assessed Claremont Canyon. Went to Claremont Can-

yon and Alvarado Drive. I had the engines remain here. I went up Alvarado Road and proceeded to Amito. The fire was encroaching on Amito, Besito, and Drury. I felt the situation had changed, and that the major immediate goal was structure protection, so I radioed the 2 CDF engines (1661 and 1674) and had them proceed up Alvarado to Amito. With the Fire Captain and the Helitac crew and the EBRP Pumper, we set up action along Alvarado on Besito and Amito (on a ridge line). It was important to keep the road clear. There were individuals with hoses who attempted to save their own houses, people who had not evacuated. There were people who were evacuating, and people in bewilderment, who did not yet believe that anything was happening. We saw no police at that time. There were no other engines or water tenders at this time. We tried to keep mobile. We didn't hook up to hydrants at this time. We still had water.

**1300**

I made a call to my dispatcher, and told him where I was and what was happening. I was told to get a hold of Incident Command (IC).

**1310**

I made another call to my Division Chief, and he asked me to coordinate with other agencies.

**1315 – 1330**

I proceeded down Amito to Gravatt. There was a wall of flame. This was the first indication of the fire flowing rapidly down the hill. There were lots of embers, and people were trying to evacuate down Gravatt. The hydrant at the corner of Gravatt and Amito was still working.

**1335**

I made another call to my dispatcher, and told him what I was doing. He informed me that the ICP was on Hiller and Tunnel Road. I told him I decided not to go to the ICP at this time. I felt I was getting alot accomplished by staying on Amito and fighting structures there. I also told the dispatcher that the situation was grave. That there weren't any Strike Teams where I was fighting, that people were coming back to their homes. We were losing numerous structures, that winds were at least 35 mph, and that they were down-slope, and that spotting conditions are tremendous, and that we couldn't stop the wildland fire. I told him we were making stands on sections of structures that we could hold.

**1345**

I went back to the staging area at Grizzly Peak and Fish Ranch Road, where they told me where the ICP was located. At this time there was a Strike Team from Orinda which followed me into Amito and Alvarado to make a stand. Also had some EBRP people. The Orinda Strike Team started taking up positions along Alvarado below Amito Drive, and they were having a hard time holding structures. The fire continued to spread with the wind, and we were not able to hold the structures.

I left Amito, and made my way down to Hiller and Tunnel Road to find the ICP.



**1430**

I went down Claremont Canyon by the Claremont Hotel looking for the ICP at Tunnel and Hiller. I noticed a lot of equipment. Went to Hiller and Tunnel, and the area had been burned over. Travelled to the Tunnel Road overpass to the Caltrans Tunnel, and then doubled-back on the frontage road back to Tunnel Road and Hiller, which was a complete loop.

**1500 – 1530**

I was at the Tunnel Road overpass, and I met a Captain from Union City, who had a Strike Team of engines. He had seen fatalities on Charing Cross Road (there were about 10 bodies including the Oakland Police Officer). I continued on Highway 13 south-bound and met up with a police officer who told me that the ICP was at 249 College Avenue and Highway 24.

**1530**

Met with Oakland Operations Chief in the ICP, and made a suggestions about Branches. Branch 1 – Highway 24 north, and Branch 2 – Highway 24 south. I asked about aircraft (planes exclusively) not helicopters.

**1545**

Met with CDF 1612 and discussed organizing the fire, and to put plans in place.

The CDF management Team from Region 1 had been ordered. Organizing was a problem. There were no delinations of Divisions or Branches.

I was given the job of contacting the Air-Tac – these were the air tankers. There were 3 locations of high priority:

- South of Highway 24, and west of Highway 13
- South of Highway 24, and east of Highway 13
- North of Highway 24

Because of the smoke and visibility, the Air-Tac couldn't fulfill the primary mission at that time. The smoke needed to clear first, so we wanted to concentrate on the area north of Highway 24, working the perimeters of the fire.

**Battalion Chief – Diablo Battalion – California Department of Forestry (CDF)**  
**report is continued with the following report from the Retired Assistant Chief of the Oakland Fire Department.**



**Oakland Fire Department Retired Assistant Chief****1200 – 1300**

I saw the smoke from Fairfield heading home. I returned home and I knew there was a major fire. I called in to FDC and talked to the FDC Dispatch Operations. He said they were short on command staff. I left home from MacArthur (Highway 24 was closed). I proceeded to the Command Post on Highway 24 and Golden Gate. I met some vehicles from Palo Alto.

**1500**

I arrived at the Command Post. The Haz-Mat and Command Van were there with many civilians hanging around. Met with the Operations Chief, and the Command Chief. In my talk with them, I tried to correct a map that they were working with to bring their map up-to-date.

**1600 – 1630**

Met with a Battalion Chief from CDF. Because I had the knowledge of the area, and the CDF Chief had a radio and rig, we were to work together. I knew many people in Oakland with whom I could make contacts for resources and places. We got together and took over Branch 2.

We were to check the perimeters of the fire. We drove Highway 13 to Broadway Terrace, Broadway Terrace to Florence, and Florence to Broadway Terrace. There were powerlines down all over. Broadway Terrace was our established perimeter, from Highway 13 to the top of Skyline. We needed to determine what was happening in these areas.

**1700**

We drove up each individual road to see how far the fire had progressed on each side. We went Skyline to Grizzly Peak and then Skyline down to Highway 13.

**1730**

The fire burned up to the top of Broadway Terrace and Skyline, but not across Broadway Terrace. The winds at this time had died down appreciably. The Lieutenant from Engine 4 was working on structures on Broadway Terrace and Pineneedle. We wanted to know how many companies were in the area, because we wanted to get an idea of what we needed in terms of resources. He mentioned that Engine 27 was around the corner. The Lieutenant from Engine 4 needed a hydrant wrench, and asked us for one. He needed to turn his hydrant off. There were no companies on Broadway Terrace until Broadway and Skyline. There were no resources available to bring into Branch 2. We proceeded up Broadway Terrace to plan what was needed, but we had no resources available.

Broadway Terrace was an excellent place to make a stand considering the winds had died down, but there were no resources available. CDF Battalion had called the Plans Chief, asking them for available resources, and giving them an assessment, but the Plans Chief said they had none. The Plans Chief was at the Command Post. We were communicating, but we did have problems with communications with Oakland Command. Branch 1 (CDF 1611) over-

heard our communication about resources, and told us that we could have 2 engines. We made it clear that we could really do something with resources.

There were some EBRP engines in this area on top of Skyline heading towards Grizzly Peak. We were trying to establish (an anchor point) the final perimeter of the fire to complete the line. What we had in our favor was the wind, which had died down, the topography, and the hydrants on Broadway Terrace which were still good. We start going down Broadway Terrace and a Strike Team from Santa Clara was coming up the hill. Strike Team (radio #2301) – 5 engine companies type-1. We ask him to take up a section of the line at Broadway Terrace at Skyline to Crown. He was successful in making this line.

**1830**

We went back down via Thornhill to ICP for resources. [The retired A/C was instrumental in talking to people who would know about what resources were available. In my mind, I felt we needed a minimum of 20 engine companies, although I told Command 40. Command said this was a 'no-go'. We also discussed this situation with CDF Battalion Chief 1612 (who was Plans Chief) who was able to get us 2 Strike Teams of type-1 engines. We positioned a Strike Team at the bottom of Broadway Terrace near Highway 13, and started building from the bottom up, establishing locations all along Broadway Terrace.

**1900**

There were 2 Strike Teams brought into Broadway Terrace and Duncan. There were several structures already on fire. The Strike Team leaders assigned their crews as they saw fit. [Note: at 1645 there were 2 CDF engines on the scene to cover Mountain and Broadway Terrace.] 2 Strike Teams at the bottom of Broadway Terrace and 1 Strike Team at the top. There were 2 additional engines at Mountain. The Lieutenant from Truck 15 became staging [manager] (for Branch 2, staging was at Thornhill east of Highway 13). This made it easier to have control of the engines and their assignments.

**1930**

We received 2 more Strike Teams of type-1 engines, and placed them at Broadway Terrace and Leo, and Broadway Terrace and Mountain. The hydrants were good, and we began to see the beginning of a perimeter of the fire in this area.

**2000 – 2400**

During this period of time, we received about 9 or 10 Strike Teams (all type-1) and 1 type-3 Strike Team. As they arrived, they checked in at staging, and they were assigned specific locations on Broadway Terrace. The plan was going very well, because we have good resources. At this time we had good communication with the Incident Command Post. We continued to put resources in place. At midnight we felt that things were coming together and that perimeters were being established.

**0200/21**

The perimeter was established and holding. There was a planning meeting at the Command



Post. I started to divide the Branch up into 3 Divisions.

- Division H with Strike Team 2301 from Broadway Terrace from Skyling to Uranus.
- Division I with Strike Team 2304 from Uranus down to the middle portion of Broadway Terrace.
- Division J with no assignment, but covering Highway 13 to the middle of Broadway Terrace.

**0230**

The retired Oakland A/C left.

The Staging manager was able to contact the procurement officer for Oakland to get reducers (adapters 2 1/2" - 3") which are used by outside fire personnel on hydrants in Oakland. These adapters were handed out to those Strike Teams coming in. The 5" master streams were working.

**0630**

There was a briefing at the Command Post, and told them things were going really well.

**0730**

Contact with Branch Director 2 for the day-shift – replacement for the previous Branch director.

**0800**

Met with the Branch 2 and 2 Strike Team leaders from the Branch.

**1000**

Drove the new Branch director through the area so that he could familiarize himself with what was going on.

**1030**

Handed Branch 2 over to the new director.

**1100**

Went home to sleep.

**1800**

No night assignment.

**1530/22**

Demobilized.



**OBSERVATIONS****Battalion Chief – Diablo Battalion – California Department of Forestry (CDF)**

This fire was a worst-case scenerio.

Oakland needs more inter-agency training, both with CDF and with other agencies. There were Strike Teams available to Oakland which were not ordered. There are inter-county Strike Teams which are available (in Contra Costa, and Santa Clara), and which were not ordered early-on in the fire. These Strike Teams could have been in Oakland alot earlier.

The flow of information in the Command Center, and the ordering (of Strike Teams) in the Command Center.

The hydrants need to be standardized with every other jurisdiction which helps Oakland fight fires.

The roadways are a problem.

The lack of viable water sources, are a problem. Amito Drive had a water supply problem.

The Oakland Fire Department needs to work on the ICS training, to prepare for those conditions which are waiting to happen. The living situation in the Oakland Hills area is a design for disaster.

[Note: These issues are discussed in section 7 of this report.]

**OBSERVATIONS****Retired Assistant Chief Oakland Fire Department**

There were too many civilians coming into the area. At the same time people were still evacuating the area. With all of the people in the streets, there weren't enough police to clear the area for the Strike Teams to come in. It was very dangerous.

The media was interfering with the operations of the fire. Media was hearing things out of context.

There were not enough command staff.

Not enough spare equipment. Things which were known during the Earthquake of '89 has not been rectified. The Command Van radios need to work, and there needs to be more radios and telephone jacks. Needs to be training around the use of the Command Van (a large motor home). Other city departments need to see the condition of the equipment, and supplying more. More large-scale exercises with other multi-company operations.

**Battalion 2 Chief – California Department of Forestry (CDF)****Saturday, October 19, 1991****1200**

I was dispatched from Sonol in Alameda County through mutual aid to a fire in the city of Oakland. The original dispatch was for 2 engines, a dozer, a Battalion Chief and a helicopter. While in transit to the fire, and seeing the column of smoke from Highway 24, I asked that our dispatch bump up to a first alarm wildland fire dispatch which would bring the total number of (CDF) engines from 2 to 6. That was done.

My first site of the fire was when I was travelling on Highway 24. The column of smoke went straight up 300 – 400 feet above the ridge line. It seemed it was hitting a slight inversion layer, and the smoke was coming out of the inversion layer and going south-west, and indicating that there was a north-east flow of air. The weather condition was a concern; it was in the high 80's low 90's, dry with a north-east flow of wind.

When I arrived on the scene, our helicopter-106 was already there making water drops. I proceeded to the top of the ridge of Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace. Met with the on-duty Battalion Chief 3. It appeared that the rate of spread of the fire had stopped, and there was shaky containment. Given the very warm and very dry environment, both the OFD Battalion Chief 3 and myself were very concerned, and we talked about those concerns. We walked over to see what progress had been made on the fire. Oakland had already started a large response with East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP) on the scene as well. The fire apparatus on the roads made transit very difficult. Because of the congestion on the roads, I had all CDF equipment stage at Fish Ranch Road and Grizzly Peak Blvd. We staged 6 engines, the helicopter 106, and the bulldozer 1642. The OFD Battalion Chief walked to the top of the fire area and was coordinating with the other OFD Battalion Chief who was at the bottom. There was also an Assistant Chief at the Command Post.

The Battalion Chief looked at the fire. The spread had been contained. There were 2 helicopters – one the CDF Helitac crew (a crew of 8 and a captain) went down the east flank, and started putting in some handlines. There was also a private helicopter [ARIS].

I spoke with 2 fire personnel from EBRP. There was apparatus from EBRP and the Oakland Fire Department, and between all of this apparatus and hoseline, the fire appeared to have been completely surrounded with fire personnel and equipment, and a lot of water flowing. The entire fire crew was going through mop-up and overhaul. All the hydrants were flowing. I offered the OFD Battalion Chief any and all of the CDF engines which were at staging, but after surveying all of the equipment being used, we couldn't figure out where they would be put. It seemed like there were enough personnel working on the fire.

**After 1300**

I was asked to release my engine companies from the incident. I did release them. I stayed



at the fire talking to both the Battalion Chief and the EBRP officer for about 30 minutes. About 30-45 minutes after arrival, the Battalion Chief released our helicopter 106. I coordinated getting the 8-person crew back up to the Landing Zone (LZ) on Fish Ranch Road. The helicopter 106 dispatched to another fire in Saratoga, and I went back to Sonol.

**Summary of Saturday October 19, 1991****1241**

East Bay Region Parks got the report of the fire.

**1317**

I arrived on the scene.

**1339**

I released our engines.

**1434**

Left the fire area. The helicopter left the fire area at this time.

**Sunday, October 20, 1991****1400 – 1500**

I was off-duty. I was called, and requested to go to the Oakland Fire as an information officer at Raimondi Park.

**1500**

I arrived at Raimondi Park. The only people there were some Alameda County volunteer sheriff units. I asked where the Incident Command Post (ICP) was, and found out it was at Highway 24 and Broadway. I proceeded to go there. When I got there, an Oakland Battalion Chief, Chief of the Oakland Fire Department, and another CDF Battalion Chief were there who was initiating the Plans Section of ICS. Asked the other CDF Chief what he needed. He needed to get a handle on resource status – what fire equipment there was available, and situation status – what has already happened with the fire, what was happening with the fire, and what will happen with the fire.

He asked me to start a reconnaissance of information. In ICS this is called a Field Observer, but this is a reconnaissance function. I asked for an assistant and the OFD Assistant Chief back from recall, gave me a Firefighter to help navigate the Oakland hill streets.

**After 1600**

We navigated according to Branches. We drove on Tunnel Road (into Branch 1) to get an idea of where the fire was, and what equipment/resources were on the scene. Alvarado and Vicente was the farthest east we could travel. We then went to the Claremont Hotel, where we saw Strike Teams which were from the San Francisco Fire Department, at the intersection be-



low Claremont where the Berkeley Chief was staging up Claremont Avenue to Gypsy Lane and Alvarado. At this time, there was no fire north of Claremont Avenue. This run took approximately 2 hours.

**After 1800 (after 2000)**

Returned to the Command Post, briefing the CDF Battalion Chief of the information I had gathered. At this time, the Governor was being briefed on the fire. The CDF Battalion Chief asked me to go through Branch 2, doing what I had done for Branch 1. We took Highway 13 to Branch 2. From Highway 13, we travelled to Broadway Terrace, stopped at Broadway Terrace. There was a large fire at Broadway, and the fire was spreading from home to home. At this time, the wind wasn't as strong as it had been previously, although visibility was next to nil. There were not a lot of resources in this area. In looking up the hill, we could see 50-60 homes burning. [Note: The intersection of this street is not known. This account occurred after 2000 at night.] At the top of Broadway Terrace was a Strike Team from Santa Clara. They were working their way down with a PG&E crew with them cutting powerlines which were down.

**2100 – 2200**

We went back on Highway 13 to the Command Post. At this time, houses on both sides of Highway 13 were burning. I delivered my report to the CDF Battalion Chief, and went back out to survey Branch 3. Broadway in the Rockridge area was very difficult to access because of all the downed powerlines and hoses in the streets. At Beechwood and Glenbrook, we met with Division A on Broadway Terrace, and then continuing through Hermosa Avenue to Florence and Proctor, and finishing up in Branch 3.

**After midnight**

We got back to the Command Post, and gave our report to the CDF Battalion Chief. We were reassigned again. Was reassigned as Information Officer, and was introduced to the Head of Dispatch – Oakland Fire Department's Information Officer. We started organizing and planning where the Information Center was going to be. Requested Information Officers to staff the Information Center. There were 35 Information Officers: 10 from CDF, 15 OFD, and 5 from the Office of Public Affairs Department. The Information Officers work for the Incident Command. The task was to figure out where to put the Information Center, how to organize it, and how to assign the information officers, as well as how to deal with the media. The Incident Command staff wanted the Information Center close to the Command Post. The OFD Information Officer and myself felt that because we were in the middle of the freeway this wouldn't be a good idea. We thought that Station 19 would be a good place – it was just off of the freeway. This is where we set up the Information Center.

**0200/21**

We started handling media contacts.

**0400**

We were settled at Station 19 as the information Center.

**0600**

We were a fully functioning Information Center. We had maps and diagrams up on the walls, phones were plugged in and in service, the media was contacted, we had information numbers. We all agreed that this was an Oakland incident, so we would try to keep Oakland fire personnel in front of the media doing most of the interviews. The Information Officer would chose who would go in front of the cameras. There were three of us who would speak to the media if there were people standing around waiting to talk to someone.

**1200**

The media was coming in saying they were getting information from alot of different sources, putting out different information. We decided we needed to get the Mayor's and City Councils' people and consolidate information into one Information Center. We got the Oakland Director of Public Affairs (out of the Mayor's office), and decided to run one Information Center out of Station 19. When this was coordinated, our concentration was to stay organized, to have people answer phones, to write documentation, to take the media out and show them the stories they wanted to get. We always had a liason at the Incident Command Post, so if the media showed up at the ICP, there was always someone to intercept them, or to show them where they could get information.

This media Information Center operated through the next week – the week after the fire. As information officers, we were dealing with the controversy surrounding the fire. Our emphasis was to get accurate and timely information out to the media. We were trying to contain a lot of the controversy about the fire. The media was listening to alot of people outside of the fire department. They would come back to us with stories, getting their information twisted, so we tried to get as much factual information out. We made decisions about what we could talk about, in terms of what facts we had available to us.

**OBSERVATIONS**

When a fire has spread this quickly, and has consumed this many homes, and you have a limited amount of resources, and the travel time for resources is long, and what these resources are facing once they get to the fire, I don't think we could have done anything differently. The major factor on this fire was the wind. I don't think there were any tactics or strategy at any point of that fire where we could have controlled that fire. As long as that fire was burning and the wind was blowing at the velocity it was blowing; it continued to burn. The reason why it was able to continue to burn was because of the wood roofs, and flammable vegetation, and the density of homes – a problem because of the roofs. This was a rapidly spreading fire which was throwing brands out in front of it, and to the sides of it which started spot fires. These spot fires were burning together, and everything was burning rapidly because of the rate and spread of the fire, and because of the dryness. The major contributor of the fire were the wood roofs. One wood roof would burn, it spots, and the shingles get into the convection column and they fall out long distances away from the original fire, and there aren't enough engines to go out after each spot. Houses with tiled roofs would burn only after the radiant heat would cause the house to catch fire. This fire continued to burn unchecked and would have



burned unchecked no matter how many resources were available to fight it, because there was continuity of fuel, which was the wood roofs. The fire kept burning. The exterior perimeter of the fire stopped, not due to anything which we did tactically, but because the wind let up. The fire did spread slowly after the wind died down, but engines and resources were able to go in and make stops. There are no tactics or strategy to stop the fire due to the velocity and dryness of the wind. In a fire such as this, there will never be enough water resources, or personnel resources to stop the fire. The fire services have been saying this for years. When you get into window periods of off-shore dry compressing winds, you are very vulnerable.

Some of the media criticisms need to be countered. If we would have had 50 channels of communication, all of those 50 channels would have been clogged, because there were so many houses burning. A Firefighter in the field would see any house burning as a priority for getting more resources on the scene, but when you have hundreds of houses, and thousands of houses, and loss of life, that is a priority. At the height of this fire, there were over 450 fire engines. It's very difficult to maintain those types of radio communications. Only those calls which have the highest priorities will get on, and sometimes the highest priorities are impeded by people whose priorities aren't as high. Those people in the field though do not know which priorities they are competing with. The constant call for ". . . send me more resources" was heard, but after a while there were no more resources to send.



**Battalion Chief – Santa Clara California Department of Forestry Plannings Section Chief**

**October 20, 1991**

**1400**

I was dispatched (as a CDF agency representative) from another fire in the Moraga area.

**1445**

I arrived on the scene, and made contact with the CDF Command Center to take over the Division spanning the area from Grizzly Peak Blvd. and Fish Ranch Road to Claremont going towards Berkeley. Staging was established at Grizzly Peak and Claremont. I made contact with the Division Chief. Since he knew the area, I asked him to accompany me through the area to find out about the problems that the Division was having. I proceeded down Claremont towards Alvarado. The only directive I had at this point was to keep the fire off of Claremont Avenue. I arrived at Alvarado and Claremont. There were 3 -4 engines from various agencies parked at that intersection. East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP) engines. They were looking for some type of direction, so I went up Alvarado to see if they could be used on Alvarado. At this time, it seemed that every house had an engine or a crew on Alvarado. The fire was at Alvarado and Gypsy Lane. Trees were laying down. The CDF Helitac Captain was cutting the trees down to protect the houses and to give the crews a better clearance to work. At Amito and Alvarado, it seemed that every house had been destroyed, so I came down Alvarado.

**1500/1515**

There was a lack of water. I went back down Alvarado towards Claremont Avenue. There were 3-4 engines who had water. I asked them to help support the structure protection on Alvarado. At this same time, there were 3 or 4 more Oakland engines without water. I told them to go back up to Grizzly, but they said Grizzly Peak was already out of water. So I suggested they try finding water in Berkeley, at Berkeley hydrants at the lower end of Claremont to fill up their engines to come up to Alvarado and Claremont to stage. On Claremont and Rispin, the fire was moving away from Rispin. Needed a couple of water tenders to help support the structure protection situation at Alvarado and then to help with mop-up if we got that far. I proceeded to the Command Post which was on Highway 24 and Broadway. I never did have a chance to tell those people what I needed, because when I arrived, they wanted me to help get the thing organized for a transition into a major incident. There wasn't any real defined handle on the status of any of the equipment, or what they were doing. The Oakland Fire Department Chief asked me to make some organization and develop it into the system.

**1630/1700**

It was at this time that Branches were being mapped on the wall, figuring out what resources were committed, where they were and who they were working for. The Division Chief had a good command and understanding of the area. He was put up into the Eagle [5] helicopter to do reconnaissance of the incident and try to give us a general map of where the fire was at this time, and where it was spreading. One of the Battalion Chiefs from CDF met me at the Command Post to set up some priorities for the air craft. The first priority was Branch 2, then

Branch 3, and finally Branch 1. We relayed that information to our Air-Tac officer. I personally didn't feel that it was favorable to use the aircraft as a number one priority, based on the wind, and based on the smoke, and lack of visibility. Safety was a priority. I asked the Battalion Chief to go out to what was designated as Branch 2, to get an understanding about the fire, and the equipment, and what that equipment was doing, and what he needed for that Branch at night. The retired Oakland Fire Department Assistant Chief was working with him helping with resources. I asked the CDF Battalion Chief to take over that Branch. I asked him to come back to me in a couple of hours so that we could go over those needs in terms of a transition from night-shift to day-shift.

Another CDF Battalion Chief arrived, and I asked him to do the same thing for Branch 3 – what was going on in Branch 3 – finding out what equipment, assignments. I wanted to start doing some resource tracking, since that was needed. I still didn't know how much equipment was requested, or how much equipment had arrived. When this information came back, it was given to the Resource Unit of the Command Post.

Resource inventory from Branch 2.

- Broadway Terrace and Skyline – Strike Teams 2301 and 2304 from Santa Clara
- Broadway Terrace and Capricorn – Strike Team 2305 from Santa Clara
- Broadway Terrace and Mountain – 5 engines either a part of 2304 or stand-alone

The CDF Battalion Chief doing aerial observation, returned. We had a briefing with him, and then sent him out again.

### **1800 – 1900**

The CDF was sending in the Incident Command Management Team. I took the Chief of the Oakland Fire Department and explained to him the concept of the incident Management Team and how it interfaces with other local agencies responsible for the incident. The Chief of the Oakland Fire Department was very receptive of the fact that this was going to be done, and that some organizational structure was starting to take place, and that the Chief manager of the Incident Command team was going to help put this into place. At this point, we at least had an understanding of the incident broken out into manageable blocks to work with, and at least knew the geographical boundaries of those blocks.

### **1900 – 2000**

CDF Battalion Chief (for Branch 2) had started planning what resources he needed for the next shift (the following morning). I contacted another CDF Battalion Chief who took over Branch 1, and asked him to do the same thing that Branch 2 was doing. I also asked the Oakland Battalion Chief in charge of Branch 3 to do the same thing, which he agreed to do. I asked that we have a meeting at midnight to go over these resource situations.

### **Before midnight**

The management team starts to arrive. Those include the Incident Team Leader – the Deputy Incident Commander, the Logistics Chief, the Operations Chief. Those that hadn't arrived in-



clude the Safety Officer, the Finance Officer, and the Plans Chief assigned to the team. All of these people were introduced and briefed on what had happened up until that point

**2400**

A meeting was held to go over those things needed for the next shift in each Branch. People on the fire scene were going to stay in their positions until the next morning, because we needed to know what personnel were staging in order to relieve the crew in the fields. I might have been over-stepping my bounds when making this decision, but I felt it was important to know what our resources were. By midnight, and no later, we needed to figure out the total number of resources we needed the next day, so that we could put in a request through OES the next day. During this period of 2000 through 2400, I had an understanding of how many resources had been requested, and how many resources were out on the line, so I had a ball-park figure of what we had for the next day. I talked to the Chief of the Oakland Fire Department, to Operations, and to Command about this situation, and told them how important it was not to put everyone out there at the same time, and this need for reserve. There was no communication with staging at this time. I had communications with Command and Operations, I had telephone communications with Branch 2, radio communications with Branch 1.

**After midnight**

Communications were either by radio or face-to-face on what was needed for the day-time operations. Part of the Plans section of the command started to arrive, and the designated Plans Chief for the team. Talked to the team's Plans Chief. I would remain Plans Chief, and he would become Deputy Plans Chief. We started doing our separate areas. He took over responsibility for ensuring that the resource unit was up and running. At this time we realized that there were 2 staging areas. In my function, the hardest job was tracking resources which were not assigned to the incident yet. The other half of my staff started doing map work, putting together the maps of the incident to develop a tracking plan so we could have an orderly movement of equipment, so that we could plan the day-shift Incident Action Plan. The goal was to have a plan by 0500, so we could brief incoming resources at 0530, and have a shift change by 0600.

**0600**

A briefing was held.

**1200**

A meeting was held.

[Note: Briefings were always held at 0600 and 1800. Meetings were held at 1200 and at 2400.]

**0630/0700**

Started moving resources towards the line. We knew how many resources were available for staging.

**1200**

All the engines which had been requested for the incident had arrived. We knew how many



engines were available for the incident.

**October 22, 1991**

**Afternoon**

We started planning for demobilization of resources, setting up a demobilization leader and meeting with Office of Emergency Services (OES). There was a need for resources on the incident. Original priorities were established by OES and were very simple: the furthest a Strike Team had to travel, the earliest they went home, regardless of when they came on the scene. The idea was to bring in more OES equipment to replace those which were leaving. This decision was denied by OES. We continued demobilizing while trying not to overload the freeway system. Another decision made by OES was that no equipment would be released after dark, because of safety reasons. This plan was set up. Demobilization continued approximately through Thursday afternoon, when the last piece of equipment was released. The Deputy Plans Chief and I were relieving each other on and off through Thursday.

**October 23, 1991**

We turned Planning over to the Oakland Fire Department. I was on duty from Sunday afternoon through Friday morning (October 25, 1991).

**OBSERVATIONS**

One of my biggest problems was that staff from local fire departments didn't stay very long in the planning operations of the incident; there was no continuity which made the job very frustrating. As we brought someone up to what was going on in the Plans section, they would leave after a few hours. In a 4-day period, the Deputy Plans Chief and I probably had 6 or 8 people working in this capacity. These people were being relieved of their duties both through internal and external orders.

We knew we were losing houses, even though it was a wildland incident. I had to divorce myself from the fact that there were houses burning. I had to see it as a wildland fire. Some of the recommendations I made, were based on the fact that we weren't burning down houses. This is specific to what was happening in staging. As soon as resources arrived in staging, they were automatically sent to where there were houses burning down. I had to divorce myself from that concept in order to reserve resources for the day-time operations.

With the wind starting to blow at around 0400 Sunday morning (Milpitas), and with predictable east winds blowing from 24 – 36 hours, I had to think about what was going to be happening the following day (Monday).

The Incident Management Team felt the Command Van was in a bad location. It should have been moved off of the freeway and into another location, because of briefings, and congestion. This location was discussed with Command, Operations and the Oakland Fire Department Chief. We thought the Command Van should have been moved away from the fire.

**East Bay Regional Parks Park Supervisor****0930**

East Bay Regional Parks was dispatched to pick up some hose left at the sight of the previous day's fire.

**1004**

Arrived at Grizzly Peak and Marlborough Terrace. There were 5 fire personnel representing East Bay Regional Parks: 5675, 5676, Truck 5632, and 5669 with both a Firefighter and myself. We met adjacent to the water tank.

5675 said to pick up the hose, so we drove down Marlborough to Buckingham, and turned on Buckingham and set up below 7151 Buckingham. We moved alot of stuff, debris, and lumber in order for the truck to get in close to the hill (for traffic), and then we backed the engine around so that the engine was facing west. The wind was blowing hard; chunks of building insulation were blowing towards the direction of the truck. I realized it was bad weather and thought of calling in to Command to get extra people into the stations. Command had already thought of that.

**1020/1030**

We started going up the hill. There were a group of 5-6 people standing in a driveway. 5632 went up the hill to see what was going on. He told me to bring up a backpack-pump and some hand-tools. Behind 7151, there was a hole in the fence. I brought up the backpacks and noticed white smoke and open fame coming from underneath the pine trees on the western-side of the gully. I walked the gully, which was difficult. At the same time, an OFD person went to this same spot, so we approached the "smokers" together. Two other OFD plus another EBRP met us at the "smokers" with the backpack and hand-tools, extinguishing the hot spots. While this was going on, Truck 5632 was repositioned in order to run hose to the hot spot. This was done from the south-west side of the 7151 Buckingham house, and our Firefighter laid a 1 1/2" line up the western side of the gully to extinguish the fire under the pine trees.

**1045**

We extinguished most of the flames and hot spots, but there was more smoke and more flames directly across – east of the gully and in more oak and pine trees. Then there was another hot spot. All of these hot spots were in the burn area of the previous day. The wind was blowing the dead pineneedles into the area from the day before. The Firefighter and I ran back across the gully to extinguish the smoke.

**1058**

I called for the duty officer 5675 to get air support. I knew it was a bad situation. Called again a minute later. Worked on these hot spots with the OFD. The 2 other EBRP crew were working the hose that had been laid up to the west side of the gully. This was 100 – 150 feet from where we were. We were turned into the hill, facing Grizzly Peak. The 2 other crew members felt something to the side and below. There were large open flames below us. It was a fully in-



volved fire in an unburned area of fresh fuel. I radioed to 5632, the Engineer for the hose laid over on the west-side of the gully. "We got something going up here, I'm going to bring 200 – 300 feet of hose adjacent to the position, to make another hose line up to catch the flame." We got the 200 feet of hose, ran down the hill to the fence – it was a really hard area to run in – to get to the truck. The Engineer was trying to reposition the truck, because he had seen the open flames and he didn't want to work the hose around the structure and across the gully. He uncoupled the hose line that was running through the western part of the gully, because that fire had been extinguished. He backed out of the driveway and repositioned in his original position on Buckingham. At the same time Engine 24 (??) came down Buckingham, found a hydrant and then hooked a hydrant into Engine 5632, so that 5632 could have water. The OFD Battalion Chief 4-A and another Lieutenant came by and started helping with the hoses. Ran an 1 1/2" hose-lay up in the side of the house (7200 Buckingham??). By this time, the fire is burning down toward Buckingham, but it is also burning west into the trees and the backyard of 7151 Buckingham. We went through the gate, where there is a huge green shed on pilings. The shed caught on fire at the same time, and the first person on the hose went down because of the heat intensity. After a blast of water, he was fine. We were forced out of the gate when the fire was coming into the house. The Engineer of 5632 gave over his engine to another EBRP Lieutenant. The Engineer and an OFD officer went under a masonry retaining wall to the roof to keep the fire off the back of the house. There was a camera-crew from Channel 2 at this position, other civilians had taken off.

Three of the EBRP were on one 1 1/2" line and straight-streaming the fire. The other EBRP and OFD were on the roof. The word came down to get out, that the fire couldn't be held. The fire crew on the roof were fixated on the fire and wouldn't come off the roof. The house was then fully involved. We needed to leave going first south and then west.

### 1125

The engine went first, and their pick-up went afterwards. Going up the road. Red and black, fire across the road. The Battalion Chief's car was on the road and fully on fire. There was another car in flame. A garage and a driveway were burning. We were trying to make the turn in the road. There was a powerline bouncing up and down on the road, and there were flames across the road. We couldn't get out. We had waited too long. We backed up into the driveways which were already on fire. 5632 went down first. There was solid flame. The 2 OFD were on the road. They jumped into the truck. The truck was rocking back and forth because of the wind. Powerlines were going down, and things were exploding. We came down Buckingham in an east direction, came around the corner, and there were 2 Oakland engines between 2 houses. One was Engine 8, and the other was Engine 24. There were hoses all over the street. There were hydrants. There were 12 people on those engines, and another 5 from our crew. There was a civilian ride-along cutting down pine trees with a chainsaw. There were 5-6 civilians that were under the porch of [the big] house, who were middle-aged and calm. Everything was on fire, but the intensity wasn't the same. The fire started to move down and up. While the fire was being fought, we tried cutting a fire-break. There were rekindles all over in this area, and the crew decided to back-fire it. The back-fire worked. The firestorm had moved on, but there were still fires in the area.



**1200**

The civilians were moved to another location during this period. The major concern was getting the civilians out of the area. In walking about 200 feet, there were power lines down everywhere, and we knew we couldn't get out. It was about this time that the water ran out (1215 by other peoples accounts). The hydrant went dry. Three of the EBRP crew walked back up Buckingham to see what the situation was for getting out of the area. In walking this route, we saw 2 OFD with a woman walking down the hill. [Note: These are the 2 members of Engine 6 who had been trapped in a swimming pool up on Buckingham.] [Note: The 2 members of Engine 6 had presumed they had gotten out of the pool at around 1330, and spent another 15 minutes doing oxygen therapy. EBRP timing was assumed to be 1230 at the latest when the water ran dry. The question remains as to how long a period of time between the water running dry, and the 2 members of Engine 6 escorting the civilian woman down the hill. The time difference remains at an hour to an hour and a half.]

This woman joined the other civilians under the protection of Engine 8, Engine 24, and EBRP. The Captain of Engine 8 suggested that since we had a wench on the truck, that we should go down Tunnel Road. We went with the ride-along civilian down Tunnel. At the intersection of Tunnel and Charing Cross, we encountered a body. We left the body and went further down, clearing the road of debris. We continued down Tunnel and found an additional body, and left this body as well. Since Tunnel seemed clear, we went back up and got the rest of the civilians. The ride-along lead these other civilians back down Tunnel Road to Highway 24. EBRP stayed on Buckingham continuing to put out hot spots in the area. With the Captain from Engine 8, they went back down to pick up the bodies from Charing Cross and Tunnel. We went down to Highway 24, and realized for the first time how massive the fire was. We took the bodies down to Oakland Tech. (Oakland Technical High School). There were flames above Temescal at this time. We had our eyes flushed out. We left Oakland Tech and came back up to the Command Post. Engine 8 Captain checked in. At the same time we picked up a few volunteers and went back up to the scene. The other EBRP people had left at that point. They had gone back up Buckingham to Fish Ranch. There was an EBRP IC at Fish Ranch.

**1600**

There had been a report that a Firefighter was "down" on Norfolk, so the EBRP first assignment after returning to IC was to dispatch to the location of the Firefighter. The other 2 crew from EBRP took this assignment. It turned out that the person reported "down" was really the on-duty Battalion 4 Chief.

At this same time Engine 8 Captain left for reassignment. I was left with the volunteers at the scene.

**1900**

We stayed helping the guy on Buckingham, whose house is across the road from the 4-story house.

**2000**

Reassignment from Fish Ranch IC to Grizzly Peak. A dozer (from CDF) was used to cut a line from Fish Ranch down to Claremont. The job was to run a hose line with 5 people to cut off

any fire which could possibly come up from Berkeley up to Grizzly Peak or Fish Ranch Roads. This assignment lasted until about 0100.

**0100/21**

An EBRP and CDF Strike Team was formed to protect Broadway Terrace structures. This lasted though 1000.

**1000**

Got some rest.

**1600**

Redeployed out to Grizzly Terrace, on the north-side of Grizzly Peak Blvd., right above where the fire started. We spent the night putting out hot spots until 0200 (Wednesday).

**0200/22**

Stand-by status.

**1100**

Released.

**OBSERVATIONS**

- This was a NO-WIN SITUATION, specifically because of the wind.
- The fuel-load of pineneedles on roofs and dead vegetation around the houses.
- House construction adjacent to trees. This was a forest fire inside a city.
- Water didn't impact initially.
- The fire was travelling sideways.
- Four minutes to get redeployed was too long a period of time to get set up for the major flare-up.

Initially we couldn't see smoke when going up the hill, so we weren't thinking about a mop-up operation. We had come to the scene to get our hoses. We didn't know there was an imminent danger of flare-ups. We weren't coming up with charged hoses. (A charged hose is a hose connected to a line of water, either connected to a truck or to a hydrant capable of putting out a fire.) Oakland had charged lines up above Marlborough and that was 200 yards away.



**Oakland Police Department/Lieutenant 2L81 Watch Commander Day-shift****0500**

I had no communications with the Oakland Fire Department concerning the fire. I was briefed slightly on my relief with the midnight crew that there had been a fire on Saturday. The morning was uneventful.

**0900**

I had left the police building. There were no problems with the Oakland Fire Department at this time. I had gone home for a meal, and I had had my radio on, and I heard that there was some activity on Beat 14, which corresponds to the area of the Oakland Hills, near the Berkeley/Contra Costa County line – in the fire area.

**1045/1055**

Called the radio room Sergeant, and asked what the activity was. He had mentioned a woman in a car on Caldwell, in the southeast part of Swainland. He also mentioned that there had been a rekindling of the fire, and that I would be enroute to the fire scene. What I had not known, was that we already had two units up there. Beat 9, which was an Officer, and District 2. This was a tactical unit roaming the district; he was noted as 2-Tack 22. He was assigned to go up there on a ringing alarm.

**1115/1120**

I was then called to go to the fire, that it had re-erupted. My route was 580 west-bound to Highway 24 north. There was thick black/brown smoke coming from the hills. The volumes of smoke were increasing. The fire had exploded (seeing the smoke). Had talked to the Sergeant about pulling out the Oakland Police Fire Plan, the Emergency Hill Fire Plan. I was enroute to the fire with red-light and siren, and that I would be going straight up where the fire was originating. I took the roads necessary to get to Tunnel Road and Buckingham. A lot of people were leaving, and going out Tunnel Road to Highway 24. The winds were steady and strong. In the hills, the winds were intensifying. The winds were gusting and rolling. When I got back to the area of Buckingham, I noticed the smoke of the fire, and the winds were about 40 mph. I saw another Officer and knew it was District 2-Tack 22. There were hot embers, and pieces of trees, mostly flying through the air, horizontal at 45 degree angles – leaves and eucalyptus bark. The wind was going in several different directions at once. I got to the intersection and met with District 2-Tack 22, who was standing outside of his car on Tunnel Road and Buckingham Blvd. helping people leave the area; his car was parked at the north curb. People were rushing to get out. People were packing their cars, getting ready to evacuate.

**1120**

I told the other Officer to get in the car. Looking through the windshield facing north, we could see very, very, dense smoke. As we looked to the mountain, the trees were exploding on fire. Northeast along the ridge above Tunnel Road from Buckingham, the grass was on fire behind the brown-shingle house. [Note: This is the 4-story structure at 7235 Buckingham Blvd.] The wind was blowing the fire through the grass, and all the grass was ablaze. This was going up to-



wards Grizzly Peak. I told the Officer to get back in his car, and to go to any other area. I don't know exactly which way he went. I never saw his direction after I left him. I tried to go up Buckingham to see exactly where the fire was going. I had no communication with the fire department.

The situation was changing; the fire was out of control. I didn't see any fire personnel in the area, but I also couldn't see farther than 150 - 200 feet, and that is only close to the ground. I made the first hair-pin turn in the road on Buckingham, but the fire by now had come down the hill, and it had jumped Buckingham right over my car. I needed to move out of that area. People were running out of Buckingham. At one point I thought they were Firefighters, but I can't say that they were. I moved quickly out the fire. The fire had now gone around the brown-shingled house, and it was going eastbound rapidly into the trees. The wind appeared to be drafting up and swirling, and throwing things back down, and gusting at 40 mph.

I went from Buckingham and Tunnel, and I went from house to house to evacuate people, looking for garage doors which were open, and cars. There are very few houses going east on Buckingham. I went down east-bound along Old Tunnel Road, towards Bay Forest, with my siren and PA system warning people.

**1133**

Notified the Sergeant in the radio room to start calling all units over to that end of town from the east-end. I wanted every available police unit up there. I got a hold of the desk man, and told him I wanted people to report back to work, especially motorcycle officers, and the 4th Platoon which is a pool of about 80 Officers off-duty. Since it was Sunday morning, I was hoping that these people would be home, and available for recall. If those people could be contacted, then I asked him to just go through the book, and get anyone who could report to work. I asked the desk officer to call our command personnel – the Deputy Chief and others. The Desk Officer could not get a hold of our Deputy Chief so I told him to get a hold of our Captain – the Shift Supervisor – our Commander. In moving up the chain-of-command ladder, we did finally reach another Deputy Chief who would reach the Chief of the Oakland Police Department.

**1138**

There was a woman with children in her house, and the gutters of her house were on fire. I waited 3 or 4 minutes until she was ready to evacuate the area. At this time, the fire was parallel between Grizzly Peak and Old Tunnel Road, moving as fast as my police car. I didn't see any fire personnel, so I didn't know where they were, nor did I see any other police cars. I was listening to my police radio, and I wasn't equating locations and distances with the area. There were streets being mentioned on the radio, but some of those streets I wasn't recognizing. One of the Sergeants on the radio was telling officers not to over-extend themselves, because the fire was moving so rapidly. They were requesting that those units in the fire area, help people move out with them, but not to have any units move into the area. The fire was creating a devastating situation.

I reached a sign on the road which said "Do Not Enter". It was a paved road. The road did not have metal spikes in it (as one-way entrances do). I immediately started going up the road, and as I did, the trees blew up in flame directly on the left.

The Chief of the Oakland Police Department phoned at this point, and I informed him there was a major conflagration. I told him we were losing a large part of Beat 14. I stopped talking to him because at that point I knew I was trapped.

**1145/1150**

The fire was now behind me, and I had to back through the fire in order to get out. I drove to Bay Forest Drive (which presumably was burning before Parkwood Apartments). When I arrived in this area, I saw a lot of cars, and people were trying to get out. I told people to warn their neighbors about getting out. I drove to the end of Bay Forest Drive where there is another *cul de sac*. [Note: All of the roads in the Bay Forest area (Bay Forest Place, Bay Forest Court, and Bay Forest Drive) end in *cul de sacs*.] It was here that I saw the first engine company of the morning. It was a grass truck (Brush rig?) – a 4-wheel drive truck with rubber hoses. There were 4 firefighting personnel. There was a Firefighter on top of the truck trying to spray water into an area forested by eucalyptus trees which had just exploded in flame of over 100 feet, and the fire was licking the back of the ridge and the condominiums. This Firefighter was trying to train water on flames going against high winds; it had no effect at all, the water was going everywhere. On my PA system I asked the fire personnel if they knew they were being surrounded by fire. The Firefighter pointed at me suggesting that I too was being surrounded by fire. The fire had moved to encircle us, the houses were in flame, seeing the reflection of the fire in the windows. I followed the truck through the fire and followed him out. I went to Bay Forest Court where cars were still parked. I kicked some of the doors in and yelled "Fire, fire" and then I left; the truck went towards Old Tunnel Road. By that time, the fire had gone over the tops of the houses on Bay Forest Court, and was progressing towards Tunnel Road on the north-side. I continued east-bound on Old Tunnel Road until I saw the fork in the road. There were 3 properties on Bay Forest at the intersection of Skyline which were immediately being threatened. The fire was encroaching on this area, travelling up towards Grizzly Peak, and then it was coming down. I never thought about or saw the Parkwood Apartments, so I don't know what was happening to them at this time.

There was one family at the end of the property which was loading things in the car. I told them they needed to leave, that the fire was going to burn their property. I stayed there for about 10 minutes, making sure that they left the site; they had animals that they needed to catch.

**1245 – 1300**

The fire at this time had crossed Highway 24. I kept travelling on Skyline to Broadway Terrace, to Woodland, Pineneedle, Balsam Way. I essentially was evacuating people in this area, I wanted to keep people from going into Broadway Terrace and Skyline, because of people evacuating out of the area. It was very difficult to move people from Pineneedle because they were filming the fire with their mini-cams. It seemed as if the fire had slowed on this side of



Highway 24. It wasn't travelling as quickly as it had previously in the Grizzly Peak, Bay Forest area. People had parked all along Broadway Terrace, lined up and parking illegally looking over the valley. I asked them to move, because of the hazard that it was causing.

**1305**

I took Highway 13 down to Park Blvd., which was where the Oakland Police Department Command Post was, and met with the Captain in charge of the swing-shift command. There was a Sergeant and one of the OPD Deputy Chiefs. I was sent back by the Captain to find the OFD Command Post, which at this time was on Broadway and Highway 13. I went down Highway 13 back towards the fire. As I approached, the smoke got thicker and thicker. At the intersection of Highway 13 and Highway 24 the smoke was incredibly dense. Embers and debris were flying and swirling. The grass was on fire. I tried to get on Highway 24, but it was closed. I tried to go the wrong way on Highway 24, and then circle back. The railings were on fire, and visibility was nil. I finally went down Broadway Terrace and went the wrong way on Highway 13. I went to the Command Post and met the Oakland Fire Department Chief, Operations, and 3 fire personnel in the Command Van. At that time, some of the Oakland Police Department personnel whom I had met with earlier, arrived at the OFD Command Van thinking about setting up a joint command post.

**1322**

Powerlines exploded (shutting down the CAD system in the police department). There were people who had lined up along the ridge where the powerlines were, who were watch the fire. When the powerlines exploded, and the lines cracked, these people started running and screaming. The fire was moving in their direction when the powerlines exploded. The OFD Command Van was moved towards the Lake Temescal area.

**1345**

I decided a good place to set up the police Command Post was at the Rockridge Bart Station area, under Highway 24. Our Sergeant stayed with the Oakland Fire Department Command Van as a link between the police department and the fire department. The Rockridge Middle School was used to set up our administrative offices with telephones and police radios.

When the police received 911 calls about the fire, the computer system was mapping the calls. Whenever calls came in and we had personnel to handle the calls, we would send the officers out to those addresses. People were being evacuated from the Swainland area, Lake Temescal - Golden Gate area, and north-side of Highway 13.

**The afternoon through the 2100/2130**

There were evacuations up to Broadway Terrace, Florence, and Hermosa. Evacuations were occurring all afternoon through 2000.

**2100 - 2130**

There was a staff meeting for different shifts.



**2000/2030**

Houses on Hermosa were in flames.

**0500/21**

There was a new shift – 12 hour shifts. Our responsibilities were property assessments and keeping people out with road-blocks, and filing missing persons reports (approximately 240).

**OBSERVATIONS**

There should be better communication between the Oakland Fire Department, the Oakland Police Department, and other jurisdictions and agencies involved with emergencies such as this. There really was no communication here. There should also be joint training between the fire and the police, and a better understanding about what each agency should do.

There needs to be an understanding about setting up evacuation centers where families can meet each other. By 1500/1600 there had been 3 centers set up: The Oakland Technical High School, Foster Middle School, and Fremont High School.

"Sig"(nal) alert is a system where all media is alerted simultaneously about an event such as the fire. There was no "Sig" alert for the Oakland Tunnel Fire. Each media had to be contacted separately. There is a way of getting information out by police teletypes, and this is picked up on every news teletype.

When the computer went down, everything else went down. There should be stand-alone communication centers. The police do have emergency generators, but I don't know whether they are hooked up to the computer system. We can not afford to lose communication with the fire department or the ambulance service.

There should be joint-training among the police and other municipalities, as well as the public service agencies such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army.

There should be resources in case of another emergency. We have 2 bridges, and 1 freeway which we could lose. How do you recall people for an emergency if these transportation networks are blocked or closed. What happens if the Highways 880 and 80 are closed, or Highway 680 and Highway 580 are closed. If the next earthquake occurs in the East Bay region, who is going to handle the emergency if our community is devastated. In case of emergencies, we need to combine all of the jurisdictions into a common training environment, to share resources. At the moment, there are duplications of fire service stations. Berkeley, Alameda, and Contra Costa County would have found out sooner about the fire if there had been shared communication facilities. There would have been no excuses about not knowing. There should be an automatic stand-by period for needed resources.

The police helicopter was not on-duty Sunday morning. This resource should be shared between the Oakland Fire Department and the Oakland Police Department.

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## **7. Overview of the Problems, Hazards, Hindrances**

In order to fully understand the complexity of fighting a fire of this magnitude, the problems, hazards, and hindrances in this situation need to be addressed.

Problems which encompass the forces of nature can only be dealt with in hindsight. The hot weather, the high winds, and the low humidity are forces which do not adhere to human intervention. Knowing that these conditions exist in a chronic, seasonal way, can make planning for these "spells" probable, assuring that the conditions which they engender are lessened by the forces of human intervention.

There are several situations and environments which need to be addressed on a more aggressive level: those situations and environments which beg change.



### **External Environments**

- Ecology of the environment
  - Wildland vegetation, and "natural" objects
    - Native brush and trees
- Topography of the environment
  - Defenseable space
  - Roads – narrow, elevated, sloped
    - Emergency-vehicle access
    - Used for parking
- Power lines
  - Above-ground
  - Below-ground
  - Live-wires
  - Creosote-covered power poles
  - Power outages during an emergency
  - Back-up generators
- Dwellings
  - Wood-shake roofing
  - Wood-siding
  - Structures built into the hill-side
- Water-access
  - Pumping equipment
  - Reservoirs
  - Power-generators for emergency pumping
  - Water-tenders
  - Available hydrants in an inaccessible environment

## **Internal Environments**

### **Communication**

- Radio communication between the Oakland Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) and fire personnel
- Radio communication between fire personnel in the field and Incident Command
- Radio communication between Incident Command and the FDC
- Cellular telephone communication between fire personnel
- Computer system back-up (CAD systems should have archival back-up)

### **Policy and Procedure for emergency situation**

- Recall procedures written and available
- Logistics for fuel, meals, transportation, communication, portable radios and phones
- Mutual aid coverage of Oakland Fire Stations in an emergency
- Mapping systems readily available in all cars and apparatus, including those of mutual aid agencies and companies
- Staffing of Incident Command and Fire Stations
- Staffing of Oakland Fire Department FDC
- Procedures for staging and establishing BASE operations
- Finance, procurement, and payroll for emergencies
- Procedures for Public Information Officers (PIO)
- Unit-log and attendance management
- Ready-reserve apparatus and spare apparatus/equipment, including reducers for hose from outside the Oakland jurisdiction

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**8. Overview of the Report Recommendations**

Much has been stated in terms of how to effectively pinpoint solutions for the problems which occurred during The Oakland Tunnel Fire. Some of those earlier solutions might have sounded simplistic. But there are other more viable solutions which are seen as long-term situations which will help alleviate primary problems. The problems are varied and so are the solutions. This section reviews those solutions.

- Intensify the training efforts within the Fire Department
- Improve community training for emergency preparedness
- Expand Incident Command training
- Provide above-ground water supply systems
- Purchase a helicopter for the Oakland Fire Department
- Develop an on-going working relationship with news media
- Plan and partake in joint-training with local jurisdictions
- Establish formal jurisdictional agreements
- Emphasize the need for an integrated communication system on a county-wide basis
- Increase the number of District Chiefs
- Aggressively enforce the Fire Prevention Codes in the wildland area year-round
- Establish an operational policy which insures that Oakland Fire Department personnel are assigned to all incoming mutual aid Strike Teams, Task Forces, or single units
- Review the current policy on dispatching Oakland Fire Department Officers to the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) during major incidents
- Adopt greater standards for hydrant installations, and improve water supplies

**Intensify the training efforts within the Fire Department with emphasis on the following:**

- The Incident Command System (ICS)
- Fire prevention inspections
- Multiple engine-company drills
- Wildland firefighting tactics and strategies
- Insure that language consistent with that used in State ICS is used during all emergency operations
- Insure that all fire dispatch personnel are also trained in the appropriate terminology used in ICS.

**Improve community training requirements for emergency preparedness**

- Tailor CORE (Citizens of Oakland Respond to Emergencies) evacuation planning to a street and neighborhood level, encouraging community committees to plan for shelter, communication, medical, search and rescue, and evacuation requirements in the possible absence of City services.

**Expand Incident Command training**

- Increase the number of ICS drills and periodically include participants from other city and county government departments to prepare for and practice multi-agency response.

**Provide above-ground water supply systems**

- Identify alternative sources of water for firefighting activities.
- Purchase above-ground portable water delivery systems.

**Purchase a helicopter for the Oakland Fire Department**

- To ensure early attacks on wildland fires, assist in evacuation of individuals in canyon areas, and to assist in operations of high-rise fires.

**Develop an on-going working relationship with news media**

- The media should have access to the Incident Command Post in order to accurately provide information to the general public. There must be close communication between the Fire Department's Public Information Officers and the media.

**Plan and partake in joint-training with local jurisdictions**

- Conduct annual disaster drills to evaluate and ensure constant readiness

**Establish formal jurisdictional agreements**

- Enter into automatic aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions to insure immediate joint-response to critical fire areas.

**Emphasize the need for an integrated communication system on a county-wide basis**

- Complete the installation of Oakland's new 800 MHz Trunk System. Aggressively encourage other municipalities and agencies to purchase similar communication systems to insure inter-agency communication compatibility.
- Thoroughly train personnel on the use of the system.

**Increase the number of District Chiefs**

- In order to make the span of control more manageable, an additional District Chief's position is required; accepted national practices recommends supervision of a maximum of 3 – 7 units per Battalion Officer.

**Aggressively enforce the Fire Prevention Codes in the wildland area year-round**

- Utilize both Fire Prevention Inspectors and engine company personnel to increase the frequency of inspections.

**Establish an operational policy which insures that a representative from the Oakland Fire Department is assigned to any incoming mutual aid Strike Team, Task Force, or single unit**

- Assigning personnel to incoming units will allow firefighting companies the ability to reach those crucial areas which would be unfamiliar to an outside agency.

**Review the current policy on dispatching Oakland Fire Department Officers to the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) during major incidents**

- The optimum goal should always be to require appropriate staff in essential positions, while minimizing the use of officers in non-operational assignments.



**Adopt greater standards for hydrant installations, and improve water supplies.**

- Improve space allocation for hydrant placement in the Oakland Hill area.
- Increase the accepted GPM (Gallons Per Minute) requirements.
- Be actively involved in East Bay MUD's water system upgrade planning.

**OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES (OES) STRIKE TEAM REPORT**

This listing represents Strike Teams listed by OES. It does not include some of the Strike Teams handled by the California Department of Forestry (CDF) nor their hand-crews dedicated to their Strike Teams. Refer to Appendix E for additional CDF Strike Team listings.

| Strike Team # | Fire Dept. ID       | Vehicle ID | Start Date | Release | # Crew |
|---------------|---------------------|------------|------------|---------|--------|
| 2037A         | Bethel Island       | E95A       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | Riverview           | E82        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Riverview           | E81        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
|               | Oakley              | E93A       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Richmond            | E62        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Oakley              | E93        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
| 2038A         | San Ramon           | OES235     | 10/20      | 10/20   | 3      |
|               | El Cerrito          | E199       | 10/20      | 10/20   | 3      |
|               | Benica              | OES154     | 10/20      | 10/20   | 3      |
|               | CDF/San Benito      | OES140     | 10/20      | 10/20   | 3      |
|               | Livermore Lab       | LAC CAR 3  | 10/20      | 10/20   | 1      |
|               | Livermore Lab       | OES159     | 10/20      | 10/20   | 1      |
| 2042A-Type1   | Contra Costa County | 10A        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Crockett/Carquinez  | E78        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | Richmond            | E61        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Riverview           | E81A       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Contra Costa County | E10C       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 2      |
|               | El Cerrito          | BC71       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 2      |
| 2043A-Type1   | Crockett/ Carquinez | E79        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | East Diablo         | E512       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Pinole              | E73        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Rodeo/ Hercules     | E75A       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Oakley              | E94        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | East Diablo         | E507       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 1      |
| TF2044        | Moraga              | PW42       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Contra Costa County | E4         | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Berkeley Lab        | E48        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | Contra Costa County | TA15       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Orinda              | E45        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Orinda              | B45        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |

| Strike Team # | Fire Dept. ID       | Vehicle ID | Start Date | Release | # Crew |
|---------------|---------------------|------------|------------|---------|--------|
| 2142A-Type1   | Marin               | E1586      | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Corte Madera        | E14        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | San Rafael          | E54        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Larkspur            | E16        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | San Anselmo         | E20        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Corte Madera        | Car 53     | 10/20      | 10/22   | 1      |
|               | San Rafael          | Chief 54   | 10/20      | 10/22   | 1      |
| 2143C-Type3   | Marin               | B1513      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Tiburon             | E12A       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Marin               | E1577      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | Marin               | E1565      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Marin               | E1570      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Novato              | E61        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
| 2144A-Type1   | Novato              | E2         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|               | San Rafael          | E52        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|               | Kentfield           | E17        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|               | Alto/Richardson     | E9A        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Kentfield           | C17        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 2      |
|               | Mill Valley         | E6         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
| 2145A-Type1   | Skywalker Ranch     | E481       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Ross                | E18        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | Marin               | B1511      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Sausalito           | E2         | 10/20      | 10/24   | 5      |
|               | San Rafael          | E53        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
| 2200A-Type1   | Napa County/CDF     | E218       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Napa County/CDF     | 1303       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 1      |
|               | Napa County/CDF     | E417       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Deer Park           | E21        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | American Canyon     | R11        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Napa                | E3382      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
| 2275A-Type1   | Daly City           | E94        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Pacifica            | E173       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | San Bruno           | E53        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Daly City           | E90        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
|               | South San Francisco | E61        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |



| Strike Team # | Fire Dept. ID      | Vehicle ID | Start Date | Release | # Crew |
|---------------|--------------------|------------|------------|---------|--------|
| 2276A-Type2   | Foster City        | E130       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Burlingame         | E35        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Hillsborough       | E32        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Millbrae           | E37        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | San Mateo          | E23        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Half Moon Bay      | E40        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Hillsborough       | U2         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
| 2277-Type1    | Menlo Park         | E3         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Woodside           | E52        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | San Carlos         | E13        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Redwood City       | E12        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Woodside           | E8         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Redwood City       | Chief 3    | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
| 2278-Type1    | San Mateo          | E24        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 5      |
|               | San Mateo County   | B4         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | San Mateo County   | E54        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | San Mateo County   | E116       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Menlo Park         | E6         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Half Moon Bay      | E2         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
| 2301A-Type1   | Sunnyvale          | E1         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Mountain View      | E5         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Palo Alto          | E1         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Los Altos          | E76        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Mountain View      | C1         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 2      |
|               | Central            | E1         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
| 2302A-Type1   | Santa Clara County | E32        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Santa Clara County | E81        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Campbell           | E1         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Santa Clara County | E10        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | San Jose           | E5         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|               | Milpitas           | C764       | 10/20      | 10/22   | 1      |
|               | Central            | E3         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Milpitas           | E84        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |

| Strike Team # | Fire Dept. ID | Vehicle ID | Start Date | Release | # Crew |
|---------------|---------------|------------|------------|---------|--------|
| 2303A-Type1   | Gilroy        | E61        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | San Jose      | Chief 13   | 10/20      | 10/22   | 2      |
|               | San Jose      | E1         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|               | Morgan Hill   | E12        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
| 2304A-Type1   | Lockheed      | E1         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Palo Alto     | E3         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Santa Clara   | E1         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|               | Palo Alto     | E5         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Mountain View | E4         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Palo Alto     | NA         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 1      |
|               | Palo Alto     | U638       | 10/20      | 10/22   | 2      |
| 2305A-Type1   | Central       | Car 6R     | 10/20      | 10/22   | 2      |
|               | Morgan Hill   | E1         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Campbell      | E6032      | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|               | Central       | E8         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|               | Shannon       | E6         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Milpitas      | E13        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
| 2306A-Type1   | San Jose      | E2         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Mountain View | C63        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 2      |
|               | San Jose      | E3         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|               | Moffett Field | E20        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 5      |
|               | Milpitas      | E1         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Sunnyvale     | E46        | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
| 2329B-Type1   | Scotts Valley | C2601      | 10/20      | 10/22   | 1      |
|               | Santa Cruz    | WT41       | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Santa Cruz    | E3511      | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|               | Aromas        | E4511      | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|               | Santa Cruz    | E211       | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Aromas        | C4500      | 10/20      | 10/22   | 1      |
| 2329A         | Santa Cruz    | E4313      | 10/20      | 10/22   | 3      |
| 2350C-Type3   | Suisun        | E3421      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Benica        | E3043      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Suisun        | E3350      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Fairfield     | E3247      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Cordelia      | E3142      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Fairfield     | E3245      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |

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|---------------|----------------------|------------|------------|---------|--------|
| 2351A-Type1   | Dixon                | E3812      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Vacaville            | E4424      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Vacaville            | E3911      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Suisun               | E3310      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Fairfield            | E3212      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Cordelia             | E3105      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 2      |
| 2375A-Type1   | Penngrove            | E9282      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Rohnert Park         | E9982      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Cotati               | E9182      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Petaluma             | E9384      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Two Rock Coast Guard | E9880      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Rincon Valley        | E7506      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
| 2377A-Type1   | Bellevue             | E7482      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Rincon Valley        | E7581      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Windsor              | E7280      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | Healdsburg           | C6300      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 2      |
|               | Santa Rosa           | E7183      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Healdsburg           | E6381      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
| 2803A-Type1   | San Mateo            | B5         | 10/20      | 10/21   | 3      |
|               | San Mateo            | C3         | 10/21      | 10/24   | 2      |
|               | Pacifica             | E172       | 10/21      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | CDF/San Mateo        | OES173     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Pacifica             | E172       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
| 2804A-Type1   | Orinda               | OES237     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | San Ramon            | OES235     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | El Cerrito           | E199       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Livermore Lab        | OES159     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | San Ramon            | BC3113     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Livermore Lab        | LAB CAR 3  | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | CDF/San Benito       | OES140     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Benica               | OES154     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |



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|---------------|---------------|------------|------------|---------|--------|
| 3000-Type1    | CDF/Butte     | E55        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Butte     | B2114      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 1      |
|               | CDF/Butte     | E44        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Butte     | E72        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Butte     | E42        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Oroville      | E2114      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 1      |
|               | CDF/Butte     | E91        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
| 3001-Type1    | Chico         | BC?        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 2      |
|               | Oroville      | E113       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Paradise      | E2         | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | El Medio      | E313       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Paradise      | E1         | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Chico         | E1         | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
| 3025-Type1    | Maxwell       | E66        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Williams      | C40        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Live Oak      | E523       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Williams      | E32        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Sutter        | E615       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Colusa        | E181       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Colusa        | C40        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
| 3050-Type1    | Willows       | C70        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 1      |
|               | Quincy        | OES214     | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Willows       | E3         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Artois        | E73        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Willows       | E85        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Hamilton      | E108       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
| 3150-Type1    | Burney        | E217       | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Redding       | E2?        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Redding       | E3?        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Redding       | E182       | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Weaverville   | E183       | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Redding       | E1         | 10/21      | 10/23   | 1      |

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|---------------|----------------|------------|------------|---------|--------|
| 3151-Type1    | Shasta College | E73        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Cottonwood     | E223       | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Millville      | E21        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Mt. Gate       | E241       | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Anderson       | E46        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Anderson       | B46        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 1      |
| 3200-Type1    | Dorris         | C1912      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 1      |
|               | Dorris         | E3511      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Happy Camp     | E3312      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Mt. Shasta     | E3611      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Tulelake       | E4921      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Klamath        | E3412      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
| 3225A-Type1   | Sutter         | E813       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Oswald-Tudor   | E613       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Medidian       | E669       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
|               | Liveoak        | E524       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Yuba           | E2         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Yuba           | C2         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
| 3250B-Type1   | CDF/Tehama     | OES205     | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Tehama     | E116       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Tehama     | E103       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | CDF/Tehama     | E113       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Tehama     | B2515      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 1      |
|               | CDF/Tehama     | E114       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
| 3300C-Type1   | Marysville     | C200       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 1      |
|               | Plumas/Brophy  | E362       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Olivehurst     | E315       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Linda          | E275       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Marysville     | E216       | 10/20      | 10/21   | 3      |
|               | Linda          | OES213     | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
| 4025C-Type3   | Pine Grove     | C6600      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
|               | Jackson        | E6331      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Sutter Creek   | E6421      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Jackson Valley | E6135      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Defender       | E6838      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Pine Grove     | E6621      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |

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| 4050C-Type3   | Copperopolis      | E235       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Calaveras         | E321       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Valley Springs    | E141       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Calaveras         | E451       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Calaveras         | E121       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Calaveras         | T804       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
| 4125A-Type1   | Roseville         | C2203      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Placer/Foothills  | E2584      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | South Placer      | E2684      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | Placer Hills      | E1981      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | Newcastle         | E2082      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Dry Creek         | E1482      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Placer Foothills  | C2500      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
| 4151C-Type1   | American River    | E11        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Fair Oaks         | E32        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Florin            | CHIEF 103  | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
|               | Galt              | E45        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Florin            | E26        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Folsom            | G36        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
| 4152C-Type3   | Sacramento        | W10        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
|               | Sacramento        | W18        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
|               | Isletin           | E4241      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Elk Grove         | G71        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Wilton            | G581       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Florin            | C33-112    | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
| 4153C-Type3   | Courtland         | G91        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | American River    | G58        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Sacramento County | G25        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
|               | Elk Grove         | B20        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
|               | Folsom            | G37        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
|               | Florin            | G52        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |



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| 4154A-Type1   | Fair Oaks         | E232       | 10/21      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | Pacific           | E256       | 10/21      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | Rio Vista         | E3511      | 10/21      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | Folsom Prison     | E39        | 10/21      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Walnut Grove      | E96        | 10/21      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | American River    | C2720      | 10/21      | 10/24   | 2      |
| 4175C-Type3   | Waterloo/Morada   | E1         | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Manteca/ Lathrop  | NA         | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Clements          | E6-2       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Escalon           | 1A1        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Manteca/Lathrop   | E32        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Delta             | S101       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Liberty           | 12-5       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
| 4201C-Type3   | Modesto           | NA         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 1      |
|               | Hughson           | E52        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | West Sanislaus    | E44        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Oakedale          | E57        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Burbank/Paradise  | E82        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Waterford/Hickman | E55        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Stanislaus County | C1         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 1      |
| 4202A-Type1   | Woodland Avenue   | WA25       | 10/21      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Stanislaus County | E44        | 10/21      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Ceres             | E22        | 10/21      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Salida            | E22        | 10/21      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Industrial        | E23        | 10/21      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Woodland Avenue   | C2         | 10/21      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Stanislaus        | C12        | 10/21      | 10/21   | 1      |
| 4250C-Type3   | Tuolumne County   | E581       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Twain Harte       | E722       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Tuolumne County   | E571       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Tuolumne County   | E551       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Tuolumne County   | E741       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Tuolumne County   | C704       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |

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| 4275C-Type3   | Woodland          | G4         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Woodland          | G3         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Galt              | E44        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 4      |
|               | Sacramento County | G65        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Willow Oak        | WOG1       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | UC Davis          | C2         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
| 4801A-Type1   | Tracy             | OES150     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Tuolumne County   | OES131     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | West Stanislaus   | OES208     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Stockton          | OES233     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Clements          | 6A1        | 10/23      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Stanislaus County | OES234     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Manteca/ Lathrop  | 3A1        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
| 4802A-Type1   | Winters           | OES174     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Sacramento County | E223       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Woodland          | E147       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Sacramento        | OES226     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Sacramento County | OES224     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Sacramento County | STL4802    | 10/20      | 10/24   | 2      |
| 4803A-Type1   | Coloma - Lotus    | C7400      | 10/20      | 10/22   | 1      |
|               | Eldorado Hills    | C8501      | 10/22      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Eldorado Hills    | NA         | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Eldorado County   | NA         | 10/23      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Murphys           | OES124     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Delta/Rio Vista   | OES175     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Eldorado County   | HRF1       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Amador        | OES149     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Woodbridge        | OES211     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
| 4804A-Type1   | Roseville         | NA         | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Roseville         | E2283      | 10/20      | 10/24   | 4      |
|               | Watt Park         | OES130     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Lake Valley       | OES128     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Truckee           | OES236     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | GeorgeTown        | OES212     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | South Placer      | NA         | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |

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| 5000A-Type2   | CDF/Mid Valley | B4317      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 1      |
|               | Fresno         | E2         | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | North Central  | E5         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Mid Valley | E7         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Mid Valley | E5         | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Clovis         | HRF2       | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
| 5001A-Type1   | Fig Garden     | E221       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Westside       | E24        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Selma          | E8501      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Fresno         | E10        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Sanger         | E324       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Mid Valley | BC4306     | 10/20      | 10/23   | 1      |
| 5025A-Type2   | Kern County    | E42        | 10/21      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Kern County    | E14        | 10/21      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Kern County    | B1         | 10/21      | 10/24   | 2      |
|               | Kern County    | E64        | 10/21      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Kern County    | E12        | 10/21      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Kern County    | E63        | 10/21      | 10/24   | 3      |
| 5075A-Type2   | Madera County  | E219       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Gustine        | E303       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Yosemite Lakes | E10        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Ahwahnee       | E16        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | Oakhurst       | E212       | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Madera     | B4213      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
| 5125A-Type2   | CDF/Merced     | E92        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Merced     | E75        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Merced     | E71        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Merced     | B4205      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 2      |
|               | CDF/Merced     | E81        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Merced     | E82        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
| 5126A-Type2   | CDF/Merced     | E76        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Merced     | E91        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Merced     | E88        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Merced     | E84        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Merced     | C4222      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 2      |
|               | CDF/Merced     | E96        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |



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|---------------|------------------------|------------|------------|---------|--------|
| 5150B-Type2   | CDF/Tulare             | E9         | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Tulare             | B4721      | 10/21      | 10/23   | 1      |
|               | CDF/Tulare             | E7         | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Tulare             | E27        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Tulare             | E19        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Tulare             | E13        | 10/21      | 10/23   | 2      |
| 5151B-Type2   | Terra Bella            | E21        | 10/21      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Hanford                | E6         | 10/21      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Exeter                 | E211       | 10/21      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Tulare City            | E1         | 10/21      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Visalia                | E1         | 10/21      | 10/22   | 3      |
|               | Tulare City            | C4118      | 10/21      | 10/22   | 2      |
| 5801B-Type1   | CDF/Merced             | BC4206     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 2      |
|               | CDF/Mariposa           | OES142     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Merced             | OES180     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Merced                 | OES146     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Madera County          | OES177     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Mid Valley         | OES203     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
| 5802B-Type1   | Kern County            | E166       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Porterville            | E179       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Kings County           | E178       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Fresno                 | E176       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | Kern County            | E167       | 10/20      | 10/24   | 3      |
|               | CDF/Tulare             | BC4115     | 10/20      | 10/24   | 2      |
| NA            | OES                    | SC4        | 10/22      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | OES                    | SC3        | 10/20      | 10/24   | 1      |
|               | Mare Island            | 4612       | 10/20      | 10/21   | 1      |
|               | AICO (Alameda County)  | SR20       | 10/20      | 10/21   | 1      |
|               | Vacaville              | NA         | 10/20      | 10/21   | 1      |
|               | Alameda County         | S72        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
| NA            | Lawrence Livermore     | LP11       | 10/20      | 10//22  | 2      |
|               | Dougherty Regional     | P141       | 10/20      | 10//22  | 2      |
|               | Pleasanton             | P61        | 10/20      | 10//22  | 3      |
|               | Dougherty Regional     | C1402      | 10/20      | 10//22  | 2      |
|               | Livermore              | P3         | 10/20      | 10//22  | 2      |
|               | Mare Island Fire Dept. | E4610      | 10/20      | 10//23  | 4      |

| Strike Team #     | Fire Dept. ID         | Vehicle ID | Start Date | Release | # Crew |
|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|------------|---------|--------|
| SF1               | San Francisco         | E6         | 10/20      | 10/21   | 4      |
|                   | San Francisco         | E3         | 10/20      | 10/21   | 4      |
|                   | San Francisco         | E1         | 10/20      | 10/21   | 4      |
|                   | San Francisco         | E17        | 10/20      | 10/21   | 4      |
|                   | San Francisco         | E36        | 10/20      | 10/21   | 4      |
|                   | San Francisco         | C1         | 10/20      | 10/21   | 2      |
| SF2               | San Francisco         | E25        | 10/20      | 10/21   | 4      |
|                   | San Francisco         | E7         | 10/20      | 10/21   | 4      |
|                   | San Francisco         | E8         | 10/20      | 10/21   | 4      |
|                   | San Francisco         | E29        | 10/20      | 10/21   | 4      |
|                   | San Francisco         | E13        | 10/20      | 10/21   | 4      |
|                   | San Francisco         | Chief 2    | 10/20      | 10/21   | 2      |
| SM5-Type1         | South San Francisco   | B60        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
|                   | NAS Alameda           | E2         | 10/21      | 10/23   | 4      |
|                   | Burlingame            | E35        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|                   | Daly City             | E?(5)      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|                   | Pt. Montara           | E44        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|                   | South San Francisco   | B67        | 10/20      | 10/23   | 2      |
|                   | Colma                 | E3 (E86)   | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|                   | Colma                 | E1         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 4      |
|                   | Novato                | C1         | 10/20      | 10/22   | 1      |
| TF1               | Point Reyes           | E1         | 10/21      | 10/23   | 2      |
|                   | National Park Service | E2         | 10/21      | 10/23   | 2      |
|                   | National Park Service | E3         | 10/21      | 10/23   | 2      |
|                   | Vallejo               | E5250      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|                   | Vallejo               | E5207      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 1      |
|                   | Vallejo               | E5211      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
|                   | Vallejo               | E5216      | 10/20      | 10/23   | 3      |
| TF2<br>(XAL001B1) | San Leandro           | Acting B/C |            |         |        |
|                   | San Leandro           | E6         |            |         |        |
|                   | Hayward               | E22        |            |         |        |
|                   | Hayward               | E11        |            |         |        |
|                   | Eden Patrol           | 2          |            |         |        |
|                   | Fairview Patrol       | 1          |            |         |        |

| Strike Team #   | Fire Dept. ID  | Vehicle ID | Start Date | Release | # Crew |
|---|----------------|------------|------------|---------|--------|
| TF12<br>(XAL001B2)  | Union City     | Cpt.       |            |         |        |
|   | San Leandro    | E4         |            |         |        |
|   | Fremont        | E1053      |            |         |        |
|   | Fremont Patrol | 4          |            |         |        |
|   | Castro Valley  | E5         |            |         |        |
|   | Union City     | E1         |            |         |        |
| TF1<br>(XAL001C1)   | Castro Valley  | Acting B/C |            |         |        |
|   | Fremont        | E10        |            |         |        |
|   | Hayward        | E2         |            |         |        |
|   | Hayward Patrol | 5          |            |         |        |
|   | Hayward        | B/C        |            |         |        |
|   | Newark         | E3         |            |         |        |
| Information<br>on TF 13, 14,<br>and 18 is not<br>available. |                |            |            |         |        |



## ALAMEDA COUNTY MUTUAL AID REQUESTS - TUNNEL FIRE

| TIME | REQUEST FROM            | NATURE  | REPORTING POINT  | MAP PAGE     | ACTION                       | ORDER # XAL | Type | REQ # | UNITS ASSIGNED      | RELEASED DATE/TIME/ETA |
|------|-------------------------|---|--|--------------|------------------------------|-------------|------|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| 1100 | Oakland                 | Wildland Fire   | Grizzly Peak & Gish Ranch                                | 6/B7         | North Zone Initial Attack    | 001         | E    | A     | North Zone Initial  |                        |
| 1145 | Oakland Dispatch        | 4 ST for Wildland fire  | Grizzly Peak & Fish Ranch                                | 6/B7         | County Mutual Aid Dispatched |             |      |       |                     |                        |
|      |                         |   |  |              | South Zone 2 TF's Wildland   | 001         | E    | B-1   | TF-2                |                        |
|      |                         |   |  |              |                              |             | E    | B-2   | TF-12               |                        |
|      |                         |   |  |              | East Zone 2 TF's Wildland    | 001         | E    | B-3   | TF-14               |                        |
|      |                         |   |  |              |                              |             | E    | B-4   | TF-18               |                        |
| 1309 | Oakland Disp.           | 4 ST's/2 Type 3/2 Type 1  | 1-Type 3 Acacia & Golden Gate<br>Rest to Grizzly Peak CP | 4/E4<br>6/B3 | Region II                    |             |      |       |                     |                        |
|      |                         |   | Grizzly Peak C.P.  | 6/B3         | Type 1 Engine ST             | 001         | E    | 1     | XSM2275             | 10/23 1100/1300        |
|      |                         |   | Grizzly Peak C.P.  | 6/B3         | Type 1 Engine ST             | 001         | E    | 2     | XMR2142A/Wallerbury | 10/22 1752/2000        |
|      |                         |   | Grizzly Peak C.P.  | 6/B3         | Type 3 Engine ST             | 001         | E    | 3     | XMR2143C/Teeta      | 10/24 1025/1200        |
|      |                         |   | Acacia and Golden Gate                                   | 4/E4         | Type 3 Engine ST             | 001         | E    | 4     | 8170C/Shepherd      |                        |
| 1309 | Berkeley/Cates          | 2-Type 1 Eng. ST  | Berkeley H.S.<br>Bancroft & Martin Luther King           | 2/B7         | County Mutual Aid Dispatched |             |      |       |                     |                        |
|      |                         |   | Berkeley H.S.<br>Bancroft & Martin Luther King           | 2/B7         | South Zone—1 Structural TF   | 001         | E    | C-1   | TF-1                |                        |
|      |                         |   | Berkeley H.S.<br>Bancroft & Martin Luther King           | 2/B7         | East Zone—1 Structural TF    | 001         | E    | C-2   | TF-13               |                        |
| 1359 | Oakland<br>Disp./Carter | 6 Type 3 Eng. ST<br>7 Type 1 Eng. ST<br>6 Air Tankers<br>6 Helitack | Raimond Park<br>18th Street & Wood                       | 7/E2         | Region II                    |             |      |       |                     |                        |
|      |                         |   | Raimond Park<br>18th Street & Wood                       | 7/E2         | Type 3 Engine ST             | 001         | E    | 5     | 9480E               |                        |
|      |                         |   | Raimond Park<br>18th Street & Wood                       | 7/E2         | Type 3 Engine ST             | 001         | E    | 6     | XSO2350C/Glantz     | 10/23 1541/1630        |
|      |                         |   | Raimond Park<br>18th Street & Wood                       | 7/E2         | Type 3 Engine ST             | 001         | E    | 7     | XYO4275C/Chnador    | 10/23 1256/1500        |
|      |                         |   | Raimond Park<br>18th Street & Wood                       | 7/E2         | Type 3 Engine ST             | 001         | E    | 8     | XSJ4176C/Robebrook  | 10/24 1238/1400        |
|      |                         |   | Raimond Park<br>18th Street & Wood                       | 7/E2         | Type 3 Engine ST             | 001         | E    | 9     | 9110C/1112          |                        |
|      |                         |   | Raimond Park<br>18th Street & Wood                       | 7/E2         | Type 3 Engine ST             | 001         | E    | 10    | XST4201C/Richards   | 10/23 1223/1415        |

# THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE

## APPENDIX B

| TIME | REQUEST FROM | NATURE | REPORTING POINT                    | MAP PAGE | ACTION                         | ORDER # XAL | Type | REQ # | UNITS ASSIGNED    | RELEASED DATE/TIME/ETA |
|------|--------------|--------|------------------------------------|----------|--------------------------------|-------------|------|-------|-------------------|------------------------|
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST               | 001         | E    | 11    | XSA4151C/Sorensen |                        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST               | 001         | E    | 12    | XCZ23206/French   |                        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST               | 001         | E    | 13    | XNA2200A/Coon     | 10/23 1541/1800        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST               | 001         | E    | 14    | XMR2144A/Lando    | 10/22 1856/2200        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST               | 001         | E    | 15    | XSC2301A/         | 10/22 1703/1900        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST               | 001         | E    | 16    | XSC2303A/Batt. 13 | 10/22 1650/1800        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST               | 001         | E    | 17    | XSN2375A/7506     | 10/23 1644/1700        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Req. from Morgan Hill—Tanker   | 002         | E    | 1     | UNK               |                        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Req. from Morgan Hill—Tanker   | 002         | E    | 2     | UNK               |                        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Req. from Morgan Hill—Tanker   | 002         | E    | 3     | UNK               |                        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Req. from Morgan Hill—Tanker   | 002         | E    | 4     | UNK               |                        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Req. from Morgan Hill—Tanker   | 002         | E    | 5     | UNK               |                        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Req. from Morgan Hill—Tanker   | 002         | E    | 6     | UNK               |                        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Req. from Morgan Hill—Helitack | 002         | E    | 7     | UNK               |                        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Req. from Morgan Hill—Helitack | 002         | E    | 8     | UNK               |                        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Req. from Morgan Hill—Helitack | 002         | E    | 9     | UNK               |                        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Req. from Morgan Hill—Helitack | 002         | E    | 10    | UNK               |                        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Req. from Morgan Hill—Helitack | 002         | E    | 11    | XSA4151C          | 10/23 0949/1330        |
|      |              |        | Raimond Park<br>10th Street & Wood | 7/E2     | Req. from Morgan Hill—Helitack | 002         | E    | 12    | UNK               |                        |



# APPENDIX B

# THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE

| TIME | REQUEST FROM     | NATURE                                   | REPORTING POINT                       | MAP PAGE | ACTION                  | ORDER # XAL | Type | REQ # | UNITS ASSIGNED      | RELEASED DATE/TIME/ETA |
|------|------------------|--|---------------------------------------|----------|-------------------------|-------------|------|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| 1430 | Berkeley/Cates   | 2 Type 1 Engine ST                       | Berkeley H.S.<br>Kittredge & Milvia   | 2/B7     | Region II               |             |      |       |                     |                        |
|      |                  |  | Berkeley H.S.<br>Kittredge & Milvia   | 2/B7     | Type 1 Engine ST        | 001         | E    | 18    | XSN2377A            | 10/24 0917/1200        |
|      |                  |  | Berkeley H.S.<br>Kittredge & Milvia   | 2/B7     | Type 1 Engine ST        | 001         | E    | 19    | XSM2277A            | 10/23 0452/1200        |
| 1540 | Oakland Dispatch | Portable Radios                          | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Region II               |             |      |       |                     |                        |
|      |                  |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood |          | 1 Draw from Radio Cache | 001         | E    | 20    |                     |                        |
|      |                  |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood |          | 1 Draw from Radio Cache | 001         | E    | 21    |                     |                        |
| XX   | Oakland Dispatch | Management Team                          | Request went direct to Region II      |          |                         | 001         | O    | 22    |                     |                        |
| 1746 | Oakland Dispatch | 5 Type 3 Engine ST<br>6 Type 1 Engine ST | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Region II               |             |      |       |                     |                        |
|      |                  |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST        | 001         | E    | 23    | XSC2302A/7          |                        |
|      |                  |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 3 Engine ST        | 001         | E    | 24    | XSA4152C/Haditgan   | 10/23 1005/1300        |
|      |                  |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 3 Engine ST        | 001         | E    | 25    | XSA4153C/Morrison   | 10/23 1021/1300        |
|      |                  |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 3 Engine ST        | 001         | E    | 26    | XTD4250C/Crabtree   | 10/23 1424/1730        |
|      |                  |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 3 Engine ST        | 001         | E    | 27    | XCA4050C/Hunness    | 10/23 1223/1800        |
|      |                  |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 3 Engine ST        | 001         | E    | 28    | XAM4025C/Blankenhel | 10/24 1025/1400        |
|      |                  |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST        | 001         | E    | 29    | XSC2305A/Bristolow  |                        |
|      |                  |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST        | 001         | E    | 30    | XSC2304A/7          |                        |
|      |                  |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST        | 001         | E    | 31    | XMR2803A/Shoeman    | 10/24 1200/1400        |



# THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE

## APPENDIX B

| TIME | REQUEST FROM     | NATURE                                     | REPORTING POINT                      | MAP PAGE | ACTION           | ORDER # XAL | Type | REQ # | UNITS ASSIGNED     | RELEASED DATE/TIME/ETA |
|------|------------------|--|--------------------------------------|----------|------------------|-------------|------|-------|--------------------|------------------------|
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 32    | OES4801A/Ennes     | 10/24 1238/2300        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 33    | OES4802A/Meaker    | 10/24 1238/1100        |
| 2050 | Oakland Dispatch | 20 Type 1 Engine ST<br>10 Type 2 Engine ST | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Region II        |             |      |       |                    |                        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 34    | XMR2145A/7         | 10/24 1025/1100        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 35    | XSM2276A           | 10/23 1112/1230        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 36    | XSM2275A/          | 10/23 1644/1300        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 37    | OES4003A           | 10/24 1238/1600        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 38    | OES4804A           | 10/24 1025/1300        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 39    | XST4202A/Wilkinson | 10/24 1238/1330        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 40    | XSA4154A/Paulsen   | 10/24 1103/1500        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 41    | XSM2278            | 10/23 0852/1100        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 42    | XSC2306A/          |                        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 43    | XCO3025/Winters    | 10/24 -/1500           |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 44    | XGL3050/Jacobs     | 10/23 1203/1700        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 45    | XYU3300C/Tye       | 10/23 1258/1700        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 46    | XSU3225A/Graham    | 10/23 1258/1830        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 47    | XSK3200/Bay        | 10/23 1112/2100        |
|      |                  |  | Ramond Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 48    | XBU3000/Redding    | 10/23 1223/1700        |

| TIME | REQUEST FROM     | NATURE                                | REPORTING POINT                      | MAP PAGE | ACTION           | ORDER # XAL | Type | FED # | UNITS ASSIGNED      | RELEASED DATE/TIME/ETA |
|------|------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------|------------------|-------------|------|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 48    | XBU3001/Rouse       | 10/24 0017/1300        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 50    | XTE3250B/Ebart      | 10/23 1048/1600        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 51    | XSH3150/Tompson     | 10/23 1203/1800        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 52    | XSH3151/Shelp       | 10/23 1005/1500        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 1 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 53    | OESS601B/           | 10/24 1025/1300        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 2 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 54    | OESS002B/Garner     | 10/24 1025/1700        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 2 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 55    | XMA5075A/Born       | 10/23 1223/1800        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 2 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 56    | XMD5125A/Hobson     | 10/23 1541/2300        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 2 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 57    | XMD5126A/Sum        | 10/23 1541/2000        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 2 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 58    | XFR500A/Carte       | 10/23 1112/1600        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 2 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 59    | XTU5161B/Sunderland | 10/22 1822/0100        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 2 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 60    | XKE5025A/Helwig     | 10/23 1048/2000        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 2 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 61    | XTU5151B/McIndenra  | 10/22 1650/2300        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 2 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 62    | XFR5001A/Gleeman    | 10/23 1203/1800        |
|      |                  |                                       | Ramond Park<br>10th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Type 2 Engine ST | 001         | E    | 63    | Unable to assign    |                        |
| 2220 | Oakland Dispatch | 10 Hellack-Planned<br>Need 10/21 Dawn | To be determined                     |          |                  |             |      |       |                     |                        |
|      |                  |                                       | To be determined                     |          |                  |             |      |       |                     |                        |
|      |                  |                                       | To be determined                     |          |                  |             |      |       |                     |                        |
|      |                  |                                       | To be determined                     |          |                  |             |      |       |                     |                        |
|      |                  |                                       | To be determined                     |          |                  |             |      |       |                     |                        |
|      |                  |                                       | Hellack                              |          |                  | 001         | E    | 64    | Unable to Assign    |                        |
|      |                  |                                       | Hellack                              |          |                  | 001         | E    | 65    | Unable to Assign    |                        |
|      |                  |                                       | Hellack                              |          |                  | 001         | E    | 66    | XCC2804A            | 10/24 1228/1300        |
|      |                  |                                       | Hellack                              |          |                  | 001         | E    | 67    | XCG2042A/Scot       | 10/24 -/1300           |
|      |                  |                                       | Hellack                              |          |                  | 001         | E    | 68    | XCG2043A/Claity     | 10/23 1541/1800        |



# THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE

## APPENDIX B

| TIME       | REQUEST FROM      | NATURE   | REPORTING POINT                       | MAP PAGE | ACTION                    | ORDER # XAL | Type | REQ # | UNITS ASSIGNED    | RELEASED DATE/TIME E/ETA |
|------------|-------------------|--|---------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------|-------------|------|-------|-------------------|--------------------------|
|            |                   |  | To be determined                      |          | Helltack                  | 001         | E    | 69    | Unable to Assign  |                          |
|            |                   |  | To be determined                      |          | Helltack                  | 001         | E    | 70    | Unable to Assign  |                          |
|            |                   |  | To be determined                      |          | Helltack                  | 001         | E    | 71    | Unable to Assign  |                          |
|            |                   |  | To be determined                      |          | Helltack                  | 001         | E    | 72    | Unable to Assign  |                          |
|            |                   |  | To be determined                      |          | Helltack                  | 001         | E    | 73    | Unable to Assign  |                          |
| 1309       | Oakland           | Overhead Team Support  | Broadway & Hwy 24                     | 6/B7     |                           |             |      |       |                   |                          |
|            |                   |  | Broadway & Hwy 24                     | 6/B7     | San Leandro FD            | 001         | O    | D     | San Leandro Chief |                          |
|            |                   |  | Broadway & Hwy 24                     | 6/B7     | Piedmont FD               | 001         | O    | E     | Piedmont Capt.    |                          |
|            |                   |  | Broadway & Hwy 24                     | 6/B7     | Dougherty Authority       | 001         | O    | F     | DRFA Chief        |                          |
| 10/21 0304 | Berkeley          | 2 Type 1 Engine ST<br>Planned Need 0800                                  | Berkeley H.S.<br>Kittredge & Milvia   | 2/B7     | Region II                 |             |      |       |                   |                          |
|            |                   |  | Berkeley H.S.<br>Kittredge & Milvia   | 2/B7     | Type 1 Engine Strike Team | 001         | E    | 74    | XPL4125A/Wright   | 10/24 1238/1600          |
|            |                   |  | Berkeley H.S.<br>Kittredge & Milvia   | 2/B7     | Type 1 Engine Strike Team | 001         | E    | 75    | X602351A/Camp     | 10/23 1541/1730          |
| 10/20 2300 | Oakland Disp      | 2 Mechanics 1-10/20<br>1-10/21   | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Request from Region II    | 001         |      |       | Late Entry        |                          |
|            |                   |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Fire Service Mechanic     | 001         | O    | 76    | Requested 10/20   |                          |
|            |                   |  | Ramondl Park<br>18th. Street and Wood | 7/E2     | Fire Service Mechanic     | 001         | O    | 77    | Requested 10/21   |                          |
| 10/24 1100 | OES A/C Beckstrom | 10 Engines and 2 Leaders<br>for Overhaul-Dispatch<br>as single resources | Oakland Staging NAS Alameda           |          | Region II                 |             |      |       |                   |                          |
|            |                   |  | Oakland Staging NAS Alameda           |          | STL                       | 001         | O    | 78    | STL Tunnel 1      |                          |
|            |                   |  | Oakland Staging NAS Alameda           |          | Type I Engines            | 001         | E    | 79    | OES223            |                          |
|            |                   |  | Oakland Staging NAS Alameda           |          | Type I Engines            | 001         | E    | 80    | OES224            |                          |
|            |                   |  | Oakland Staging NAS Alameda           |          | Type I Engines            | 001         | E    | 81    | OES226            |                          |
|            |                   |  | Oakland Staging NAS Alameda           |          | Type I Engines            | 001         | E    | 82    | OES234            |                          |
|            |                   |  | Oakland Staging NAS Alameda           |          | Type I Engines            | 001         | E    | 83    | OES236            |                          |
|            |                   |  | Oakland Staging NAS Alameda           |          | STL                       | 001         | O    | 84    | STL Tunnel 2      |                          |
|            |                   |  | Oakland Staging NAS Alameda           |          | Type 1 Engines            | 001         | E    | 85    | OES215            |                          |
|            |                   |  | Oakland Staging NAS Alameda           |          | Type 1 Engines            | 001         | E    | 86    | OES216            |                          |



## APPENDIX B

# THE OAKLAND TUNNEL FIRE

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## DIRECTORY OF NARROW AND DEAD-ENDED STREETS IN THE OAKLAND HILLS AREA

| STREET NAME       | NARROW | DEAD END |
|-------------------|--------|----------|
| ABBOTT DRIVE      | X      |          |
| ABERFOIL          | X      |          |
| AITKEN DRIVE      | X      |          |
| ALBERT            |        | X        |
| ALHAMBRA AVENUE   | X      |          |
| ALMA PLACE        | X      |          |
| ALMADEN LANE      | X      | X        |
| ALPINE TERRANCE   |        | X        |
| ALTA VISTA        | X      |          |
| ALTAMONT AVENUE   |        | X        |
| ALTURA PLACE      |        | X        |
| ALVARADO          | X      |          |
| ALVINGROOM COURT  |        | X        |
| AMITO             | X      |          |
| ARCADIA AVENUE    | X      |          |
| ARDMORE           | X      |          |
| ARIMO             | X      |          |
| ARMANINO COURT    | X      | X        |
| ARMOUR            | X      | X        |
| ASCOT PLACE       |        | X        |
| ASHMOUNT          | X      |          |
| AUBURN STREET     | X      |          |
| AVSEON AVENUE     |        | X        |
| BACON ROAD        | X      |          |
| BAGSHOTTE         | X      |          |
| BALBOA            | X      |          |
| BALFOUR           | X      |          |
| BALSAM            | X      | X        |
| BANNING DRIVE     | X      |          |
| BANTRY AVENUE     | X      |          |
| BARMEID PLACE     | X      | X        |
| BARNER PLACE      |        | X        |
| BARROWS           | X      |          |
| BATES             | X      |          |
| BEAU FOREST DRIVE | X      |          |
| BEMIS             | X      | X        |
| BENEVIDES         | X      | X        |
| BENTON            | X      |          |
| BESITO            | X      | X        |
| BIRCH COURT       |        | X        |
| BLACHFORD COURT   | X      | X        |
| BLAIR AVE         | X      | X        |
| BOWLES            |        | X        |
| BOYD AVENUE       | X      |          |
| BRANDON           | X      |          |
| BRIAR CLIFF ROAD  | X      |          |
| BRIDGE            | X      |          |
| BRIDGEVIEW        | X      | X        |
| BRISTOL           | X      |          |
| BROADMOOR VIEW    | X      | X        |
| BROOKSIDE         | X      |          |
| BROOKWOOD         | X      | X        |



|                      |   |   |
|----------------------|---|---|
| BRUNELL              | X | X |
| BRUNELL PLACE        |   | X |
| BRUNS COURT          |   | X |
| BUCKEYE AVENUE       | X |   |
| BUCKINGHAM           | X |   |
| BUENA VENTURA AVENUE | X |   |
| BUENA VISTA          | X |   |
| BURDECK COURT        |   | X |
| BURDECK DRIVE        | X | X |
| BURGOS AVENUE        | X |   |
| BURKHALTER AVENUE    |   | X |
| BURLINGTON           |   | X |
| BURR STREET          | X | X |
| BURTON DRIVE         | X |   |
| BUTTERS DRIVE        | X |   |
| CABOT DRIVE          | X | X |
| CALDECOTT LANE       |   | X |
| CALDWELL             | X |   |
| CALMAR               | X |   |
| CALODEN              |   | X |
| CALODEN LANE         | X | X |
| CALVERT COURT        | X | X |
| CAMELFORD PLACE      | X |   |
| CAMELIA PLACE        |   | X |
| CAMERON              |   | X |
| CAMINO LRENADA       |   | X |
| CANNON VIEW LANE     | X |   |
| CANON                | X |   |
| CAPRICORN AVENUE     | X |   |
| CAPTAINS COVE        | X |   |
| CARISBROOK DRIVE     | X |   |
| CARISBROOK LANE      |   | X |
| CARLSTON             | X |   |
| CATHY LANE           | X | X |
| CAVENDISH LANE       | X | X |
| CHABOLYN TERRACE     | X |   |
| CHABOT COURT         |   | X |
| CHABOT ROAD          | X |   |
| CHAMBERS LANE        | X |   |
| CHANCELLOR PLACE     | X |   |
| CHAPPEL PLACE        | X | X |
| CHARING CROSS ROAD   | X |   |
| CHATWORTH COURT      |   | X |
| CHELSEA DRIVE        | X |   |
| CHELSEA COURT        |   | X |
| CHELTON LANE         | X |   |
| CHICO COURT          | X |   |
| CHIMNEY ROCK         | X | X |
| CIRCLE HILL DRIVE    | X |   |
| CLARENDON CRESCENT   | X |   |
| CLARKE STREET        | X |   |
| CLIFFLAND            | X |   |
| CLIFTON STREET       |   | X |
| CLIPPER HILL         | X |   |

|                  |     |   |
|------------------|-----|---|
| CLIVE AVENUE     | X   |   |
| COLBOURN PLACE   | X   |   |
| COLTON PLACE     | X   | X |
| COLUMBIAN DRIVE  |     | X |
| CONRAD COURT     | X   | X |
| CONTRA COSTA     | X   | X |
| CORTEREA AVENUE  |     | X |
| CORTEZ COURT     | NTA |   |
| COTTER COURT     |     | X |
| COVINGTON STREET |     | X |
| CRANE WAY        | X   |   |
| CRANFORD WAY     |     | X |
| CREED            | X   | X |
| CREIGHTON WAY    |     | X |
| CRESCENT         |     | X |
| CREST            | X   |   |
| CRESTVIEW DRIVE  | X   |   |
| CROSS ROAD       | X   |   |
| CROWN AVE        | X   |   |
| CUMBERLAND WAY   |     | X |
| CUNNINGHAM       | X   |   |
| DARNBY DRIVE     | X   |   |
| DARTMOUTH        | X   |   |
| DAVENPORT        |     | X |
| DENTON PLACE     | X   |   |
| DEVON WAY        | X   |   |
| DIABLO           | X   |   |
| DIAS PLACE       |     | X |
| DINGLEY          | X   |   |
| DOLORES          | X   |   |
| DONCASTER PLACE  | X   | X |
| DORIS PLACE      | X   | X |
| DORISA AVENUE    | X   |   |
| DOROTHY PLACE    | X   | X |
| DOVER            |     | X |
| DOWNEY           |     | X |
| DRAKE LANE       | X   | X |
| DRAKE PLACE      | X   | X |
| DREYER           | X   | X |
| DURY COURT       | X   |   |
| DWIGHT PLACE     | X   | X |
| DWIGHT WAY       | X   |   |
| EARL STREET      |     | X |
| EASTWOOD COURT   |     | X |
| EDENVALE PLACE   | X   |   |
| EL CAMINITO      | X   |   |
| EL PATIO         |     | X |
| ELBERT           | X   | X |
| ELDERBERRY DRIVE | X   |   |
| ELMONTE AVENUE   |     | X |
| ELROD            |     | X |
| ELSTON COURT     |     | X |
| ELVERTON         | X   |   |
| ELVESSA          | X   | X |

|                    |   |   |
|--------------------|---|---|
| ENCINA WAY         | X |   |
| ENGLEWOOD          | X | X |
| ENOS               |   | X |
| ENTRADA            | X | X |
| ESCHER             | X |   |
| ESCHER DRIVE       | X |   |
| ESTATES            | X |   |
| ETTERICK           | X | X |
| EUCALYPTUS ROAD    | X |   |
| EVERETT            | X |   |
| EVERGREEN LANE     | X | X |
| EVIREL PLACE       | X |   |
| EXETER DRIVE       | X |   |
| FAIRVIEW           | X |   |
| FAIRWAY AVENUE     | X |   |
| FALLBROOK          | X | X |
| FARALLON           | X | X |
| FERNHOFF COURT     | X | X |
| FERNHOFF ROAD      | X |   |
| FIELD STREET       | X |   |
| FLEET              | X |   |
| FLINTRIDGE AVENUE  | X | X |
| FLORENCE AVE       |   | X |
| FLORENCE TERRACE   | X |   |
| FLORIO STREET      | X |   |
| FORESTLAND         | X |   |
| FRYE               | X | X |
| GALVIN             | X |   |
| GASPAR DRIVE       |   | X |
| GELSTON            | X | X |
| GENOA              |   | X |
| GIRVAN DRIVE       | X |   |
| GIRVIN DRIVE       | X |   |
| GLEN               | X | X |
| GLENDOME CIRCLE    | X |   |
| GLENDORA           | X |   |
| GLENN OAK          | X |   |
| GLENVIEW           | X |   |
| GLENWOOD           | X | X |
| GOLDEN GATE        | X |   |
| GOULDIN ROAD       |   | X |
| GRAE EAGLE         | X | X |
| GRAHAM PLACE       | X | X |
| GRANDVIEW          | X |   |
| GRASS VALLEY COURT |   | X |
| GRAVATT            | X |   |
| GREENLY DRIVE      |   | X |
| GRIFFIN            | X | X |
| GRISBORNE AVENUE   | X |   |
| GROSVENOR          | X |   |
| GUIDO STREET       | X |   |
| GUNN               |   | X |
| GWIN ROAD          | X | X |
| GYPSY LANE         | X | X |



|                    |   |   |
|--------------------|---|---|
| HADDON             |   | X |
| HAMPEL             | X |   |
| HARBOR VIEW        |   | X |
| HARBORD COURT      |   | X |
| HAVERHILL DRIVE    | X |   |
| HEAFY ROAD         | X |   |
| HEATHER RIDGE      | X |   |
| HELLMAN STREET     |   | X |
| HEMLOCK LANE       | X |   |
| HERITAGE PLACE     | X | X |
| HILL ROAD          | X |   |
| HILLCROFT CIRCLE   | X |   |
| HILLMONT DRIVE     | X |   |
| HILLSIDE STREET    |   | X |
| HILLTOP CRESCENT   |   | X |
| HILLWOOD           |   | X |
| HOLMAN ROAD        | X |   |
| HOLYROOD MANOR     |   | X |
| HOMEGLEN LANE      | X |   |
| HOOD               |   | X |
| HOWELL STREET      | X |   |
| HUBERT             | X |   |
| INDIAN             |   | X |
| IRONWOOD           | X | X |
| IRWIN              |   | X |
| JACQUELINE TERRACE | X | X |
| JEAN               | X |   |
| JOHNSTON           |   | X |
| JORDAN             | X |   |
| KENILWORTH         | X |   |
| KERRIGAN           | X | X |
| KESWICK COURT      | X |   |
| KEY COURT          |   | X |
| KIMBERLY COURT     |   | X |
| KITCHENER          | X | X |
| KLAMATH            | X | X |
| KROHN LANE         | X | X |
| LAIRD AVENUE       |   | X |
| LAMP STREET        | X |   |
| LANE COURT         |   | X |
| LARKSPUR           | X | X |
| LARRY LANE         | X |   |
| LAS AROMAS         |   | X |
| LAS VEGAS AVENUE   |   | X |
| LATIMER            | X |   |
| LAWLOR STREET      | X | X |
| LEAMONT COURT      |   | X |
| LEO WAY            | X | X |
| LEONA              | X | X |
| LEXFORD PLACE      | X | X |
| LINCOLN WAY        | X |   |
| LIVE OAK ROAD      | X |   |
| LOCHARD            | X | X |
| LOCKSLEY           | X |   |

|                       |   |   |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| LONGCROFT DRIVE       | X |   |
| LONGRIDGE             | X |   |
| LONGWALK DRIVE        | X |   |
| LOWRY                 |   | X |
| MAGELLAN              | X |   |
| MAIDEN LANE EXTENSION |   | X |
| MAJESTIC AVENUE       | X |   |
| MALL COURT            |   | X |
| MANCHESTER            | X |   |
| MANDALAY              | X |   |
| MANDANA CIRCLE        |   | X |
| MANOA STREET          | X |   |
| MARDEN LANE           |   | X |
| MARGARIDO             | X | X |
| MARK                  |   | X |
| MARLBOROUGH TERRACE   | X |   |
| MARSH PLACE           |   | X |
| MARVIN COURT          |   | X |
| MASTLANDS             | X |   |
| MATHIEU               | X |   |
| MAURITANIA AVENUE     | X |   |
| MAYDON COURT          |   | X |
| MAYNARD AVENUE        | X |   |
| MCDONNELL             | X | X |
| MCGURRIN ROAD         | X | X |
| MELVILLE DRIVE        | X |   |
| MELVILLE LANE         | X |   |
| MELVIN ROAD           | X | X |
| MENDENHALL DRIVE      | X | X |
| MERLIN COURT          |   | X |
| MERRIEWOOD CIRCLE     | X |   |
| MERRIEWOOD DRIVE      | X |   |
| MIAMI COURT           |   | X |
| MICHIGAN AVENUE       | X |   |
| MIRA VISTA            | X |   |
| MISSION HILLS         | X | X |
| MOKELUMNE             | X |   |
| MONTEREY              | X |   |
| MONTWOOD WAY          |   | X |
| MOORE                 | X |   |
| MORLEY                | X |   |
| MORNING STAR COURT    | X |   |
| MORRILL COURT         |   | X |
| MOTT PLACE            | X |   |
| MOUNTAIN GATE WAY     | X |   |
| MOUNTAIN VALLEY       | X | X |
| MOUNTAIN VIEW         | X | X |
| MOYER PLACE           |   | X |
| NAIROBI PLACE         |   | X |
| NORFOLK               | X |   |
| NORMAN LANE           | X |   |
| NORTH STREET          |   | X |
| NORTHVALE             | X |   |
| NORTHWOOD COURT       | X | X |

|                               |   |   |
|-------------------------------|---|---|
| NORTON                        | X | X |
| NORWOOD                       | X |   |
| NOTTINGHAM DRIVE              | X |   |
| NOYO                          | X |   |
| OAKHILL ROAD                  | X |   |
| OAKWOOD                       | X |   |
| OBSERVATORY                   | X | X |
| OCCIDENTAL                    |   | X |
| OCEAN VIEW                    | X |   |
| OLD REDWOOD ROAD              | X |   |
| OUTLOOK DRIVE                 | X |   |
| OVERLAKE                      |   | X |
| OVERMOOR                      | X |   |
| PALI COURT                    |   | X |
| PALOMA                        | X |   |
| PAMPAS                        |   | X |
| PANAMA COURT                  | X |   |
| PANORAMIC WAY                 | X |   |
| PARAMOUNT                     | X |   |
| PARK LANE                     | X |   |
| PARTIDGE AVENUE               | X |   |
| PELHAM COURT                  | X | X |
| PERALTA OAKS COURT            |   | X |
| PERALTA OAKS DRIVE            |   | X |
| PERTH PLACE                   | X |   |
| PINEHAVEN ROAD                | X |   |
| PINEHILL COURT                | X |   |
| PINENEEDLE                    | X |   |
| PINHILL LANE                  | X |   |
| PLEASANT VALLEY COURT - NORTH |   | X |
| PLEASANT VALLEY COURT - SOUTH |   | X |
| PORTAL                        | X |   |
| QUIETWOOD                     | X |   |
| RAND                          | X |   |
| RANDOLPH                      | X |   |
| RAVENWOOD LANE                |   | X |
| REINHART                      |   | X |
| RETTIG                        | X |   |
| RICH                          | X |   |
| RIDGEMOOR ROAD                | X | X |
| RIFLE LANE                    | X |   |
| RIO VISTA                     |   | X |
| RISPIN                        | X |   |
| ROANOKE                       | X |   |
| ROBINHOOD WAY                 | X | X |
| ROBINSON DRIVE                | X |   |
| ROBLE ROAD                    | X |   |
| ROBLEY TERRACE                | X |   |
| ROCKRIDGE                     | X | X |
| ROCKWELL STREET               | X |   |
| RODERICK                      | X |   |
| ROSAL                         | X |   |
| ROSEMOUNT                     | X |   |
| ROSS COURT                    | X |   |



|                    |   |   |
|--------------------|---|---|
| ROSS STREET        | X |   |
| RUBIN DRIVE        | X |   |
| RUTHLAND ROAD      | X | X |
| RYDAL COURT        | X | X |
| SAGE ROAD          | X | X |
| SAMARIA LANE       | X |   |
| SAN LUIS           | X | X |
| SANDBORN           | X |   |
| SANTA RAY          | X |   |
| SANTA RAY          | X |   |
| SARAZEN AVENUE     |   | X |
| SARONI COURT       | X | X |
| SCARBOROUGH DRIVE  | X |   |
| SCARBROUGH         | X |   |
| SCOTT ROAD         | X |   |
| SCOUT ROAD         | X |   |
| SENECA STREET      | X | X |
| SEQUOYAH ROAD      | X |   |
| SERENO CIRCLE      | X |   |
| SHADOW MOUNTAIN    | X |   |
| SHELDON            |   | X |
| SHEPPARD           | X |   |
| SHERIDAN ROAD      | X | X |
| SHERWICK           | X |   |
| SHERWOOD DRIVE     | X |   |
| SHIRLEY DRIVE      |   | X |
| SHORT HILL ROAD    | X |   |
| SIGOURNEY AVENUE   | X | X |
| SILER              | X | X |
| SIMS DRIVE         |   | X |
| SIMSON STREET      | X |   |
| SKYWAY LANE        | X | X |
| SLATER             | X |   |
| SLYHOWE ROAD       |   | X |
| SNOWDEN            |   | X |
| SOBRANTE           | X |   |
| SOMERSET ROAD      |   | X |
| SOTELO AVENUE      |   | X |
| SOUTHWOOD COURT    | X | X |
| SPRINGFIELD STREET |   | X |
| ST. ANDREWS ROAD   | X |   |
| STARKVILLE         | X | X |
| STELLA STREET      |   | X |
| STEPHENS WAY       | X |   |
| STERLING DRIVE     | X |   |
| STONEWALL ROAD     | X | X |
| STRATFORD          |   | X |
| SUNKIST DRIVE      | X |   |
| SUNNYHILLS         | X |   |
| SYLHOWE            | X | X |
| SYLVAN WAY         | X |   |
| TALBOT AVENUE      | X |   |
| TAMARISK           | X | X |
| TANGLEWOOD         | X |   |

|                   |   |   |
|-------------------|---|---|
| TATE TERRACE      |   | X |
| TAURUS AVENUE     | X | X |
| TERALYNN COURT    | X |   |
| TERRABELLA PLACE  | X |   |
| TERRABELLA WAY    | X |   |
| THACKERAY DRIVE   | X |   |
| THE TURN          | X | X |
| THERMAL STREET    | X |   |
| THORNDALE         | X |   |
| THOUSAND OAKS     | X |   |
| TOTTERDELL STREET | X |   |
| TRESTLE GLEN      | X |   |
| TRINIDAD          | X |   |
| TULLY PLACE       | X |   |
| TURNER            |   | X |
| TURNLEY AVENUE    | X | X |
| TURTEL CREEK      | X | X |
| TWIN OAKS WAY     | X |   |
| TYSON             | X | X |
| UNDERHILLS        | X |   |
| UPLANDS           | X |   |
| URANUS AVENUE     | X |   |
| VALE              | X | X |
| VALLE VISTA       | X |   |
| VALLEY VIEW       | X |   |
| VAN SICKLEN       |   | X |
| VETERAN WAY       |   | X |
| VICENTE PLACE     | X |   |
| VIEW PLACE        |   | X |
| VILLANOVA LANE    | X |   |
| VIRGO ROAD        | X | X |
| VISTA             | X |   |
| WARFIELD          | X |   |
| WAWONA            | X | X |
| WEAVER PLACE      | X |   |
| WESTFIELD WAY     |   | X |
| WESTMORELAND      | X |   |
| WESTOVER DRIVE    | X |   |
| WESTVIEW DRIVE    | X | X |
| WESTVIEW PLACE    | X | X |
| WHITE COURT       |   | X |
| WHITTLE AVENUE    |   | X |
| WICKSON           | X |   |
| WILD CURRANT      | X |   |
| WILDING LANE      | X | X |
| WILLARD PLACE     | X | X |
| WILTON DRIVE      | X | X |
| WINTHROPE STREET  | X | X |
| WOOD COURT        |   | X |
| WOOD DRIVE        | X |   |
| WOODCLIFF COURT   |   | X |
| WOODROW           | X |   |
| WRENN STREET      | X |   |
| YANKEE HILL       |   | X |

|                |   |   |
|----------------|---|---|
| YORKSHIRE      | X | X |
| ZIEGLER STREET | X | X |
| ZINN DRIVE     | X | X |
| 104TH AVENUE   |   | X |
| 105TH AVENUE   |   | X |
| 61ST STREET    | X |   |
| 86TH AVENUE    |   | X |
| 87TH AVENUE    |   | X |
| 92ND AVENUE    |   | X |



**AGENCIES AND COUNTY JURISDICTIONS WHICH WERE INVOLVED IN THE FIRE**

This is a partial listing of federal, state, and county agencies involved in the fire.

Alameda County  
Amador County  
Berkeley  
Burling  
Butte County  
Calaveras County  
California Department of Forestry (CDF)  
Colusa County  
Contra Costa County  
Contra Costa County crew  
East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD)  
East Bay Regional Parks (EBRP)  
Emergency Medical Services (EMS)  
Fresno County  
Glenn County  
Kern County  
Kings County  
Lawrence Livermore Berkeley (LLB)  
Livermore  
Madera County  
Mariposa County  
Marin County  
Merced County  
Moraga  
Napa County  
Naval Air Station (NAS) Alameda  
Oakland  
Office of Emergency Services (OES)  
Orinda  
Piedmont  
Placer County  
Sacramento County  
San Francisco County  
San Joaquin County  
San Mateo County  
Santa Clara County  
Santa Cruz  
Shasta County  
Siskyou County  
Solano County

Sonoma County  
Stanislaus County  
Sutter County  
Tehama County  
Travis  
Treasure Island  
Tulare County  
Tualumne County  
United States Forestry Service (USFS)  
United States Forestry Service (USFS) Corrections  
Yolo County  
Yosemite  
Yuba County

**ADDITIONAL STRIKE TEAMS UNDER CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY (CDF)**


This California Department of Forestry (CDF) listing includes hand-crew counts.

| <b>Strike Team #</b> | <b>Start Date</b> | <b># Crew</b> |
|----------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| 9110C – Type 3       | 10/20             |               |
| 9170C – Type 3       | 10/20             |               |
| 9182G                | 10/20             | 48            |
| 9183G                | 10/20             | 40            |
| 9478G                | 10/20             | 48            |
| 9480G – Type 3       | 10/20             | 50            |
| 9488G                | 10/20             | 49            |



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## MAP OF THE OAKLAND FIRE DEPARTMENT STATIONS



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